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Abstract 
This thesis examines the use of cross applications in civil protection order proceedings 
in New South Wales (NSW) (known as Apprehended Domestic Violence Orders, 
ADVOs). A cross application takes place when one person in an existing or former 
intimate relationship, usually the woman, applies for an ADVO and sometime 
afterwards the defendant in that originating application, usually the man, seeks an 
ADVO against the first person. The focus on cross applications provides a means to 
investigate the nature of men‟s and women‟s competing allegations about domestic 
violence, and to explore the way in which professionals working within the ADVO 
system approach, and seek to unravel, these competing claims. This thesis draws on 
the extensive debate within the sociological literature about „what is domestic 
violence‟ and whether domestic violence is gendered in its perpetration. This debate 
has been paid scant attention in the legal literature. This thesis examines the 
assumptions underpinning the legal definitions and understandings of domestic 
violence in the civil protection order system, with reference to these theoretical debates 
about „what is domestic violence‟ and „what counts as domestic violence‟. To do so it 
draws on empirical work: semi-structured in-depth interviews with women involved in 
cross applications and key professionals working in the field, documentary analysis of 
court files, and observations of court proceedings. The key contribution of this thesis to 
this literature is threefold: (1) it explores the question of gender perpetration through 
the investigation of official data (a data source little explored in debates about gender 
and domestic violence), (2) it combines qualitative and quantitative methods in a single 
study, and (3) it extends questions about the gendered perpetration of domestic 
violence to the legal arena (in particular the prime legal arena that responds to 
domestic violence in NSW, the ADVO system, a system ostensibly designed to better 
respond to domestic violence). 
This thesis found that, like other studies in this field, the analysis of quantitative data 
alone reveals few differences between the types of violence men and women are 
alleged to use against their intimate partners. However when supplemented by 
qualitative data differences started to emerge particularly for men who lodged their 
application second in time. This qualitative analysis reveals not only that male second 
applicants appeared to make claims of a different nature, but that some men appeared 
to use the ADVO process to undermine women‟s claims for legal protection. The 
differences that emerged between men and women‟s alleged experiences of domestic 
violence resonated with feminist understandings of domestic violence that highlight its 
ii 
function of control and the repetitive, cumulative environment in which violence is 
perpetrated by men against women. 
While the study focussed on cross applications, its findings reveal a number of issues 
of concern for the ADVO system more broadly: its focus on incidents, the poor quality 
of complaint narratives, the brevity of court proceedings and the emphasis on 
settlement. These features undermine the progressive potential of the ADVO 
legislation to capture more than single incidents of largely physical violence. This was 
further compounded by the fact that while the professionals interviewed articulated 
broad definitions of domestic violence, this tended to be lost when responding to 
practice-orientated questions (here professionals returned to incident-based 
definitions). Perhaps more significantly the defining feature of domestic violence as a 
mechanism of control is not articulated in the NSW legislation, and hence (not 
unsurprisingly) was generally not articulated in the complaint narratives examined in 
this thesis. Yet control was the dominant way in which the women interviewed 
described their relationship with their former partner. The failure of complaint 
narratives to reflect the dimension of control, combined with the failure of key 
professionals to give sufficient emphasis to control in their practice under the ADVO 
legislation, an absence highlighted through the focus on cross applications, is an issue 
of concern for the ADVO system generally. This is important given the growing 
recognition in the research literature of the fundamental nature of control to the 
experience of domestic violence, particularly women‟s experiences of domestic 
violence. 
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1. Introduction 
1. Olivia and John 
In September 2002 the police attended a domestic violence
1
 incident involving a 
de facto couple, Olivia and John. In response the police applied for a civil 
protection order, known in New South Wales (NSW) as an Apprehended 
Domestic Violence Order (ADVO),
2
 to protect Olivia from John. At the same 
time they applied for an ADVO to protect John from Olivia. The text of the 
applications for both parties was exactly the same. It reads, in full: 
Parties have been arguing with each other over the last 2 days. Yesterday both 
parties had assaulted each other. Tonight, around 5.30pm further assaults took 
place by both parties. [John] assaulted [Olivia] by throwing her against [a] wall, 
choking and hitting her. [Olivia] assaulted [John] by scratching him severely all 
over his body. Both parties charged with assault. 
This representation of the violence suggests that the use of violence is mutual – 
that at some level Olivia and John are as „bad as each other‟ and hence require 
legal protection from each other for domestic violence.  
Six days later both ADVO applications were listed before the Local Court. At 
court Olivia consented to an ADVO being made against her to protect John, 
without making any admissions
3
 regarding the allegations contained in the 
complaint quoted above. This ADVO provided that Olivia must not intimidate, 
stalk, „assault, molest, harass, threaten or otherwise interfere‟ with John for 12 
months. If she was to contravene these terms she could be charged with a 
criminal offence and liable to a fine and/or imprisonment.
4
 
On the same day at court, the ADVO application to protect Olivia from John was 
withdrawn as it transpired that she had obtained an ADVO against him some five 
months earlier. That ADVO protected Olivia for 12 months in similar terms to 
                                                          
1 The different terminology used to describe domestic violence, and the rationale for using this term, are discussed later in 
this chapter. 
2 Civil protection orders have different names in different jurisdictions (protection order, restraining order, injunction). In 
NSW they are generically known as Apprehended Violence Orders (AVOs), of which there are two types: ADVOs for 
people who have a „domestic relationship‟; and Apprehended Personal Violence Orders (APVOs) where the parties have 
no such relationship (eg work colleagues and neighbours). 
3 At the time of the fieldwork this was Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562BA(2), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal 
Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s78(2). 
4 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562I, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s14. 
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the ADVO that Olivia consented to, outlined above. However, a further condition 
was added to Olivia‟s ADVO which prohibited John from entering or loitering 
around her home. 
In addition to applying for mutual ADVOs, the police charged both parties with 
offences arising from the incident. John was charged with maliciously damaging 
or destroying property, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, two counts of 
common assault, and contravening an ADVO.
5
 Olivia was charged with assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm, and maliciously damaging or destroying 
property.
6 
The charge fact sheet for the offences allegedly perpetrated by John 
provides greater information about what took place during the incident: 
[John] punched [Olivia] with his fist onto her left kidney area. [He then] 
commenced walking out of the bedroom, whilst he was doing so he punched the 
door causing damage to it. [He] woke the children and made them scream.  
 
 [Olivia] ran towards [John] and grabbed him by his collar of his shirt and she 
… scratched him at this time. [Olivia] said, „Why do you do this, why do the 
children have to put up with this. I am sick of you smashing my stuff and how 
do you like it.‟ [Olivia] walked up towards the stereo and pushed her foot on 
it causing it to crack.  
[John] grabbed [Olivia] with his two hands onto her shoulders and threw her to 
the ground. [John] had a tight grip [on Olivia‟s] neck causing her to not 
breath[e]. [John] released [her] neck and stepped away from [her].  
 
 [Olivia] got up from the ground and said, „are you trying to kill me?‟ [and she 
verbally] abused [John].  
[John] said, „fuck you, you[‟re], dead.‟ He grabbed [Olivia] and threw her onto 
the ground. He pushed [her] head back and forth onto the ground, 
 
 whilst this was occurring [Olivia] was swinging her hands at him to protect 
herself. 
[John] leant over [Olivia‟s] body and started to head butt her onto the head area. 
… [Olivia] sustained lumps and bruises to her head and ear … [John] said, „If 
DoCS take my kids, your[‟re] a dead cunt and get off the floor you fucker.‟ At this 
stage [Olivia] was vomiting blood from her mouth area and could not get up 
from the floor. [John] tried to wipe off the blood from the floor. He said, „Get up 
like nothing has happened, get onto the lounge.‟ [Olivia] had trouble getting up 
from the ground. [John] grabbed a blanket and placed it onto [Olivia‟s] head and 
later placed his hands over the [her] mouth.  
 
 [Olivia] tried to release herself from [John], whilst this was happening 
[Olivia] bit his finger for him to let go. [John] was screaming for [Olivia] to 
get her mouth of[f] his finger… 
                                                          
5 Respectively Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss195, 59, 61 and then Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562I, now Crimes (Domestic 
and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s14. 
6 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss59 and 195. 
3 
 
This second, more detailed, version of the incident also produced by the police 
provides quite a different account of the events that led the police to attend the 
residence. It indicates that John was utilising more serious, aggressive, frequent 
and repetitive violence against Olivia, than she used against him – indeed 
violence that caused injury. In comparison while we certainly see that Olivia 
used violence, it was exercised in direct response to what John was doing. We 
can sense Olivia‟s anger at John‟s violence against her and there is some sense of 
frustration that this is not the first time she has experienced violence directed at 
her and her belongings, nor the first time that the children have witnessed its 
occurrence. Indeed we know that some five months prior to this incident, there 
had been another incident that led the police to obtain an ADVO to protect 
Olivia. 
Have Olivia and John both perpetrated domestic violence (albeit of varying 
degrees) simply because they have used violence against the other? Or has only 
one party (John) perpetrated domestic violence? If we take the latter approach, 
how should we understand Olivia‟s actions and behaviour? What makes 
domestic violence different from other acts of violence between intimate 
heterosexual partners? 
I present Olivia and John‟s story – not for the numerous questions it raises about 
the police response – but rather for the way it illustrates that in order to 
understand the nature of domestic violence we need to know more than simply 
„who did what to whom‟ and „how many times‟, as is outlined briefly in the 
ADVO complaint narrative, before labels such as „domestic violence‟, 
„perpetrator‟ and „victim‟ are deployed. 
2. This thesis 
This thesis examines the use of cross applications in NSW ADVO proceedings 
involving current or former intimate heterosexual partners.
7
 
A cross application takes place when one person in a current/former intimate 
relationship, usually the woman, applies for an ADVO and sometime afterwards
8
 
                                                          
7 The focus on heterosexual relationships is explained later in this chapter. 
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the defendant in that originating application, usually the man, seeks an ADVO 
against the first person.
9
  
Person A (complainant ADVO 1) v Person B (defendant ADVO 1) 
 
Person B (complainant ADVO 2) v Person A (defendant ADVO 2) 
In a small number of cases both ADVO applications may be generated at the 
same time. In this thesis these are referred to as dual applications, and are a 
special category of cross application.
10
 The case study of Olivia and John is an 
example of a dual application. 
Lawyers and women‟s services in NSW have raised concerns about the incidence 
and nature of cross applications for over a decade.
11
 Similar concerns have been 
raised in other Australian jurisdictions
12
 and in other countries, particularly in the 
United States of America (USA).
13
 There are no official statistics available on 
the incidence of cross applications in NSW; very little is known about when 
cross applications are lodged, whether there are differences in the types of 
allegations made by men and women, and how these competing allegations are 
resolved by the legal system. Two studies have focused on cross applications, 
both unpublished papers conducted by then undergraduate law students.
14
 Cross 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 The definition of a cross application is discussed later in this chapter. 
9 This gender breakdown is supported by the data gathered in this thesis, see Chapter 6. 
10 See Chapter 8. 
11 These concerns were raised with the author during her practice as a solicitor with the then Domestic Violence 
Advocacy Service, a NSW community legal centre, and with the various Women‟s Domestic Violence Court Assistance 
Schemes (WDVCASs) and others during the conduct of this research. This concern is also demonstrated by the Women‟s 
Legal Resources Centre (WLRC) preliminary research on this topic: Cross Applications in Apprehended Violence Order 
Proceedings in Four Local Courts in NSW (1999) unpublished paper. Copy on file with author. See also submissions to 
the NSW Ombudsman, Domestic Violence: Improving Police Practice (2006) at 21; and NSWLRC, Apprehended 
Violence Orders (2003) at [11.6]-[11.17]. 
12 Victoria: Melinda Walker, „Interpreting the Figures: Increases in Women‟s Violence or Just More Masculinist Legal 
Tactics?‟ (1995) 5 Australian Feminist Law Journal 123; and Anna Stewart, „Who are the Respondents of Domestic 
Violence Protection Orders?‟ (2000) 33 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 77. Queensland: 
Queensland Domestic Violence Council, „Cross Applications: The Protection Order Backlash‟ (1993) 6(4) Shattering the 
Silence: Official Newsletter of the Domestic Violence Resource Centre 1. Western Australia: Department of the Attorney 
General, A Review of Part 2 Division 3A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (2008) at 35. 
13 In the USA the focus has been on mutual orders: see Elizabeth Topliffe, „Why Civil Protection Orders are Effective 
Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protection Orders are Not‟ (1992) 67 Indiana Law Journal 1039; Joan 
Zorza, „What is Wrong with Mutual Orders of Protection?‟ (1999): <http://www.scvan.org/mutual_orders.html> (14  
January 2009); Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, Final Report (1998) published in 
(1989) 15 William Mitchell Law Review 827 at 878-79; James Ptacek, Battered Women in the Courtroom: The Power of 
Judicial Responses (1999) at 14; and Catherine Klein & Leslye Orloff, „Protecting Battered Women: Latest Trends in 
Legal Relief‟ (1999) 10 Women and Criminal Justice 29 at 39-40. 
14 Juliet Dimond, Legal Abuse as a Form of Domestic Violence: The Phenomenon of Protection Order Cross Applications 
(1995) unpublished (copy on file with author); and WLRC, above n11. 
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applications have also emerged in research focusing on other aspects of the 
ADVO system.
15
  
This limited research raises concern about the way in which cross applications, 
or the mutual orders that might result from them, may serve to: silence women‟s 
stories about domestic violence, trivialise women‟s experience of violence by 
failing to attribute blame, suggest that violence is mutual, ignore or discount the 
role of gender in understanding domestic violence, perpetuate the myth that 
women are as violent as men in their intimate relationships, and expose women 
to the risk of being charged with contravening the order made against them.
16
 
Cross applications may also be used in subsequent legal proceedings, for 
example family law proceedings concerning children, to discount women‟s 
concerns about violence and ongoing parenting.
17
 Concern has also been 
expressed about the way in which a cross application may be deployed to 
continue to harass and intimidate a victim.
18
  
Cross applications raise questions about men and women‟s use of violence in 
intimate relationships. The debate about whether men and women are equally 
violent in their relationships has long animated the sociological literature, but has 
been given little recognition in the legal literature.
19
 This thesis seeks to examine 
the assumptions underpinning the legal definitions and understandings of 
domestic violence in the NSW ADVO system through the case study of cross 
applications, with reference to the theoretical debates about „what is domestic 
violence‟ and „what counts as domestic violence‟. It draws on detailed empirical 
                                                          
15 In research on breaches of ADVOs: Hayley Katzen, „How Do I Prove I saw his Shadow?‟ Responses to Breaches of 
Apprehended Violence Orders: A Consultation with Women and Police in the Richmond Local Area Command (2000) at 
42; and research on post-separation parenting arrangements: Miranda Kaye, Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, Negotiating 
Child Residence and Contact Arrangements Against a Background of Domestic Violence (2003) at 54-55. 
16 In Australia see Rosemary Hunter & Julie Stubbs, „Model Laws or Missed Opportunity?‟ (1999) 24 Alternative Law 
Journal 12 at 15-6; Helen Spowart & Rebecca Neil, „Stop in the Name of Love‟ (1997) 22 Alternative Law Journal 81 at 
84; Walker, above n12 at 125. In the USA see Topliffe, above n13 at 1061; Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force, above 
n13 at 879; Klein & Orloff, above n13 at 39; and Zorza, above n13; Leigh Goodmark, „Law is the Answer? Do We Know 
That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women‟ (2004) 23 St Louis University 
Public Law Review 7 at 24.  
17 Topliffe, above n13 at 1062-1064. See also Goodmark, „Law is the Answer?‟, above n16 at 24. 
18 Spowart & Neil, above n16 at 84; Helena Barwick, Alison Gray & Roger Macky, Domestic Violence Act 1995: Process 
Evaluation (2000) at 58; and Department of the Attorney General, above n12 at 35.  
19 Michelle Dempsey, „What Counts as Domestic Violence? A Conceptual Analysis‟ (2006) 12 William and Mary Journal 
of Women and the Law 301 at 305. Exceptions to this absence include the extensive work of Russell Dobash & Rebecca 
Dobash: eg see „Women‟s Violence to Men in Intimate Relationships: Working on a Puzzle‟ (2004) 44 British Journal of 
Criminology 324; Russell Dobash, Rebecca Dobash, Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, „The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in 
Marital Violence‟ (1992) 39 Social Problems 71. See also Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist 
Lawmaking (2000) at 24-27; Linda Mills, Insult to Injury: Rethinking our Responses to Intimate Abuse (2003) at 67-84; 
and Demi Kurz, „Battering and the Criminal Justice System: A Feminist View‟ in Eve Buzawa & Carl Buzawa (eds), 
Domestic Violence: The Changing Criminal Justice Response (1992). 
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work, involving semi-structured in-depth interviews with women involved in 
cross applications and key professionals working in the field, documentary 
analysis of court files, and observations of court proceedings.  
How we look at and define domestic violence has important implications for how 
the legal system labels and responds to the violence women and men use in 
intimate relationships.
20
 A common method of defining domestic violence is 
identifying and measuring the types of acts and behaviours that might form its 
constituent parts, and by reference to the types of relationships that might be 
considered „domestic‟ (or familial). This thesis, drawing on feminist 
understandings of domestic violence, emphasises the contextual dimensions of 
violence that contribute, and provide meaning, to an act as an act of domestic 
violence. The multiple methods employed in this thesis, drawing on quantitative 
and qualitative data, highlights the limitations of some forms of quantitative 
information when presented devoid of the context in which the act „counted‟ took 
place.  
This thesis asks: Is it sufficient to label a person a „perpetrator‟ of domestic 
violence simply on the basis that a person has used an act of violence against 
their intimate partner? Do we need to know whether there have been other acts of 
violence or abuse? Do we need to know about the meaning and impact of the 
violence? Is it important, or useful, to categorise different types of violence 
between intimate partners? Gender differences emerge across victimisation, 
perpetration and impact in response to such questions. These differences have 
been documented in other research and the call for context in understanding 
domestic violence has been extensive.
21
 The contribution of this thesis is to 
explore the way these questions are posed (or not posed), in the primary legal 
avenue for protection from domestic violence in NSW, the ADVO system, and to 
examine how the competing claims men and women present about domestic 
violence are approached and resolved by professionals within that system. 
                                                          
20 Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 324-25. See also Michael Johnson, „Domestic Violence: It‟s 
Not About Gender – Or Is It?‟ (2005) 67 Journal of Marriage and the Family 1126 at 1129. 
21 See Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19; Russell Dobash & Rebecca Dobash, „The Context-Specific 
Approach‟ in David Finkelhor, Richard Gelles, Gerald Hotaling & Murray Straus (eds), The Dark Side of Families: 
Current Family Violence Research (1983); Schneider, above n19 at 46-49; Deborah Tuerkheimer, „Recognizing and 
Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence‟ (2004) 94 Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 959 at 966; Martha McMahon & Ellen Pence, „Making Social Change: Reflections on Individual and 
Institutional Advocacy with Women Arrested for Domestic Violence‟ (2003) 9 Violence Against Women 47 at 51-52; 
Susan Miller, Victims as Offenders: The Paradox of Women‟s Violence in Relationships (2005) at 10. 
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The remainder of this introduction is divided into three parts. First, I introduce 
the theoretical concerns and debates about gender and domestic violence that 
underpin this study. Many of these debates are reflected in community attitudes 
about domestic violence. Second, I provide an overview of the research setting of 
ADVOs in NSW. Here I introduce the empirical research undertaken in this 
thesis, the methodology and key limitations. I present a working definition(s) for 
the purpose of this thesis, and a rationale for the use of the term „domestic 
violence‟. Finally I outline the structure of this thesis. 
3. An introduction to the concerns of this thesis  
The problem of domestic violence has been the subject of extensive advocacy, 
research and government action over the last 30 years. In particular the women‟s 
movement in Australia, as in many other Western countries, has been active and 
successful in gaining political attention for the violence many women experience 
from their current/former male partners. This has led to the implementation of a 
wide range of measures to promote the safety of women and respond 
appropriately to male perpetrators. This understanding of domestic violence as 
primarily a problem of men‟s violence against women, is supported by extensive 
feminist research which conceptualises men‟s use of violence as an issue of 
„power and control‟ or „coercive control‟ reflective of, and made possible by, the 
unequal position of men and women in society. This does not mean that feminist 
research ignores the role of other factors in the occurrence and experience of 
domestic violence (such as race, class or sexual orientation), as is often claimed, 
but rather it takes the view that recognising domestic violence as a gendered 
harm „allows us to begin to ask important questions about the construction of 
gender, the potential to transform damaging forms of masculinity associated with 
that violence and about social and cultural factors which permit men to resort to 
violence‟.22 
This view of domestic violence as a gendered harm is supported by official 
statistics: 
                                                          
22 Julie Stubbs, „Introduction‟ in Julie Stubbs (ed), Women, Male Violence and the Law (1994) at 4. 
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 Women were the victims in 71.1 per cent, and men were the offenders in 80.4 
per cent, of the domestic assaults reported to NSW police (1997-2004).
23
 
 Three quarters of intimate partner homicides involve men killing their 
current/former female partners.
24
 
 Over 70 per cent of ADVO applications are made by, or on behalf of, 
women.
25
  
 A 2005 study of hospital admissions in Western Australia found that 85 per 
cent of admissions due to domestic violence were for women.
26
 
Other Australian studies have sought to measure the prevalence of violence 
against women.
27
 In 2005 the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) explored 
gender differences in the prevalence of violence (defined as actual and threatened 
physical and sexual violence).
28
 This study examined violence from intimate 
partners, as well as from family members, other people known to the victim, and 
strangers. While men experienced more instances of violence in the broad 
context of their lives (primarily from other men), women were more likely to 
experience violence in the context of their intimate relationships (also from 
men): 31 per cent of the women who were physically assaulted in the past year 
were assaulted by a current/former partner, while only 4.4 per cent of men were 
assaulted by a current/former partner.
29
 Women were three times more likely 
than men to have experienced violence from a former partner since the age of 15 
(15% of women, 4.9% of men).
30
 
                                                          
23 Julie People, „Trends and Patterns in Domestic Violence Assaults‟, Crime and Justice Bulletin: Contemporary Issues in 
Crime and Justice, No 89, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (2005) at 6.  
24 Jenny Mouzos & Catherine Rushforth, „Family Homicide in Australia‟, Trends and Issues in Crime and Justice, No 
255, Australian Institute of Criminology (2005) at 1. 
25 Local Courts NSW, Apprehended Violence Statistics: Year 2005, Table 1.2. Unpublished, copy on file with author. This 
figure has remained relatively stable over the last few years. The data compiled by Local Courts does not include the 
gender of the defendant. This information would be valuable, and it is collected in other jurisdictions: see Department of 
Justice Victoria, Measuring Family Violence in Victoria: Victorian Family Violence Database (Volume 3): Seven Year 
Trend Analysis 1999-2006 (2008) at [6.2]-[6.4].  
26 Arem Gavin & Chris Gillam, Hospital Admissions due to Intimate Partner Violence in Western Australian 1994-2003: 
Highlight Report (2005) at 1. 
27 Jenny Mouzos & Toni Makkai, Women‟s Experiences of Male Violence: Findings from the Australian Component of 
the International Violence Against Women Survey (IVAWS) (2004); and ABS, Women‟s Safety Australia 1996, Cat No. 
4128.0 (1996). 
28 ABS, Personal Safety Australia, Cat No. 4906.0 (2005) at 5. Michael Flood has criticised this study: „Violence Against 
Women and Men in Australia: What the Personal Safety Survey Can and Can‟t Tell Us‟ (2006) (Summer)(4) DVIRC 
Quarterly 3. 
29 ABS, „Personal Safety‟, above n28 at 9. 
30 Ibid at 11. 
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Despite the profile that emerges from official data and various prevalence 
studies, there continues to be debate within the research community, as well as 
amongst the general community, about whether men and women are equally 
violent in their intimate relationships.  
A. Debate about definitions and gender in the literature 
i. Family violence and feminist research 
In general terms the debate about gender and domestic violence in the literature 
is characterised by a schism between the largely USA-based, „family violence‟ 
researchers (who see domestic violence as symmetrical in its occurrence, with 
men and women being equally likely to be perpetrators) and „violence against 
women‟ or feminist researchers (who see domestic violence as asymmetrical, 
predominantly perpetrated by men against women).
31
 The debate, often 
acrimonious, has continued in relatively similar terms for over 30 years. The 
debate reflects differences in the theoretical framework in which questions are 
asked (for family violence researchers this is in terms of conflict theory, whereas 
feminist researchers tend to view violence against women as a manifestation of 
women‟s subordinate status in society) and how definitions are made operational 
in research (methodological questions and decisions). The differences, both 
epistemological and political, centre on „what counts‟32 and ultimately what is a 
„social problem‟ worthy of attention.33  
Family violence researchers typically use act-based survey instruments, most 
notably the Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS) developed by Murray Straus in the 
1970s;
34
 they have found that men and women use physical violence against their 
intimate partner at equal rates, and in some studies that women use physical 
                                                          
31 This characterisation of the division in the research has been employed by others: see Rebecca Dobash & Russell 
Dobash, Women, Violence and Social Change (1992) at 258-84; Chris Atmore, Men as Victims of Domestic Violence: 
Some Issues to Consider (2001) at 4. 
32 Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 324, 328. 
33 Domestic violence is widely seen as a social problem. Debate about gender perpetration challenges how the problem is 
perceived, the measures put in place to address it, and whether the current response (directed at men‟s violence) is 
appropriate: see Murray Straus, „Physical Assaults by Wives: A Major Social Problem‟ and Demi Kurz, „Physical 
Assaults by Husbands: A Major Social Problem‟ in Richard Gelles & Donileen Loseke (eds), Current Controversies on 
Family Violence (1993). See also Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 325-326.  
34 Murray Straus, „Measuring Conflict and Violence: The Conflict Tactics (CT) Scales‟ (1979) 40 Journal of Marriage 
and the Family 75. See also Murray Straus, Sherry Hamby, Sue Boney-McCoy & David Sugarman, „The Revised 
Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS2): Development and Preliminary Psychometric Data‟ (1996) 17 Journal of Family Issues 
283. 
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violence at even greater rates than men.
35
 It is this symmetrical finding that is at 
the core of subsequent debates. In response feminist researchers have argued that 
it is not possible to simply count acts of violence devoid of the context in which 
they occur, and that if family violence researchers were more attuned to context 
they would find that women‟s use of violence, compared to that of men, is 
qualitatively and quantitatively different. Using largely qualitative research 
methods, feminist researchers have highlighted the multiple and varied acts and 
behaviours that some men use to exert power and control over women in intimate 
relationships. 
Chapter 2 explores this division in the sociological research in detail. 
The examination of cross applications in this thesis reflects these debates in three 
key ways. First it seeks to explore the competing claims made by men and 
women within a relationship by exploring the allegations each made when 
seeking a civil protection order. As noted by Heather Melton and Joanne 
Belknap, official data (in this thesis the use of court files) has been „neglected in 
the debate over gender symmetry or asymmetry and thus is an important resource 
in an attempt to further investigate this issue‟.36 Second, by employing multiple 
methods in a single study, this thesis highlights the methodological debates by 
illustrating the limits of act-based methods when counterpoised with the in-depth 
and qualitative material gathered from the interviews and court files (Chapters 7-
9). Finally this thesis investigates the link between the limits of counting-based 
methods and the incident driven approach of the legal system, much discussed in 
terms of the criminal justice system, but, as is suggested in this thesis, replicated 
in the civil protection order system. 
                                                          
35 Eg see the results of the National Family Violence Surveys (USA) (1975, 1985): Murray Straus, „The National Family 
Violence Surveys‟ in Murray Straus & Richard Gelles (eds), Physical Violence in American Families: Risk Factors and 
Adaptations to Violence in 8,145 Families (1990); in Australia see Bruce Headey, Dorothy Scott & David de Vaus, 
„Domestic Violence in Australia: Are Women and Men Equally Violent?‟ (1999) 2 Australian Social Monitor 57; in New 
Zealand see: David Fergusson, John Horwood & Elizabeth Ridder, „Partner Violence and Mental Health Outcomes in a 
New Zealand Birth Cohort‟ (2005) 67 Journal of Marriage and Family 1103. See also Martin Fiebert, „References 
Examining Assaults by Women on their Spouses or Male Partners: An Annotated Bibliography‟ (1997) 1 Sexuality and 
Culture 273, this has been updated see: <http://www.csulb.edu/~mfiebert/assault.htm> (14 January 2009); and John 
Archer, „Sex Differences in Aggression Between Heterosexual Partners: A Meta-Analytic Review‟ (2000) 126 
Psychological Bulletin 651. 
36 Heather Melton & Joanne Belknap, „He Hits, She Hits: Assessing Gender Difference and Similarities in Officially 
Reported Intimate Partner Violence‟ (2003) 30 Criminal Justice and Behaviour 328 at 337.  
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ii. Different types of intimate partner violence? 
There is growing interest in the proposition that the two groups of researchers are 
studying different types of domestic violence as a consequence of the differences 
inherent in the samples that they access (where family violence theorists use 
large-scale randomised samples, and feminist researchers tend to use small-scale 
samples obtained via women‟s refuges, police, courts or hospitals) and the 
different instruments they use to measure violence. Michael Johnson and 
colleagues have conducted the most notable work in this area.
37
 Johnson argues 
that family violence theorists are examining „situational couple violence‟ (a form 
of domestic violence that is likely to be isolated, minor and mutual in its 
perpetration, does not escalate and is not used to control the other person), while 
feminist researchers are examining „intimate terrorism‟ (that is, the form of 
violence conjured by the term „domestic violence‟; this is largely perpetrated by 
men to exercise control over their female partners, it is repetitive and likely to 
escalate).  
While I agree with Johnson that not all violence that takes place between 
intimate partners is „domestic violence‟,38 and this is a key contention for this 
thesis, I have a number of concerns with this model and its application. These 
concerns are explored in Chapter 2. Some of the concerns derive from the 
development of the typology as an „answer‟ to the division in the sociological 
research, outlined above, and others relate to the role of the researcher in 
                                                          
37 Michael Johnson, „Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of Violence Against Women‟ 
(1995) 57 Journal of Marriage and the Family 283; Michael Johnson & Kathleen Ferraro, „Research on Domestic 
Violence in the 1990s: Making Distinctions‟ (2000) 62 Journal of Marriage and the Family 948; Michael Johnson & 
Janel Leone, „The Differential Effects of Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings from the National 
Violence Against Women Survey‟ (2005) 26 Journal of Family Issues 322; Johnson, „ It‟s not about Gender‟, above n20; 
Michael Johnson, „Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and Asymmetry in Domestic Violence‟ (2006) 12 Violence 
Against Women 652; and Michael Johnson, A Typology of Domestic Violence: Intimate Terrorism, Violent Resistance and 
Situational Couple Violence (2008). Johnson is not the only person to conduct work in this area, see also Janet Johnston & 
Linda Campbell, „A Clinical Typology of Interparental Violence in Disputed Custody Divorces‟ (1993) 63 American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 190; Janet Johnston, „A Child-Centered Approach to High-Conflict and Domestic-Violence 
Families: Differential Assessment and Interventions‟ (2006) 12 Journal of Family Studies 15; Suzanne Swan & David 
Snow, „A Typology of Women‟s Use of Violence in Intimate Relationships‟ (2002) 8 Violence Against Women 286 and 
the related area of typologies of perpetrators: Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, „A Typology of Men who are Violent toward 
their Female Partners: Making Sense of Heterogeneity in Husband Violence‟ (2000) 9 Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 140; Neil Jacobson & John Gottman, When Men Batter Women: New Insights into Ending Abusive 
Relationships (1998). In Australia see Kerrie James, Beth Seddon & Jac Brown, „Using it‟ or „Losing It‟: Men‟s 
Constructions of their Violence Towards Female Partners (2002). Murray Straus himself distinguished between „ordinary 
violence‟ and more serious forms of violence: „Ordinary Violence, Child Abuse and Wife Beating: What do They Have in 
Common?‟ in Finkelhor et al (eds), above n21. For recent applications or interest in differentiation see: Nancy Ver Steegh 
„Differentiating Types of Domestic Violence: Implications for Child Custody‟ (2005) 65 Louisiana Law Review 1379; 
Lawrie Moloney, Bruce Smyth, Ruth Weston, Nicholas Richardson, Lixia Qu & Matthew Gray, Allegations of Family 
Violence and Child Abuse in Family Law Children‟s Proceedings: A Pre-Reform Exploratory Study (2007); and 
Dempsey, above n19. 
38 See also Flood, „Violence Against Men and Women in Australia‟, above n28; and Sue Osthoff, „But, Gertrude, I Beg to 
Differ, a Hit is not a Hit is not a Hit‟ (2002) 8 Violence Against Women 1521. 
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identifying, valuing and naming acts as domestic violence (or as something else) 
– a criticism also levelled at CTS-based studies. Such approaches ignore the role 
of the victim and the perpetrator in interpreting, and providing meaning to, acts 
of violence and abuse. As Cavanagh and colleagues have argued, acts only have 
the „potential‟ to be „domestic violence‟; it is through the interaction and 
negotiation of the relationship and its history that such acts attain their meaning 
for the victim and the perpetrator.
39
 
For a variety of reasons inherent in the data collected in this thesis, it is not 
possible to test the relevancy of Johnson‟s typology to cross applications (the 
prime limitation is the lack of articulation of control in ADVO complaint 
narratives, the feature that differentiates Johnson‟s proposed categories). 
However, this growing research area is clearly related to the argument of this 
thesis that not all acts of violence between intimate relationships are acts of 
domestic violence, thus questions or issues that resonate with, or challenge 
Johnson‟s work are raised where relevant in this thesis.  
iii. Women’s use of violence against an intimate partner 
The results of family violence research, and the work of Johnson, raise 
challenges about how the violence some women use in intimate relationships is 
characterised. Is it to be seen as „domestic violence‟ and a social problem worthy 
of attention, or is women‟s use of violence of a different nature and quality to 
that of men‟s? While women are clearly capable of using violence, their use of 
violence against an intimate partner has been little explored until recently, except 
in relation to battered women who have killed their violent partners.
40
 Since the 
early 2000s feminist research on women‟s use of non-lethal violence against 
their heterosexual intimate partners has intensified, demonstrated in the 
publication of three special issues of the international journal Violence Against 
                                                          
39 Kate Cavanagh, Russel Dobash, Rebecca Dobash & Ruth Lewis, „Remedial Work: Men's Strategic Responses to their 
Violence against Intimate Female Partners‟ (2001) 33 Sociology 695 at 698-99. 
40 Eg see, Schneider, above n19 ch 8; Rebecca Bradfield, The Treatment of Women Who Kill Their Violent Male Partners 
Within the Australian Criminal Justice System (PhD thesis, University of Tasmania, 2002); Rebecca Bradfield, „Women 
Who Kill: Lack of Intent and Diminished Responsibility as the Other „Defences‟ to Spousal Homicide‟ (2001-2002) 13 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 143; Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, „Defending Battered Women on Charges of 
Homicide: The Structural and Systemic Versus the Personal and Particular‟ in Wendy Chan, Dorothy Chunn & Robert 
Menzies (eds), Women, Madness and the Law: A Feminist Reader (2005); Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, `Race, Gender 
and the Battered Woman Syndrome: An Australian Case Study' (1995) 8 Canadian Journal of Women and Law 122;  
Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, „Defending Battered Women on Trial: The Battered Woman Syndrome 
and Its Limitations‟ (1992) 16 Criminal Law Review 387. 
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Women in 2002-2003,
41
 and one special issue of the international journal 
Violence and Victims in 2005.
42
 In addition, numerous articles and books have 
been published on this topic.
43
 A considerable amount of this work has 
investigated whether men and women have different motivations for using 
violence against an intimate partner. This research has indicated that there are 
multiple motivations for some women‟s use of violence; while self-defence tends 
to dominate, women also use violence to retaliate, seek revenge, exert (usually 
short-term) control, and in frustration or anger. A common theme of this research 
is that women‟s use of violence tends to be in the context of their own 
victimisation. This literature is explored in Chapter 2. 
Looking at women‟s use of violence raises questions about how we think women 
respond to the violence that they experience. While research indicates that 
women actively respond to the violence that they experience in multiple, 
strategic ways, this is not widely recognised in popular conceptions of „a victim 
of domestic violence‟ which tend to position victims as passive, submissive, 
downtrodden and unable to „leave‟, often bringing into play the „familiar binary 
categories‟44 of „deserving‟ and „undeserving‟ victims, and „victim‟ versus 
„agent‟. Discussions about women‟s use of violence against an intimate partner 
raise numerous questions including what we think a victim should be like, and 
how a victim should respond or behave. It confronts the „central tension within 
feminism‟ of a „false dichotomy between women‟s victimisation and women‟s 
agency‟.45 
                                                          
41 Vol 8(11-12); Vol 9(1).  
42 Vol 20(3). 
43 See Shamita Das Dasgupta, „Just Like Men? A Critical View of Violence by Women‟ in Melanie Shepard & Ellen 
Pence (eds), Coordinating Community Responses to Domestic Violence: Lessons from Duluth and Beyond (1999); 
Shamita das Dasgupta, „A Framework for Understanding Women‟s use of Nonlethal Violence in Intimate Heterosexual 
Relationships‟ (2002) 8 Violence Against Women 1364; Kathleen Ferraro, Neither Angels Nor Demons: Women, Crime 
and Victimization (2006); Kevin Hamberger, „Men‟s and Women‟s Use of Intimate Partner Violence in Clinical Samples: 
Toward a Gender Sensitive Analysis‟ (2005) 20 Violence & Victims‟ 131; Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, „Commentary: 
Female Perpetration of Physical Aggression Against an Intimate Partner: A Controversial New Topic of Study‟ (2005) 20 
Violence and Victims 251; Melton & Belknap, above n36; Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟ above n21; and Susan Miller & 
Michelle Meloy, „Women‟s Use of Force: Voices of Women Arrested for Domestic Violence‟ (2006) 12 Violence Against 
Women 89. 
44 Lee Fitzroy, „Violent Women: Questions for Feminist Theory, Practice and Policy‟ (2001) 21 Critical Social Policy 7 at 
11. 
45 Schneider, above n19 at 74. 
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The study of cross applications in cases where women are alleged to have used 
violence against their intimate partners raises these issues.
46
 While some 
instances of women‟s use of violence may be self-defence (a defined legal 
response), other instances may more appropriately be seen as motivated by 
anger, frustration or retaliation. Certainly the professionals interviewed for this 
thesis struggled with what terminology to use to describe women who use 
violence in the context of their victimisation outside of the binary notions of 
victim and perpetrator.
47
 Questions about women‟s use of violence and its 
appropriate characterisation are being explored in the USA in the context of 
women arrested for domestic violence offences.
48
 However, it is important to 
consider that the civil protection order system has a different focus to the 
criminal system (which in so many ways is structured on discrete incidents), and 
hence asks different questions. Whereas the criminal law asks whether an offence 
has been committed, a civil protection order asks „who needs protection?‟ It is 
suggested that the different nature of these questions means that competing 
claims about violence presented at the civil level may expose greater challenges 
to the legal system‟s understanding of domestic violence. 
iv. Community attitudes and gender 
Community attitude surveys also reflect conflicting views about the role of 
gender in the perpetration of domestic violence. Since the late 1980s there have 
been positive shifts in community attitudes about domestic violence, with various 
surveys documenting a broadening of people‟s understanding of the types of 
behaviours that constitute domestic violence, and a reduction in the proportion of 
people who adhere to myths about domestic violence.
49
 However, the proportion 
of respondents who believe that domestic violence is primarily perpetrated by 
                                                          
46 Not every case examined in this thesis involved women using violence/abuse. A number of the women interviewed 
denied the allegations made against them, and in other cases challenged that the act/behaviour that they used was violent 
or abusive: see Chapter 7. 
47 See Chapter 9. 
48 See Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟, above n21; Miller & Meloy, above n43; David Hirschel & Eve Buzawa, 
„Understanding the Context of Dual Arrest with Directions for Future Research‟ (2002) 8 Violence Against Women 1449; 
and McMahon & Pence, above n21. See also Canada: Women Abuse Council of Toronto, Women Charged with Domestic 
Violence in Toronto: The Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Charge Policies (2005); Melanie Crouch, „Dual 
Arrests‟ (2003) 5(1) Resolve News 1. 
49 Four Australian studies reflect changes in community attitudes, while these studies are not entirely comparable they do 
indicate key shifts: Public Policy Research Centre, Community Attitudes Towards Domestic Violence (1988); 
Commonwealth, Office of the Status of Women (OSW), Community Attitudes to Violence Against Women: Detailed 
Report (1995); Cultural Perspectives, Attitudes to Domestic and Family Violence in the Diverse Australian Community 
(2000) and VicHealth, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Community Attitudes to Violence Against Women: Progress 
and Challenges in Creating Safe and Healthy Environments: A Summary of Findings (2006); and Natalie Taylor & Jenny 
Mouzos, Community Attitudes to Violence Against Women Survey 2006: A Full Technical Report (2006). 
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men against women has decreased, notwithstanding the research evidence to the 
contrary. 
Two community attitude surveys document this negative trend: the 1995 federal 
survey conducted by ANOP Research Services for the Office of the Status of 
Women (Cth),
50
 and the 2006 Victorian survey conducted by the Australian 
Institute of Criminology (AIC) for VicHealth.
51
 In 1995, 50 per cent of 
respondents identified domestic violence as primarily perpetrated by men,
52
 but 
this decreased to 40 per cent in 2006.
53
 In 1995, only 9 per cent of respondents 
stated that men and women were equally likely to perpetrate domestic violence. 
In 2006 this increased to 20 per cent.
54
 The 2006 survey also found that „sizeable 
proportions also believed that the psychological and emotional harms are equal 
for both men and women‟.55 This led the 2006 survey to conclude: 
This suggests that there is a poor understanding that domestic violence is committed 
mainly by men against women and is frequently characterised by a persistent pattern of 
controlling and abusive behaviours.
56
 
When reflecting on „community attitudes‟, it is important to consider that these 
attitudes may also be held by victims and offenders, and by people involved in 
the operation of the legal system (magistrates, police, lawyers, support workers). 
As Justice Colleen Moore of the Family Court of Australia pointed out in relation 
to judges of the Family Court, „it is likely that the attitude and perspective of 
judges is not markedly dissimilar to the attitude and perspective of the 
community generally‟.57  
                                                          
50 OSW, above n49. 
51 VicHealth, above n49; and Taylor & Mouzos, above n49. While there are differences between the two surveys, the 
2006 survey was specifically designed to provide some comparative data: see Taylor & Mouzos, above n49 at 3-7 see also 
15-16. 
52Taylor & Mouzos, above n49 at 49, Table 4.2.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 VicHealth, above n49 at 24. Between 24-39% of those surveyed agreed that emotional harms were suffered equally by 
men and women: Taylor & Mouzos, above n49, Table 4.3 at 56. 
56 VicHealth, above n49, at 24. 
57 Colleen Moore, „A Judicial Perspective on Domestic Violence in Family Law‟ paper presented at Challenging the 
Legal System‟s Response to Domestic Violence, Brisbane 23-26 March 1994, cited in Jennifer Hickey & Stephen 
Cumines, Apprehended Violence Orders: A Survey of Magistrates (1999) at 8. 
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4. The research setting of this thesis 
A. The protection order system in NSW 
Civil protection orders were introduced in NSW, and many other jurisdictions, to 
address some of the key limitations of the criminal law in responding to domestic 
violence. They were a product of feminist activism and engagement with law 
reform focused on generating a more appropriate response to the particular harms 
suffered by women from their intimate partners.
58
 Civil protection orders were 
seen as having many key advantages over the criminal law in terms of: 
accessibility, the lower standard of proof (that is, on the balance of probabilities), 
the provision of future protection beyond the notion of deterrence provided by 
the criminal law, the ability of women to commence and instruct their own legal 
action, and the way in which a civil procedure may ameliorate the reluctance 
many victims have about involving the criminal law and its associated features of 
punishment. However, it must also be remembered that civil protection orders 
were not seen as a replacement for the criminal law, rather they represent another 
legal option open to victims of domestic violence. In fact it is possible to have 
both an ADVO and criminal charges arising from the same incident.
59
  
Civil protection order schemes have been particularly embraced in Australia.
60
 In 
contrast, the USA emphasises criminal action, evidenced in the development of 
mandatory or pro arrest policies, while also making provision for state-based 
civil protection orders. This different emphasis is particularly well illustrated by 
the website for the NSW Police; while it is noted that domestic violence 
constitutes „criminal behaviour‟,61 the page detailing the „police and the legal 
response‟ is confined entirely to ADVOs (there is no mention of criminal action 
except in relation to breach of an ADVO).
62
 
While there have been continuing debates about the interplay between the civil 
protection order system and criminal responses to domestic violence in 
                                                          
58 Rosemary Hunter, Women‟s Experience in Court: The Implementation of Feminist Law Reforms in Civil Proceedings 
Concerning Domestic Violence, (SJD thesis, Stanford University, 2006) at 1. 
59 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562O, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s81.  
60 Hunter, „Women‟s Experience at Court‟, above n58, at 6; and Heather Douglas, „Not a Crime Like Any Other: 
Sentencing Breaches of Domestic Violence Protection Orders‟ (2007) 31 Criminal Law Journal 1 at 4. 
61 <http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/community_issues/domestic__and__family_violence> (14 January 2009). 
62 <http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/community_issues/domestic__and__family_violence/police_and_the_legal_response> 
(14 January 2009). 
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Australia,
63
 this is not the main concern of this thesis. These arguments are 
briefly canvassed in Chapter 2, however the prime reason for exploring these 
arguments is the contention that some of the main limitations of the criminal law 
find themselves reflected in the response of the ADVO system. In this way the 
ADVO system appears to replicate some of the problems it was intended to 
ameliorate. 
ADVOs were first introduced in NSW in 1982.
64
 The ADVO system is the most 
frequently relied on legal tool to provide protection to victims of domestic 
violence. For each calendar year 2002–2005 the number of ADVO applications 
has exceeded 31 000.
65
 This figure includes all „domestic relationships‟, and is 
not limited to intimate relationships.
66
 While it is possible for acts of domestic 
violence to also be addressed via various criminal offences,
67
 this is less common 
when compared to the number of ADVOs applications.
68
  
The empirical work for this thesis was undertaken when the ADVO provisions 
were contained in a dedicated section of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), Part 15A. 
In 2008 these provisions were removed from the Crimes Act and placed in a new 
stand-alone Act to address domestic and personal violence protection orders.
69
 
                                                          
63 See Jocelyn Scutt, „Going Backwards: Law Reform and Women Bashing‟ (1986) 9 Women‟s Studies International 
Forum 49; and Heather Douglas & Lee Godden, The Decriminalisation of Domestic Violence (2002) at i. Compare Julie 
Stubbs & Sandra Egger, The Effectiveness of Protection Orders in Australian Jurisdictions (1993) at 6. 
64 Civil protection orders are available in all Australian jurisdictions: Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2001 
(ACT); Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT); Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989 (Qld); 
Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA); Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas); Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987 (Vic); and 
Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA). New legislation was recently passed in Victoria and the ACT, see Domestic Violence 
and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT), commences 30 March 2009; and Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) (ss1, 
2, 224 commenced 24 September 2008, ss3-223 on 8 December 2008, with ss225-232 yet to be proclaimed).  
65 See Local Courts NSW, Apprehended Violence Statistics: Year 2002, Table 1.2; Local Courts NSW, Apprehended 
Violence Statistics: Year 2003, Table 1.2; Local Courts NSW, Apprehended Violence Statistics: Year 2004, Table 1.2; and 
Local Courts NSW, „2005‟, above n25 Table 1.2 (all unpublished data, copy on file with author). 
66 Local Courts does not provide data on relationship type. The data collected for this thesis, and other research, indicates 
that most ADVOs are sought in intimate relationships: see Chapter 6. See Lily Trimboli & Roseanne Bonney, An 
Evaluation of the NSW Apprehended Violence Order Scheme (1997), Table 5 at 28; Ombudsman, above n11 at 5. This 
profile is also reflected in other jurisdictions: see Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 73; and 
Rosemary Wearing, Monitoring the Impact of the Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987 (1992) at 316. 
67 Eg Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61 common assault s61; s59 assault occasioning actual bodily harm s59; malicious 
damage ss195-196, 198-200; and various sexual offences ss61I-61P, 65A and 80A. 
68 At the time of the fieldwork NSW did not record whether an offence was a domestic violence offence; they were simply 
recorded as „assault‟ and so on. The Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) introduced a mechanism 
whereby an offence may be recorded as a domestic violence offence. This should assist in data collection. BOCSAR 
publishes data on the number of domestic violence incidents reported to the police. This data indicates that for the years 
2002-2007 over 25 000 domestic violence related assaults (across all domestic relationships) were reported to the police 
each year: search using the Specific Crime Tool (conducting a search of all offences, NSW and all premises) available on 
BOCSAR website: <http://bocd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/bocd/cmd/crime/Init> (14 January 2009). Following a report to the 
police there is a process of attrition; this has been explored in the ACT: Natalie Taylor, Analysis of Family Violence 
Incidents July 2003-June 2004: Final Report (2006) at [2.9]. 
69 Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW).  
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As a result, in this thesis I refer to the law as it was when the fieldwork was 
conducted and provide a footnote reference to the new provision.  
i. Research on the ADVO system 
Previous studies have investigated aspects of the ADVO system: for example, its 
effectiveness,
70
 the attitudes of magistrates,
71
 breaches of ADVOs,
72
 and 
comparing the ADVO system to systems operating in other Australian 
jurisdictions.
73
 The extent to which these studies have explored gender 
differences has generally been limited to noting the number of ADVO 
applications sought by women compared to men.  
No study to date in Australia has explored the way in which the complaints made 
by women and men might differ in terms of content (what types of 
violence/abuse are alleged, the extent or duration of the alleged violence/abuse, 
whether multiple forms of violence/abuse are alleged, the sustaining of injuries, 
or whether violence/abuse is alleged to continue after separation). This thesis, in 
exploring cross applications, examines whether there are gender differences in 
these dimensions. 
B. The Local Court setting  
ADVOs are dealt with in the lowest tier of the NSW court hierarchy, the Local 
Court.
74
 AVOs occupy a great deal of the time of the Local Court. In a survey of 
magistrates conducted for the NSW Judicial Commission in 1998, two-thirds of 
the magistrates estimated that between 10 to 20 per cent of their time is 
consumed by AVO matters, and of that work load, approximately two-thirds 
would involve domestic violence.
75
  
There has been scant Australian research exploring the nature and understanding 
of domestic violence in the Local Court setting. To date most research that delves 
into the conceptual areas of definitions and understandings of domestic violence, 
and women‟s responses to violence, have focused on higher court 
                                                          
70 Trimboli & Bonney, above n66. 
71 Hickey & Cumines, above n57. 
72 Katzen, above n15. 
73 Stubbs & Egger, above n63. 
74 In NSW the court system comprises the Local Court, the District Court and the Supreme Court. In other jurisdictions 
the Local Court may be known as the magistrates‟ court or court of summary jurisdiction. 
75 Hickey & Cumines, above n57 at 16. See also Hunter‟s findings in Victoria: „Women‟s Experience at Court‟, above 
n58 at 60. 
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determinations, most often in the area of criminal law (often involving women 
who have killed their violent partner) or family law determinations. The 
emphasis on higher court and written determinations, fails to appreciate that the 
vast majority of matters are at some stage presented, if not finalised, in the lower 
court jurisdiction. For many people, across a range of legal actions, this is often 
the only jurisdiction with which they have contact.
76
 The frequent use of the 
ADVO system means that it is in this civil system that most stories about 
domestic violence are told. It is here that the most „ordinary‟, „common‟, 
„everyday‟ stories about domestic violence emerge.77 Rosemary Hunter‟s recent 
dissertation, which focused on civil protection orders in the Magistrates‟ Court in 
Victoria, is a notable exception.
78
 Hunter similarly emphasised the absence of 
research on the lowest court in responding to domestic violence. 
5. Overview of methodology 
A. The aims of the research 
This thesis employs cross applications as a case study to explore the following 
interlinked research questions: 
 Is women‟s use of violence different to that of men? 
 Is a cross application indicative of „mutual‟ violence? 
 Does the ADVO system focus on incidents, rather than a contextual 
understanding of acts of violence/abuse, even though it was ostensibly 
designed to better capture and respond to the problem of domestic violence?  
 Is a cross application more likely to be another method of harassment? 
I have limited my focus to heterosexual relationships rather than all intimate 
partner relationships. This was defined to include current/former: spouses 
                                                          
76 That this is the level of court that most people have contact with, led one former Chief Justice of the High Court to 
emphasise the importance of its „performance‟: Anthony Mason, „The Courts as Community Institutions‟ (1998) 9 Public 
Law Review 83 at 84. 
77 See similar comments by Ptacek, above n13 at 6. 
78 Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58. Notable work on the nature of domestic violence allegations and 
judicial responses has been conducted in two lower courts in Massachusetts: Ptacek, above n13. 
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(marital); de facto partners (common law spouse); and non-cohabitating dating 
relationships (boyfriends/ girlfriends).
79
  
This focus on heterosexual relationships is not to suggest that violence does not 
occur in same-sex relationships (or indeed a wide range of other relationships) - 
of course it does - but rather in recognition that understandings of violence in 
same-sex relationships may differ from theories about violence in heterosexual 
relationships.
80
 In addition, no women in same-sex relationships volunteered to 
be interviewed,
81
 and only one court file involved a same-sex relationship. This 
does not mean that I will not refer to research that concerns same-sex domestic 
violence. In many ways the lack of gender difference has meant that researchers 
examining lesbian and gay intimate violence have always needed to be attuned to 
who is using violence for the purposes of power and control and who is not.
82
  
B. Definition of domestic violence adopted in this thesis 
This thesis adopts a two-pronged approach to defining domestic violence within 
the context of the ADVO system. First is a definition that is informed by feminist 
understandings of domestic violence. This is captured in the definition adopted 
by the federal government‟s Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (PADV) 
program: 
Domestic violence is an abuse of power perpetrated mainly (but not only) by men 
against women in a relationship or after separation. It occurs when one partner attempts 
physically or psychologically to dominate and control the other. Domestic violence takes 
a number of forms. The most commonly acknowledged forms are physical and sexual 
violence, threats and intimidation, emotional and social abuse and economic deprivation. 
Many forms of domestic violence are against the law.
83
 
What is significant about this definition, like other definitions adopted by 
feminist researchers, is the way that it connects acts with their function, that is, to 
                                                          
79 With the exception of excluding same-sex relationships, this is the definition in Linda Saltzman, Janet Fanslow, Pamela 
McMahon & Gene Shelley, Intimate Partner Violence Surveillance: Uniform Definitions and Recommended Data 
Elements, Version 1.0, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2002) at 11. 
80 See Dasgupta, „Framework for Understanding‟, above n43 at 1369; Julia Perilla, Kim Frndak, Debbie Lillard & Cynthia 
East, „A Working Analysis of Women‟s Use of Violence in the Context of Learning, Opportunity and Choice‟ (2003) 9 
Violence Against Women 10 at 19-22; and the contributions in Kerry Lobel (ed), Naming the Violence: Speaking Out 
About Lesbian Battering (1986). 
81 One woman, who wanted to discuss her experience with a cross application arising from her lesbian relationship, 
contacted the researcher after the fieldwork was completed in mid 2008. 
82 Nancy Worcester, „Women‟s Use of Force: Complexities and Challenges of Taking the Issue Seriously‟ (2002) 8 
Violence Against Women 1390 at 1401. 
83 PADV was an initiative of the Australian Federal Government (1998-2005): 
<http://ofw.facs.gov.au/womens_safety_agenda/previous_initiatives/padv/index.htm> (14 January 2009). 
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exert „power and control‟ or to „dominate‟ the other person. This has also been 
referred to as „coercive control‟.84 
The other critical definition adopted in this thesis is that relied on in the 
legislation providing for ADVOs. While „domestic violence‟ is not defined per 
se, it is evident in the grounds on which an ADVO may be granted; the court 
may grant an order where it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that a 
person „fears‟, and that fear is „reasonable‟: 
 the commission of a „personal violence offence‟; or 
 „conduct amounting to harassment or molestation‟ that is „sufficient to 
warrant the making of an order‟. This does not have to involve „actual or 
threatened violence to the person‟ and may be confined to property damage; 
or 
 intimidation or stalking that is „sufficient to warrant the making of an 
order‟.85 
This is a fairly broad definition of the types of behaviour that might warrant the 
attention of the law, however the only avenue through which the function of 
domestic violence might find itself articulated is in terms of „fear‟. I explore the 
usefulness of this criterion in Chapter 2, particularly given the absence of similar 
features in other jurisdictions, however in many key ways „fear‟ is different to 
control and domination. 
The two definitional frameworks are important, not only because this thesis 
focuses on the ADVO system, but also because it ultimately seeks to argue that 
there is an overriding approach and understanding about domestic violence that 
underpins the practice of the law.  
i. A note on terminology 
Various terms have been used to describe domestic violence (for example, family 
violence, spouse abuse, battering, wife abuse, and intimate partner violence). 
While the terms are often used interchangeably, they have particular political and 
                                                          
84 Evan Stark, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (2007). 
85 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562AE, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s16. 
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social implications, often intentional, about whether gender is seen as central to 
understanding the use of violence in intimate relationships.  
For the purpose of this thesis I use the term „domestic violence‟ (and, on 
occasion, intimate partner violence). This is the predominant language used in 
NSW, and until recently, in Australia generally.
86
 While the use of „domestic 
violence‟ in the NSW legislation refers to a wide range of relationships, in 
research it is generally used to denote violence between current/former intimate 
partners.
87
 
The term „domestic violence‟, while gender neutral, has also been more clearly 
aligned with a gendered understanding of intimate partner violence in Australia. 
In the USA „battering‟ has been more closely aligned with a gender analysis. 
„Battering‟ has not been preferred in Australia for its emphasis on physical forms 
of violence, and the way it places women victims (always) in a battered position. 
In the international arena, the term „intimate partner violence‟ is increasingly 
preferred as „domestic violence‟ is seen to encapsulate other forms of familial 
violence such as child and elder abuse.
88
 
The term „domestic violence‟ usefully distinguishes the theoretical approach of 
this thesis from that of the largely USA-based „family violence‟ research. This is 
important given the different usage of the phrase „family violence‟ in Australia. 
In Australia, „family violence‟ is the term often preferred by Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) peoples. In the context of Aboriginal work around 
family violence, it is not only the recognition that violence might be exercised 
against a multitude of family members, but critically that violence against an 
intimate partner (most usually Aboriginal women) has reverberations throughout 
the family and community and hence any response to violence against Aboriginal 
women must be holistic, incorporating measures for men, women, children and 
the community. This expansive approach is said to better reflect the fact that in 
Aboriginal communities there is „not a clear delineation between public and 
                                                          
86 Increasingly „family violence‟ has been used alone, or in combination with domestic violence, often with the intention 
of incorporating Indigenous preference for „family violence‟, see discussion below. 
87 Lesley Laing, Progress, Trends and Challenges in Australian Responses to Domestic Violence (2000) at 1. 
88 Claudia García-Moreno, Henrica Jansen, Mary Ellsberg, Lori Heise & Charlotte Watts, WHO Multi-country Study on 
Women‟s Health and Domestic Violence Against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women‟s 
Responses (2005) at 14. 
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private spheres‟.89 It has also been noted that, at least in Western Australia, 
„within the Aboriginal community there is no agreement [that]…Aboriginal 
family violence is the same “phenomenon” as domestic violence in the wider 
community‟.90 It should be noted here that Aboriginal approaches to „family 
violence‟ often differ from the white feminist framework that characterised early 
work in Australia on domestic violence. Within the Aboriginal conception of 
family violence, gender is but one of the factors to examine within the context of 
colonisation, dispossession, separation, and continuing disadvantage.
91
 The focus 
on women as victims within white feminist frameworks is also seen to fail to 
recognise the many levels of interaction of race, gender and victimisation that 
cross gender and racial positions within domestic violence and responses (in 
particular the white feminist emphasis on criminal justice responses).
92
 
While Indigenous preference for the term „family violence‟ is widely 
acknowledged in Australia, it is worth noting that its use is not without debate. 
Some Aboriginal women activists and services have been outspoken about their 
preference for the term „domestic violence‟ and the need to focus on the violence 
that Aboriginal women experience from their intimate male partners.
93
 
C. Definition of a cross application 
A cross application is not defined in the legislation and how they are understood 
and defined is open to some debate. That is to say that there is agreement, in the 
literature and in practice, that a cross application involves the same parties as the 
complainant and the defendant alternatively.
94
 While generally the „cross 
applicant‟ would be referred to as the person who made the application second in 
time; this is not necessarily the case, with some authors cautioning about „first in‟ 
                                                          
89 Janet Stanley, Adam Tomison & Julian Pocock, Child Abuse and Neglect in Indigenous Australian Communities 
(2003). 
90 Sue Gordon, Kay Hallahan & Darrell Henry, Putting the Picture Together: Inquiry into Response by Government 
Agencies to Complaints of Family Violence and Child Abuse in Aboriginal Communities (2002) at 31. Emphasis in 
original. 
91 Ibid at 56-57; Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Task Force on Violence (2000), at xxxi, xxxiii; Audrey Bolger, 
Aboriginal Women and Violence (1991) at 29, 34-35 and 45; and Paul Memmott, Rachael Stacy, Catherine Chambers & 
Catherine Keys, Violence in Indigenous Communities (2001) at 10-23. 
92 Heather Nancarrow, In Search of Justice in Domestic and Family Violence (MA thesis, Griffith University, 2003) at 10. 
93 See Pam Greer & Lesley Laing, Pathways to Safety: An Interview about Indigenous Family Violence with Pam Greer, 
Indigenous Training and Development Consultant (2001); Gordon et al, above n90 at 29; and Dale Bagshaw, Donna 
Chung, Murray Couch, Sandra Lilburn & Ben Waldham, Reshaping Responses to Domestic Violence: Executive 
Summary (1999) at 43.  
94 See Dimond, above n14; WLRC, above n11; Douglas & Godden, above n63 at 28. At times this definition is merely 
implicit: see Toni Dick, „Protection or Quid Pro Quo‟, paper presented at Challenging the Legal System‟s Response to 
Domestic Violence, Brisbane 23-26 March 1994, at 10-12. 
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approaches in determining who is the victim and who is not, or who is the more 
vexatious litigant and who is not (questions that arise in the label cross 
applicant).
95
 
There are however differences of opinion when temporal connections between 
the first and second application are considered. While the literature is silent on 
this question, the professionals interviewed in this thesis presented an array of 
definitions dependant on time and incident variables. All the professionals agreed 
that applications that are listed at the same time are cross applications, however 
there was considerable disagreement about whether applications made some time 
apart should be identified as cross applications, or simply as „fresh incidents‟.96  
I have taken a broad approach to the definition of „cross application‟ for the 
purposes of this thesis. Thus I have not imposed any temporal limitations and I 
have included police dual applications.
97
 The reason for this broad approach is 
twofold:  
1. as an exploratory study it seemed beneficial to adopt a broad rather than a 
narrow definition; and 
2. it complies with the approach advocated in this thesis of examining the full 
context of domestic violence rather than discrete incidents.  
However, in practical terms it has been easier, particularly in terms of the court 
file sample, to identify cross applications made around the same time, rather than 
those that were made some time apart, and thus this sample is biased in this way. 
However, the interview sample redresses this bias somewhat; four of the women 
who participated in the interviews experienced the cross application after the 
finalisation of their own ADVO application (often when their former partner was 
charged with contravening the woman‟s ADVO, or where she had sought to 
extend her original ADVO).
98
 
                                                          
95 Dick, above n94 at 12.  
96 DVLO1, DVLO5, DVLO6, MAG4, PP1, PP2, PP3, WDVCAS3, WDVCAS5 would consider applications made some 
time apart as „fresh incidents‟. This raised interesting questions for MAG2, who generally would also see these as fresh 
incidents, yet „technically it is a cross order, isn‟t it? Same parties, same piece of legislation‟, thus she concluded „maybe 
I should review [my] definition‟. 
97 One professional did not consider a police dual application a cross application: Informal interview with barrister 25 July 
2007. Dual applications are discussed in Chapter 8. 
98 See Frances, Lillian, Louise, and Rosemary.  
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D. The empirical study 
To explore cross applications detailed empirical work was undertaken. In 
summary, this thesis adopted a multi-method approach to collecting and 
analysing data (discussed in detail in Chapter 3), involving: 
1. In-depth semi-structured interviews:  
- With women involved in cross applications (n=1099) 
- With key professionals: magistrates (n=5); solicitors (n=6); police 
Domestic Violence Liaison Officers (DVLOs) (n=6); police prosecutors 
(n=5) and coordinators of Women‟s Domestic Violence Court Assistance 
Schemes (WDVCAS) (n=5).  
2. Documentary analysis of court files: 78 cross applications involving 156 
single ADVO applications were gathered from three Sydney courts over the 
period March 2002 – February 2003. 
3. Observations of local court proceedings at two large Sydney local courts 
over 2006-2007. Seven list days were observed involving 73 ADVO 
mentions and two contested cross application hearings.
100
 
The research was approved by the Human Ethics Committee, University of 
Sydney in two stages. The first stage involved interviews with women and the 
analysis of court files. The second stage involved interviews with key 
professionals. 
E. Limitations 
The methodological limitations of the data collected are detailed in Chapter 3. 
Here I briefly canvass three overriding limitations. 
i. Lack of involvement of women from different backgrounds  
No Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander women were interviewed in this study 
and only one woman was born overseas. It would have been of great benefit to 
this research to explore: whether cross applications work differently for different 
groups of women; whether different, more subtle behaviours may fail to be 
                                                          
99 Another woman was interviewed but was excluded because, while her former husband had sought an ADVO against 
her, she had decided not to seek her own ADVO despite being advised to do so by her solicitor and the WDVCAS. 
100 One of which settled on the day of the hearing. 
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accorded recognition as violence due to different cultural readings;
101
 and 
whether women from different cultural backgrounds respond differently to the 
violence they experience.
102
 There has been some suggestion from other 
jurisdictions that Aboriginal women may be more likely to fight back, and more 
likely to be penalised for taking those actions.
103
 
ii.  Lack of interviews with men  
It was originally intended that this research would involve in-depth interviews 
with men involved in cross applications. Despite attempting several different 
methods of recruitment this did not eventuate. The recruitment methods and the 
limitations created by this absence are detailed in Chapter 3. The absence of 
men‟s voices, in the same way as provided through the interviews with women, 
is a gap in this research. However, the study is exploratory and some access to 
men‟s experiences is provided through the analysis of court files. Any future 
studies in this area should investigate the best methods for recruiting men.  
iii.  Geographical limitations  
This study aims to examine a feature of the NSW ADVO system. While five 
women interviewed resided outside Sydney, most of the professionals 
interviewed and all the court files were sourced from Sydney. There may well be 
differences in the way in which cross applications are dealt with in other parts of 
NSW, thus the findings cannot be suggested to be representative (a problem 
further emphasised by the small sample size). The potential for geographical 
differences is also evident in the data gathered: for example the women who 
resided in rural areas spoke about the benefits of having the same magistrate deal 
with their cases, and other women and professionals spoke about the variability 
of magistrates between different courts.
104
 
                                                          
101 Dasgupta, „Framework for Understanding‟, above n43 at 1371-72. 
102 Dasgupta, „Just like Men‟, above n43 at 217. 
103 Eg see Nancarrow, above n92 at 67, who notes the increased incarceration of ATSI women in Queensland following 
the increased criminalisation of domestic violence. See also research which has found that African American women may 
use violence more often against their intimate partners: Carolyn West & Suzanna Rose, „Dating Aggression among Low 
Income African American Youth: An Examination of Gender Differences and Antagonistic Beliefs‟ (2000) 6 Violence 
Against Women 470 at 488; and Vicki Moss, Carol Pitula, Jacquelyn Campbell & Lois Halstead, „The Experience of 
Terminating an Abusive Relationship from an Anglo and African American Perspective: A Qualitative Descriptive Study‟ 
(1997) 18 Issues in Mental Health Nursing 433 at 447.  
104 See Chapter 9. 
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6. Structure of this thesis 
This thesis is divided into ten chapters: 
Chapter 1 (this introduction) introduces the key issues and concerns of this 
thesis, its definitional parameters, and the environment of the empirical study. 
Chapter 2 explores the debates about the gender perpetration of domestic 
violence that have animated the sociological literature. This chapter explores 
work on typologies of domestic violence as a way to explain the disparate 
research findings. It considers the „problem‟ of how we define or conceptualise 
women‟s use of violence against an intimate partner. The chapter then turns to 
the legal setting and asks what conception of domestic violence underpins the 
civil legal system‟s understanding of domestic violence. 
Chapter 3 details the methodology and its limitations, and introduces the four 
components of the empirical research. 
Chapter 4, drawing on the empirical data, provides an overview of the law, and 
its practice, in NSW to enable the reader to place the empirical findings in 
context.  
Chapter 5 explores the violence and abuse experienced by the women 
interviewed. The women experienced multiple forms of violence and abuse 
alone, and in combination, before and after separation. This chapter highlights 
the way in which women described their relationships as controlling.  
Chapter 6 profiles the nature and incidence of cross applications at the three 
court sites, and analyses the ADVO complaint narratives gathered in that court 
file sample. This chapter provides a useful counterpoint to Chapter 5. This 
chapter demonstrates the limitations of counting methods alone as a means to 
understand domestic violence (and competing claims).  
Chapter 7 analyses the nature of the cross claim in detail. This chapter explores 
the qualitative material, where available, and in this way highlights three key 
areas of difference between women‟s allegations of domestic violence and the 
claims made by male second applicants. These areas concern the presence of 
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criminal charges, the making of allegations that appear to be unable to ground an 
ADVO, and the use of a lengthy „wounded narrative‟.  
Chapter 8 examines police dual applications, a special category of cross 
applications. While dual applications represent a small proportion of cross 
applications, they are a highly problematic category. Dual applications highlight 
the dominance of incident-based definitions of domestic violence held by police.  
Chapter 9 analyses how cross applications are approached and resolved by key 
professionals working in the ADVO system. This chapter presents key areas of 
decision-making regarding cross applications: the making of interim orders, and 
the final disposition of applications. The chapter then turns to the conceptions of 
domestic violence held by key professionals.  
Chapter 10 draws together the key findings and theoretical questions that guided 
and challenged this study, and highlights areas that require further research and 
investigation. 
7. Summary 
This chapter has introduced the key concerns of this thesis: the continuing debate 
in the literature and the general community about the gendered nature of 
domestic violence. It has introduced the setting for the thesis, the ADVO system, 
the Local Court and the limited knowledge that is currently available about cross 
applications and the possible resultant mutual orders. It has briefly outlined the 
aims and methods of this study. Finally, it has explained the decision to adopt the 
term „domestic violence‟ in this thesis and some of the critical discussion about 
terminology in this field. 
29 
 
2. Conceptions of domestic 
violence 
Despite an assumed, almost self-evident core, „violence‟ as a term is ambiguous and its 
usage is in many ways moulded by different people as well as by different social 
scientists to describe a whole range of events, feelings and harm....
105
 
This chapter begins to explore what conception of domestic violence underpins 
the NSW ADVO system; this exploration is extended through the empirical 
analysis presented in Chapters 4-9. Central to this task is an examination of the 
debate that has raged between family violence and feminist researchers, 
introduced in Chapter 1, regarding whether the perpetration of domestic violence 
is gendered. The focus of this chapter is to explore the key differences in the 
definition and conception of domestic violence that typifies these two strands of 
research. These definitional or conceptual frameworks underpin how we 
understand men‟s and women‟s use of violence against an intimate partner and 
whether such acts should be labelled and responded to as domestic violence. This 
chapter examines these definitional and conceptual differences in order to ask 
questions of the civil protection order system, and cross applications in particular 
which, at face value, suggest gender equivalence and mutuality in the use of 
violence and abuse. As documented in Chapters 5-8 this apparent gender 
equivalence is not sustained by the data analysed in this thesis. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the sociological debate has been paid scant attention within legal 
responses to domestic violence, yet it resonates with the legal system‟s focus 
(particularly that of the criminal justice system) on discrete incidents of violence.  
1. The competing sociological research 
A. Family violence research: Conflict theory and discrete acts 
Since 1975, when the first National Family Violence Survey (USA) was 
conducted,
106
 there has been a growing body of research, referred to as „family 
                                                          
105 Elizabeth Stanko, „Introduction‟ in Elizabeth Stanko (ed), The Meanings of Violence (2000) at 2-3. 
106 There have been two National Family Violence Surveys: (1975) with one person in a married/cohabitating relationship 
in 2143 households; and (1985) with 6002 households: Straus, „The National Family Violence Surveys‟ above n35 at 3-4. 
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violence research‟,107 that has found that men and women are equally violent, 
and in some cases women are more violent, in their intimate relationships.
108
 As 
noted in Chapter 1, many of these studies use the CTS,
109
 or similar act-based 
instruments.
110
 Straus and Gelles, for example, found in the 1985 National 
Survey that 12.4 per cent of cohabitating or married women reported using 
violence
111
 against their male partner in the previous year, compared to 11.6 per 
cent of cohabitating or married men.
112
 Furthermore, 4.8 per cent of the women 
who used violence reported using „severe violence‟113 compared to 3.4 per cent 
of the men.
114
  
The CTS is based on „conflict theory‟, which is premised on the notion that 
conflict is „an inevitable part of all human association‟, however, how people 
respond to conflict varies.
115
 The opening paragraph to the administration of the 
CTS illustrates this emphasis: 
No matter how well a couple gets along, there are times when they disagree, get 
annoyed with the other person, want different things from each other, or just have spats 
or fights because they‟re in a bad mood, are tired, or for some other reason. Couples also 
have many different ways of trying to settle their differences. This is a list of things that 
might happen when you have differences...
116  
Thus the CTS seeks to measure the various „conflict tactics‟ a person might use 
to resolve disputes: reasoning (for example, „discussed [the] issue calmly‟), 
verbal aggression (for example, „insulted or swore‟), and violence or physical 
aggression (for example, kicking, hitting or using a weapon).
117
 Feminist 
                                                          
107 The focus on the „family‟ is also important. Family violence theorists see domestic violence as part of a continuum of 
violence exercised between different family members. This does not mean different forms of family violence are 
approached as the same phenomenon, rather that there are common elements and connections across the different types: 
Murray Straus, „Ordinary Violence‟, above n37 at 214-15. 
108 Michael Kimmel estimated that over 100 studies had reached this conclusion: „”Gender Symmetry” in Domestic 
Violence: A Substantive and Methodological Research Review‟ (2002) 8 Violence Against Women 1332 at 1333. See also 
Fiebert, above n35; and Archer, „Sex Differences in Aggression‟, above n35. 
109 Straus, „Measuring Conflict and Violence‟, above n34.  
110 Eg see the Family Interaction module of the International Social Science Survey Australia (IsssA) used in Headey et al, 
above n35. 
111 Defined as „an act carried out with the intention, or perceived intention, of causing physical pain or injury to another 
person‟: Richard Gelles, „Methodological Issues in the Study of Family Violence‟ in Straus & Gelles (eds), above n35 at 
21.  
112 Murray Straus & Richard Gelles, „How Violent Are American Families? Estimates from the National Family Violence 
Resurvey and Other Studies‟ in Straus & Gelles, above n35, Table 6.1, at 97.  
113 Defined as „acts that have a relatively high probability of causing an injury‟: Gelles, „Methodological Issues‟, above 
n111 at 16. 
114 Straus & Gelles, „How Violent Are American Families‟, above n112 at 97.  
115 Straus et al, „CTS2‟, above n34 at 284. 
116 Ibid at 310. 
117 Ibid. 
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researchers have criticised this focus on conflict, arguing that it ignores violence 
motivated by factors other than conflict, notably the „control-instigated‟ violence 
experienced by many women.
118
  
The CTS poses questions about these various „conflict tactics‟ in a behaviourally 
specific format (for example, have you „twisted [your] partner‟s arm or hair‟, 
„…pushed or shoved [your] partner‟). This is both a strength (because it avoids 
contentious or ambiguous terms such as „violence‟, „abuse‟ or „crime‟)119 and a 
limitation (because the identification of a discrete act does not reveal anything 
about the context of that act at that time or within the relationship more 
broadly).
120
 The CTS is generally administered to people in intact 
relationships,
121
 and ideally a person provides responses about their own acts, as 
well as those perpetrated by their partner, during the previous year.
122
 
The CTS originally concentrated on physical forms of violence,
123
 which were 
assessed for severity (for example, shoving was designated as „minor‟, and 
„beating up‟ or using a weapon as „severe‟). This was expanded in the CTS2 to 
include sexual coercion and psychological aggression.
124
 While these are 
welcome additions, the CTS2 still omits countless acts and behaviours that 
women (and some men) report as part of their experience of domestic 
violence.
125
 It is in terms of physical violence that most claims about gender 
symmetry centre, where studies consistently find that men and women perpetrate 
                                                          
118 Walter DeKeseredy & Martin Schwartz, Measuring the Extent of Woman Abuse in Intimate Heterosexual 
Relationships: A Critique of the Conflict Tactics Scale (1988) at 2-3; Ferraro, above n43 at 40; and Kimmel, above n108 
at 1341, 1342. 
119 Straus et al, „CTS2‟, above n34 at 284, 285; and Gelles, „Methodological Issues‟, above n111 at 19, 24. Compare 
Gayla Margolin, „The Multiple Forms of Aggressiveness Between Marital Partners: How do we Identify Them? (1987) 
13 Journal of Marital and Family Therapy 77 at 82 where she notes that even the CTSs specific questions are open to 
interpretation. Eg a couple in her study who indicated that they had „kicked‟ each other revealed this was a playful 
activity engaged in in bed. The issue of interpretation has been a particular criticism levelled at crime surveys: see Patricia 
Tjaden &Nancy Thoennes, „Prevalence and Consequences of Male-to-Female and Female-to-Male Intimate Partner 
Violence as Measured by the National Violence Against Women Survey‟ (2000) 6 Violence Against Women 142 at 157.  
120 See DeKeseredy & Schwartz, above n118 at 3-4; and Dobash & Dobash „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 329-30. 
121 It does not ask about violence perpetrated by a former partner; an area where women report greater, and often more 
severe, victimisation: see Kimmel, above n108 at 1350-51. 
122 See discussion of the administration of the CTS in Murray Straus, „Conflict Tactics Scales‟ in Encyclopedia of 
Domestic Violence (2007). 
123 See Straus‟ rationale for this focus: „The Controversy over Domestic Violence by Women: A Methodological, 
Theoretical, and Sociology of Science Analysis‟ in Ximena Arriaga & Stuart Oskamp (eds), Violence in Intimate 
Relationships (1999) at 20-22.  
124 Straus et al, „CTS2‟, above n34. 
125 DeKeseredy & Schwartz, above n118 at 2. See Chapter 5 which details the broad experiences wide-ranging 
violence/abuse experienced by the women interviewed for this thesis. 
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physical violence at similar rates.
126
 However it is important to note that gender 
symmetry has also been found in the use of psychological aggression,
127
 and in 
some cases sexual aggression or coercion.
128
 As mentioned above, these findings 
focus on the mere presence of the act/behaviour and not its context; thus 
behaviour that might be recorded as psychological aggression (for example, 
„insulted or swore at my partner‟, „shouted or yelled at my partner‟129), might 
indeed be perpetrated by men and women at equal rates, but whether such 
behaviour should be labelled „domestic violence‟ requires consideration of a 
range of contextual issues such as how that act functions in the relationship, what 
other acts/behaviours have been perpetrated, and so on. 
To add some context the CTS2 incorporated questions about injuries,
130
 in 
recognition that the same act may impact differently on the target dependent inter 
alia on whether the act was exercised by a man or a woman. Invariably studies 
that included such questions have found that, despite an equivalent use of 
physical violence, women were more likely than men to sustain injuries (often 
from minor acts) and to require medical treatment.
131
 Questions were generally 
confined to physical injuries and did not take account of gender differences in 
psychological impact.
132
  
Not only is the finding of symmetry in the use of physical violence contested, but 
also the accompanying finding of „mutuality‟. Jan Stets and Murray Straus, for 
example, found that in relationships where violence occurred this was 
perpetrated by both parties „in about half of the cases‟, while in a quarter of the 
cases only the man used violence and in the remaining quarter only the woman 
                                                          
126 Suzanne Swan, Laura Gambone, Jennifer Caldwell, Tami Sullivan & David Snow, „A Review of Research on 
Women‟s Use of Violence With Male Intimate Partners (2008) 23 Violence & Victims 301 at 302. Eg studies that have 
reached this conclusion: Straus, „Physical Assaults by Wives‟, above n33 at 69; Headey et al, above n35 at 58; and Holly 
Orcutt, Marilyn Garcia & Scott Pickett, „Female-perpetrated Intimate Partner Violence and Romantic Attachment Style in 
a College Student Sample‟ (2005) 20 Violence Against Women 287 at 291-292. 
127 Swan et al, „Review of Research‟ above n126 at 303-04.  
128 See studies cited in Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 327. Compare Swan et al, „Review of 
Research‟, above n126 at 302-03 which found that men were much more likely to perpetrate sexual aggression. 
129 Straus et al, „CTS2‟, above n34 at 308. 
130 Ibid at 205, 309. 
131 Swan et al, „Review of Research‟, above n126 at 305. 
132 WHO, Women‟s Mental Health: An Evidence Based Review (2000) ch 4; and VicHealth, The Health Costs of 
Violence: Measuring the Burden of Disease Caused by Intimate Partner Violence: A Summary of Findings (2004) at 20-
21. 
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used violence.
133
 In an Australian study, relying on an act-based instrument 
similar to the CTS, Headey and colleagues found that 54 per cent of respondents 
who indicated that they had been physically assaulted also admitted assaulting 
their partner.
134
 This led the authors to conclude that „violence runs in 
couples‟.135 The use of the term „mutual‟, and related terms such as 
„bidirectional‟ or „reciprocal‟,136 suggest that the use of violence by both parties 
is equivalent, of the same import and consequences. However, in the absence of 
information about the context of usage such terms are misleading as they fail to 
reveal the motivation behind the acts or the way that the same acts may have 
different meanings and consequences in the relationship. 
There have been many methodological and epistemological criticisms of CTS-
based research and research reliant on similar act-based instruments. Some of 
these criticisms have been mentioned: the inadequacy of the theoretical 
framework of conflict;
137
 the limited focus on physical acts of violence;
138
 and 
that counting discrete acts fails to reveal anything about the context of the act 
(both at the time and more broadly).
139
 In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
the CTS fails to consider that the meaning of a „violent‟ or abusive act is 
generated and interpreted in the interactional setting.
140
 That is to say that the 
CTS does not consider the way in which the people involved play a role in 
constructing and defining acts as violent or not.
141
 
Other criticisms of the CTS include that it:  
                                                          
133 Jan Stets & Murray Straus, „Gender Differences in Reporting Marital Violence and its Medical and Psychological 
Consequences‟, in Straus & Gelles, above n35 at 161. 
134 Headey et al, above n35 at 59. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Eg see, Raul Caetano, Sushasini Ramisetty-Mikler & Craig Field, „Unidirectional and Bidirectional Intimate Partner 
Violence Among White, Black and Hispanic Couples in the United States‟ (2005) 20 Violence & Victims 393; Felicity 
Goodyear-Smith & Tannis Laidlaw, „Aggressive Acts and Assaults in Intimate Relationships: Towards an Understanding 
of the Literature‟ (1999) 17 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 285.  
137 Ferraro, above n43 at 40; DeKeseredy & Schwartz, above n118 at 2-3; Dale Bagshaw & Donna Chung, Women, Men 
and Domestic Violence (2000) at 56; and Kersti Yllö, „Through a Feminist Lens: Gender, Power and Violence‟ in Gelles 
& Loseke (eds), above n33 at 51-3. 
138 See above n125 and infra text. 
139 See Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 327-328; Bagshaw & Chung, above n137 at 5-6; and 
DeKeseredy & Schwartz, above n118 at 2, 3-4. 
140 See John Baldwin, „Research on the Criminal Courts‟ in Roy King & Emma Wincup (eds), Doing Research on Crime 
and Justice (2000) at 242.  
141 Cavanagh et al, above n39 at 699. See also Taylor & Mouzos, above n49 at 2; Mary Ann Dutton, „Understanding 
Women‟s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Women Syndrome‟ (1993) 21 Hofstra Law 
Review 1191 at 1207. In relation to sexual violence see Liz Kelly, „Journeying in Reverse: Possibilities and Problems in 
Feminist Research on Sexual Violence‟ in Lorraine Gelsthorpe & Allison Morris (eds), Feminist Perspectives in 
Criminology (1990) at 109. 
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 Ranks acts in a hierarchical fashion making assumptions that psychological 
abuse is less serious than physical violence, and that certain acts of physical 
violence are more serious and injurious than others. Such an approach 
ignores the research that indicates that many women report psychological 
abuse as the most damaging.
142
  
 Ignores the different meaning, and consequences, acts might have in different 
cultures.
143
  
 Is generally confined to acts that have occurred in the past year thus failing 
to consider the way in which an earlier act of violence may continue to 
maintain its power over time. As Kimmel states, „this might capture some 
version of reality but does not capture an ongoing systematic pattern of abuse 
and violence over many years‟.144 
 Assumes that men and women provide „unbiased, reliable accounts of their 
own violent behaviour and that of their partner‟.145 Research has indicated 
that men tend to deny, minimise and transfer blame for their violent acts; in 
comparison women appear to readily admit their own acts of violence.
146
 
It is important to note that the criticisms levelled at the CTS, and similar act-
based instruments, are not simply about quantitative versus qualitative 
methodologies, rather they address the underlying „concept formation‟ of the 
research:
147
 the questions that are asked, how researchers assess responses, and 
what researchers think responses reveal. Surveys using the CTS, and similar 
instruments, have played an important role in „sensitizing the media, government 
officials, and members of the general public‟ about the scale and nature of 
domestic violence.
148
 In this way, the CTS is a valuable tool. It is a reliable
149
 
                                                          
142 DeKeseredy & Schwartz, above n118 at 2; Ferraro, above n43 at 16. 
143 Dasgupta, „Framework for Understanding‟, above n43 at 1371-72. 
144 Kimmel, above n108 at 1341. See also Bagshaw & Chung, above n137 at 6. 
145 Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 327. 
146 See Dobash et al, „Myth of Sexual Symmetry‟, above n19; Kimmel, above n108 at 1344-46; and Miller & Meloy, 
above n43 at 105. 
147 Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 332. 
148 DeKeseredy & Schwartz, above n118 at 1.  
149 The extent to which an „indicator consistently comes up with the same measurement‟: David de Vaus, Research 
Design in Social Research (2001) at 29. Emphasis in original. 
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and valid
150
 research instrument and remains the most widely used survey tool to 
measure the prevalence of domestic violence, and other forms of family 
violence.
151
 Family violence and feminist researchers have both used the CTS in 
whole or in part.
152
 However, like all measurement tools it has strengths and 
limitations, and, as the criticism detailed above has indicated, when considering 
the findings of act-based instruments we need to be attentive to whether they 
simply tell us about the presence of acts of physical violence (and on occasion 
other forms of violence and abuse) between intimate partners and not whether 
these acts form part of „domestic violence‟.  
B. Feminist research: A continuum of violence and abuse to 
exert ‘control’ 
In contrast to the approach of family violence researchers, feminist research has 
been engaged much more extensively (although not exclusively) with qualitative 
research methods
153
 with generally small samples of women, often accessed via 
refuges, police, courts or hospitals. This research has highlighted other critical 
dimensions to the experience of domestic violence, notably the function of 
control, the broad range of acts and behaviours involved, and its repetition and 
frequency. Through this work, feminist researchers have found that women are 
the predominant victims of domestic violence (a view supported by official 
statistics
154), and that women‟s use of violence is qualitatively and quantitatively 
different to that of men‟s.155 Importantly these understandings of domestic 
violence have been drawn directly from women‟s experiences, and the meanings 
                                                          
150 That a construct measures what it intended to measure: David de Vaus, Surveys in Social Research (1985) at 47. As de 
Vaus explains it is not the measure itself that is valid but rather the „use to which the measure is put‟: at 47. The validity 
of the CTS has also been challenged: see Dobash et al, „Myth of Sexual Symmetry‟, above n19 at 77-8; Russell Dobash, 
Rebecca Dobash, Kate Cavanagh & Ruth Lewis, „Separate and Intersecting Realities: A Comparison on Men‟s and 
Women‟s Accounts of Violence Against Women‟ (1998) 4 Violence Against Women 382 at 385; Margolin, above n119 at 
81-82; and Kurz, „Physical Assaults by Husbands‟, above n33 at 94. 
151 Ferarro, above n44 at 18. 
152 Eg feminist studies that have employed modified versions of the CTS: García-Moreno et al, above n88; and Tjaden & 
Thoennes, above n119.  
153 See discussion about the traditional preference for qualitative methods in feminist research and the increasing use of 
quantitative methods in Sue Griffiths & Jalna Hanmer, „Feminist Quantitative Methodology: Evaluating Policing of 
Domestic Violence‟ in Tina Skinner, Marianne Hester & Ellen Malos (eds), Researching Gender Violence: Feminist 
Methodology in Action (2005). 
154 See Chapter 1. 
155 Dobash et al, „Myth of Sexual Symmetry‟, above n19 at 72.  
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that women themselves ascribed to the acts and behaviours used against them 
(rather than the meanings ascribed by the researcher).
156
 
Feminist(s) definitions of domestic violence extend beyond a focus on discrete 
incidents to include the context of the use of violence. This has three key 
dimensions:
157
 
1. the repetitive, cumulative, patterned environment in which violence and 
abuse is exercised; 
2. the function of the use of violence and abuse to exert power and control, or 
coercive control, over the victim; and  
3. the broad contextual framework that connects the use of violence and abuse 
to the positions and privileges of men in comparison to women in society.
158
 
As noted in Chapter 1, this does not mean that feminist research fails to take 
account of intersecting factors such as race, class and sexuality, rather it 
emphasises the importance of recognising gender in any understanding of 
domestic violence.
159
 
One device commonly used to depict „power and control‟ is the „wheel‟ 
developed by the Domestic Abuse Intervention Program, Duluth Minnesota 
USA.
160
 This wheel was developed as a result of listening directly to women who 
had experienced domestic violence.
161
 It illustrates the range of tools, tactics and 
                                                          
156 Yllö, „Through a Feminist Lens‟, above n137 at 54. Eg see the development of the power and control wheel discussed 
below. See also Cavanagh et al, above n39 at 698-99. 
157 Some feminists have applied Urie Bronfenbrenner‟s ecological framework to explore domestic violence and women‟s 
use of violence. Bronfenbrenner developed this framework to explain child development through the interaction of four 
environmental levels: (1) the microsystem or individual/personal level; (2) the mesosystem which includes close settings 
such as the family; (3) the exosystem which includes work, the neighbourhood and government agencies; and (4) the 
macrosystem which is the level of culture and the broader society: see „Toward and Experimental Ecology of Human 
Development‟ (1997) American Psychologist 513. For application of this framework to domestic violence see García-
Moreno et al, above n88; Lori Heise, „Violence Against Women: An Integrated, Ecological Framework‟ (1998) 4 
Violence Against Women 262; Mark Fondacaro & Shelly Jackson, „The Legal and Psychosocial Context of Family 
Violence: Toward a Social Ecological Analysis‟ (1999) 21 Law & Policy 91; Dasgupta, „Framework for Understanding‟, 
above n43; and Mary Ann Dutton, Lisa Goodman & James Schmidt, Development and Validation of a Coercive Control 
Measure for Intimate Partner Violence: Final Technical Report (2005) at 6. The applicability of Bronfenbrenner‟s model 
is beyond this thesis: it is mentioned here to underscore the extent to which feminists engage with the contextual 
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Women‟ in Martha Straus (ed), Abuse and Victimization Across the Lifespan (1988) at 243; Stark, above n84 at 5; 
Rebecca Dobash & Russell Dobash, Violence Against Wives: A Case Against the Patriarchy (1979); Kersti Yllö & 
Michelle Bograd (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse (1988); and Dasgupta, „Framework for Understanding‟, 
above n43 at 1367-68. 
159 Stubbs, above n22; Schneider, above n19 at 62-65. 
160 See <http://www.duluth-model.org/documents/PhyVio.pdf> (26 January 2009). See also Ellen Pence & Michael 
Paymar, Education Groups for Men Who Batter: The Duluth Model (1993). 
161 Ptacek, above n13 at 172. Reference omitted. 
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behaviours used by perpetrators against their current/former partners, including: 
coercion and threats, intimidation, economic abuse, male privilege, the use of 
children, isolation tactics, and emotional abuse. It also includes the way in which 
perpetrators minimise, deny and blame others, or external factors, for their use of 
violence.
162
 The use of violence, physical and sexual, depicted as the rim of the 
wheel, operates as a powerful binding mechanism. These multiple and varied 
acts/behaviours are repeated, alone and in combination, to reinforce the coercive 
power of the perpetrator over the victim.  
In another way James Ptacek uses the concept of „social entrapment‟ to indicate 
the processes involved in domestic violence, and the powerful connections the 
use of violence and abuse to control women has on the availability and role of 
social and community institutions. As Ptacek states, „social entrapment 
emphasizes the inescapably social dimension of women‟s vulnerability to men‟s 
violence, women‟s experience of violence, and women‟s ability to resist and 
escape‟.163  
The breadth of acts and behaviours (well illustrated in the power and control 
wheel) identified by feminist researchers as part of domestic violence has been 
critical in broadening societies‟ understanding of „what counts as domestic 
violence‟.164 As Liz Kelly (who was particularly concerned with definitions of 
sexual violence) pointed out, feminist work has been crucial in resisting 
dominant, masculine concepts of what counts as violence and thus expanding 
definitions of violence.
165
 Expanding our understanding of what is domestic 
violence is important as it impacts on what society interprets as normal behaviour 
and conversely, behaviour warranting attention.
166
  
While the work of feminist researchers and advocates has considerably enhanced 
our understanding of domestic violence, areas of weakness remain concerning 
                                                          
162 See also Cavanagh et al, above n39. See Chapter 7. 
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165 Liz Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence (1988) at 27. 
166 Ibid. 
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how effectively the centrality of coercive control has been translated into 
understandings, and measurements, of domestic violence.
167
 
Evan Stark, in his most recent book, argued that the domestic violence movement 
has stalled because it emphasised „violence‟ and failed to articulate effectively 
the function of control.
168
 So while control is invariably mentioned in feminist 
definitions of domestic violence,
169
 and, in turn, the definitions adopted by many 
services and agencies,
170
 Stark argues that control has not been translated beyond 
this definitional stance into research design or appropriate service responses 
(particularly legal responses). This means that services and legislation continue 
to respond to discrete acts of violence, despite often being the result of extensive 
feminist advocacy. This failure can be seen in the way that some researchers 
have failed to make connections between the function of control and the broad 
range of acts of violence and abuse emphasised by feminists as part of domestic 
violence. A good illustration of this problem is provided in Linda Mills‟ work. 
While Mills adopts a broad definition of domestic violence, she fails to connect 
the presence these acts/behaviours to the function of control, thus leading her to 
conclude that „we have all experienced domestic violence‟, that it is „part of all 
our lives‟.171 In this way Mills confuses acts that are hurtful, with acts that are 
part of domestic violence, and in so doing, depletes meaning from the phrase 
„domestic violence‟. This is not so different to the criticism levelled at family 
violence research for failing to examine acts of physical violence in context to 
determine whether they are employed as a tool to effect control, or for some 
other purpose (self-defence, protection, retaliation or anger).  
Failing to emphasise the function of control has also left the language of „abuse‟ 
open to be co-opted to address behaviours that the term „domestic violence‟ was 
never intended to address. This argument has been made in different ways by 
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Dobash and Dobash (who point out that we need to be careful about conflating 
acts of violence and abuse as if they were the same thing with the same 
consequences),
172
 and Michael Flood (who points out that some men have been 
able to successfully usurp the language of domestic violence to include hurtful 
and unfortunate acts, by „re-nam[ing] their…experiences of verbal conflict, 
name-calling, and stereotypically “nagging” as “verbal and emotional 
abuse”‟).173 
The identification and measurement of „coercive control‟ is an area of current 
research. Studies have varied in their approach; many have attempted to measure 
control within „broader measures of psychological abuse, [which] are neither 
comprehensive nor internally consistent‟.174 It has only been in recent years that 
Evan Stark, and Mary Ann Dutton and colleagues have brought a „more 
theoretical approach‟ to coercive control that moves away from merely listing the 
types of behaviours that might evidence its presence.
175
 Dutton and colleagues, 
who define coercive control as „a dynamic process linking a demand with a 
credible threatened negative consequence for non compliance‟,176 have 
developed and validated
177
 a tool to measure control. The tool is based on a 
conceptualisation of control as interacting with, and interdependent on, the 
existence of violence and abuse; control is not approached as a separate variable 
(as is characteristic of approaches that incorporate control under the rubric of 
„psychological abuse‟ or isolation tactics). The tool devised by Dutton and 
colleagues has three interrelated scales: demands (for example, that a person 
maintains a certain appearance, or that a person limits their time outside the 
home);
178
 coercion (for example, threatening a person if s/he reports the violence 
and abuse to the police or to others);
179
 and surveillance (for example stalking, or 
                                                          
172 Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 332, 334.  
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Contemporary Issues in Adult Sexual Assault in NSW (2003) at 13. Available at 
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174 Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa Goodman, „Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Towards a New Conceptualization‟ 
(2005) 11/12 Sex Roles 743-44. 
175 Johnson, „Typology of Domestic Violence‟, above n37 at 14. 
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monitoring travel away from the home).
180
 It also measures the victim‟s response 
to these measures (for example, „I did what my partner wanted‟).181 Importantly 
Dutton and colleagues emphasise the role of context in understanding the 
meaning and function of these behaviours; without such context acts/behaviours 
such as „threatening to leave your partner if he does not stop his violence‟ might 
be misinterpreted as control rather than a „socially acceptable‟ threat.182 
Work on „coercive control‟, as a theoretical concept and as behaviour(s) to be 
measured, is of particular importance as the field continues to debate the 
gendered perpetration of domestic violence, a debate that has taken on a renewed 
focus as a consequence of the increasing arrest of women for domestic violence 
offences in the USA: Are these women engaging in domestic violence? Do they 
use violence for controlling purposes? How do we conceptualise, and respond to, 
women‟s use of violence against an intimate partner? 
C. Women’s use of violence 
While many feminist researchers recognise that women are capable of 
violence,
183
 women‟s use of violence in the domestic setting has, until recently, 
been neglected except in the context of lethal violence.
184
 There are many 
reasons for this reticence. Examining women‟s use of intimate partner violence 
might: undermine women‟s access to specialist services, reinforce notions that 
violence is a relationship issue, blame women for the violence that they 
experience, and distract attention from the perpetrator of domestic violence by 
focusing on women who „fight back‟.185  
In this section I explore two interrelated dimensions of research on women‟s use 
of violence: (1) gender differences in the context of, or motivations for, the use 
of domestic violence; and (2) recognition of the multiple and strategic ways that 
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women respond to the violence they experience. These are important to the 
exploration of cross applications which not only raise gender differences in the 
use of intimate partner violence, but also illustrates the way that some women do 
indeed „fight back‟, as a response strategy, against the violence they experience. 
i. The context for using violence 
One of the key criticisms feminist researchers have raised against the findings of 
family violence research has centred on the contention that much of the violence 
perpetrated by women recorded by the CTS would be acts of self-defence.
186
 
Self-defence is, however, a complex issue
187
 with a particular legal meaning 
(evidenced by the profound difficulties women who kill their violent partners 
have in claiming this defence
188
). While self-defence might account for some 
women‟s use of violence, it fails to describe all women‟s use of violence against 
their intimate partner.
189
 The complex and legal nature of self-defence led 
Johnson and Ferraro to prefer the phrase „violent resistance‟ to describe women‟s 
use of violence in response to their own victimisation.
190
  
Research has highlighted varied motivations for women‟s use of violence. Swan 
and colleagues, for example, in their study of 108 women who had used violence 
against their intimate partner in the previous six months,
191
 found that women 
nominated multiple motivations including: self-defence (75%); retribution (to get 
even with their male partner for something he had done) (45%); and to exert 
„control‟ (to get their partner to do something or refrain from doing something) 
(38%).
192
 Susan Miller,
193
 in her observations of women participating in a 
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at 87. 
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domestic violence offender program, characterised the women as having 
perpetrated three types of violent behaviour: defensive (65%),
194
 „frustration 
response‟ (an „end of her rope‟ response) (30%)195, and „generalized violent 
behaviour‟ (where the woman was also violent towards others) (5%).196 Poco 
Kernsmith, who surveyed 125 men and women participating in „batterer 
intervention counselling‟ in Los Angeles,197 found that the women were more 
likely than men to report „using violence in response to previous abuse‟ rather 
than to exert power and control. No significant differences were found in the use 
of violence in self-defence, however, women were more likely than men to 
„report using violence to get back at…or punish a partner‟.198 
Research in this field has also highlighted other reasons for women‟s use of 
violence, for example: to „demand[] attention, express[] anger, escap[e] abuse, 
and punish[] the abuser‟;199 and „to stand up for themselves in an attempt to 
salvage their self-worth, to get their partners‟ attention, [and] to earn their 
partners‟ respect‟.200 
A common theme in this research is that, while not all women‟s violence can be 
characterised as self-defence, a woman‟s experience of victimisation was an 
„important contextual factor‟ in understanding her motivation for using 
violence.
201
 For example, in the study conducted by Swan and colleagues 
mentioned above, nearly all of the women (102/108) had experienced an act of 
physical or sexual violence in the previous year.
202
 Thus, in a subsequent 
literature review, Swan and colleagues concluded that „many domestically 
violent women – especially those who are involved with the criminal justice 
system – are not the sole perpetrators of violence‟.203  
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ii. Women’s multiple and varied responses to violence 
Women victims of domestic violence have traditionally been characterised as 
passive and submissive (powerfully depicted in Lenore Walker‟s work on the 
„battered woman syndrome‟204). The prospect that women use violence against 
their intimate partner directly challenges this perception and draws on the 
extensive debates about women‟s victimisation and agency.205 
Research on women‟s agency has emphasised the multiple and strategic ways in 
which women respond to and negotiate the violence that they experience.
206
 
Mary Ann Dutton, for example, has identified that women respond to violence by 
drawing on personal measures (such as compliance, escape, resistance and 
defending oneself), informal measures (such as enlisting family and friends to 
assist), and formal measures (such as contacting the police or taking legal 
action).
207
  
Some cultures may also be less proscriptive of women using violence, thus some 
groups of women may resort to using violence more often than others.
208
 In 
addition, some groups of women may have fewer options. Some women, for 
example, have encountered poor responses from the police in the past, informed 
by race and gender, which may mean that contacting the police is not seen as an 
attractive or feasible option.
209
 For these women violence may be identified as a 
useful, or perhaps the only, option to reduce or stop the violence. 
Despite increasing recognition of women‟s varied responses to their 
victimisation, tension between viewing women victims as passive and 
submissive (and hence „true‟ or „genuine‟ victims) and as agents who may 
respond to domestic violence with violence (and hence not „deserving‟ victims) 
remains. Research on women arrested for domestic violence offences in the USA 
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has highlighted not only gender differences in the perpetration of violence, but 
also how the arrest of some women is connected to idealised notions of who is a 
„true‟ victim. As Susan Miller and Michelle Meloy explain: 
…although mandatory and/or pro arrest policies aim to eliminate discretion based on 
race, class, or even gender, it is possible that women who do not conform to gendered 
notions of a so-called pure or good victim (ie nice, delicate, passive), but rather are more 
„masculine‟ (ie mouthy, aggressive toward police, drunk) are the ones who will continue 
to face arrest. When women use violence, they may evoke different reactions from 
authorities because their behaviour contradicts gender role assumptions of 
submissiveness.
210
 
Binary categories such as „true‟ versus „untrue‟ (or „undeserving‟) victims, and 
victim and perpetrator/offender,
211
 are dominant within legal discourses and legal 
responses to domestic violence. As Miller and Meloy note: 
The need to dichotomize violent relationship constellations into victim and perpetrator 
categories is characteristic of an incident based criminal justice system, where a single 
act of violence committed by a woman can eclipse an entire history of victimization.
212
  
Thus the legal system finds it hard to see women who use violence, or women 
who fight back, as victims of domestic violence.
213
 The failure of the legal 
system, and family violence research, to examine the context of the use of 
discrete acts, has led to the deployment of the labels of victim and perpetrator by 
sole reference to a single act. Such an approach fails to appreciate the context of 
victimisation, and fails to describe accurately what is domestic violence (by 
reference to control), and what is not. This has meant that some women‟s use of 
violence (and that of some men‟s) may be inappropriately labelled as domestic 
violence, and as a result these women may be directed, as has been the case in 
the USA, to programs designed to address „domestic violence‟, and in particular 
designed to address men‟s use of domestic violence.214 Note that this concern is 
not meant to suggest that some acts of violence (whether perpetrated by men or 
women) don‟t warrant legal attention, but rather whether it is appropriate to 
respond with a „domestic violence‟ response. 
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D. Different types of intimate partner violence  
Since the mid 1980s an increasing number of researchers have explored the 
notion that there are different types of domestic violence.
215
 Michael Johnson and 
colleagues have conducted the most extensive work in this area.
216
 This work has 
been designed to explain the different findings regarding gender symmetry, and 
to guide appropriate responses. Johnson, with Kathleen Ferraro, posited that 
there are four types of domestic violence
217
 characterised by the presence (or 
absence) of control:
218
 
 Intimate terrorism (previously termed „patriarchal terrorism‟). This is the 
form of violence conjured by the term „domestic violence‟. It is characterised 
by coercive control and is likely to involve frequent, serious violence that 
escalates over time. It is predominantly perpetrated by men against women. 
 Situational couple violence (previously termed „common couple violence‟). 
This type of violence tends to be incident, or situation, specific. It is not 
characterised by control and is not a pattern of behaviour, rather it tends to be 
focused on a specific argument. According to Johnson and Ferraro situational 
couple violence is generally infrequent, involves less serious acts of violence, 
does not escalate, and is perpetrated by both men and women generally on a 
mutual basis.
219
  
 Violent resistance. This describes the use of violence by a person in response 
to their experience of intimate terrorism, and as noted above, is preferred to 
the more restrictive concept of self-defence. This form of violence is 
perpetrated almost entirely by women. 
 Mutual violent control. This describes those situations where both partners 
use violence to control the other and hence can be viewed as „two intimate 
terrorists battling for control‟. Johnson and Ferraro note that this form of 
violence is „rare‟ and little is known about it.220 
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Applying this typology, Johnson argues that family violence researchers and 
feminist researchers have reached different conclusions regarding the symmetry 
of domestic violence because the samples relied upon are „biased‟ towards 
capturing different types of domestic violence. Johnson argues that family 
violence researchers capture „situational couple violence‟ because the sample 
relied upon (randomised population surveys), while assumed to produce unbiased 
results, are in fact biased by the „rate of refusal‟.221 Johnson suggests that victims 
of intimate terrorism are likely to refuse to participate in such surveys due to fear 
and the possible presence of the perpetrator at the time of the survey.
222
 In turn, 
Johnson argues that feminist research, reliant on small samples frequently 
derived from the police, courts, refuges and so on (which are likely to involve the 
most serious cases), are biased towards capturing cases of „intimate terrorism‟.  
This work on different types of domestic violence is important. It underscores the 
argument of this thesis that not all acts of violence perpetrated by an intimate 
partner are acts of domestic violence; that we need to know more about the 
context of perpetration before such labels can be deployed. Hence Johnson‟s 
work, which draws on feminist work that has always emphasised coercive 
control as integral to the definition of what is domestic violence and what is not, 
is attractive.
223
 However, whether a formalised typology is necessary, implying 
some kind of scientific validity, is open to question. While the applicability of 
Johnson‟s model (or indeed that proposed by other researchers) is beyond the 
data gathered in this thesis (as noted in Chapter 1), it represents an important 
underlying theme and development in the research literature. For these reasons, I 
highlight my concerns with its formulation and application, and in later chapters 
raise questions, where relevant, about its role and applicability in the context of 
cross applications. As Johnson himself recognises, this work on differentiation is 
in its „infancy‟ and requires further investigation.224  
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i.  Concerns with Johnson’s typology 
I have four main concerns with Johnson‟s typology and its potential usage. 
First, Johnson appears to rely on sample bias as the sole explanation for the 
different findings regarding gender symmetry. This approach sidesteps whether 
the contradictory results stem from the concept formation underlying the 
respective research (outlined above). In this way Johnson bypasses the 
substantive critiques and debates that have flown in both directions over the last 
30 years, which involve much more than simply the inaccurate labeling of acts as 
domestic violence, and instead go to the core of the formation of the research 
questions and instruments themselves.  
Second, while Johnson emphasises control as characteristic of intimate terrorism, 
his typology continues to emphasise physical violence. As Johnson explains, 
„this is after all, a framework for identifying types of intimate partner 
violence‟.225 For Johnson, control is a factor that assists in the delineation of 
types of intimate partner violence, rather than a critical component of domestic 
violence. In his most recent book Johnson provides an example of a woman who 
experienced many tactics of control throughout her relationship, but did not 
experience physical violence until after separation. Johnson views this case as 
„incipient intimate terrorism‟ rather than simply „intimate terrorism‟,226 despite 
the fact that the woman stated that her former husband: 
…controlled her every move, humiliated her at every opportunity, controlled the money 
and gave her a carefully monitored allowance, intimidated her with fierce outbursts of 
anger, and quite explicitly threatened her, including telling her in detail what he would 
do to her and her father if she ever tried to leave him. She said she knew what he was 
capable of and she lived her life in a state of constant terror.
227
  
This approach privileges the researcher‟s assessment of the meaning of violence, 
as opposed to the person to whom the act was directed (the woman herself 
referred to her former husband as an intimate terrorist). Thus Johnson appears to 
assume that the meaning of violence is „readily discernable‟ from the data he 
draws on.
228
 Like the criticism levelled at CTS-based research, Johnson fails to 
                                                          
225 Ibid at 46. Emphasis in original. 
226 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Kaye et al, above n15 at 14. 
48 
consider the way that the meaning of violence is highly contextual and often only 
discernable to the person to whom the act is directed.
229
  
Third, Johnson‟s most recent discussion of his typology raises questions about 
„situational couple violence‟ and the definitional parameters of this, the largest 
category. While situational couple violence is generally defined as minor, 
infrequent and situationally-based, it may also include acts that are: serious, 
cause injury, attract legal intervention, are repeated and increase in severity over 
time.
230
 Thus Johnson notes that even this type of domestic violence can be 
asymmetric in its perpetration and consequences, with men causing more injuries 
and generating fear.
231
 The presence of these features would appear to raise great 
caution about this category, suggesting perhaps that some of these cases have 
been miscategorised as „situational couple violence‟ and instead bear greater 
similarities to „intimate terrorism‟.  
Fourth, the application of Johnson‟s typology, particularly in the legal setting, 
needs to be carefully considered given the way in which some of the categories 
may inadvertently reinforce recurrent myths about domestic violence. Situational 
couple violence, for example, may inadvertently reflect ideas that domestic 
violence is a relationship issue, involves minor or trivial matters, that women are 
equally involved in violence, and hence that much of this form of violence does 
not warrant the attention of the law. In turn, intimate terrorism may be used to 
reinforce ideas about „true‟ and „genuine‟ victims involving the most serious and 
visible cases of violence, as compared to „untrue‟ or „undeserving‟ victims who 
might also use violence against their partner. I don‟t mean to suggest that 
Johnson intends to reinforce such myths, rather that consideration needs to be 
given to the way in which the use of the proposed typologies may in fact do so. 
Research by Edna Erez and Tammy King illustrates this concern.
232
 Erez and 
King surveyed 62 defence and prosecution attorneys in Ohio about the most 
common and successful defence strategies in domestic violence criminal cases. 
The strategies thus identified were: that the (male) defendant was acting in self-
                                                          
229 Ibid. 
230 Johnson, „Typology of Domestic Violence‟, above n37 at 21, 62.  
231 Johnson, „It‟s Not About Gender‟, above n20 at 1129. 
232 Edna Erez & Tammy King, „Patriarchal Terrorism or Common Couple Violence: Attorney‟s views of Prosecuting and 
Defending Women Batterers‟ (2000) Domestic Violence: Global Responses 207. 
49 
defence or that the woman had „exaggerated the incident and was making a “big 
deal” out of nothing‟.233 The attorneys surveyed also noted that most defendants 
sought to explain their behaviour by blaming the victim for either initiating the 
incident or provoking him.
234
 The authors concluded: 
The study suggests that attorneys‟ discourse of woman battering reflects batterers‟ 
accounts of battering and portrays intimate violence that reaches the court, by and large, 
as common couple violence. Victims‟ battering experiences, which are likely to reflect 
patriarchal terrorism, are denied, minimized, or at best referred to as a few „true‟ or 
„real‟ cases of domestic violence.235 
Thus Erez and King found that while the work of these lawyers was more likely 
to involve intimate terrorism (as they deal with cases that had come to the 
attention of the criminal law), the lawyers instead viewed the cases as involving 
situational couple violence by relying on long-standing perceptions of domestic 
violence as trivial, minor and mutual. This highlights the way in which Johnson‟s 
typology may coalesce with the common „excuses‟ or explanations the law has 
(always) offered for men‟s violence against women (one-off, minor, mutual). 
This risk, that the category of situational couple violence may be used to dismiss 
the extent of violence perpetrated against women by their intimate partners,
236
 
must be considered in future work on the development of typologies or other 
methods of differentiating between types of domestic violence.  
Work on different types of domestic violence, and work on identifying coercive 
control, is important as the field continues to grapple with competing research 
findings regarding gender perpetration, and increasing questions about women‟s 
use of violence against an intimate partner. In both areas work has only been 
recent, and many questions remain. This thesis seeks to add to this field by 
exploring one area where men and women present competing claims about 
domestic violence; cross applications within the NSW ADVO system. 
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2. Conceptions of domestic violence in the civil protection 
order system 
This sociological debate has many parallels with feminist critiques of the way the 
criminal justice system addresses the harms suffered by women, particularly its 
emphasis on incidents, the primacy of physical assault, the failure to recognise 
the gendered nature of many harms suffered by women, and the inability to 
address the cumulative experience of domestic violence.
237
 As Demi Kurz has 
argued, the criminal law replicates the conception of domestic violence 
underlying family violence research.
238
 A question for this thesis is whether these 
criticisms of the criminal justice system also play out in the civil protection order 
system, a system ostensibly designed to respond more appropriately to domestic 
violence.
239
  
A. The development of civil protection orders 
Many western countries have implemented civil, or quasi-criminal, protection 
order systems to provide future protection to victims of domestic violence. These 
systems were implemented from the 1970s in the USA
240
 and the UK,
241
 and in 
Australia from the 1980s.
242
 Civil protection order systems were a direct 
response to the inadequacies of the criminal law to address the harms 
experienced by women in their intimate relationships highlighted by feminist 
academics and advocates.
243
 The criticisms of the criminal law have been broad-
ranging and include doctrinal issues, its rules and procedures (particularly rules 
of evidence, notions of corroboration and credibility), and its implementation.
244
 
In this section I highlight the key progressions provided by civil protection orders 
(at face value) in addressing domestic violence when compared to the response 
provided by the criminal law, and hence seek to draw attention to the ways in 
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which civil protection orders provide scope to better capture the cumulative and 
varied experience of violence and abuse that comprises domestic violence. 
i. Beyond acts of (largely) physical violence 
Like family violence research, the criminal law tends to focus almost exclusively 
on discrete acts of „violence‟ to the exclusion of the varied acts of violence and 
abuse prominent in feminist definitions of domestic violence.
245
 Thus, a great 
deal of what women describe as violence and abuse is not captured by the 
criminal law.
246
 One of the effects of this emphasis on „violence‟ is that domestic 
violence is portrayed as „extraordinary‟ rather than as a commonplace event in 
the lives of many women.
247
 Critically the emphasis and response to acts of 
„violence‟ has also meant that any appreciation of, let alone response to, coercive 
control has been absent from criminal justice responses.
248
 As Evan Stark 
describes, the visibility of physical violence and injuries has left obscured the 
many mechanisms of „personal entrapment‟ that characterise domestic violence 
(for example, surveillance mechanisms such as requiring a woman to answer the 
phone within a certain number of rings, checking the odometer of her car, 
making demands about the way she cooks, dresses and engages in sex).
249
  
It has only been in recent years that some jurisdictions have recognised other 
forms of domestic violence as criminal offences. The most notable and 
widespread of these is stalking. Other jurisdictions, such as Tasmania, have 
recently introduced offences of emotional and economic abuse.
250
 This has been 
subject to some criticism,
251
 and there have been no prosecutions to date.
252
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In contrast civil protection orders generally address a range of behaviours beyond 
physical violence.
253
 While the NSW ADVO scheme was initially limited to acts 
of physical violence, sexual violence and property damage, this quickly 
expanded to include harassment or molestation.
254
 Over time it was clarified that 
harassment and molestation could be directed at a person‟s property and did not 
have to involve actual violence to the person.
255
 In 1993 stalking and 
intimidation were included as grounds for an ADVO.
256
 While these are the types 
of acts/behaviours that ground an ADVO, the complaint process also provides 
scope for a complainant to detail other acts/behaviours that can provide 
important context to the understanding and appreciation of the acts as acts of 
domestic violence. This is particularly the case after 2006 when it was made 
clear that the court may have reference to any „pattern of behaviour‟ in 
determining whether conduct amounts to intimidation.
257
 
ii. Beyond single discrete acts 
The criminal law addresses single incidents of violence. This means that while a 
person may have perpetrated multiple assaults during, and after, a relationship, 
that person may only be charged with offences relating to a single incident 
(although they may be charged with multiple offences). Thus the prosecution of a 
criminal offence for an act of domestic violence represents a „fleeting snapshot of 
an ongoing relationship, a snapshot that may not accurately reflect the dynamics 
of the ongoing relationship‟.258 In this way the defence may be able to cast the 
presenting incident, often a minor criminal offence, as an isolated, aberrant event 
that is „out-of-character‟. As Hunter notes: 
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Regarded in isolation, much abusive and threatening behaviour can be explained away, 
given a benign interpretation, or made to appear innocuous. The decontextualized 
examination of disaggregated incidents can leave a case in shreds.
259
  
Thus the minor nature of the presenting crime is emphasised, rather than its 
evidence of a „serious‟ pattern of behaviour.260  
In the USA this focus on discrete incidents has recently attracted heightened 
criticism in research on the increasing arrest of women for domestic related 
assaults as a result of mandatory or pro-arrest policies. Commenting on this 
increase, Meda Chesney-Lind notes that the criminal law and its actors (such as 
the police) „mimic the same errors‟ that can be found in family violence research, 
by adopting a process that „de-contextualizes‟ the abuse, removing consideration 
of meaning and motive.
261
 
In contrast, civil protection order systems generally ask for some account of the 
violence beyond a single incident (although, as will be seen in Chapter 6, 
incidents still dominate practice in NSW). In this way, protection order systems 
are not, at face value, incident-based, in the same way as criminal actions. While 
incidents are certainly mentioned in civil protection orders there is generally 
space to accompany those incidents with reference to past events, and acts 
outside the criminal law but having some import in the experience of domestic 
violence. 
In addition, a distinctive feature of the NSW ADVO system is the linkage 
between the types of incidents that might ground an ADVO and their impact on 
the victim, the generation of fear.
262
 The requirement for fear arguably provides 
scope to bring into play notions of control, or at the very least an understanding 
that the behaviour alone is not sufficient; that there must be this other 
component, fear. This is quite different to the requirement of „repetition‟ used in 
Victoria, criticised by Hunter because it focuses on the perpetration of acts rather 
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than how they operate in the relationship.
263
 The connection to „fear‟ is a 
potentially useful mechanism, as it can assist in moving the legal response from 
incidents (whether an event happened) to examining how the acts function („who 
is in fear?‟ and „who requires protection?‟). The presence of fear is one area in 
which research exploring questions of the symmetry of domestic violence has 
found significant asymmetrical results, with women much more likely than men 
to report being in fear.
264
 
iii. A lesser standard of proof 
Civil protection orders, by adopting the civil standard of proof (on the balance of 
probabilities), recognise the immense difficulties faced by some women in 
successfully pursuing a criminal action (where the standard of proof is beyond 
reasonable doubt). In this way civil protection orders recognise that many acts of 
domestic violence occur in private, with few, if any witnesses or other forms of 
corroborating evidence.  
iv. The provision of future protection 
The future protection provided by the criminal law is limited to the extent that 
punishment may deter such behaviour. In comparison civil protection orders 
place conditions on the defendant‟s behaviour not only in respect of criminal 
offences (for example in NSW „not to assault‟, „not to stalk or intimidate‟), but 
also on the extent to which the defendant can come into contact with the victim. 
In this way, because civil protection orders prohibit behaviour and limit contact, 
the scope of an ADVO once made can address a range of opportunities for 
harassment, verbal abuse and so on that would otherwise evade legal 
apprehension (for example phoning a person and verbally abusing them becomes 
a breach of an ADVO, and hence a criminal offence, if that ADVO prohibited 
telephone contact).
265
 In this way, while the grounds to seek a protection order 
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might not encompass the full range of behaviours that women complain about as 
part of domestic violence, the actual terms of an ADVO, once made, may in fact 
address the opportunity for such acts to be perpetrated. 
v. A guiding statement 
Another key feature of the NSW ADVO system that distinguishes it from the 
criminal law is that the legislation providing for such orders has an objects 
statement and statement of parliamentary recognition.
266
 The object of the 
ADVO legislation is to ensure the safety and protection of people experiencing 
domestic violence, to reduce and prevent domestic violence, and to „enact 
provisions …consistent with certain principles underlying the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women‟.267 The statement of what parliament 
recognises goes further; it recognises: that domestic violence „in all its forms, is 
unacceptable behaviour; that it is „predominantly perpetrated by men against 
women and children‟; and that it „occurs in all sectors of the community‟.268 This 
statement of parliamentary recognition, rather than the objects clause, continues 
to be the site where more progressive statements about domestic violence are 
articulated; for example in 2006 seven new clauses were added to this statement 
including, „that domestic violence extends beyond physical violence and may 
involve the exploitation of power imbalances and patterns of abuse over many 
years‟.269 
It is interesting to note that Hunter laments the absence of such an „interpretative 
framework‟ in the Victorian legislation, suggesting that it leaves magistrates 
„unconstrained in invoking their own beliefs and assumptions about domestic 
violence‟.270 Given the brevity of ADVO procedures,271 something that Hunter 
also noted in the Victorian context,
272
 I would suggest that this interpretative 
framework, which has been in place in NSW for over eight years appears to have 
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made little difference to ADVO processes or procedure, if indeed it is reflected 
on at all. 
B. Criticisms of civil protection order systems 
From the outset there have been criticisms of civil protection order systems. 
Jocelyn Scutt, one of the earliest critics in Australia, argued that civil protection 
orders undermined the criminal response by not responding to an assault as an 
assault at the outset. Scutt argued that this reinforced police arguments that they 
had no power to act in domestic assaults, it allowed earlier acts of domestic 
violence to go unpunished, and it suggested that domestic violence was a civil 
(that is private) rather than a criminal matter.
273
 Julie Stubbs and Sandra Egger 
responded to Scutt‟s contentions by stating that: 
The argument that domestic violence has been decriminalised is overstated, and is at 
odds with the explicit dual focus of policy development in most [Australian] 
jurisdictions where both criminal sanctions and protection orders are promoted as 
complementary responses to domestic violence. The argument also denies the extent to 
which changes in police policies and enforcement practices have been achieved by 
means other than law reform.
274
 
While Julie Stubbs, in early research in NSW, found that protection orders were 
not being used instead of criminal prosecutions,
275
 recent research in Queensland 
suggests that the Queensland civil protection order system has „trumped the 
operation of the Criminal Code‟.276 However, the question of the value of civil 
protection order systems is not as simple as determining how it relates to, or 
replaces, criminal prosecutions. In many ways the debate about the pros and cons 
of the protection order system vis-à-vis the criminal law has subsided – they are 
both seen as crucial and play an important complementary role. However there 
are a number of aspects of the civil protection order system and its 
interrelationship with the criminal justice system that continue to reflect some of 
the concerns expressed by Scutt. They are: the continuing high rate of 
withdrawal of ADVO applications,
277
 the lack of action on breaches,
278
 and the 
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gap between the number of ADVO applications and the number of domestic 
violence related criminal proceedings. 
i. The implementation problem 
Many criticisms of civil protection order systems centre on what has been termed 
the „implementation problem‟.279 This is a problem that dogs much feminist 
engagement with law reform.
280
 The problem of implementation charts the gap 
between the law as written and its practical application.
281
 Hunter has canvassed 
the reasons why feminist law reform efforts encounter implementation 
problems.
282
 One reason is the gap between the intent of the reform and the 
prevailing legal culture, where, as Hunter argues, feminist measures may always 
be seen as radical in that they aim to disrupt existing structures. Another reason 
concerns the way in which law itself may not be a useful mechanism to bring 
about change for women, in that measures that might assist women need to be 
translated and fitted within existing legal categories; this process removes the 
transformative power of what was intended.
283
  
As Hunter notes „we should expect implementation problems‟.284 However the 
drive for new laws, rather than addressing implementation problems, 
continues.
285
 The most recent review of the ADVO system by the NSW Law 
Reform Commission (NSWLRC)
286
 and the subsequent government response 
illustrates this approach. In its report the NSWLRC noted that many submissions 
commented that „the main problems [with the legislation] lie with its 
implementation and interpretation‟,287 yet we have continued to see legislation 
introduced or amended that does little to address this fundamental issue.
288
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This thesis has as its focus the law in action, rather than the doctrinal 
representations of what the law is.
289
 This focus redirects attention to the critical 
problem of implementation, rather than simply continuing to tinker at the edges 
of law reform. This does not mean that feminist engagement with law reform is 
not fruitful (clearly it has been enormously fruitful, if also frustrating), rather that 
the artificial division between doctrine and implementation must be considered – 
that the law on the books does not exist without the law in practice (and vice 
versa).  
The empirical chapters that follow (Chapters 4-9) engage with the question of 
how the ADVO system is implemented through a specific focus on cross 
applications. They examine and highlight features of the ADVO system that 
militate against its more progressive elements, such as: 
 the limited nature of the complaint narrative (as detailed in Chapter 4, 
complaints tend to be brief, focus on single incidents, emphasise physical 
violence, and often fail to make reference to the legislative requirement of 
fear),  
 the continuing focus on incidents in practice, and  
 the limited capacity of magistrates to hear and reflect on information about 
domestic violence as a consequence of the constraints of the work 
environment.  
The problem of implementation refocuses attention on the messages and 
understandings of domestic violence that are conveyed via the key legal players 
(police, legal representatives and magistrates) who work within the legal system. 
The work of James Ptacek on judicial demeanour in civil protection order 
proceedings has been illuminating in this regard.
290
 For many women it is not so 
much whether they were successful in obtaining an order (although this is 
important) but how they were responded to, listened to, and validated through 
that process. 
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Whether the criminal law is able to take on more progressive, cumulative 
understandings of domestic violence has been questioned. Susan Miller for 
example, articulates this problem: 
The criminal justice system is by its very nature incident-driven. It is difficult to imagine 
the possibility of such an entrenched manner of operation to really change and look 
beyond dichotomous thinking (did the person break the law or not) to a more 
contextualized approach.
291
  
Various researchers have commenced debates about how the criminal law might 
better conceive of domestic violence as a patterned form of behaviour, and as 
coercive control.
292
 This thesis‟ focus on the civil protection order system raises 
additional concerns; if the civil law, despite its more progressive elements, 
replicates the criminal law‟s focus on incidents devoid of context, then the 
problems of implementation and conceptions of domestic violence that 
underscore the implementation of the legislation are more pronounced and 
challenging. 
3. Summary 
The issues raised in this chapter are complex and subject to detailed (and 
continuing) debate. These issues have critical import in the study of cross 
applications that is the focus of this thesis. First, cross applications, at a general 
level, reflect the debate on gender symmetry by requiring an examination of the 
competing claims made by men and women. In addition the methods used in this 
multi-method study provide an active illustration of the research debate by 
demonstrating the limits of act-based measures alone (Chapters 6-7) in indicating 
the presence of „domestic violence‟, and in turn the value of qualitative 
information that provides crucial meaning to the way in which acts are 
understood. Second, the original research undertaken for this thesis explores 
whether men and women seek protection orders arising from the same or 
different acts or behaviours, and the combination, patterning and context of the 
use of violence. This data makes a contribution to the broader literature on 
women‟s and men‟s use of domestic violence. Third, the cases gathered in this 
study evidence women engaging in a wide range of behaviours that sit 
                                                          
291 Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟, above n21 at 131.  
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uncomfortably with idealised notions of victims of domestic violence. Analysing 
those behaviours offers the opportunity to consider the way in which acts and 
behaviours are given meaning from the context of usage, in both an individual 
and broad sense. 
The second part of this chapter commenced the exploration of the way in which 
the civil protection order system might, through its design and practice, 
reproduce specific aspects of the sociological debate (for example the reliance on 
incidents as indicators of domestic violence, the extent to which the context of 
acts is taken into account, and the extent to which the civil protection order 
system responds to acts/behaviours beyond physical violence). The legal system, 
and research on that system, has largely ignored the sociological debate, yet the 
criticisms of the criminal law has many resemblances to the feminist critique of 
family violence research. A question for this thesis, explored through the 
empirical data that follows (Chapters 4-9) is whether the potentially progressive 
elements of the various civil protection order systems has been harnessed, or 
instead the civil law has retained the criminal law‟s focus on discrete incidents. 
How domestic violence is understood in the civil protection order system is 
crucial to how the law approaches men‟s and women‟s competing claims about 
domestic violence. Looking at the debates in the sociological literature provides 
an important lens in examining current legal responses. Data derived from the 
civil protection order system can also inform this sociological debate.
293
 This 
exploration of what understanding of domestic violence underpins the civil 
protection order system is continued, and expanded upon, in the detailed 
investigation of cross applications in the NSW ADVO system that follows in 
subsequent chapters. The next chapter details the methodology adopted for this 
empirical study. 
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3. Methodology 
This chapter details the methodology employed to undertake the empirical 
component of this thesis. In summary, this thesis employed a mixed-method 
approach informed by feminist research practices. Qualitative data was gathered 
through in-depth interviews with women and key professionals, the analysis of 
complaint narratives for ADVOs, and through the observation of court 
proceedings. Quantitative data was primarily gathered through the analysis of 
court files.  
The first part of this chapter introduces the methodology adopted in this thesis: it 
canvasses the insights and approaches of feminist research practices, and 
explores the complexities of undertaking „sensitive research‟ and the reflexivity 
required of the researcher. This is followed by the detailed description of the 
samples used in this research, the process of analysis, and the key limitations of 
the research. 
1. Approaches and concerns 
A. A multi-method inquiry informed by feminist research 
practices 
It is our contention that if the aim is to better understand and explain any social issue, 
then the use of different methods with their respective strengths and weaknesses 
provides a more fruitful approach than relying solely upon a single data collection 
technique.
294
 
This thesis adopted a multi-method approach to collecting and analysing data, 
using different sources of information and different approaches to the collection 
and analysis of that data. This incorporated: 
1. In-depth semi-structured interviews with women involved in cross 
applications; 
                                                          
294 Ruth Lewis, Rebecca Dobash, Russell Dobash & Kate Cavanagh, „Researching Homicide: Methodological Issues in 
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2. In-depth semi-structured interviews with key professionals who deal with 
cross applications [magistrates, solicitors, police prosecutors, Domestic 
Violence Liaison Officers (DVLOs), and WDVCAS coordinators]; 
3. Documentary analysis of court files; and 
4. Observations of Local Court proceedings. 
These methods of data collection were selected because they operated to elicit 
key information, which could be supplemented, enhanced, or tested by data from 
one of the other sources.
295
 In-depth interviewing, for example, allowed for the 
gathering of rich, narrative data, while the documentary analysis of court files 
provided a useful way to gather quantitative data and limited qualitative data, 
from a larger sample. The documentary analysis, then, provided a way to put the 
detailed experiences of women within the larger context of the legal practice 
environment,
296
 where the stories presented by the women „give life to the 
statistics, and [in turn] the statistics tell us that the stories are not idiosyncratic or 
aberrational‟.297 
Multiple methods assist in shedding greater light on the issue being examined 
and provide a process of triangulation that allows greater confidence in findings 
when they are reported across different data sources.
298
 The use of multiple 
methods also provides a mechanism through which a researcher can attempt to 
address the various limitations of a particular data source and method with 
another,
299
 providing for a „more comprehensive picture‟ of the topic being 
investigated.
300
 
i. Feminist research practice 
„What makes research feminist?‟ has been debated extensively in the research 
literature. Responses, which have varied over time, have centred on: who 
conducts the research, the topic of the research, the aims of the research, whom it 
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is about, its purpose, the processes adopted, and the role or positioning of the 
people who participate in the research, particularly in relation to the 
researcher.
301
 Until recently it was de rigueur to state that feminist research was 
qualitative research, now there is increasing emphasis placed on the appropriate 
use of both quantitative and qualitative research methods. There is, then, no 
agreed upon definition or approach that marks research as „feminist‟.302  
This thesis evidences feminist research practices and concerns in the following 
ways: 
 It is concerned with exploring women‟s experience of violence and the 
multiple ways in which women might respond to that violence, in order to 
improve our understanding of women‟s experience of domestic violence.  
 It is concerned with improving legal responses to domestic violence in an 
environment where there continues to be questions raised about whether 
domestic violence is a gendered phenomenon. 
 It adopts a multi-method approach to enable a process of exploring women‟s 
and men‟s stories about violence within the context of competing claims 
presented in ADVO cross applications. The use of multiple methods provides 
scope to investigate in-depth women‟s use of the ADVO system in a manner 
that would not be captured through the analysis of documents, or interviews 
alone.  
 Women chose to participate in this research, often expressing the hope that 
their contribution would assist others by improving practice and by 
increasing knowledge in the area of domestic violence and cross applications. 
A key component of this research was the conduct of in-depth interviews with 
women involved in cross applications (as well as in-depth interviews with key 
professionals). The process of interviewing, and particularly the positioning of 
researcher and researched, has been a dominant concern within feminist analysis 
                                                          
301 Lorraine Gelsthorpe, „Feminist Methodologies in Criminology: A New Approach or Old Wine in New Bottles?‟ in 
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of research methodologies. Ann Oakley,
303
 and Liz Stanley and Sue Wise
304
 were 
early commentators on the need to conduct research without the hierarchical 
positioning of researcher and researched, and aspired to put in place methods that 
produced a more interactive process. Whether this ideal is possible has been 
questioned; I agree with Lisa Maher, reflecting on her ethnography of women 
drug users in New York, that you can never eliminate all the disparities in 
positioning between researcher and researched that might be generated by the 
choice of the topic, the background and experiences of participants, who holds 
knowledge about the topic, who can walk away from the situation, and decisions 
about how the research is written up or presented (no matter how collaborative 
processes might be).
305
 This does not mean that research and knowledge 
hierarchies are accepted, but rather that we need to identify them, question them 
and be conscious of the ways in which they operate.  
In-depth interviewing has a number of benefits in exploring a sensitive and 
hidden area such as domestic violence, and it has been used extensively in 
studies of violence against women.
306
 It provides a critical way to explore 
context and meaning, and to „give voice‟ to women‟s experiences of violence. 
These aspects of the experiences of violence are unable to be captured through 
quantitative methods. This does not mean that quantitative methods are not 
valuable in researching violence against women; as noted in Chapter 2, research 
employing quantitative methods has provided, and continues to provide, crucial 
information about the nature and prevalence of domestic violence. Increasingly, 
researchers have been combining qualitative and quantitative methods in order to 
capture different dimensions of domestic violence, to enhance strengths of 
certain methods, and counter weaknesses of others.  
ii. Conducting sensitive research 
Researching domestic violence involves researching a „sensitive topic‟. 
Raymond Lee and Clare Renzetti define a „sensitive topic‟ as  
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[O]ne which potentially poses for those involved a substantial threat, the emergence of 
which renders problematic for the researcher and/or the researched the collection, 
holding and/or dissemination of research data.
307
  
Sensitive research may raise ethical, methodological or technical issues for those 
conducting the research and for those participating in it.
308
 There are a range of 
ethical considerations in conducting research on domestic violence. These 
include: how to access research participants, how to ensure safety, appropriate 
ways to ask questions about personal and traumatic topics, making decisions 
about the extent to probe responses, negotiating on-going contact if required, and 
providing appropriate referrals where required. In addition there are concerns 
about the extent to which the researcher is affected by the stories s/he is told. It is 
also important to consider that research participants also make decisions about 
their engagement with research on a sensitive topic: making decisions not only to 
participate but also the extent of their participation.  
Perhaps the requests for continuing legal information by some participants raised 
the most troubling positioning for me as a researcher – to what extent does the 
researcher influence responses to interview questions, or impact on the process 
the participant is engaged in, by providing answers to these types of questions? 
Many participants knew that I had been a solicitor who worked in the area of 
domestic violence (I provided information about my background and interest in 
the topic of cross applications when asked) and this knowledge often led people 
to ask for legal advice. I referred the person either back to the police or to a legal 
representative, while also providing pointers about the types of questions or 
issues they should raise when talking to those professionals.  
B. An exploratory study 
This is an exploratory study. As a PhD research project there are obvious 
resource limitations that determine factors such as sample size, the process of 
recruitment, and the extent to which participants from different backgrounds can 
be included. Small samples have been gathered across the professional groups, 
often relying on passive snowball methods of recruitment or targeted 
recruitment. While these approaches have limitations (see below), they provide a 
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means to access those professionals who have particular experience in the field 
of study and thus provide a useful insight into potential directions for future 
research.  
C. Grounded theory analysis 
Like many qualitative studies this thesis adopted a grounded theory
309
 approach 
to investigate the qualitative material gathered from the interviews, court files 
and observations. There is some debate about what grounded theory is and the 
extent to which researchers actually practice its tenets.
310
 For instance, to what 
extent does coding „emerge‟ from the data rather than being shaped by the 
knowledge that the researcher brings to the topic? Despite many differences in 
practice and debates about what is grounded theory, this thesis, in the analysis of 
the in-depth interviews, has been attuned to coding topics raised in the narrative, 
examining relationships (and differences) between topics, and identifying ideas 
that emerge directly from the data. Many topics have been developed „in vivo‟, 
that is, in the language of the interview participants. The process of grounded 
theory is also encouraged by the use of computer programs like NVivo7, used 
here for the analysis of the interviews with key professionals, which was 
specifically designed with grounded theory in mind. 
2. Introduction to the samples 
A. Women involved in cross applications 
Ten (10) women involved in cross applications participated in semi-structured, 
in-depth interviews for this thesis.
311
 The interviews were predominantly 
conducted over November 2002 – October 2003, with one being conducted in 
April 2008.
312
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i. Recruitment 
Women were recruited for the study via the network of WDVCASs. WDVCASs 
operate in many Local Courts in NSW, and were selected to assist with 
recruitment as they come in contact with, and provide support to, many women 
seeking ADVOs. WDVCASs also assist women defendants in ADVO 
applications where they are also victims of domestic violence.
313
 Given the 
relatively small number of cross applications compared to ADVO applications 
generally,
314
 this was identified as the most efficient means of contacting women 
involved in cross applications. 
Utilising the WDVCAS network also provided a safe way in which to make 
contact with women who satisfied the selection criteria
315
 (that the person had 
been a party to a cross application involving a current/former intimate partner,
316
 
and that cross application had been lodged ideally, but not exclusively, within six 
months of the original application
317
). Recruitment through a WDVCAS meant 
that the women were already in contact with a support service. This was 
important as the interview may have brought to the surface issues that the women 
had not thought about or discussed for some time, if at all, for which they may 
have required further assistance or counselling.  
It was made clear that the other party involved in the cross application would not 
be interviewed. The reason for this was twofold: to ensure the safety of the 
interview participant, and to ensure that the person felt that they were able to be 
open and honest in their answers knowing that the interviewer was not going to 
interview the other party and compare responses.
318
 
After being provided with the „Participant Information Sheet‟ by the WDVCAS, 
a woman could elect to contact the researcher directly. Eight of the ten women 
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interviewed were recruited via this method. One other woman was recruited after 
her solicitor provided her with information about the research project,
319
 and the 
tenth contacted the researcher directly following a newspaper article that 
mentioned the research project.
320
 In this way the women interviewed selected 
their involvement. Self-selection is important in a sensitive area of research such 
as domestic violence which is frequently hidden from public view and which is 
stigmatised in a range of ways.
321
 However, self-selection means that the 
experiences of the women interviewed are not necessarily representative of all 
women involved in cross applications. These interviews are supplemented by 
other data sources relied on in this thesis. 
ii. The interview 
The in-depth interviews followed a semi-structured interview schedule.
322
 This 
schedule was pilot-tested. The semi-structured format provided scope for the 
gathering of some comparative information across interviews while also 
retaining flexibility to pursue areas of concern and interest to the interview 
participant, and to adjust the order of topics as the interview proceeded.
323
 The 
key advantage of the semi-structured interview process was that it provided 
space for each woman to articulate in her own words her experience of violence, 
and her experience of the cross application and the legal process.  
Prior to commencing the interview women participants were told about the 
general structure and nature of the interview. The women were reminded that 
they did not have to participate in the interview, did not have to answer any 
questions they did not feel comfortable answering, and could stop the interview 
at any time.
324
 They were also asked whether they had any questions or concerns 
before the interview commenced. 
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While most interviews took approximately two hours, some were considerably 
longer often interrupted by lunch and, on occasion, discussions continued after 
the interview. 
The interview schedule sought to provide multiple opportunities for disclosure 
and recall.
325
 It commenced with demographic questions, and a general question 
about how the woman would describe her relationship (and conversely how she 
thought her current/former partner would describe the relationship). This was 
followed by a focus on her ADVO application, and the cross application. The 
schedule then returned to questions about the experience of violence; when 
violence first commenced, what was the worst thing that happened to her, what 
was the most common, and how frequently violence occurred.
326
 This approach 
was intended to elicit greater disclosure as trust and comfort levels were 
established as well as enabling multiple opportunities for recall. This approach 
left it open to women to describe and nominate certain events and to ascribe their 
own meaning to the violence and abuse they experienced, rather than answering 
questions based on a rigid list of specific types of violence. This means that some 
women may have volunteered information about certain acts, such as sexual 
assaults, while others may not have defined various coercive sexual relations as 
assaults (or as domestic violence).
327
 It also allowed women to describe acts that 
they found to be abusive or controlling that do not fit neatly within traditional 
categories of violence. 
Six interviews were conducted face-to-face and four were conducted over the 
telephone. Face-to-face interviews were generally conducted at a support service 
close to where the woman resided. Two women were interviewed in their homes. 
All but one interview was tape-recorded with the consent of the participant and 
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transcribed in full.
328
 Extensive notes were taken for the interview that was not 
tape-recorded.  
The in-depth interviews with women were analysed and coded for themes in 
Word.  
The women interviewed for this research, who are quoted extensively in this 
thesis, are referred to by a pseudonym, rather than a code number, to retain the 
sense that the experience and story is that of a person. There is a risk that this is 
lost when people are referred to by numerical codes. 
iii. Profile  
Over half of the women interviewed were in their mid 30s. Six were aged 32-38, 
three were aged 40-50 and one woman was in her early 20s. At the time of the 
interview, five lived in Sydney, and five lived in rural or coastal areas of NSW.  
Seven women had been married to the perpetrator, one had been in a de facto 
relationship and for two the perpetrator was a non-cohabitating boyfriend.  
All but two relationships (which were for less than one year) had been of lengthy 
duration: two for eight years, three for ten-12 years, two for 14-15 years and one 
over 20 years. 
Seven women had children with the perpetrator. Three had three children, and 
four had two children. For all but one of these women, whose children were 
adults, the children were dependent and resided with the mother.  
At the time of the interview all the women had ended their relationship with the 
perpetrator. For six women this was the first, and final, separation. Three women 
had previously separated on one occasion. The remaining woman had separated 
over 15 times from the perpetrator, initiated variously by her and the perpetrator. 
At the time of the interview one woman had been separated for eight months, one 
for 18 months, five women had been separated for around two years, one had 
been separated for four years, another for over five years and one for nearly eight 
years. All these women detailed continuing experiences of violence and abuse 
despite the length of separation.  
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With the exception of one woman, who was born in a non-English speaking 
country, all were born in Australia. There were no women from ATSI 
backgrounds interviewed in this research. The absence of women from different 
cultural backgrounds is a limitation of this research.
329
  
The nature of the violence experienced by the women interviewed was extensive 
and complex. It is explored in detail in Chapter 5. All experienced some form of 
physical violence, many on multiple occasions. Four women spoke of sexual 
assaults. With one exception, all women had threats issued against them or 
towards people close to them. All women interviewed experienced other forms of 
abuse including verbal abuse, damage to property, phone and SMS messages, 
stalking, isolation from family and friends, and the use of children to further 
harass or intimidate the woman.  
This was the first ADVO application for five women and all were accompanied 
by a cross application. The remaining five had applied for more than one ADVO, 
not all of which had been subject to a cross application; for three this was their 
second ADVO application, and two had sought multiple ADVOs. 
B. Men involved in cross applications 
It was originally planned that a sample of men involved in cross applications 
would be interviewed for this thesis. Several recruitment methods were used in 
an attempt to achieve this. Unlike women involved in ADVO applications, men 
do not have the same formal support organisations that could be accessed by the 
researcher to facilitate recruitment.  
The first method of recruitment involved contacting clerks of selected Local 
Courts and asking them to distribute the Participant Information Sheet to men 
involved in private cross applications.
330
 Men could then initiate contact with the 
researcher. This garnered no responses. 
Solicitors interviewed for this research were also asked to pass on information 
about this research to any clients they had who had been involved in cross 
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applications. As a result one solicitor referred a woman involved in a cross 
application to the researcher. No men were recruited via this method. 
In 2006 men‟s or fathers‟ rights groups were contacted to facilitate recruitment. 
One fathers‟ rights group, of their own accord, listed the research project on their 
website.
331
 As a result two men made contact with the researcher. Both of these 
men resided in another Australian jurisdiction. It was decided that they would be 
interviewed, given that the primary issues explored in this thesis are not so much 
concerned with specific jurisdictional issues, but rather conceptual or definitional 
issues that have applicability across jurisdictions. One of these men was 
interviewed via the telephone. Arrangements to interview the second man by 
telephone fell through and he ended up expressing a strong preference for a face-
to-face interview and tentative arrangements were made to interview him when 
he next visited Sydney. Contact with this man eventually ceased and he did not 
recontact the researcher to make arrangements for the interview. 
The final method of recruitment involved attending court on an ADVO list day 
and approaching men involved in cross applications and providing them with 
information about the research. This was a very time consuming method of 
recruitment; it depended not only on a cross application being listed, but the 
parties attending court, and the man being willing to participate. No male 
participants were recruited via this method. While this was very time consuming, 
this time was utilised to conduct court observations (see below). 
The interview with the single male participant has been excluded from this study, 
as it represents only one male experience from another jurisdiction.  
Similar difficulties in recruiting men were encountered by Clare Connelly and 
Kate Cavanagh in their study of protection orders in Scotland (indeed, like the 
present study, they were not successful in recruiting any men for their study).
332
 
Connelly and Cavanagh noted that this difficulty was created by the absence of  
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male support services and the small number of men applying for protection 
orders, which meant that there was also a smaller pool of potential 
interviewees.
333
 
While this thesis would be stronger if men had been interviewed, the limits of 
engaging, or continuing with recruitment methods, as a sole researcher without 
additional funding, meant that it was not possible to do so. The types of violence 
and other acts that form the content of men‟s cross applications was able to be 
captured via two secondary methods: (1) from the examination of court files; and 
(2) asking women in their interviews about the nature of the complaint made 
against them. In some interviews with professionals, views about men and the 
nature of their complaints were also gathered. 
C. Key professionals with experience with ADVOs and cross 
applications 
Five groups of key professionals were interviewed: NSW Local Court 
magistrates, solicitors, police prosecutors, NSW Police DVLOs, and coordinators 
of WDVCASs. Small samples from each professional group were interviewed. 
This was due to the constraints of a PhD research project and the nature of an 
exploratory project. Thus the analysis of interviews with key professionals is not 
representative, but rather presents the view of selected individuals who work 
within targeted professional occupations. In fact the variability of some 
responses within the same professional group provides a good illustration of the 
range of views and attitudes held within a single profession. This form of 
purposive sampling, while not representative, is an efficient means of gathering 
the views of experienced practitioners from across the spectrum of professionals 
working in the field.
334
 
A semi-structured interview schedule was developed to interview the 
professionals.
335
 The interview followed a similar format for all groups, with 
variations to take account of the different work performed by the different 
groups. It was divided into five sections: (1) work experience; (2) understanding 
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of domestic violence; (3) cross applications in the work setting; (4) outcomes of 
cross applications; and (5) recommendations.  
The in-depth interviews with professionals were analysed using NVivo7. An 
initial analysis identifying main themes was conducted in Word to allow for a 
process of familiarisation with the data prior to coding within NVivo7. This 
familiarisation process was also employed to offset the „drive‟ to code within 
NVivo7 which risks losing sight of not only the individual interview but also its 
place and relationship to other interviews and data samples. 
i. Magistrates 
Five magistrates of the NSW Local Court were interviewed. Magistrates were 
recruited via an email from the Chief Magistrate, forwarded to all NSW 
magistrates, informing them about the research and inviting them to contact the 
researcher. Few magistrates responded to the first email and a second email was 
sent. Given the slow response, the initial magistrates interviewed were asked to 
invite their colleagues to participate, that is, a passive snowball method was used.  
John Baldwin in his research on the criminal courts in the UK notes the general 
reluctance of members of the judiciary to participate in empirical research 
projects (although he suggests that lay members of the magistracy are not 
necessarily so disinclined).
336
 Baldwin also noted the negative impact that 
previous research which has had an „unpopular reception‟ may have on attempts 
to recruit professionals for subsequent research projects.
337
 In 1999 the NSW 
Judicial Commission conducted a survey of magistrates about AVOs and 
domestic violence.
338
 The results of this survey were poorly received by 
magistrates (although perhaps it is more accurate to say that the media coverage 
generated by the publication of the report was poorly received
339
). This 
experience may have meant that magistrates were disinclined to volunteer to 
participate in another study about domestic violence. 
                                                          
336 Baldwin, above n140 at 248. 
337 Ibid at 250-254. 
338 Hickey & Cumines, above n57. 
339 See Cindy Wockner, „Nagged into it‟, The Daily Telegraph (30 August 1999) at 1; Linda Doherty, „Fury over 
Dinosaur Magistrate‟, The Sydney Morning Herald (31 August 1999) at 5. 
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There were frequently time constraints on these interviews, which meant that it 
was necessary to edit the interview schedule to fit the time that was available.  
The five magistrates interviewed represented a broad range of experience within 
the magistracy; one had been a magistrate for 28 years, one for 14 years, two had 
between six and seven years experience and one had recently been appointed. 
Three of the magistrates were women and two were men. All magistrates 
interviewed presided over courts in Sydney, but many had worked in courts in 
other parts of NSW. All interviews were conducted face-to-face, tape-recorded 
and transcribed.  
ii. Solicitors 
Five solicitors were interviewed, three men and two women.
340
 Two solicitors 
were in private practice in rural NSW, two worked for community legal centres, 
and the remaining solicitor worked for the NSW Legal Aid Commission. Four 
solicitors were recruited via a letter to the editor published in the Law Society 
Journal of NSW.
341
 The remaining solicitor was known to the researcher and was 
selected for her extensive experience with ADVOs. 
All the solicitors had been in practice for over five years, with three having been 
in practice for over ten years. The extent of their practice in the area of domestic 
violence (including the broad spectrum of legal matters this might entail) varied; 
for one solicitor 100 per cent of her work was domestic violence related, three 
estimated that between 15 and 50 per cent of their workload concerned domestic 
violence, while the remaining solicitor estimated that only six to seven per cent 
of his work concerned domestic violence. 
With one exception all interviews were conducted face-to-face, tape-recorded 
and transcribed. For the interview conducted via the telephone the reception was 
so poor that tape-recording for transcription purposes was not possible, instead 
extensive notes were taken.  
 
                                                          
340 The researcher met with another solicitor, however, an interview was not conducted as he simply wanted to discuss a 
case he handled in 1991 and had no recent experience with ADVOs. 
341 Above n319. 
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iii. Police Prosecutors 
Five police prosecutors were interviewed. Recruitment was facilitated by an 
officer of the Legal Branch, NSW Police, who advised that the best method of 
recruitment was a targeted approach. The officer of the Legal Branch selected 
five prosecutors who worked in the three metropolitan courts where the court 
files had been gathered for this research. All the interviews with police 
prosecutors were conducted in 2006. After completing these interviews a further 
five questions arising from the interviews were asked via email. Only two 
prosectors answered these additional questions.
342
  
I also requested that the officer in the Legal Branch forward a general email to all 
prosecutors inviting them to participate in this research. This garnered no 
volunteers. 
There are obviously issues concerning the representativeness of the prosecutors 
specifically targeted by the officer of the Legal Branch to participate in the 
research, as the legal officer clearly performed a gate-keeping role. In addition 
the „voluntariness‟ of the interview process was compromised: at least one of the 
participants gave the impression that she felt compelled to participate. PP4 
appeared very reluctant and partially hostile during the interview. On multiple 
occasions she stated that she had little, if any, experience with cross applications 
despite indicating that 50 per cent of her work concerned domestic violence. Her 
responses to questions tended to be either affirmative or negative (yes/no) 
without elaboration, or that she did not have any experience or knowledge of the 
area.  
Two of the prosecutors had been in this role for over ten years, one for nine 
years, and two for less than five years. Three were male and two female. All 
estimated that over 20 per cent of the workload would, to some extent, involve 
matters concerning domestic violence. Three prosecutors estimated that at least 
half of their work concerned domestic violence. 
All interviews were conducted face-to-face and, with the exception of PP4, all 
interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed in full. PP4 did not want to be 
recorded and, as a result, extensive notes were taken. 
                                                          
342 PP2 and PP5. 
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iv. Domestic Violence Liaison Officers 
Six DVLOs were interviewed. Initially recruitment was sought via an email 
forwarded by the Domestic Violence Policy Officer, NSW Police to all DVLOs 
inviting them to make contact with the researcher. This garnered few responses 
and a follow-up email was sent. Two DVLOs were recruited via this method. A 
further two DVLOs were selected via a passive snowball method. The remaining 
two DVLOs had prior contact with the researcher and were invited to participate 
in this current research project (a convenience sample). 
Interviews were conducted with DVLOs over 2005-2006. All the DVLOs 
interviewed were women.
343
 Three of the DVLOs had been a police officer for 
less than three years, two between 7 and 9 years, and one for 28 years,
344
 and the 
duration of appointment as a DVLO varied; two had been a DVLO for under one 
year, one for 18 months, two for between three and four years and one for eight 
or nine years.
345
 All were currently stationed in a Local Area Command (LAC) in 
Sydney, and none had experience outside the metropolitan area (although they 
had been stationed in other LACs in Sydney). All the DVLOs interviewed were 
employed as DVLOs on a full-time basis. This meant that all their work was 
related to domestic violence, with the exception of one DVLO who also 
performed some general duties work as a result of her station being short-staffed. 
All interviews were conducted face-to-face, tape-recorded and transcribed. 
v. Women’s Domestic Violence Court Assistance Scheme 
coordinators 
Five coordinators of WDVCASs were interviewed.  
WDVCASs are funded by the NSW Legal Aid Commission to provide support 
and information to women involved in ADVO matters at various NSW Local 
Courts. The coordinator position is funded, and the support workers are generally 
seconded from local services (for example, from refuges, family support services 
and women‟s health services). A small number of WDVCASs have additional 
                                                          
343 Women comprise 75.8% of DVLO positions in NSW (at 31 August 2006): email communication Gregory Urch, 
Acting Sergeant, Project Officer, Domestic & Family Violence NSW Police (20 September 2007). Compare women 
comprise only 25.5% of all staff positions (sworn and unsworn staff): NSW Police, Annual Report 2005-2006 at 19. It 
was suggested by interview participants, that the DVLO position is attractive to women with family responsibilities as the 
position generally works business hours.  
344 The average length of a DVLOs service as a police officer is 12.7 years (at 31 August 2006): email communication 
with Urch, above n343. 
345 The average length of service as a DVLO is 2.6 years (at 31 August 2006): ibid. 
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funded positions reflecting the demand for their service and the profile of their 
clients [for example, some employ an Indigenous worker, or a culturally and 
linguistically diverse (CALD) worker]  
All the WDVCAS coordinators interviewed were women. One had been a 
coordinator for two-and-a-half years, two for over four years, and the remaining 
two for over seven years. Two WDVCAS coordinators worked in rural areas, the 
remainder worked in Sydney. One of the WDVCAS coordinators currently 
working in Sydney had previous experience in the same role in a rural area. All 
the work of WDVCAS coordinators is related to domestic violence. Four 
interviews were conducted face-to-face and one over the telephone. All were 
tape-recorded and transcribed. 
D. The documentary component 
A documentary analysis was conducted of court files collected for a 12 month 
period (March 2002 – February 2003) at three large Sydney Local Courts 
(CourtA, CourtB and CourtC). These three courts were selected because they 
process a high level of ADVOs each year and are regularly placed in the top ten 
Local Courts for ADVO workload. In 2002, when the cases that comprised the 
court files were determined, the three courts dealt with between 915 and 1152 
applications each.
346
 A year was selected as the sampling period to eliminate the 
effects of possible peaks and troughs in the use of the ADVO system as a result 
of holidays, special events and so on.
347
 
Seventy-eight (78) complete cross applications
348
 were identified in the court file 
analysis, representing a total of 156 individual applications. Ten of these 
complete cross applications were made on exactly the same date („dual 
applications‟), the remaining 68 were made on different dates. A further seven 
„incomplete‟ cross applications were identified. „Incomplete‟ cross applications 
refers to the situation where only one, or „half‟, of the applications was located, 
however it was clear from the text of the complaint that there had been an earlier 
ADVO application by the defendant against the person now seeking an ADVO 
                                                          
346 Local Courts NSW, „2002‟, above n65, Table 2.2.  
347 See Rochelle Braaf & Robyn Gilbert, Domestic Violence Incident Peaks: Seasonal Factors, Calendar Events and 
Sporting Matches (2007). 
348 Cross applications in which a full, or paired, set of complaints was located. 
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(whether or not that original application resulted in a final ADVO).
349
 These 
types of cross applications were the most difficult to identify as they were 
dependent on the complaint actually making some reference to the earlier ADVO 
complaint or order. Therefore it must be acknowledged that the identification of 
cases within this category is far from comprehensive. 
Each cross application has been given a code number identifying the court and 
the applications (for example, CourtA-1); where it is not clear from the text 
which application is being discussed greater identification has been provided [for 
example, CourtA-1 (Private M 2
nd
) indicates that the application being discussed 
is the private male application second in time]. 
i. Profile of location of the courts studied 
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the profile of the Local Government Areas 
(LGA) in which the three courts where court files were gathered are located.
350
  
Table 3.1: Profile of Local Government Areas for court file sample 
 LGA (CourtA) LGA (CourtB) LGA (CourtC) Australia 
Median age 32 32 37 37 
Indigenous 
population 
2.6% 2.4% 0.6% 2.3% 
Population 
born overseas 
34.3% 20.5% 16.5% 22.2% 
Rate of 
unemployment 
6.8% 5.3% 2.9% 5.2% 
Median 
household 
income ($ per 
week) 
1105 1147 1374 1027 
According to the 2006 Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas (SEIFA) Index of 
Social Disadvantage,
351
 CourtA and CourtB are ranked within the top 15 areas of 
Sydney for disadvantage, while CourtC is located within the 15 areas with lowest 
disadvantage. 
                                                          
349 Other complaints were identified that made reference to the other person also having alleged that they had been violent 
or abusive. These were excluded unless they made specific reference to an ADVO against the applicant. 
350 Data gathered from the 2006 Census using the QuickStats tool available of the ABS website searching location:  
<http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/ABSNavigation/prenav/LocationSearch?ReadForm&prenavtabname=Location%20Se
arch&&&navmapdisplayed=true&textversion=false&collection=Census&period=2006&producttype=&method=&produc
tlabel=&breadcrumb=L&topic=&>  (8 February 2009). 
351 SEIFA weighs a range of factors to assess disadvantage (income level, unemployment, educational attainment, 
skilled/unskilled occupations, and other variables that reflect disadvantage). The rankings noted in the text are derived 
from the Local Government website for CourtA. 
80 
ii. Nature of an ADVO court file 
Court files were examined to gather quantitative and qualitative information 
about the nature of cross applications.  
Court files contain documents, generally produced by the police and court, which 
provide the information necessary to process and determine an ADVO 
application. ADVO court files are generally small (the vast majority would be 
less than ten pages in length, with many being considerably shorter). While a file 
may be up to ten pages it is important to note that the actual text of the complaint 
is very short; almost half of the complaint narratives examined in this study were 
less than ten lines in length.
352
 A file generally includes: a cover page generated 
for court administration purposes (this indicates the magistrate, whether the 
parties are represented and the outcome of each court appearance), a copy of the 
ADVO application (this contains information about the parties, their relationship, 
the nature of the complaint and the orders sought), a copy of the affidavit of 
service, and any interim orders that may have been made. Very few court files 
contain information in addition to this. Occasionally there may be letters written 
by the parties to the court (for example requesting an adjournment or withdrawal, 
or that their address be kept confidential), pieces of evidence, and other material. 
If there were criminal charges associated with the ADVO, sometimes the charge 
fact sheet is appended to the court file, however, this was rare and only occurred 
for two cases in the court file sample.
353
 
iii. Information gathered from the court files 
A data collection sheet was developed to gather quantitative data from the court 
files.
354
 This recorded such matters as: whether the man or the woman was the 
first in time, the type of ADVO (that is, a private or police application), the 
contents of the complaint (was there a history of violence, was the complaint 
confined to a single incident, the types of acts/behaviour alleged, fears held), 
whether the parties had legal representation, how the applications were dealt with 
by the court, and whether there were any related legal proceedings. 
                                                          
352 See Chapter 4. 
353 CourtA-6 (Olivia and John) and CourtC-17. 
354 See Appendix 5. 
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The quantitative data gathered from the court files was analysed through the use 
of a Microsoft Access database created for this research. Most of the questions 
posed in the data collection sheet required a yes/no response and were coded as 
such.  
The data collection sheet also enabled the recording of additional comments or 
matters of interest, for example: whether either party sustained injuries, there 
were any related family or criminal law proceedings, either party had sought a 
previous ADVO, the woman was pregnant in any incident detailed in her 
complaint, and whether one of the parties was trying to leave or separate.  
iv. The nature of documentary analysis 
Documentary analysis, like all methods of data collection, possesses a number of 
limitations, particularly relating to the process of production. Questions need to 
be asked about who is the author (and conversely who is not the author), for what 
purpose the document has been produced, under what conditions the document 
has been produced, what information has been selected for inclusion and 
alternatively omission, what is the meaning of the document (or parts of the 
document), and how is the document to be read and understood (are different 
readings and meanings possible).
355
  
These considerations are particularly pertinent for court files and police records 
which have been produced and compiled for a particular purpose, for example a 
criminal charge, or in this case an ADVO complaint. The „particular purpose‟ 
often means that an ADVO complaint does not necessarily contain information 
beyond what is deemed necessary to achieve that purpose. ADVO complaints are 
generated in two ways; via the police or via the chamber magistrate (referred to 
as a private complaint). In both instances victims of domestic violence generally 
provide some account of what has been happening to them and it is translated 
into an ADVO complaint. For some police initiated complaints this may take 
place at the scene of an incident, where there may be a number of competing 
priorities for the police officer charged with writing the complaint, for example, 
arresting the perpetrator and providing assistance to the victim. Thus the resultant 
complaint for an urgent TIO may be very short and only detail the presenting 
                                                          
355 See discussion in Bryman, above n323 at 302; and Victor Jupp, „Documents and Critical Research‟ in Roger Sapsford 
& Victor Jupp (eds), Data Collection and Analysis (1996) at 303. 
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incident. In other situations victims may attend the police station or attend the 
chamber magistrate‟s office and request an ADVO. In these instances greater 
time may be available to generate a more detailed account of the violence that 
has been alleged to have been experienced by the complainant.  
Other studies that have examined police or court records, for example the study 
by Rebecca Dobash and Russell Dobash
356
 concerning domestic homicide, found 
that while police records do not contain „elaborate information‟, particularly 
when compared to in-depth interviews, police records nevertheless contain „some 
account of the source of the argument, form of physical attack, injuries received, 
presence of witnesses and the response of the police‟.357 The same cannot be said 
for many of the cases examined in this study of cross applications. The 
astounding lack of detail in many complaints, and the inclusion of irrelevant and 
inadmissible evidence, must be commented upon, not only as creating limitations 
for this component of the research, but also in terms of the ADVO process itself. 
The way in which complaints for ADVOs are crafted, the story that they tell (and 
the story that they fail to tell) about domestic violence, is of particular 
importance to whether a case proceeds and particularly how cross applicants 
assess their prospects and are themselves assessed by various key professionals 
as they enter the court system. The quality of the complaint narrative and its 
production is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
v. Limitations specific to the study of cross applications 
A number of limitations in the documentary component were specific to cross 
applications. While NSW Local Courts have a computer record of the names of 
parties involved in a case, its number and its final resolution there is no 
computerised system by which cross applications can be identified. As a result it 
was necessary to rely on, count, and review the paper court files held by the 
various Local Courts. This created a number of limitations: 
 There is a bias towards cross applications that were eventually listed together. 
It was virtually impossible to locate a cross complaint that was made some 
time after the original complaint (a small number of these types of cross 
                                                          
356 Rebecca Dobash & Russell Dobash, „The Nature and Antecedents of Violent Events‟ (1984) 24 British Journal of 
Criminology 269.  
357 Ibid at 272. See also Lewis et al, above n294. 
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complaints were located but this was achieved through an ad hoc process 
rather than systematically) as I was reliant on linking names that appeared on 
the court list and this was most obviously, and easily, achieved when the 
cases were listed on the same day. 
 Only the court files for the ADVO list day were examined. While most 
ADVOs are listed on that day, not all are; some may be listed on other days 
because they are urgent matters, or have been listed with related criminal 
charges, or for other reasons such as a simple error in listing or the 
availability of parties. 
 The paper nature of the court files necessitated manual counting; this 
frequently required tracking a complaint over a lengthy time period (some 
complaints took over nine months to resolve). Following and recording 
paperwork in this manner obviously creates room for error. 
 Many details were missing from ADVO applications (for example not all 
complaints were dated, service affidavits were not always attached to court 
files, the age of the parties and the relationship type was often absent, 
incorrect or partial). For this reason I have not noted the relationship type or 
age of the parties in the analysis of the court file sample in subsequent 
chapters as there were too many errors or missing data. 
While there are multiple limitations associated with the documentary component 
of the study, the data was not available in any other format or accessible via any 
other method that might have alleviated these limitations.  
E. The observation component 
As noted above, I initially observed court proceedings as a method of recruiting 
male applicants involved in cross applications. While this was ultimately 
unsuccessful, the observations themselves began to highlight other dimensions of 
the ADVO process that were striking and had potentially key implications for 
cross applications and understandings of domestic violence in the legal setting; 
for example: the virtual absence of any discussion about domestic violence; the 
brevity of proceedings; and the way in which some of the matters that are 
expressed in cross applications also have some articulation, on occasion, in 
general ADVO matters. For this reason court observations were incorporated into 
84 
the research strategy. I developed a data sheet to record details
358
 including: the 
gender of the complainant and defendant, the nature of the application (police or 
private), whether an interpreter was required, whether the parties were 
represented, the demeanour of the magistrate,
359
 and whether there was any 
discussion, via comments, submissions or evidence about the nature of the 
violence alleged. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the brevity of proceedings and the tendency 
for these proceedings to concentrate on procedural, rather than substantive, issues 
meant that frequently these details could not be identified or recorded. 
Observations were conducted at two courts (CourtC
360
 and CourtD) from the end 
of 2006 to early 2007. Both of these courts are busy Sydney metropolitan courts. 
A total of 73 ADVO mentions were observed, and two hearings (however one of 
these settled on the date of the hearing). 
Court observations ceased once the point of saturation had been reached;
361
 that 
is, the point where no new themes or issues emerged. In the end what was 
significant about the court proceedings observed was the speed of the process 
and what was absent from the process – the lack of any substantive articulation 
about domestic violence, or indeed any comment at all. See Chapter 4. 
3. Summary 
This chapter has detailed the methodology employed in this thesis. It is a multi-
method inquiry, gathering qualitative and quantitative data through four main 
sources: in-depth semi-structured interviews with women, in-depth semi-
structured interviews with key professionals, documentary analysis of court files, 
and court observations. In many ways the quantitative analysis of the court files 
usefully highlights the limitations of a counting approach devoid of context when 
it is counterpoised with the qualitative material gathered from the court files and 
the in-depth interviews. In this way it demonstrates in practical terms many of 
                                                          
358 See Appendix 6. This data-sheet was used for court observations from 18 October 2006, prior to this time field notes 
were taken. 
359 Following Ptacek‟s work: above n13. 
360 Court files were also examined at this location; hence the court has been identified by the same code. 
361 Strauss & Corbin, above n309 at 212. Theoretical saturation is where, for the category identified, no new concepts are 
emerging, the category observed is well-developed (or not extending further), and the relationship between categories is 
„well established and validated‟.  
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the debates about definitions explored in Chapter 2. As noted by Denzin and 
Lincoln qualitative research that utilises multiple methods in a single study is a 
„strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any 
inquiry‟.362 The next chapter provides an outline of the legal environment of this 
study and Chapters 5-9 present the findings of the empirical study. 
                                                          
362 Norman Denzin & Yvonna Lincoln, „Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research‟ in Denzin & 
Lincoln (eds), „Collecting and Interpreting‟, above n297 at 8. 
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4.  The legal environment of this 
study 
This chapter provides an overview of the legislation relating to ADVOs and its 
practice in order to place the empirical analysis in Chapters 5-9 in context. It also 
draws on that empirical data (particularly the interviews with key professionals, 
the court file data, and court observations) to analyse or make comments about 
legal practice. The chapter highlights two key areas of concern: the inadequate 
nature of many ADVO complaint narratives; and the institutional setting of the 
Local Court which means that cases are dealt with in very brief proceedings and 
settlement is emphasised. These two facets are integral to the story that is told (or 
not told) about domestic violence, and therefore critical to how competing claims 
made by men and women in cross applications are approached and dealt with. 
This analysis demonstrates how issues that arise for ADVOs generally, take on a 
more concentrated focus in cross applications.  
1. Overview of the ADVO legislation 
At the time of the fieldwork (2002-06), the legislation governing ADVOs was 
contained in a dedicated section of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), Part 15A.
363
 
A. Two types of orders 
There are two types of protection orders in NSW: (1) ADVOs for people who 
have some domestic or familial relationship, and (2) APVOs where the people 
have no such relationship, for example neighbours or work colleagues.
364
 In 
essence the two orders, and the procedures under which they are obtained, are 
largely the same. The main differences are: 
                                                          
363 This has since been replaced by a stand-alone Act: Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). Few 
substantive changes were made to the law. As explained in Chapter 1 footnote references are provided to the law at the 
time of the fieldwork, the new provision and any changes to the law if relevant. 
364 At the time of the fieldwork ADVOs and APVOs were separated in two divisions of Part 15A. While the new Act still 
provides for the two types of orders, they have not been similarly delineated. 
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 Statement of objects. In 1999 a statement of objects was inserted to guide the 
ADVO provisions.
365
 A similar guiding statement was not introduced for 
APVOs until 2006.
366
  
 Role of the police. The police have a strong legislative obligation to apply for 
ADVOs,
367
 and have no similar obligation in relation to APVOs. 
 Discretion to refuse to issue process. An authorised justice (usually the 
chamber magistrate) has no discretion to refuse to commence proceedings for 
an ADVO application, but does have such discretion in relation to APVO 
complaints. Thus while a chamber magistrate may refuse to accept a 
complaint for an APVO, s/he must accept all applications for ADVOs 
regardless of the content and nature of the allegations made.
368
  
 Referral of cases to mediation. Generally ADVO matters are not considered 
appropriate for mediation,
369
 whereas APVOs, with some limitations, are. 
Thus APVO cases may be referred to mediation at various stages in the 
complaint process.
370
 
 Costs provisions. ADVO applicants enjoy considerable protection from costs 
orders if their applications are unsuccessful.
371
 This is not the case for 
APVOs, where costs may be awarded where the court considers it „just and 
reasonable‟.372  
                                                          
365 By the Crimes Amendment (Apprehended Violence) Act 1999 (NSW). This was expanded by the Crimes Amendment 
(Apprehended Violence) Act 2006 (NSW) s562I, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) 
s9(3)(d). Minor semantic changes were made by the new Act. See discussion in Chapter 2. 
366 By the Crimes Amendment (Apprehended Violence) Act 2006 (NSW). 
367 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562C(3)-(3A), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s49.  
368 It is interesting to note that one authorised justice at CourtC made a notation on some cross applications that it was a 
„*****CROSS APPLICATION*****‟: see CourtC-1 (Private W 2nd); CourtC-14 (Private M 2nd); CourtC-25 (Private M 
2nd); and CourtC-29 (Private M 2nd). 
369 Cases where there is a „fear of violence‟ are generally not considered appropriate for mediation: see 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/community_justice_centres/ll_cjc.nsf/pages/CJC_faqs#h2> (24 January 2009). 
However some cases involving ADVOs are mediated by the CJC: see NSWLRC, Mediation and Community Justice 
Centres: An Empirical Study (2004) at [3.6]. One case in the court file sample was mediated: CourtC-18. 
370 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562AK(5)(d), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) ss21 and 
53(4)(b). In 2005 the chamber magistrate referred 12.8% of APVO applicants to the CJC: Local Courts NSW, „2005‟, 
above n25, Table 1.3. 
371 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562N. Costs may only be awarded in a private ADVO application where the court is 
satisfied that the complaint was „frivolous and vexatious‟: s562N(2); or in a police application where it is satisfied „that 
the police officer made the complaint knowing it contained matter that was false or misleading in a material particular‟: 
s562N(3). Now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s99(3)-(4). 
372 In accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), Div 4, Part 2 of Ch 4, see Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) 
s562N(1), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s99.  
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While not part of the legislation, the other key difference between ADVOs and 
APVOs is the availability of legal aid. Legal aid, subject to a means test, is 
available to complainants in ADVO matters, but it is generally not available to 
defendants in ADVO matters or complainants and defendants in APVO 
matters.
373
 
B. Commencement 
The ADVO system is initiated via the making of a complaint. A complaint may 
be made by the police on behalf of a person (often referred to as the „person in 
need of protection‟ or PINOP), or by the person themselves to an authorised 
justice (usually the chamber magistrate at the Local Court), this is known as a 
„private complaint‟.374 Both methods of commencing an application are dealt 
with in the same way and result in the same orders, where granted.  
The police in NSW initiate over 70 per cent of ADVOs. This is a consequence of 
the strong legislative obligation placed on police to do so,
375
 and stands in 
marked contrast to other Australian jurisdictions.
376
 It is worth noting that, while 
the NSW obligation requiring police action is certainly strong, it is not without 
discretion.
377
  
When the police attend an incident, they may also seek an urgent protection order 
if required. When the fieldwork was undertaken this was known as a Telephone 
                                                          
373 At the time of the fieldwork this policy was less than clear in relation to cross applications; aid was only available to a 
defendant in a cross application if that application was lodged within three months of the original application. Thus 
running the risk of facilitating a „first-in-first-served‟ approach: Legal Aid Commission of NSW, Legal Aid Policies 
(2006) at [7.1(a)(iv)-(v)].  In March 2008 this policy changed now aid is available to ADVO defendants where Legal Aid 
is „satisfied that the defendant …is a victim of domestic violence‟: Legal Aid NSW, Criminal Law Matters Guidelines at 
[1.9.2] available at 
<http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/asp/index.asp?pgid=755&cid=993&link=Guideline|criminal_law|9#paragraph_11465> 
(23 January 2009). 
374 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562C(1), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s48(2). 
375 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562C(3)-(3A), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s49. The 
new Act provides additional guidance regarding the police discretion not to apply for an ADVO.  
376 Other Australian jurisdictions do not have a similar obligation and this absence is reflected in the statistics: in Victoria 
only 24% of intervention orders in 2002-03 were police applications: VLRC, Review of Family Violence Laws: 
Consultation Paper (2004) at [7.39]. A new Victorian Police Code of Conduct has seen the number of orders sought by 
the police increase markedly: Victorian Community Council Against Violence, above n25 at 17. Research conducted in 
Queensland in 2001 found that 46% of protection orders were sought by the police: Douglas & Godden, above n63 at 19. 
In the ACT police may apply for protection orders and have an obligation to apply for emergency orders in certain 
circumstances: see Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2001 (ACT) s11 generally and Part 7 for emergency 
orders. While police involvement in protection order applications has been encouraged in Australia, overseas jurisdictions 
have debated the desirability of such „third-party‟ applications: see Cathy Humphries & Miranda Kaye, „Third Party 
Applications for Protection Orders: Opportunities, Ambiguities and Traps‟ (1997) 19 Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law 403; and Burton, above n241 at 47-52.  
377 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562C(3)-(3A), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s49. 
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Interim Order (TIO).
378
 TIOs provide the police with a mechanism to obtain an 
urgent order by telephoning
379
 a magistrate when the incident occurs outside 
court hours or an impracticable distance from court. TIOs are temporary, at the 
time of the fieldwork lasting up to 14 days,
380
 during which time the parties are 
required to attend court for the order to be dealt with like any other application.  
There are many recognised advantages of the police obligation in NSW.
381
 These 
include:  
 representation by the police prosecutor,382  
 greater insulation against a costs order,383  
 the symbolic function of the police acting for a victim of domestic violence 
(reinforcing the message that domestic violence is a „crime‟), and  
 reinforcing to police that domestic violence is part of their work.384  
There may, however, still be a variety of reasons why a person may choose to 
initiate a private application. These include: a previous (or current) poor response 
from the police, the desire not to involve the police, and the benefits of 
instructing one‟s own legal representative and hence retaining greater control 
over the proceedings.
385
 
i. Who can apply for an ADVO? 
A person who is, or has been, in a „domestic relationship‟ with the perpetrator 
may apply for an ADVO. „Domestic relationship‟ is defined broadly and includes 
current/former intimate partner relationships (the focus of this thesis
386
), 
                                                          
378 Now known as „provisional orders‟: Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) Part 7, which also 
expanded the circumstances and methods under which the police may apply for such orders. 
379 This may now be performed via „telephone, facsimile or other communication device‟: Crimes (Domestic and 
Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s25(1). 
380 Now 28 days: Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s32.   
381 Hunter & Stubbs, above n16 at 15. 
382 While this is a benefit it is important to note that some women in the present study were critical of the representation 
provided by police prosecutors: Chapter 9.  
383 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562N, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s99(4). 
384 See submissions in NSWLRC, „AVOs‟, above n11 at [6.32]-[6.33]. 
385 See ibid, at [6.34]; Kaye et al, above n15 at 51. 
386 See Chapter 1. 
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relatives,
387
 people living in the same residential facility, and those involved in 
dependent care relationships.
388
 
C. Grounds on which a court may make an ADVO 
The Crimes Act provides reasonably expansive grounds for the making of an 
ADVO. In many ways this operates as a pseudo-definition of „domestic violence‟ 
which is not specifically defined in the Act.  
A court may grant an ADVO where satisfied on the balance of probabilities that 
the complainant has „reasonable grounds to fear and in fact fears‟389 that the 
defendant will: 
 commit a „personal violence offence‟390 (largely concerned with acts of 
physical violence, sexual violence, property damage and stalking), or 
 harass or molest the complainant, being behaviour which „in the opinion of 
the court, is sufficient to warrant the making of the order‟. Such behaviour 
need not involve „actual or threatened violence to the person‟ and may be 
limited to actual or threatened damage to property,
391
 or 
 stalk or intimidate the complainant or a person the complainant has a 
domestic relationship with, „being conduct that, in the opinion of the court, is 
sufficient to warrant the making of the order‟.392 
The Crimes Act also provides some definitions (albeit circular) for some of these 
terms: 
Intimidation means: 
(a) conduct amounting to harassment or molestation; or 
(b) the making of repeated telephone calls; or 
                                                          
387 Defined in Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s4(6), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s6. 
388 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562A(3), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s5. The new Act 
clarifies that living in the same household does not include people residing in a correctional facility or detention centre. It 
also recognises ATSI extended family or kinship systems. 
389 If the PINOP is under 16 years of age, or suffers from an „appreciably below average intelligence function‟, the court 
does not need to be satisfied that the person holds these fears: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562AE(2). In 2006 this was 
extended to enable the court to make an ADVO where a person states that they are not in fear but „in the opinion of the 
court (i) the person has been subject at any time to conduct by the defendant amounting to a personal violence offence, 
and (ii) there is reasonable likelihood that the defendant may commit a personal violence offence against the person, and 
(iii) the making of the order is necessary in the circumstances to protect the person from further violence‟: now Crimes 
(Domestic and Family Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s16(2)(c). 
390 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s4(1), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s4.  
391Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562AE(3). The new Act incorporates harassment and molestation as part of intimidation: 
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s7(1)(a).  
392 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562AE(1), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s16(1)(b).  
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(c) any conduct that causes a reasonable apprehension of injury to a person with 
whom he or she has a domestic relationship, or of violence or damage to any 
person or property.
393
 
…. 
Stalking means the following of a person about or the watching or frequenting of the 
vicinity of or an approach to a person‟s place of residence, business or work or any place 
that a person frequents for the purpose of any social or leisure activity.
394
 
It is arguable that the absence of an exclusive definition is beneficial to 
complainants as it allows scope to possibly complain about, and be provided with 
redress for, a wide range of different behaviours that a perpetrator may engage in 
(particularly those that might amount to harassment or intimidation). This, of 
course, depends on legal representatives listening to their clients, and reflecting 
these stories in their court advocacy.
395
 MAG2 reflected on the potential of the 
legislation to encompass a broad range of behaviours:  
…it‟s a really interesting piece of legislation and only decades later will it show what an 
extraordinary piece of legislation it was … like sometimes you‟ll read a complaint and 
you‟ll think „oh there‟s just not much in that‟, … then you take a proper look at 15A and 
you think, „actually that is – that‟s harassment‟ … 
Given that most ADVO cases settle in some way,
396
 the way in which „fear‟ is 
considered by the court rarely comes to the fore. Rather the only information 
about „fear‟ is the way that it is incorporated in complaint narratives, or adduced 
via evidence (where this takes place). One case in the court file sample was 
determined following a hearing on the question of „fear‟.397 The magistrate in 
that case dismissed the woman‟s ADVO application on the basis that the fear 
asserted could no longer be considered reasonable because the last incident of 
violence had occurred some seven months prior. Here fear was assessed in terms 
of an incident framework informed by gaps between events, rather than within 
the context of the relationship or the role of violence in the relationship, for 
instance the way that episodic violence may generate ongoing fear. Such an 
                                                          
393 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562A(1), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s7. In 2006 
„repeated telephone calls‟ was replaced with a subsection that makes specific reference to new technologies (eg SMS 
messages and email). More importantly a provision was added which provides that the court may have regard to „any 
pattern of violence‟ in determining whether conduct amounts to intimidation. 
394 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562A(1), now Crimes (Domestic and Family Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s8. Like for 
intimidation, above n393, this provision makes reference to a „pattern of violence‟ to assist the court in determining 
whether conduct amounts to stalking. 
395 See Nan Seuffert, „Locating Lawyering: Power, Dialogue and Narrative‟ (1996) 18 Sydney Law Review 523; Nan 
Seuffert, „Lawyering and Domestic Violence: A Feminist Integration of Experiences, Theories and Practices‟ in Stubbs 
(ed), above n22. 
396 See discussion later in this chapter. 
397 CourtC-30. This case is analysed as a case study, Brenda and Joel, in Chapter 8. 
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approach to „fear‟ fails to harness its potential to be an informative tool in 
understanding allegations of domestic violence. Perhaps unsurprisingly following 
this dismissal the man withdrew his ADVO application.  
2. The complaint narrative 
An application for an ADVO contains a „complaint‟ that outlines why the person 
is seeking an ADVO. Complaints, then, generally contain some information 
about past acts of violence and abuse, the most recent incident(s), and the impact 
of the alleged acts/behaviour on the complainant (usually by reference to fear).
398
 
Few studies have explored the narrative of protection order complaints. Recent 
work by James Ptacek,
399
 Shonna Trinch and Susan Berk-Seligson
400
 and Alesha 
Durfee
401
 in different parts of the USA are notable exceptions. No study of the 
NSW ADVO system has analysed complaint narratives, rather they have tended 
to interview complainants about the incident(s) that led to the ADVO 
application.
402
  
Alesha Durfee conducted a qualitative analysis of protection order petitions as 
part of her study of the role of status characteristics (race, gender, class, age and 
socio-economic status) on access to the protection order system in Washington 
State, USA.
403
 While there are many jurisdictional differences between Durfee‟s 
study and the present study, her comments about narratives, legal discourse, and 
the likelihood of success for certain claimants, have clear resonance for NSW.  
Durfee explores the way that Washington State‟s civil protection order system 
places an over-reliance on the individual‟s narrative: 
                                                          
398 NSW Police, Domestic Violence: Policy and Standing Operating Procedures (SOPS) (2000) provides that a complaint 
should include a „history of the relationship‟, „details of the most recent incident as well as any past history of violence, 
including harassment, threats, stalking‟, and „the victim‟s fears regarding further harassment or violence from the 
defendant‟: at [4.1] 
399 Ptacek, above n13, ch 4. Ptacek examined a random sample of 100 protection orders lodged in two lower courts in 
Massachusetts. He analysed the affidavits lodged by the women for the types of violence/abuse alleged to have been used 
by the defendant and the strategies/motivations underpinning these tactics. 
400 Shonna Trinch & Susan Berk-Seligson, „Narrating in Protective Order Interviews: A Source of Interactional Trouble‟ 
(2002) 31 Language in Society 383; and Shonna Trinch, Latina‟s Narratives of Domestic Abuse: Discrepant Versions of 
Violence (2003). 
401 Alesha Durfee, Domestic Violence in the Civil Court System (PhD dissertation, University of Washington 2004). 
402 Eg see Trimboli & Bonney, above n66; and Julie Stubbs & Diane Powell, Domestic Violence: Impact of Legal Reform, 
NSW BOCSAR (1989). 
403 Durfee, above n401. 
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The protection order process…, more than any other aspect of the justice system 
accessed by domestic violence victims is structured around the written language of 
victims and abusers. In most other arenas, various actors within the justice system 
paraphrase or shape the narratives of victims and/or abusers to meet the formal 
procedural requirements or conform to informal norms of legal communication….In 
contrast, most evidence presented during the course of protection order proceedings is 
directly constructed by victims and/or abusers. 
404
 
Durfee found that those petitioners (or complainants) who were able to present 
their story within a recognised legal discourse and structure were more likely to 
be successful. Hence those people who had legal assistance to draft the petition 
were more likely to be successful than those who did not. This was because the 
events detailed in the petition were more likely to fit statutory requirements, were 
less likely to include irrelevant information, and adopted an „over-arching 
structure situating individual acts of violence within a larger framework‟.405 
Durfee also found that those narratives that satisfied societal conceptions of 
domestic violence (for example, if the victim fits within notions of an „ideal‟ 
victim, or the acts complained of are „real‟ domestic violence) are more likely to 
be successful.
406
  
The role of the chamber magistrate or the police in constructing the complaint 
narrative for an ADVO is different to the role of the legal representative/advocate 
explored in the studies by Durfee,
407
 and Trinch and Berk-Seligson.
408
 In these 
studies lawyers or paralegals played an important role in translating or 
performing „repair work‟ on the stories told by people seeking protection.409 That 
is, that the lawyers or paralegals, representing the complainant‟s interests, were 
engaged in a process of translating the woman‟s story into a „legally and 
linguistically adequate account of domestic violence capable of resulting in a 
protective order‟.410 Police and chamber magistrates do not have an advocacy 
role to present the complainant‟s story in the „best light‟ for legal determination. 
                                                          
404 Ibid at 110. 
405 Ibid at 122. 
406 Ibid at 111. See also John Conley and William O‟Barr‟s work on unrepresented litigants in a small claims jurisdiction: 
John Conley & William O‟Barr, Rules versus Relationships: The Ethnography of Legal Discourse (1990); and William 
O‟Barr & John Conley, „Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives‟ in Judith Levi & 
Anne Walker (eds), Language in the Judicial Process (1990). 
407 Above n401. 
408 Above n400. 
409 Trinch & Berk-Seligson, above n400 at 384. 
410 Ibid. 
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The writing of complaints in NSW is of a different nature, in that complaints are 
written by either a police officer or a chamber magistrate – and hence are indeed 
„paraphrased‟ or „shape[d] by‟ these professionals.411 Thus the police and the 
chamber magistrate play a crucial role in the process of gaining protection. The 
critical role of the chamber magistrate as the first point of contact is obviously 
reflected in legislative developments in NSW. The removal of the discretion to 
refuse to issue process
412
 clearly recognises the pivotal nature of this position and 
the potential to perform a „gate keeping‟ or „filtering‟ role. Yet this discretion is 
only one aspect of this role – the actual writing of the complaint is also critical to 
the manner in which cases are received and assessed in court. As the Victorian 
Law Reform Commission (VLRC) pointed out in its review of the Victorian 
protection order system: 
[the interview with the registrar] influences the scope of the application, what 
information is included in it, what is provided to the magistrate, and what terms and 
conditions the person requests to have imposed.
413 
In this way Hunter places the registrar or chamber magistrate as the „ultimate 
author‟ of the complaint, with the: 
[p]ower to rewrite the applicant‟s story, to highlight or discard elements they regarded as 
ir/relevant, and to blanch emotion from the scene…[it is] the registrar who filtered the 
applicant‟s story and produced a legally acceptable account to place before the court.414 
Similarly WDVCAS3 explains that complaint narratives are „skewed by the 
perception of the [police officer] writing [the complaint]…it‟s often about the 
police officer‟s interpretation of behaviours‟ rather than the victim‟s account of 
what happened. 
Rather than the chamber magistrate or police officer being the „ultimate author‟ 
of the complaint narrative, the nature of the complaints gathered in the court file 
sample suggest a mixed approach to the production of the narrative. This means 
that the work of Durfee and Hunter both have relevance to the analysis of 
complaint narratives. Certainly a great deal depends on the chamber magistrate 
and the police officer; whether they have a good understanding of domestic 
                                                          
411 Durfee, above n401 at 110. 
412 By the Crimes Amendment (Apprehended Violence Orders) Act 1996 (NSW).   
413 VLRC, „Consultation Paper‟, above n376 at [7.22]. 
414 Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 130. 
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violence, whether they are approachable and non-judgmental, the types of 
questions that they ask and the responses that they provide. At the same time, for 
at least some complaints gathered in the court file sample, there appeared to be 
little mediation between what the victim said and the text produced in the 
complaint. For these complaints it appeared that the police or the chamber 
magistrate simply adopted an approach of „tell me what has been happening‟415 
and this has been reproduced (appearing almost verbatim). This assessment was 
confirmed by MAG2: 
Do you call it drafting? … they usually just start straight in with the consciousness. I 
mean you can actually see it coming out of the mouth, they just type as it came out. Yeah 
[it‟s] being kind…to describe it as „drafting‟…I mean there‟s usually a whole lot of junk 
in there you can‟t use anyway…they‟ve [just] written down what she‟s said, half of 
which is valuable to me and half of which will be fertile grounds for cross-
examination.
416 
The process of eliciting women‟s stories about violence within a legal setting is a 
complex one in which there are concerns about silencing women‟s accounts 
through the lens of what the law requires; in this context it might be argued that 
the lack of legal involvement, or directive involvement, in the writing of 
complaints may serve to enhance or facilitate access to the legal process.
417
 My 
concern with the poor quality of complaint narratives, however, is not so much 
about the way legal discourse may silence women‟s stories, rather there seems to 
have been little attention paid to eliciting, and documenting, information that the 
law requires at a basic level.  
Many complaints analysed for this thesis were clearly inadequate; by and large 
they focused on a single incident, there was often too little information, too little 
detail, and/or a considerable amount of irrelevant information. This is different to 
the limitations of the police documents examined by Dobash and Dobash 
concerning criminal offences where they noted that police or court records 
contained a „summary…of the violent event necessary for their own purposes 
                                                          
415 Compare the petition form in Durfee‟s study asked about: „the most recent incident or threat of violence and date‟, 
„history of threats and violence‟, „violence or threats towards the children‟, „injuries treated by a doctor‟, and „the use of 
weapons or objects‟: above n401 at 121. While these questions might be criticised for the narrow focus on certain types of 
acts of violence/abuse, it is suggested that providing some guiding framework may elicit more information of relevance to 
granting a protection order. 
416 Informal interview with barrister, above n97, also referred to complaint narratives as a „stream of consciousness‟. 
417 Durfee, above n401 at 111. 
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[that is sufficient to support a criminal charge]‟.418 In this thesis many complaints 
examined were, not merely a summarised account of events, but often lacked 
sufficient information to support an ADVO. The following two complaints 
illustrate these concerns; they fail to specify any of the acts and behaviour that 
took place and employ „code‟ terms for violence: 
The defendant and the PINOP have been married since [date]. The [defendant] has an 
issue with alcohol and this has caused several problems including an eviction from a 
previous address. The couple are constantly the subject of domestic altercations, in the 
past the defendant has sometimes been [the] PINOP…..419 
The parties have been married for about four years. Police were called to the premises 
today by a third party. Police have attended and found there has clearly been an 
altercation between the parties, however it is unclear who may have been the aggressor 
and who may have been the victim. Both parties have suffered injury consistent with 
some parts of their story and Police are satisfied that unless an order is made against 
each party there is the likelihood or probability of further violence between the parties. 
The matter still remains subject to further investigation.
420
 
This assessment that many complaints are of poor quality was confirmed in the 
interviews with key professionals.
421
 MAG4 described the quality of complaints 
as „atrocious‟ with complaints generally being just „bare bones…with very little 
information‟ resulting in a „wonderful story which says nothing‟. MAG3 noted 
the variability of complaints, with some being incredibly detailed, while others 
are „a load of absolutely incomprehensible garbage‟. Police prosecutors were 
similarly scathing:  
…there's not enough put in the actual allegation itself to get the order. Say for example, 
… a PINOP makes [a complaint that]… she was harassed on a particular day and that's 
why she wants the application and that's all that appears in the [complaint]. And when 
you roll along to court she'll walk in with you know a trolley load of documents and 
records and „oh this has been going on for months‟ but the actual [complaint] itself 
is…confined to a very small time frame. That's probably the biggest problem.422 
While both DVLOs and police prosecutors made critical comments about the 
standard of complaints written by police, they invariably asserted that there had 
                                                          
418 Dobash & Dobash, „Nature and Antecedents‟, above n356 at 283. 
419 CourtC-32 (Police M 1st). 
420 CourtC-30 (Police dual application).  
421 See DVLO1, DVLO3, DVLO4, DVLO5, MAG2, MAG3, MAG4, MAG5, PP1, PP2, PP3, PP5, WDVCAS2 and 
WDVCAS3. Compare MAG1 who noted that while complaints were „fairly…brief‟ they generally provided „adequate 
[information]…to ascertain…the circumstances of the dispute‟.  
422 PP1. See also PP3. 
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been improvements in recent years as a result of the training provided to general 
duties officers.
423
 
While the ADVO complaint form does not ask about the most recent incident, 
invariably this is what complaints centre on, and is what the court is most 
interested in.
424
 As has been noted in other research, the „most recent incident‟ is 
generally not the first incident, nor is it necessarily the most serious.
425
 In 
Durfee‟s study, the form completed by petitioners specifically asked about the 
most recent incident. Durfee notes that this is often one of the more trivial events, 
yet because it is the most recent, it is the most „raw‟ and as a result petitioners 
often expend a considerable amount of time detailing this event, and leave other 
stronger examples brief and lacking in detail.
426
 This obviously has an impact on 
the likelihood of success. It may also be that the most recent incident holds for 
the victim certain indicators of what is likely to take place; that is to say that the 
presenting incident, while perhaps minor or trivial, is read by the victim through 
the lens of past experience. The precipitating incident is obviously important 
(particularly to the police in a TIO application), but it still needs to be understood 
in context for an adequate account of the domestic violence (and the presenting 
incident) to be intelligible to the court. 
References to „fear‟ in ADVO complaints appear to be included in a routine and 
habitual manner, frequently as a bald statement to conclude a complaint without 
any reasoning or thematic connection to the victim‟s experience.427 The 
following complaint illustrates this approach: 
Former de facto partners until [date]. Tonight [PINOP] went to RSL with [defendant], 
argument ensued. [PINOP] tried to leave and [defendant] would not let him. Both then 
left and went into … Police Station. [PINOP] then left and went home and short time 
later [defendant] arrived banging on windows yelling abuse and threats. [Defendant] 
(sic) fears for his safety.
428
  
                                                          
423 See DVLO3, DVLO4 and PP1. 
424 Elizabeth Goss & Monica Neville, Apprehended Violence Orders: A Guide to Legal Practice in NSW (2003) at 20. 
425 See Ruth Busch, „”Don‟t Throw Bouquets at Me…(Judges) Will Say We‟re in Love”: An Analysis of New Zealand 
Judges Attitudes Towards Domestic Violence‟ in Stubbs (ed), above n22 at 106-107; Durfee, above n401 at 120; Hunter 
& Stubbs, above n16 at 14 discussion of a „trigger‟ event. See also Chapter 5 where few of the women interviewed 
reported incidents to the police during their relationship. 
426 Durfee, above n401 at 40-41, 120.  
427 Ibid at 126. 
428 CourtC–1 (Police M 1st). Emphasis added. In the final sentence there appears to be some confusion about who is the 
defendant and PINOP. 
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Durfee notes in her research that those narratives (usually produced with the 
assistance of lawyers) that provided some thematic structure and connection 
between events and its impact (such as the creation of fear), were more likely to 
be persuasive. Some of the complaints gathered in the court file sample did 
provide these types of thematic connections, for example: 
The victim states that there have been problems since the relationship started. The 
victim further states that she has been assaulted by the defendant on numerous times 
over the marriage ... The assaults have consisted mainly of pushing, hitting and having 
objects thrown at her. Recently the victim and defendant separated, with the defendant 
moving out of the family home….The defendant has since moved back in the family 
home. The victim now fears for her safety while the two reside in the same house, due to 
the assaults in the past. The victim also states that the defendant has become more 
aggressive and threatening of late.
429 
The routine or habitual reference to „fear‟ also has repercussions in the court 
setting. This was revealed by MAG3 who discussed a case where she refused an 
ADVO sought by the police. On the completion of the case the defence sought 
costs against the police. As noted above, the police have extensive protection 
against the awarding of costs; it is only possible to be awarded costs against the 
police where the court is satisfied „that the police officer made the complaint 
knowing it contained matter that was false or misleading in a material 
particular‟.430 
[T]he defendant was [pursuing costs] … on the basis that the police officer had in fact made 
a statement that she knew to be false, that statement being the absolutely standard things 
they put in every single [ADVO] which is you know the … „she fears for her safety if the 
order is not granted‟ or …something like that, and that tends to go in every single 
[complaint]. …[The defence] was asserting that [the police officer] couldn‟t possibly have 
[known that and that it was] false because they were say[ing]… [the victim] did not in fact 
tell [the police] that she [had fears] – that there was no evidence that the particular police 
officer actually knew that [the woman had fears]…431 
The tendency then to adduce „fear‟ via incidents and in a routine way appears to 
undermine the benefit of „fear‟ as a legislative criterion. 
Complaints for ADVOs are brief. Of the 156 individual complaints that form the 
court file sample, approximately 47 per cent were between one and ten lines in 
length (with just under half of these being less than five lines), approximately 36 
                                                          
429 CourtC–7 (Police W 1st).  
430 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562N, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s99(4). 
431 MAG3. 
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per cent were between 11 and 20 lines, approximately 11 per cent were between 
21 and 30 lines and approximately 5 per cent were over 30 lines in length. Those 
complaints generated by the police as a TIO were the briefest complaints 
examined. 
The text of a complaint is not restricted to a particular length, but invariably the 
complaint narratives fit within the space provided on the institutional form that 
commences the process. As PP3 argued: 
… the complaints on roneoed forms are only half a page so authors tend to restrict 
themselves to that, for that reason subconsciously or consciously. Um some restrict it to 
that size.
432
  
It is possible for the complaint to be appended to the form, however this is 
rare.
433
  
While most magistrates allow complainants to provide evidence in addition to 
those matters specified in the complaint, some do not. As PP2 noted „some 
magistrates hold you to that bloody complaint‟. This may be a particular issue in 
busy courts with high workloads. MAG4 explained that in most circumstances 
(unless it is a „contested matter with some substance‟) she restricts parties to the 
matters specified in the complaint „otherwise it‟s unfair to the other side if 
they‟ve got to meet matters that … they‟re not … aware they have to meet‟. 
While some of the problems with complaint narratives are a product of the 
purpose for which they are produced, and the conditions of production, this is not 
always the case. The quality of some complaints is so poor I would suggest that it 
makes it difficult, not merely for research purposes, but more critically for the 
legal system to make decisions as required by the legislation governing 
ADVOs.
434
 The lack of attention paid to the complaint process also suggests a 
lack of attention and seriousness accorded to allegations about domestic 
violence. DVLO1 also linked the quality of complaints to general duties police 
officer‟s „lack of effort‟ in responding to domestic violence incidents that do not 
involve charges: 
                                                          
432 PP3. 
433 See the lengthy complaints lodged by a small number of male second applicants: Chapter 7.   
434 See similar conclusion in the family law setting: Moloney et al, above n37 at 119.  
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AVOs don‟t require a [police] brief…that‟s why police treat them so off-handly, because 
they don‟t need to make any effort – they just apply for the AVO and maybe get a 
statement from her. If you‟re lucky you‟ll get a statement from the cop and that‟s it. They 
don‟t make any effort. 
DVLO1, however, contented that while there may be problems with the quality 
of complaint narratives „in the end‟ they „serve their purpose‟.435 That is to say, 
DVLO1 asserted that if the purpose is to obtain an ADVO then, by and large, the 
complaint narratives satisfy this goal.
436
 Durfee also noted that while many 
petitions in her study were vague and lacking in detail the petitioners were still 
successful in obtaining orders. Durfee, however, points out that concerns with the 
adequacy of complaint narratives and their fit with legislative requirements are 
important in „border cases‟ (that is, cases that are contested, allege incidents that 
do not neatly fit the legal requirements, or where there is no corroborative 
evidence); in a border case an inadequate complaint may mean that the 
petitioner/complainant is less likely to be successful.
437
 The complaint narrative, 
then, is of particular importance in cases involving competing claims, where not 
only is the substance of the complaint important to the court asked to make a 
determination, but it is also important to the people involved in cross claims and 
their assessment of their likelihood of success. 
3. Before the Local Court 
As noted in Chapter 1 ADVOs occupy a great deal of the time of the Local 
Court.
438
 Five magistrates were interviewed for this research and all emphasised 
the length of the ADVO list that they handle and the manner in which this 
impacted on their practice. The length of the list was seen as an impediment to 
applying the training and education they had received. MAG4 suggested a 
schism between „ideological based training‟ and the practical context of:  
…the sheer volume of getting through 80 matters in an AVO list … what you need 
training in is recognising the matters where you‟re going to have to spend more time 
                                                          
435 Email communication (9 August 2005). 
436 However one must question this proposition when 43.1% of ADVO applications were withdrawn/dismissed in 2005: 
Local Courts NSW, „2005‟, above n65 Table 1.4. 
437 Durfee, above n401 at 135-136. 
438 See Hickey & Cumines, above n57 at 16. Other courts also deal with ADVOs: the Children‟s Court (when the 
defendant is under 18 years of age) and the District Court (when AVOs are appealed or involve more serious criminal 
charges).  
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[on] … given that if you‟ve got 80 matters in a five-hour day how many minutes is that 
per matter? Not very many.
439
 
It is also important to reflect on the wide array of matters that the Local Court 
deals with beyond AVOs, for example the full range of criminal matters (whether 
or not they remain in that court
440
), traffic matters, council matters, civil cases up 
to a certain financial amount, environmental cases, a small number of family law 
cases. MAG4, a recent appointee to the bench, reflected on this breadth of work: 
The first thing that just about everybody says is I just can‟t believe the range of sorts of 
things that come before the court, you know. I mean you get your tree preservation 
orders, your dividing fences, your common assault, committals, your AVO lists, your – 
everything. You know, you feel as though everything is – is strange and new. 
The increased use of protection orders has exacerbated the workload in the lower 
courts; a problem not isolated to NSW. Hunter notes that intervention orders had 
become a „substantial component‟ of the work of the Victorian Magistrates‟ 
Court without „additional resources‟ having been provided to the court to process 
these applications.
441
 As a result, Hunter argues that intervention orders „tend to 
be dealt with in similar, routinized, ways to other matters‟.442 The same can be 
said for NSW. 
This has been referred to as the „gap‟ between legal principles (laws, rights, 
processes) and „the daily reality of the administration of justice‟.443 Baldwin, in 
his work on criminal courts, notes that while there are a series of rights that are 
often held out in the administration of the law (for example, the presumption of 
innocence, the right to a fair trial, the right to trial by jury, and the burden of 
proof) that „these rights are translated in practice into pale shadows in the great 
majority of cases heard in the criminal courts‟.444 This gap certainly appears 
evident in the empirical work undertaken in this thesis, and will be the subject of 
further discussion in Chapter 9, suffice to state here that it accords with the 
                                                          
439 See also MAG2.  
440 The Local Court deals with summary offences, some indictable offences where the defendant pleads guilty or consents 
to it being dealt with summarily, and committal proceedings.  
441 Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 60.  
442 Ibid at 61. See also Marc Galanter, „Why the „Haves‟ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change‟ 
(1974-1975) 9 Law and Society Review 95 at 121. 
443 Baldwin, above n140 at 244. 
444 Ibid. 
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findings of Pat Carlen and Doreen McBarnet that the gap may be greater in 
magistrates‟ courts.445 
A. Coming before the court 
When an ADVO application comes before the Local Court it is dealt with on a 
„list‟ or „mention‟ day. This is a day concerned with short, procedural matters: Is 
the ADVO still sought? Is an adjournment required? Are interim orders (IOs) 
sought? Is the matter contested? If so, how much time needs to be set aside? 
Most NSW Local Courts have a dedicated list day(s) to deal with AVO matters. 
While this is a dedicated day, other types of matters may also be listed (for 
example, fresh criminal charges, APVOs and other matters). The allocation of a 
dedicated day assists in providing ADVO complainants, at some courts, with 
access to the WDVCASs,
446
 a safe room, a dedicated courtroom and, at some 
courts, a dedicated prosecutor. 
Most ADVOs are resolved at a mention. This does not mean that cases are 
necessarily resolved on the first day at court (many will be adjourned numerous 
times for various reasons
447
), but that few are resolved following a hearing. One 
of the magistrates interviewed expressed a distaste for ADVO hearings: 
I work on a principle that I don‟t want to hear any domestic violence matter from the 
point of view of … a true hearing where there is um evidence tendered and cross-
examination on that evidence. As I have indicated parties that can enter into conflict 
over the most minor of matters which end up out of all proportion. Now there are 
persons with expertise in dispute resolution and the Community Justice Centre is one of 
those persons. If one can get the combatants to go to those people with the expertise they 
are probably far better off than doing battle in the court environment because ultimately 
down the track somewhere those persons will most probably have to live or may have to 
live in the same environment so if someone can resolve the problem rather than the 
courts clinically – and clinically listen to the evidence, dissecting it and coming to a 
determination I think it‟s far better.448  
While I would not suggest that this view is held by all, or even most, magistrates, 
the civil process itself emphasises settlement and consent.
449
 The emphasis on 
                                                          
445 Pat Carlen, Magistrates‟ Justice (1976); and Doreen McBarnet, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of 
Justice (1983) at 138-140. See also the discussion of „summary justice‟ in Andrew Sanders & Richard Young, Criminal 
Justice (2nd ed, 2000) at 483-549. 
446 For detailed information about the WDVCASs see Chapter 3. 
447 Eg to effect service, enable the defendant to obtain legal advice, explore settlement, await the finalisation of related 
criminal charges, or because of illness.  
448 MAG4. 
449 Rosemary Hunter, „Having Her Day in Court? Violence, Legal Remedies and Consent‟ in Jan Breckenridge & Lesley 
Laing (eds), Challenging Silence: Innovative Responses to Sexual and Domestic Violence (1999) at 61; and Rosemary 
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negotiation, settlement and consent in the ADVO process takes place within the 
context of the limited time and resource demands of the Local Court, the cost of 
legal proceedings, and the way in which the likelihood of success is cast for 
complainants. Marc Galanter in his work on the way that the „basic architecture‟ 
of the legal system impacts on the use and limits of the law as a method of 
achieving „redistributive change‟ (that is the way facets of the law and its 
operation coincide to inhibit reform) points out that those legal arenas with 
limited resources and more cases than can be adjudicated, emphasise and 
promote settlement.
450
 This is a description that well fits the Local Court and its 
increasing load of cases, including ADVOs, without additional resources. 
Also of interest is the way in which this emphasis on consent might interweave 
with, and reinforce, the notion that the magistrates‟ court deals with „triviality‟; 
that is “minor offences”, “everyday offences”, “the most ordinary cases”, 
“humdrum events”.‟451 This may be a particular concern for ADVOs which tend 
to be surrounded by an aura of triviality reflected in comments such as that they 
waste the court‟s time, that ADVOs are just a piece of paper and so on. Andrew 
Sanders and Richard Young have argued that the high level of guilty pleas in the 
magistrates‟ courts in the United Kingdom „fuels‟ „the ideology of triviality‟, yet 
when the substance of the charges are examined they are far from trivial or minor 
matters, and the decisions magistrates are required to make are of significant 
import.
452
 The same concerns can be raised in respect of the ADVO process 
where the high level of settlement undermines the nature of the allegations 
contained in many complaints, the responsibility of the perpetrator, and the 
significance of making an order. Instead settlement appears as a mode of private 
ordering, rather than a method by which domestic violence is addressed in the 
public arena of the court. 
Concern has been expressed about the impact of private ordering on women in a 
number of different legal areas, as well as specifically in the context of civil 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hunter, „Consent in Violent Relationships‟ in Rosemary Hunter & Sharon Cowan (eds), Choice and Consent: Feminist 
Engagements with Law and Subjectivity (2007) at 160. 
450 Galanter, above n442 at 95 and 121. 
451 McBarnet, above n445 at 143. 
452 Sanders & Young, above n445 at 488. 
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protection orders.
453
 The emphasis on settlement, particularly via consent orders 
is discussed later in this chapter, and in Chapter 9 where it is argued that the 
emphasis on settlement takes on a heightened role in cross applications.
454
  
For professionals involved in the legal system a mention day tends to be seen as 
unproblematic; it is, after all, a procedural day. Two women interviewed in this 
thesis highlighted the disparity between their experience of their cases and the 
procedural way in which it was approached by professionals at court. Keira was 
told by the police „[it is] just a mention, don‟t worry about it.‟455 Frances described 
finding the process:  
… really frustrating because you can‟t say anything and they just sort of sit there, read 
it and know what‟s happening and they don‟t want to have any idea like um and I know 
it‟d take forever if everybody went up there and spoke, but …there‟s this massive big 
lead up to this one little hearing and none of that can come across. 
As has been mentioned, magistrates commonly face substantial case lists on an 
ADVO mention day and this places constraints on the time that can be allocated 
to each case. However, even taking account of these resource and time 
constraints, the brevity of matters is worthy of note. Court observations 
undertaken for this thesis found that most ADVO matters are dealt with in three 
minutes or less. As a result there is typically no comment at all about the 
violence or abuse that has taken place and what fears might be held by the 
complainant for the future. Hunter, in her research on protection orders, also 
commented on the „extreme brevity‟ of proceedings in the Victorian Magistrates‟ 
Court.
456
 Like the present study, Hunter found that most matters were dealt with 
in three minutes, with the exception of contested hearings. In the present study 
those ADVO applications that were accompanied by criminal charges took 
longer, up to 15 minutes, particularly where an early guilty plea was entered and 
the issue of sentencing was determined that day.  
                                                          
453 In family law see: Marcia Neave, „Resolving the Dilemma of Difference: A Critique of “The Role of Private Ordering 
in Family Law”‟ (1994) 44 University of Toronto Law Review 97. This has been a particular focus in work on mediation 
and family law proceedings involving violence, see: Hilary Astor, „Swimming Against the Tide: Keeping Violent Men 
Out of Mediation‟ in Stubbs (ed), above n22 at 147-73. In relation to civil protection orders see Hunter, „Consent in 
Violent Relationships‟, above n449 at 158-60. 
454 See Chapter 9. 
455 Keira. 
456 Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 100-127. 
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Magistrates in Hunter‟s study explained that it was not possible, within the 
constraints of the list, to allow people to convey all the evidence that they wanted 
to provide.
457
 In a similar way MAG4 in the present study stated: 
…the reason I don‟t take evidence is simply one doesn‟t have time [to hear] 50 or 60 
interim orders. And some courts are worse…I‟ve heard of some of my colleagues getting 
130 [AVO matters] in a day.
458
 
Hunter suggests that the pressure of case loads and the lack of time to devote to 
each case means that cases are „“processed” or “handled” rather than given 
individual attention‟.459 This has been documented in other jurisdictions.460  
It is not simply the brevity of matters that is of concern, but what that brevity 
means – what statements and messages are not conveyed because of the lack of 
time and the „routinized‟ process of „getting through‟ the list.461 In my 
observation of 73 ADVO cases in three Sydney courts it was rare for there to be 
any comment about the types of violence/abuse experienced, how the victim felt 
as a consequence of the alleged violence/abuse, how the defendant responded to 
the allegations, or any comments from the magistrate about the allegations.
462
 
This creates a number of issues of concern. First, it means that there is an almost 
complete absence of statements by magistrates that denounce domestic violence 
on the busiest day at court. James Ptacek, in his study of judicial demeanour in 
domestic violence cases in Massachusetts, emphasised the crucial role performed 
when judicial officers publicly acknowledge and denounce domestic violence: 
Through these kinds of statements, judges define abuse as injustice. Such public 
acknowledgements, made to women who have taken considerable risks to appear in 
court, offer support at a critical point in the process of victimization.
463
  
Second, victims of domestic violence are not provided with any stories about the 
experiences of others which may serve to validate or affirm their own 
                                                          
457 Ibid at 112-13.  
458 MAG4. See also MAG2, MAG5. 
459 Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 101. 
460 Eg in Pennsylvania: Edward Gondolf, Joyce McWilliams, Barbara Hart & Jane Stuehling, „Court Response to Petitions 
for Civil Protection Orders‟ (1994) 9 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 503 at 513; and comment by an interview 
participant from a USA nationwide survey, Kit Kinports & Karla Fisher, „Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence 
Cases: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of Reform Statutes (1992) 2 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 163 at 
209, see also recommendation for additional resources at 210.  
461 See references above n442. 
462 Comments of this nature tended to be made only when there were associated criminal charges for which the defendant 
plead guilty and the magistrate was determining sentence, or in the small number of cases in which additional evidence 
was heard to determine whether to grant an IO. 
463 Ptacek, above n13 at 157-58.  
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experience. If one of the issues women face is not defining their experience as 
violence, then the power of the court environment in documenting the experience 
of others can serve to reinforce the messages that „you are not alone‟, that „your 
experience is violence and abuse‟, and that „the law can assist‟. 
There was one exception to this invisibility of violence in the observation of 
court proceedings. At CourtC a male magistrate went to great lengths in domestic 
violence criminal charge cases to read out and emphasise the elements of the 
offence, describing what took place during the incident, as well as reprimanding 
the offender when delivering the sentence.
464
 This approach countered the 
routine defence submissions (that the incident that led to the charge was „out of 
character‟, that the defendant is a „fine upstanding citizen‟, a „good father‟, that 
alcohol had been consumed, that the defendant had expressed remorse and so 
on), which in a range of ways silence the woman‟s experience of violence by 
minimising the incident and the man‟s responsibility. 
Thirdly, the creation of a public record within the Local Court setting could 
challenge common misconceptions about what constitutes domestic violence. As 
discussed in Chapters 5-6, what is experienced by women and what is 
documented in ADVO complaints does not all centre on „serious‟ forms of 
physical violence (although these are present in many complaints), but rather the 
far more common and arguably more encompassing picture of multiple tactics, 
that alone might appear minor and trivial, but when viewed cumulatively are 
more indicative of „coercive control‟.465 
Finally, absent an adequate understanding of the violence and the fears of the 
complainant, it is unlikely that an appropriate order can be tailor-made to meet 
the circumstances of the complainant. 
i. The making of interim orders 
If an ADVO application is to be adjourned the court will usually be asked to 
determine whether an IO should be granted (or continued). In making this 
decision the court is simply required to be satisfied that it is „necessary or 
                                                          
464 Observation CourtC (18 October 2006). 
465 See Stark, above n84; and Evan Stark, „Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to 
Coercive Control‟ (1995) 58 Albany Law Review 973. 
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appropriate to do so in the circumstances‟.466 The NSWLRC notes that this 
provision „provides little or no guidance to the court on how to exercise the 
power‟.467  
An IO may be made ex parte,
468
 by consent (without or without admissions),
469
 
or on the basis of evidence or submissions.
470
 Once an IO is made it may be 
continued on subsequent appearances or it may be revoked.  
The unreported decision of Smart v Johnson in 1998,
471
 which considered 
whether a contested IO can be made without giving both parties an opportunity 
to give evidence and conduct reasonable cross examination, is important here. In 
that case Justice Dunford held that it was a denial of natural justice to grant an IO 
without doing so. However Dunford made it clear that such a hearing was 
focused on whether an IO was „necessary or appropriate‟ not whether the 
complaint was proven on the balance of probabilities. The NSWLRC notes that 
some magistrates follow this decision „strictly‟;472 that is to say, if the defendant 
contests the making of an IO, the magistrate will allocate time, generally that 
afternoon to conduct a hearing. For many parties the thought of having to wait all 
day at court can „encourage‟ negotiation.  
There is no official data available on the making of IOs, and no other study on 
the NSW ADVO system has examined IOs in the Local Court. However, the 
NSWLRC in its recent review of the ADVO system, received submissions from 
key professionals working in this field (including community legal centres, 
women‟s support groups, solicitors, and magistrates) who were critical about 
practice in this area.
473
 
The making of an IO is obviously important to complainants – without an IO, 
they have no protection until the finalisation of their ADVO application.
474
 
Where an ADVO is contested this can be a considerable period of time, 
                                                          
466 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562BB(1), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s22(1). 
467 NSWLRC, „AVOs‟, above n11 at [7.25].  
468 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562BB(2), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s22(3). 
469 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562BA.  
470 In some cases this is confined to a simple (re)confirmation on oath that the complaint is true and correct. 
471 Smart v Johnson (Unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Dunford J, 8 Oct 1998). 
472 NSWLRC, „AVOs‟, above n11 at [7.32]. See MAG5.  
473 Ibid at [7.27]-[7.30].  
474 Unless the defendant was present in court, an IO must be served to be enforceable. 
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particularly in some Sydney courts where a person can wait over six months for a 
hearing date. 
There are alternatives to IOs that are little used in the Local Court. The most 
significant is the ability to impose bail conditions on an ADVO defendant even if 
there are no related criminal proceedings.
475
 Unlike the making of undertakings, 
which is the other alternative, bail conditions possess some level of repercussion 
if they are breached. While not of the same strength as an IO (if an IO is 
breached it is a criminal offence) a breach of bail can require the defendant to 
reappear before court and have bail reviewed. Bail is not preferred to IOs for 
reasons relating to its relative lack of strength and the fact that victims are rarely 
provided with a copy of bail conditions, unlike the case with IOs. However bail 
is an alternative that can afford some level of protection, unlike undertakings. 
There are no statistics available on the use of bail as an alternative to IOs in the 
Local Court of NSW. 
ii. The resolution of ADVOs in the Local Court 
An ADVO application may be finalised in the Local Court in a number of ways: 
 An ADVO may be made on a final basis after a defended hearing, an ex parte 
hearing, or by consent with or without the defendant admitting to the 
allegations contained in the complaint.
476
 The vast majority of ADVOs are 
made by consent without admissions.  
 At any time during the court process, a complainant may withdraw the 
application. In some situations an ADVO is withdrawn in exchange for 
undertakings. An undertaking is a promise to the court, generally in the same 
terms as the order that was sought. An undertaking has no legal effect.
477
 
 After a hearing (whether defended or ex parte) a magistrate may dismiss the 
application. An ADVO may also be dismissed where the person seeking the 
ADVO fails to attend court to continue with the application. In practice many 
                                                          
475 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562L, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s83. 
476 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562BA, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s78. 
477 While there are no repercussions for the breach of an undertaking; the giving of an undertaking, and the legal processes 
involved may, for some defendants, be effective in preventing or reducing the occurrence of violence. See Kate and Keira 
whose cross applications were resolved this way and at the time of the interview had not experienced any further 
violence/abuse: Chapter 9. 
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ADVOs that are withdrawn are marked „withdrawn and dismissed‟ by the 
court. 
In 2005, 55 per cent of ADVO applications were granted, 43.1 per cent were 
withdrawn/dismissed, only 1.9 per cent were dismissed after a contested 
hearing.
478
 
The resolution of ADVO complaints by consent, the most popular way of 
resolving ADVO applications generally, warrants further exploration.
479
 The 
legislation makes it clear that the court may grant consent orders without being 
satisfied of the matters alleged in the complaint; it also states that the court is not 
to conduct a hearing unless it is „in the interests of justice to do so‟.480 Very few, 
if any, hearings are conducted into the making of consent orders, and there was 
even some suggestion by other professionals (notably not magistrates), that 
magistrates barely read, or address, the complaints that are resolved by 
consent.
481
 As one prosecutor explained: 
Ah you‟ve always got to be satisfied that one [an ADVO] is warranted, but … where the 
people have consented, …. Bear in mind that the court has a lot of other work and we‟ve 
got to manage our time. If someone‟s consenting and they‟re knowing what it‟s all 
about, that seems to be totally unnecessary to drag a matter out.
482
 
Hunter has argued that the notion of „consent‟ in domestic violence proceedings 
is problematic.
483
 While there are a range of benefits associated with the ability 
to consent to a protection order without the necessity of a contested hearing, 
there are also a range of disadvantages, for example, such a regime assumes that 
the parties are equal in their negotiations, that there are no other factors, such as 
intimidation and threats, that influence the willingness to consent, it fails to 
provide a public record of forum in which the woman‟s story is affirmed, and the 
                                                          
478 Local Courts NSW, „2005‟, above n65, Table 1.4. 
479 There is no data available on how orders are resolved. The only NSW study that has documented mode of resolution 
found that 77.6% of cases were resolved by consent, and 22% by ex parte determinations. However the study excluded 
hearings because of researcher unavailability: Trimboli & Bonney, above n66 at 37. 
480 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562BA(3)(b), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s78(3). 
481 DVLO3, PP2 and PP5. 
482 PP5. 
483 See Hunter, „Having Her Day in Court‟, above n449. See also Hilary Astor, „Domestic Violence and Mediation‟ 
(1990) 1 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 143. 
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man‟s actions are not clearly denounced.484 Consent makes the “problem” of 
violence disappear from view‟.485 
Hunter notes the „encouragement‟ given to defendants to consent to orders – this 
encouragement is evident on two dimensions: the attractiveness of consenting 
without admissions; and the prospect of finalising the matter that day with little, 
if any legal costs. In the Victorian context, Hunter notes that defendants are often 
persuaded by a clerk outside the courtroom to consent to a protection order; if 
this encouragement has proved unsuccessful then the magistrate in court will also 
suggest to the defendant the benefits of consent: 
…the Magistrate will sometimes repeat the options [already articulated by the clerk] …, 
with strong encouragement for the defendant to consent without admitting the 
allegations. Consenting saves considerable time for the defendant and for the court, and 
it also spares the Magistrate from having to listen to all the details of the alleged 
violence.
486
 
Hunter suggests that if the police were more involved in protection order 
applications in Victoria there may be less consent without admissions, as „police 
support for the complainant‟s allegations would render consent without admitting 
those allegations much less of an option‟.487 This has certainly not transpired in 
NSW where the police have been actively involved in ADVO applications for a 
long time, and to a greater extent, than Victoria.
488
  
Hunter questions the way in which these orders are referred to as „consent‟ 
orders, when in practice only the defendant consents; questions of consent are 
not raised with the victim at all.
489
 In this way the practice of consent in civil 
protection order proceedings is different to settlement processes in other types of 
civil actions.
490
 While the NSW legislation casts the making of consent orders as 
requiring some decision on the part of both parties, in practice this is not how 
consent is obtained in the Local Court. While some may argue that consent on 
the part of the victim is implicit in seeking the order, those being the terms on 
which the victim would agree, many victims express dissatisfaction with the fact 
                                                          
484 Hunter, „Having Her Day in Court‟, above n449 at 66-7. 
485 Ibid at 67. 
486 Ibid at 64. 
487 Ibid. 
488 See comparative police data above n376. 
489 Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 120. 
490 Hunter „Consent in Violent Relationships‟ above n449 at 162. 
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that the defendant can „consent without admissions‟. It is perhaps this additional 
feature, without admissions, that makes consent orders so problematic, where the 
object of the woman‟s legal action is not only to obtain a protection order but at 
some level to tell her story, be believed and have some attention focused on the 
wrong inherent in the defendant‟s behaviour.491 In this area Hunter raises another 
concern about the dominance of consent orders made without admissions: the 
absence of a legal proceeding that affirms that the woman‟s story is indeed true. 
Instead what eventuates is a dominance of orders where there has been no 
determination; this leaves us without measures to counter the resilient refrain that 
women lie about, fabricate or exaggerate their experiences of violence, nor do we 
have a process which clearly addresses and labels the defendant‟s behaviour as 
wrong.
492
 Hunter sees this as a way in which men can continue to deny and 
minimise their violence, and that consent provides a means by which this denial 
is „echoed by the state…on a grand scale‟.493 
There is great pressure to generate consent outcomes.
494
 One magistrate 
colourfully depicted her powers of persuasion in garnering consent orders: 
I love consent without admission and I can sell it [like] ice to Eskimos in terms of by 
consent without admissions.
495
 
This magistrate placed this persuasive power in the context of the court system, 
the workload and the fact that contested cases may be adjourned for a number of 
months. As she explained, often defendants are very clear that they do not agree 
with the order, but once they find out that they will be required to return to court, 
take another day off work, and so on, they are often more than willing to „agree‟. 
In this vein MAG3 explained: 
…one in five consents with great enthusiasm to final orders. I've certainly had matters here 
where I was concerned that defendants didn‟t really understand what it was they were 
agreeing to and I did my best to make sure that they haven‟t been bullied into agreeing to 
something that they‟re not prepared to agree to because … I mean I had a matter not that 
long ago where this guy said „yeah I'm prepared to agree to orders‟ … and then he said 
„yeah but I want to make a statement‟, you know „I've got it all written out here‟ and started 
reading it out. And I said, „well hang on a sec, you know you‟re consenting without 
                                                          
491 Eg see professional‟s comments about consent without admissions in Hunter‟s study: ibid at 120, and by the women 
interviewed, at 121-122. 
492 Ibid at 122-123. 
493 Ibid at 123. 
494 See also Dick, above n94. 
495 MAG2. See also WDVCAS4. 
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admission – you know it‟s not a matter of – I don‟t need to know anything about these 
circumstances… you‟re agreeing to orders being made against you and…‟ - he‟s reading 
out all this stuff about how „it was all lies‟… – I said „well you know if you don‟t agree with 
the orders and you don‟t agree with the allegations you can have the matter stood over for 
a hearing‟, you know… And he said „but I can‟t take another day off work‟. I mean I'd say 
that‟s another one in five because they can‟t take another day off work and that‟s why 
they‟re going to consent [laughter].496 
4. Summary 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the law and practice of ADVOs in 
the Local Court environment. It has noted that most ADVO complaints are 
initiated by the police, most are made on behalf of women, and that just over half 
result in a final order. The benefits of civil protection order systems such as ease 
of access, low cost, speedy relief are evident in this discussion; however, the 
chapter has highlighted key problematic features with the system as it is currently 
practised: the poor quality of many ADVOs complaint narratives, the brevity of 
court proceedings, the workload of the courts, and the emphasis on consent and 
settlement. This means that little attention is actually focused on the problem of 
domestic violence – rather there appears to be an administrative imperative to 
„get through the list‟ – it is suggested that this has repercussions for the 
understanding of domestic violence that is reflected in ADVO proceedings, 
something that is clearly highlighted through the case study exploration of cross 
applications. Chapters 5-9 turns to exploring in detail the empirical data of this 
study and extends many of these themes raised in this chapter. 
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5.  Women’s experiences of 
violence: The interview sample 
This chapter focuses on the interview sample with women (n=10) involved in 
ADVO cross applications. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the many 
dimensions of women‟s experiences of domestic violence that are not captured 
through the „snapshot‟ approach evident in their ADVO complaint narratives. 
Through this discussion the controlling aspect of the use of violence and other 
behaviours becomes clear. This resonates with Evan Stark‟s recent work where 
he explains that coercive control is exercised through the deployment of (often 
tried and tested) different „technologies‟, including the use of violence, 
intimidation, isolation and control.
497
 
In this chapter I commence with the women‟s discussions of the way that the 
violence and abuse they experienced formed an environment of „control‟. It is 
only after discussing this important context that I turn to a more conventional list 
style approach in order to document the extent and range of violence and abuse 
experienced by these women. I then return to the issue of control by exploring a 
range of acts or behaviours that the women interviewed experienced that 
illustrate a „poor fit‟ with conventional ways in which domestic violence might 
be identified. The final section of the chapter examines the way in which these 
experiences of violence are narrowed in the complaint narrative for the ADVO(s) 
each woman sought. 
1. Experience of intimate partner violence  
A. Control 
The women I interviewed emphasised the use of control against them in their 
relationships. It is important to note that the women themselves raised this as the 
defining feature of their experience, often in response to the general question: 
„How would you describe your relationship?‟ The term „control‟ or „controlling‟ 
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was actively volunteered by the women to describe the violence that they 
experienced and the intent of the perpetrator. Half of the women made specific 
reference to control.
498
  
Frances provides an excellent illustration of the way that control characterised 
her experience of violence: „… looking back … it was … just a full on 
controlling sort of relationship I suppose‟. When asked what she meant by 
„controlling‟, Frances explained: 
You know at the time you think you‟re doing it for the good of the family and all the rest 
of it but it was basically, yeah um, you know, he would never um, he would never 
socialise with my friends, it would always – you know, I had to see my friends on my 
own, um he‟d you know, he‟d be – he‟d basically control when and where I worked or 
um he wouldn‟t look after the kids if I ever needed to do anything, um so I was basically, 
you know, tied to the house ... Um so yeah … any money that we spent was basically 
what … he wanted it to be spent on … It was always … his things. 
I asked Frances how often her former husband would behave in these ways: 
Um gee I don‟t know. Um I suppose some of it was like always there, I mean, I knew I 
had to be home at a certain time or um, you know, if I wasn‟t home to answer the phone 
or whatever. Um and yeah any time he wanted to do something or have his own way or 
something and I didn‟t agree with it you‟d know – there‟d be a blow up and he‟d end up, 
you know, smashing something… 
Frances nominated the constant control as the „worst‟ thing her former husband 
did to her: 
…Just the constant, um need to be controlling what I'm doing, like or um even now he‟d 
ring up and he‟d go „you have to talk to me‟…and it‟s only recently that I've said… „well 
no I don‟t‟ and hung up. But it  – it, you know, he had this thing and somehow made me 
(laughter), stupid me, – to yeah do whatever he felt – you know, he‟d tell me „this is 
what you have to do‟ and I would do it. … [A]nd I just … became a non-person, I think, 
which is what I sort of struggle with now, finding out who I am… 
Rosemary, who was married to her former husband for 21 years and experienced 
many different forms of violence and abuse, reported that her former husband‟s 
control had a similar sustained impact: 
…well [I‟m] just finding it hard to get out in the real world again.  And – and trust – you 
know, trying to find trust. …[B]ecause he was – he was a controller and he – he had to 
make all the decisions so I'm having troubles, you know, making the right decisions 
because he had to have the say, he had to have … control of everything.  
For others control was implicit in the limits placed on their social and economic 
freedom (for example some women were prevented from having contact with 
                                                          
498 Frances, Kate, Keira, Megan and Rosemary. 
115 
friends and family,
499
 or engaging in paid work,
500
 their time outside the home 
was monitored,
501
 they were required to seek permission to do things,
502
 and one 
woman was prevented from speaking in her first language
503
). Lillian, who was 
married to her former husband for over 15 years and has two children with him, 
felt that her former husband viewed her as a possession: 
[the relationship was] one-sided (laughter). Does that make sense? Um as long as I did 
what I was told I was okay …that‟s when the abuse and violence came into it or physical 
violence – it just got worse over the years. I mean it was sort of manipulated game 
playing and I wasn‟t allowed to do this, wasn‟t allowed to do that, um I never los[t] 
contact with my family, [but] I lost all my friends, um I wasn‟t allowed to go out, um I 
was allowed to work as long as it was on his grounds. Um yeah, that sort of thing huh…. 
[He was] very over protective…I was more of a possession to him than anything else.  
Lillian nominated the way he sought to „isolate me from the world‟ as the worst 
thing he did to her. To capture the controlling nature of the relationship and the 
pervasiveness of violence and abuse it is useful to quote Lillian at length; here 
she described the first time she experienced violence from her former husband: 
Um I'd say that [it was at my birthday party] and …some … guy came up and talked to 
me and gave me a kiss …[and Bill504] went right off his head, um and made accusations 
that I was trying to get onto him and things like that… At that stage…there was no 
physical [violence], more the, you know, „I was doing wrong‟. [That] I shouldn‟t 
…[have] let him come up and kiss me for my birthday. [A year later they started living 
together. It was at this time that Bill first used physical violence against her] …he started 
going off, just because I wouldn‟t … make him a cup of tea. Um anyway he had his 
hands around my throat ah I remember quite clearly screaming out and … a pillow 
going over my face. Um I remember him saying … „you go tell your dad and youse are 
both dead‟. …that was my main fear…[that he would] hurt my loved ones before he‟d 
actually kill me. …He presents very well … when everyone was there um he was nice as 
pie, soon as everyone left that was it. Dinner wasn‟t right I'd wear the plate, ah throw it 
across the table, tea wasn‟t hot enough or not cold enough, not enough sugar, he‟d just 
throw it. Towards the end it got that bad – I mean he‟d break things, he‟d break 
jewellery or … anything that I liked. Um when that … wasn‟t getting to me, wasn‟t 
upsetting me, that‟s when the physical, I mean full-on black eyes. Before it was just 
pulling my hair out or bruises… um in the last 12 months before I left it started getting 
really bad. I had some whopping black eyes …. 
The identification of control as the defining feature of the use of violence and 
abuse in the relationship was almost completely absent from the ADVO 
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116 
complaint narratives examined in this study. None of the ADVO complaints for 
the women interviewed mentioned control, nor did any mention any restrictions 
placed on their ability to conduct their lives. The only complaint that suggested 
the presence of control was the one made by Rosemary which referred to a 
„pattern of behaviour‟. While „control‟ is not grounds for seeking an ADVO, and 
hence its absence from complaint narratives might be understandable, I suggest 
that the failure to convey this characteristic of what otherwise appear to be 
discrete acts means that ADVO complaint narratives are unable to move beyond 
a narrow incident focus in their portrayal of „what is domestic violence‟. 
While control is arguably implicit in the statements about being „fearful‟, such 
statements, as argued in Chapter 4, appear to be inserted as a routine way to 
conclude a complaint rather than providing a connection between, or a 
framework in which to understand, the perpetration of violence in the 
relationship. Control may also be implicit in complaints where the complainant 
alleges that the defendant has placed restrictions on their social and economic 
freedoms. As was noted in Chapter 2 the recognition of „power and control‟ or 
„coercive control‟ is critical to understanding the gendered dimensions of 
violence perpetrated in an intimate context. Evan Stark argues that it is „coercive 
control‟, rather than „violence‟, that must be brought to the fore in our 
understanding of, and response to, domestic violence.
505
 Thus the emphasis on 
„violence‟ has led to an emphasis on the visible and that which is assumed to be 
„serious‟, rather than an appreciation of the way in which the more common, 
„minor‟ forms of violence and abuse accumulate within an environment of 
control that inhibits the freedom and choice of women.
506
 
B. The generation of fear 
…it‟s when it starts affecting your life…507 
Six women spoke about being scared, fearful or simply not knowing „what would 
happen next‟.508 Research comparing men‟s and women‟s use of violence in 
intimate relationships has found that there is a clear gender difference in the 
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extent to which acts of violence generate fear; where it is women who are more 
likely than men to report being fearful of their partners.
509
 
Rosemary spoke a great deal in her interview about being scared and feeling 
„trapped…I felt like a hostage…waiting to be freed‟.510 She highlighted the 
lasting impact of having been threatened with a gun during her marriage: 
I was waiting for him, like a time bomb to hit you know. It was like laying there and 
waiting for something to really badly happen, you know. I was waiting for him to come 
in with a gun and do something to me … [Rosemary goes on to describe the incident that 
led to the final separation]. … he just come at me, … and laid into me … smacked me 
around the head and threw me on the floor and put his knee between my legs and really 
hurt me and grabbed me wherever he could… and I‟m saying a prayer under my breath 
to hold my temper back because I was – I was really ready to go right off and I thought 
well I‟m just going to put myself into more danger with him because he – his eye – the 
evilness in his eyes just really was scary…511 
These comments reflect the research of Mary Ann Dutton where she found that 
many women report feeling in a „state of siege‟ never knowing when the next act 
of violence will take place.
512
 
Marcella indicated her level of fear by the fact that, near the end of her marriage, 
she asked a friend to call her each day „to be sure that I‟m still okay, that I‟m 
alive‟. Fear is also evidenced by the fact that during the relationship Marcella 
sought safety at a women‟s refuge. 
C. The clarity provided by ‘looking back’  
 
…maybe I was in love…I just couldn‟t see anything wrong [at the time].513 
A number of women pointed out that it was only in retrospect that they were able 
to identify and name their experience as domestic violence.
514
 Liz Kelly, in her 
work on the continuum of sexual violence, has noted that women may not 
necessarily have a name for their experiences, or be able to identify it as violence 
or abuse at the time that it occurs, and that it is only over time that they are able 
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to recognise what took place and to identify it as abuse.
515
 Keira explained this 
process of recognition: 
[At the time there] didn‟t seem anything wrong to me, maybe in hindsight um it was a bit 
controlling. Um particularly financially, um and there had been incidences looking back 
where I go „mmm that potentially could have been exceptionally violent‟, um it was just 
fortunate that people walked in the room or – or I was able to stop that from happening 
but I didn‟t realise that until you know six months after.  
Keira reflected that, despite having professional knowledge about domestic 
violence having worked in the field, she still did not recognise her experience as 
domestic violence when it occurred:  
I guess it was probably one of the hardest things to accept that no matter how much I 
knew about DV that it wasn‟t until it came to the crunch that I could see a lot of things 
that happened…it‟s a lot easier to see when you‟re outside looking in. 
Frances also stated that she was unable to identify the extent of controlling 
behaviour until after her marriage had ended. This was despite the fact that she 
first experienced violence one year into her marriage and this violence included 
physical assault, property damage, and restrictions on her ability to contact 
friends, to work and to access financial resources. 
Two women stated that they originally held the view that domestic violence only 
involved physical violence, and hence the term did not apply to them.
516
 It was 
only through their contact with specialist domestic violence services and 
literature that their knowledge about domestic violence, and their own 
experiences, expanded.
517
 As Lillian explained: 
…what does the term domestic violence mean to you? 
Um now or before? 
Well you can talk about both if you want.  
OK, before domestic violence to me was that um a very physical abuse. Um but now 
looking back and after continuous counselling [it] started way in the beginning when we 
just sort of going out together and that was verbally, emotional, the known game plan, 
um the whole thing of um keeping me from everyone. 
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D. Repetition, frequency and cumulative environments 
A number of the women spoke about long experiences of violence; during the 
relationship and, for many, for a considerable period after separation.
518
 Four 
women had lengthy relationships (from eight to 21 years) and all stated that the 
violence commenced early in the relationship, and continued throughout.
519
 None 
of these women made a report to the police until after separation. 
In contrast to the act-based approach of CTS research, one of the defining 
features of feminist research is that domestic violence is characterised by 
multiple forms of violence and abuse often perpetrated over lengthy periods of 
time and with varying degrees of frequency and repetition.
520
 Reflecting this, 
domestic violence has been described as the „quintessential repeat crime‟.521 
While individual violent and abusive acts can be identified, they also interact 
with each other and provide a multi-layered meaning to each successive act. 
Evan Stark argues that it is this repetition and frequency of often „minor‟ forms 
of violence „that distinguishes coercive control‟.522 Other research has also noted 
that the duration and frequency of women‟s experiences of violence and abuse in 
their intimate relationships provides a marked contrast to men‟s experiences.523 
The repeated, frequent use of multiple forms of violent and abusive behaviour is 
clearly demonstrated in the sample of women interviewed in this research. Every 
woman complained that they had experienced multiple forms of violent, abusive 
and controlling behaviours. The types of acts perpetrated often changed after 
separation due to the loss of, or reduction in, face-to-face contact, but continued 
nevertheless.
524
 
The frequency and repetition of violence used against the women interviewed 
varied. Liz Kelly also found considerable variation in her research and noted that 
for some women physical violence was used fairly regularly (weekly or monthly) 
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but for others there were long gaps (often a year or more) between acts of 
physical violence (although other forms of abuse may have been deployed during 
that time).
525
  
Three of the women interviewed in this study reported an increase in frequency 
and seriousness over time.
526
 Janet indicated that „…at first it was only every two 
or three weeks then it got more frequent‟.527 It is worth noting Janet‟s assessment 
of frequency, where every two or three weeks must also be identified as frequent. 
Lillian noted that for two or three days her husband would be „as nice as pie and 
then just absolutely schizophrenic‟. For Lillian the violence and abuse increased 
in severity and frequency during the last year of her relationship, coinciding with 
her husband‟s increased use of alcohol and other drugs.528 For Rosemary 
violence took place approximately once a month; however this varied „sometimes 
it would be more often and sometimes there‟d be a bit of a gap‟. Chloe‟s 
experience of violence was initially less frequent than the other women 
interviewed, approximately once every six months, with a „nice time‟ between 
the violent events. However, over time the perpetration of violence increased to 
once every month. 
Other women spoke of a sustained frequency and repetition throughout the 
relationship. Marcella said that violence and abuse was „a day-to-day 
occurrence…part of the normal … life with him‟. While Frances stated that she 
felt that the violence had increased in frequency and seriousness over time, she 
also noted that to some extent it was „always there‟. This resonates with Evan 
Stark‟s work where he notes that for some women the frequency and repetition 
of violence becomes part of „routine behaviour that resembles other routine 
events such as eating, sleeping, or going to the toilet‟.529 
E. Forms of violence – a multiple, cumulative experience 
[P]hysical [violence]… is easily detectable because you can see it from the outside. You 
can see it with your eyes the fact of domestic violence with physical abuse. … but you 
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can‟t necessary [see other forms of abuse] you can‟t really see it, that‟s why it‟s hard [to 
identify it as part of domestic violence].
530
 
In this part of the chapter I outline the different forms of violence and abuse 
experienced by the women interviewed. It is important to note that women were 
not specifically asked about the types of violence that they experienced – rather 
they were asked multiple questions that enabled a picture of the experience of 
violence and abuse to be gathered.
531
 This means that just because a woman did 
not mention a form of violence in her interview does not mean that it did not take 
place; there are a range of reasons why she may have not spoken about it. This 
needs to be borne in mind when considering the following discussion. 
i. Physical violence 
Most women experienced actual or threatened physical violence. This included 
being hit,
532
 punched,
533
 kicked,
534
 pushed,
535
 grabbed,
536
 attacked with a 
knife,
537
 threatened with a gun,
538
 thrown against a wall
539
 or onto the floor,
540
 
shoved in the back,
541
 choked or strangled,
542
 and had their hair pulled.
543
 One 
woman had boiling water poured on her.
544
 Two women had their former 
husband drive at them in his car. In one case this happened when she had a child 
in the car
545
 and for the other it took place soon after he had been convicted of 
breaching her ADVO.
546
 Two women experienced physical violence when they 
were pregnant.
547
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Two women described being involved in a siege-style incident. Lillian and her 
children had moved in with a relative when her former husband came and 
barricaded them in the house with a „shotgun‟. Frances was also locked in her 
house by her former husband; he destroyed furniture, disconnected the phone, 
and threatened to burn the house down with her in it. 
While some of these incidents were reported to the police and resulted in charges 
and ADVO applications,
548
 many were not. 
As a result of this violence four women reported that they sustained injuries. 
Injuries included: a „swollen head‟,549 being unable to move afterwards or feeling 
paralysed,
550
 bruises,
551
 black eyes,
552
 having to use crutches following a „karate 
kick…[that] sent me straight for a wall‟,553 a wound to the head,554 broken ribs,555 
hair pulled out,
556
 and „pains in my head‟ after being „belted‟ around the head.557 
Some visited doctors to have their injuries attended to. One woman stated that 
during these doctor‟s visits she „covered‟ for her husband.558 
However, it is important to note that not one woman interviewed nominated an 
act of physical violence as the „worst‟ form of violence experienced. 
ii. Sexual violence 
Four women reported that they had been „sexually assaulted‟ or „raped‟ by their 
former partner,
559
 all of whom stated that this was the „worst‟ thing that 
happened to them. In addition to being sexually assaulted, Keira also reported 
that her former partner would get angry, „uptight‟ or „shitty‟ towards her when 
she refused to have sex. Marcella described being coerced to perform sexual acts 
that „I did not like…I would be forced to do in a manner that he would like and if 
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I don‟t I get hit or pushed sometimes‟. Megan described the rape as a way of 
„letting me know who was boss‟. 
iii. Threats and intimidation 
Seven women experienced threats or similar intimidating behaviour. This 
included threats to harm or kill the woman
560
 or people close to her,
561
 threats to 
use weapons,
562
 and threats to burn or damage property.
563
 Two women received 
bullets in their post-box.
564
 In both instances it was not possible to say with 
certainty that the bullet was the result of their former husband‟s actions, 
however, from their point of view „who else could it have been‟. Stark describes 
these as „anonymous‟ acts of violence „whose authorship is never in doubt‟.565 
That is to say, from the woman‟s experience there was no other person who 
could have perpetrated these acts other than their former partner. 
Four women received death threats pre and post separation.
566
 Janet said she 
received „a lot of death threats‟. For two women these threats were conveyed via 
their children, one of whom was six at the time.
567
  
iv. Verbal and emotional abuse 
Many women spoke of being verbally and emotionally abused.
568
 This included 
name-calling,
569
 put-downs,
570
 comments about their sexual performance,
571
 
physical appearance,
572
 the standard of their mothering
573
 or household duties,
574
 
and accusations that the woman was having affairs.
575
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Louise nominated the „mental abuse‟ as the „worst‟ thing her former husband did 
to her.
576
 She highlighted the longstanding impact this form of abuse had and 
explained that: 
…I lost all my confidence, even to get in the car and drive. I just felt, I didn‟t want to go 
out anywhere… I just wasn‟t myself at all and it was just from – from him constantly 
putting me down and – anything that I did wasn‟t right. Like even…just the meal that I 
cooked it was never – it was never right, you know what I mean, like, I couldn‟t do 
anything right. 
The experience of verbal and emotional abuse continued to have an impact on 
the women after separation (for example on their self-esteem and emotional well-
being). For many they continued to experience verbal abuse after separation, 
often in the context of post separation parenting arrangements (see discussion 
below). 
v. Stalking 
Three women complained of behaviour that amounted to stalking. Lillian‟s 
former husband would drive past her house, throw objects at her house, and yell 
abuse and threats at her from the driveway. Janet, who had set up a new home in 
another location, was followed to that new location within a week.  
The main complaint leading to Marcella‟s second ADVO application was the 
constant presence of her former husband in the vicinity of her house and 
workplace. As she states „there was no month that I would not see him.‟ Marcella 
made a number of reports to the police about these „appearances‟ as a breach of 
her ADVO. The police never took formal action as they interpreted these 
„appearances‟ as „coincidences‟ or the man‟s right to be in a „public place‟. In 
contradistinction to this interpretation Marcella stated that it was „systematic 
intimidation‟.  
vi. Financial abuse 
Two women complained about financial abuse, albeit in different ways. For one 
it was the lack of access to financial resources, for the other it was the continual 
use of her money. Marcella explained that she was not permitted to handle the 
money she earned. Her former husband refused to allow her to have her own 
bank account, „everything was in his name‟. Keira complained that during her 
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relationship they always used her money and that her former partner would get 
angry when she was unable, or refused, to do so. 
vii. Property damage or destruction 
Five women complained about damage to their own or joint property. This 
included: the removal of the woman‟s personal property,577 thrown objects,578 
deliberate damage to objects including objects of special importance to the 
woman,
579
 damage to the front door of the woman‟s house,580 broken 
windows,
581
 and damage to or interference with the woman‟s car.582  
Like the „anonymous‟ threats discussed earlier, it was not always possible for the 
women to definitively state that the damage was caused by their former partner; 
however for these women the „authorship was never in doubt‟.583 Keira explained 
this „authorship‟ in the context of the slashing of her car tyres, once at her work 
and later at her home address: 
There are very few people who know where I live and where I would park my car at 
[work] … it probably indicated very strongly that someone was actually following [me] 
um because I was only at [work] for about half-a-day um and they slashed exactly the 
same tyres…584 
Frances experienced multiple incidents of property damage, including damage 
caused by her former husband‟s attempts to break into her house after separation. 
In response Frances purchased a „guard dog…to stop him being able to come to 
the house and he‟s still on at the kids – “got to get rid of that dog”, “got to get 
rid of that dog”. Um he doesn‟t want any obstacles in the way of being able to 
get in if he wants to…‟ 
viii. Violence towards others 
Four women reported that their former partner directed actual or threatened 
violence towards people close to them.
585
 Kate‟s former husband assaulted her 
                                                          
577 Marcella. 
578 Lillian. 
579 Chloe, Frances and Lillian. 
580 Chloe, Frances and Lillian. 
581 Frances. 
582 Chloe, Frances, Keira and Lillian.  
583 Stark, above n84 at 254. See also above n565 and infra text. 
584 See also Lillian. 
585 Janet, Kate, Keira and Lillian. 
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new partner, threatened to burn his house down, and regularly drove along his 
residential street. 
For Janet, the event that led to her most recent ADVO application involved her 
former husband attempting to pull her stepmother out of a car, „to attack her, and 
she had to – she locked the car door and he had his face up against the window 
and stuff like that, verbally abusing …[her]‟.  Janet also reported that her former 
husband had been found guilty of assaulting her 17 year old son from a previous 
relationship for which her was placed on a good behaviour bond and ordered to 
attend an anger management program.  
Lillian stated that „…anyone that came with me [to court] or got involved with 
me…was harassed and more trouble was started up‟ as a result she stopped 
asking people to accompany her to court.
586
 
ix. Former partner threatened self-harm 
Two women spoke about actual or threatened self-harm by their former 
partners.
587
 Threats to self-harm or to commit suicide by the perpetrator are 
identified in the „Power and Control Wheel‟, discussed in Chapter 2, as a tactic 
of control and coercion.
588
 Lillian provided a disturbing example that took place 
in front of one of their children who was around five or six years of age:  
…um there was one night that, three-o-clock in the morning he came home from the pub 
and um heaved me out of bed wanting his dinner and [the children] were asleep in their 
beds and he grabbed a pair of scissors and started stabbing himself with them, yelling 
out that I was stabbing him and [their son woke up and came into the room]…[son] was 
standing there saying „no daddy, you‟re stabbing yourself‟, [her former husband] just 
told him that he was a „lying little blah, blah, blah and go back to bed, you don‟t know 
what you‟re on about‟. 
x. Is it violence? 
A number of the women detailed acts that they found to be abusive that do not fit 
within conventional lists of acts of violence or abuse. These acts would therefore 
not be captured by an act-specific survey like the CTS discussed in Chapter 2.  
                                                          
586 See also Keira. 
587 Keira and Lillian. 
588 See above n160. Threats to commit suicide by the perpetrator are also invariably included in risk assessment tools: eg 
see the Victorian Family Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Management: Supporting an Integrated Family Violence 
Service System (2008) at 54. See also Jacquelyn Campbell, Nancy Glass, Phyllis Sharps, Kathryn Laughon & Tina 
Bloom, „Intimate Partner Homicide: Review and Implications of Research and Policy‟ (2007) 8 Trauma, Violence and 
Abuse 246 at 261. 
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During her relationship Marcella‟s husband forced her to watch news stories 
about violence against women: 
…he would call me – he would make me listen to that sort of report in the news and if I 
don‟t come and sit next to him in the – in the lounge room he would be very angry at 
me.
589
 
Keira worked with her former partner and once the relationship ended, he 
constantly emailed her about trivial work issues, questioned the quality of her 
work, queried the hours she worked, accessed her email account without her 
permission, and threatened not to sign her time sheets. 
After separation Kate was pursued by acts that might be interpreted as „displays 
of love‟. For example, her former husband placed a sign on every telegraph pole 
along her street stating that he loved her and wanted her back. There were also 
numerous emails, SMS messages and telephone calls to this effect. This 
behaviour culminated in more obvious acts of violence, particularly against her 
new partner. Kate reflected that when she decided to end the relationship she 
„knew it wouldn‟t be easy‟ and that he „wouldn‟t give up‟. 
Three women stated that their former partner had reported them to various 
agencies either to discredit them or to cause them to be investigated.
590
 These 
women were reported to the NSW Department of Community Services 
(DoCS),
591
 rental or accommodation agencies,
592
 the police,
593
 mental health 
services,
594
 schools,
595
 Centrelink,
596
 and their workplace.
597
 As Lillian stated: 
I‟ve had numerous complaints go in everywhere…I‟ve had complaints with my real 
estate, I‟ve had complaints go to the children‟s school, I‟ve had complaints go into my 
workplace, I‟ve had [Centrelink]…notified I have partners living with me, um I‟ve had 
full investigation done and it‟s all proven clear. 
                                                          
589 A similar story was recounted in Kaye et al, above n15 at 51. 
590 SOL5 also mentioned this practice. 
591 Janet and Marcella. 
592 Lillian and Marcella. 
593 Janet and Marcella.  
594 Janet. 
595 Lillian. 
596 Lillian. 
597 Lillian.  
128 
This type of harassing behaviour, which does not fit easily within conventional 
understandings of what is domestic violence, has been reported in other 
research.
598
  
F. Violence continuing after separation 
As has been discussed in many other studies, women and those who assist them 
are constantly subject to the refrain „why doesn‟t she leave?‟,599 yet many 
women do effect separation and the violence continues.
600
 A range of studies 
have indicated that one of the key gender differences in the perpetration of 
violence is the extent to which it continues after separation, with women much 
more likely to experience violence from their former male partners.
601
 One of the 
ironies of the emphasis on leaving is the fact that the time of separation is a 
particularly dangerous time for women victims of domestic violence.
602
  
Recognising the violence that continues after separation is key to illuminating 
how violence is exercised as a method of control. Martha Mahoney has argued 
that „separation assault‟ should be specifically named: 
…by emphasizing the urgent control moves that seek to prevent the woman from ending 
the relationship, the concept of separation assault raises questions that inevitably focus 
additional attention on the ongoing struggle for power and control in the relationship.
603
 
A number of the women interviewed spoke about violence that continued for a 
long time after separation.
604
 Frances, who was still experiencing violence two 
years after separation, speaks eloquently about her surprise at this: 
I would never have thought that it would have continued after we‟d broken up. Like I 
would have thought that – especially since he started it, that that would have the end 
and we‟d sort of go on our own merry way and I never expected it to get um – I suppose 
I found it worse in a way – in some ways because I felt that I was away from it now and 
I suppose I knew what it was then, because I – I‟d been educated on it and therefore I 
                                                          
598 Kaye et al, above n15 at 35. See also Doreen in Stark, above n84 at 233. 
599 See Kate Cavanagh, „Understanding Women‟s Responses to Domestic Violence‟ (2003) 2 Qualitative Social Work 229 
at 232. See also Goldfarb, above n265.  
600 See Mahoney, above n247. See also Kaye et al, above n15 at 35-37.  
601 Bagshaw & Chung, above n137 at 11; Dasgupta, „Just Like Men?‟, above n43 at 201; and Atmore, above n31 at 43. 
602 See Dutton, above n141 at 1212; Rebecca Dobash, Russell Dobash, Kate Cavanagh & Juanjo Medina-Ariza, „Lethal 
and Nonlethal Violence Against an Intimate Female Partner: Comparing Male Murders to Nonlethal Abusers‟ (2007) 13 
Violence Against Women 329 at 343-44. See also the rates of intimate homicide in Australia: Mouzos & Rushforth, above 
n24 at 2 found that one-quarter of intimate partner homicides occurred when the relationship had ended, and of these 
victims 84% were women; and Alison Wallace, Homicide: The Social Reality (1986) at 99: where almost half (46%) of 
the women were killed by their intimate partner after separation or during the process of separation. 
603 Mahoney, above n247 at 7. 
604 Frances, Janet, Keira, Lillian, Louise and Rosemary.  
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wouldn‟t stand for it either anymore and to have it keep going, going, going, going um 
yeah, I never expected anything… like that to happen. 
Similarly Keira reflected on the disparity between the length of her relationship 
and the continuation of violence post separation: „I mean the 18 months…[since 
separation is] double the time of our relationship, um that‟s a hard thing to cop, like 
you can cop it for a couple of months I think and so “OK now get over it”.‟ 
Likewise Janet, who had been separated from her husband for six years at the 
time of the interview, was still experiencing abuse. This was the second time 
Janet had separated from her husband. In her interview she described how after 
the first attempt at separation, he had harassed her with telephone calls and 
threats, and as a result she returned to the relationship to „stop that happening‟. 
While for some women the continuing opportunity for violence was the ongoing 
contact between the children and their father, this was not always the case. Two 
women, who did not have children with the perpetrator, also experienced 
violence after separation.
605
 
The types of violence experienced after separation reflect the types of violence 
and abuse experienced while the relationship was intact, and included: multiple 
telephone calls, SMS messages and emails, stalking, verbal abuse, property 
damage and threats. For some women the violence following separation 
constituted multiple breaches of their ADVO (not all of which were reported to 
the police).
606
 For Frances, these breaches involved „harassing phone calls‟, 
attempts to break into her house, „smashing the window‟, coming to her mother‟s 
house when she was there, property damage, and following her around a party all 
night and back to her house where „we had this blow up in the middle of the front 
lawn‟. Frances‟s former husband has been convicted of four offences of 
contravening her ADVO and as a result he has been fined, subjected to an 18 
month good behaviour bond, a 12 month good behaviour bond, and a community 
service order. 
The extent of ongoing harassment and violence against Lillian since separation is 
quite extraordinary: 
                                                          
605 Kate and Keira. 
606 See also Frances. 
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[From] 2001 to 2002 [something happened] every day (laughter). Um anything from 109 
phone calls, anything to driving up here throwing fire crackers in my yard and 
everything … if he sees me it‟s the ongoing harassment. …[T]he last lot of [breach] 
charges was [2002] ah it was…there was threats um there was something like 17 phone 
messages just on my answering machine threatening me that he was going to blow me 
away and he was outside my house etcetera.  
Lillian‟s former husband lodged his cross application at the same time he was 
charged with the breaches mentioned above. 
i. Pursuing contact via the telephone and other media 
Many women complained about ongoing telephone contact and the use of other 
media to contact them (for example, SMS messages and emails).
607
 Contact was 
pursued at the woman‟s home and workplace,608 often at all times of the day and 
night.
609
 As Janet explained: 
…just the harassment with the phone calls…ringing up constant[ly] – „who‟s there?‟ 
Abusing down the phone line and hang up and he‟s straight back into it again. And 
sometimes they just go on for all hours… 
In the end Janet disconnected her landline and now only uses a mobile phone. 
Similarly Lillian stated, „I had calls until three o‟clock in the morning, four 
o‟clock in the morning. I‟d pull the phone out...‟610 
Three women received messages that purported to be declarations of love from 
their former partners.
611
 This was sometimes extensive. Keira reported that: 
Um in the beginning, um he probably text messaged me 20 to 30 times a day. 
And what sort of things did he say …? 
Um „I love you‟, „I miss you‟, „I need you‟, „I can‟t live without you‟, um just that sort of 
stuff. 
Lillian reported that she still receives these „love‟ messages two years after 
separation, and after her former husband has been charged with multiple 
offences, including contravention of her ADVO. Frances said that she now 
reports: 
Everything from a silly little message like „kiss, kiss, kiss‟ or …messages he sent at 
Christmas. I mean they say „it‟s harmless‟. I mean on Valentine‟s Day he sent a message 
                                                          
607 Chloe, Frances, Kate, Keira, Lillian, Louise, Megan and Rosemary. 
608 Kate. 
609 Frances and Janet. 
610 See also Lillian quoted above. 
611 Kate, Keira and Lillian. 
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saying …‟happy Valentine‟s Day to my darling wife‟. Um our wedding anniversary … 
he rang up my daughter trying to find out where I was going to be to send me flowers. 
Other research has noted the way in which these continuing declarations of love 
may be misinterpreted by the legal system and others, yet the women receiving 
them experience them as a continuation of the control evident in the 
relationship.
612
 Lillian, quoted above, alluded to this different interpretation: „I 
mean they [various professionals] say “It‟s harmless”‟, but clearly this is not 
how she experienced these messages evidenced by the fact that she reported 
these acts to the police. Kate similarly interprets the „love‟ messages she received 
as evidence of her former husband‟s inability to accept that the relationship had 
ended. 
ii. Breaches around contact with children 
A number of women complained about what they saw as breaches of their 
ADVO at the time of contact between the father and the children. Similar 
accounts of violence and abuse at this time has been reported in other research.
613
 
When incidents take place at changeover women often find it difficult for these 
acts to be acknowledged, or responded to, as a breach of their ADVO, rather the 
acts tend to be seen by the police as „family matters‟.614 
Louise stated that her ADVO would be breached when:  
…he was picking up the kids – he‟d just stand out the front and abuse me about different 
things. …he was coming up and um bashing on the window so hard he almost broke it, 
every time he picked the children up.
615
 
Marcella made a statement to the police,
616
 complaining that when her former 
husband returned the children from contact he dropped them off in her residential 
street rather than at the location specified in the Family Law Order (FLO). This 
was not a breach of the ADVO as her former husband was outside the exclusion 
zone around her residential address. However, Marcella viewed this „minor‟ non-
                                                          
612 Busch, „Don‟t Throw Bouquets at me…‟, above n425; and Busch et al, „The Gap‟, above n281 at 196. 
613 Kaye et al, above n15 at 119-121; Kathryn Rendell, Zoe Rathus & Angela Lynch, An Unacceptable Risk: A Report on 
Child Contact Arrangements Where There is Violence in the Family (2000). Similar findings have been reported in other 
jurisdictions: Linda Neilson, Spousal Abuse, Children and the Legal System: Final Report for Canadian Bar Association, 
Law for the Futures Fund (2001), at 62. Available at <http://www.unbf.ca/arts/CFVR/documents/spousal-abuse.pdf> (27 
January 2009); Lorraine Radford, Marianne Hester, Julie Humphries & Kandy-Sue Woodfield, „For the Sake of the 
Children: The Law, Domestic Violence and Child Contact in England‟ (1997) 20 Women‟s Studies International Forum 
471, at 477; and Lorraine Radford & Marianne Hester, Mothering Through Domestic Violence (2006) at 91-95.  
614 Hayley Katzen, „It‟s a Family Matter, Not a Police Matter: The Enforcement of Protection Orders‟ (2000) 14 
Australian Journal of Family Law 119.  
615 Louise. 
616 Marcella provided a copy of this statement to the researcher. 
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compliance with the FLO through the spectrum of her past experiences of 
violence – and thus as intentional non-compliance, intimidation and a breach of 
her ADVO. In her statement to the police Marcella states how this non-
compliance made her feel: „I felt intimidated and horrible. I didn‟t know what to 
do, [he] is not suppose[d] to drop the children off in our street‟.617 
Usually Lillian made sure she was not at home when changeover took place but 
on one occasion she came outside to the car to give her children an umbrella and 
„he started yelling and there was a match, a screaming match then. I said I‟m 
calling the police‟. 
Frances‟s FLO provided that her former husband can telephone to speak with the 
children but not with her:  
So the children speak to him, but he chooses [to]…ring me at another time and [when he 
does speak with the children he says] „put your mother on, put your mother on‟ and then 
I said „just say no‟…and then other times when he does actually phone me he starts off 
with a very tiny issue about the kids and then goes into something else. So basically I 
refused to talk to him at all because he goes into some huge big screaming and shouting 
matches and „you‟ve got to do this, you should be doing this, blah, blah, blah‟. 
G. The presence of children 
In recent years extensive research has documented the detrimental impact that 
witnessing intimate partner violence, or living in a household where it takes 
place, has on children.
618
 The high rate of children witnessing violence has been 
reported in the literature.
619
 While women were not specifically asked in this 
study about whether children had been present when violence was perpetrated 
against them, six reported instances when this took place.
620
 This involved the 
children: 
 Being present when acts of physical violence were perpetrated.621  
                                                          
617 Louise also complained about regular non-compliance, such as returning the children late, as just „wear[ing] you 
down‟. 
618 Anne Blanchard, „Violence in Families: The Effect on Children‟ (1993) 34 Family Matters 31; Robbie Rossman, 
„Longer Term Effects of Children‟s Exposure to Domestic Violence‟ in Sandra Graham-Bermann & Jeffrey Edleson 
(eds), Domestic Violence in the Lives of Children: The Future of Research, Intervention, and Social Policy (2002); David 
Woolfe, Claire Crooks, Vivian Lee, Alexandra McIntyre-Smith & Peter Jaffe, „The Effects of Children‟s Exposure to 
Domestic Violence: A Meta-Analysis and Critique‟ (2003) 6 Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review 171; and 
Lesley Laing, Children, Young People and Domestic Violence (2000). 
619In the study by Kaye et al, 62.5% of women interviewed reported that their children had directly witnessed violence: 
above n15 at 28. See also Moloney et al, above n37 at [5.2.5]; Ferraro, above n43 at 32-35. 
620 Frances, Janet, Lillian, Louise, Marcella and Rosemary. 
621 See Lillian‟s disturbing account, detailed above, of the incident where her former husband stabbed himself in front of 
their son. 
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 Being present when other forms of abuse, particularly verbal or emotional 
abuse, were used against the woman.
622
 This verbal abuse would then be 
repeated by the child against the mother.
623
 
 Being used to convey messages of violence.624 After separation, Janet‟s 
former husband would use the children to convey threats to kill her. One 
death threat was made via their six year old daughter. Janet states that she 
reported this to the police and it „was just put down as a breach of the 
AVO‟.625 
At least two fathers sought, or threatened to obtain, residence of the children.
626
 
In Janet‟s case her former husband sought residence of the same child he used to 
convey the death threat mentioned above. In the case of Lillian, who was subject 
to severe violence including a siege where her former husband had a gun, her 
former husband threatened „that he was going to take the kids off me and he was 
going to take them away or things like that‟. 
2. Seeking protection – a narrowing depiction of domestic 
violence 
In this final section I analyse the women‟s ADVO applications. The ten women 
interviewed had sought 12 ADVOs that were accompanied by a cross 
application.
627
 All but one of the women lodged their application(s) first.
628
 Nine 
of these ADVOs were initiated by the police (it is unclear whether these 
applications involved urgent TIOs). All the applications lodged against these 
women were privately initiated. 
While some women attended the interview with copies of their ADVO 
applications, the application made against them, and the resultant orders, not all 
                                                          
622 Frances, Louise and Marcella. 
623 Marcella. 
624 Frances, Janet and Rosemary. Most of these children were under ten years of age, with one aged 17.  
625 This does not mean that it was actioned as a breach. 
626 At the time of the fieldwork, the FLA referred to the „resident‟ parent as the one with the primary care of the children, 
and the „contact‟ parent as the non-resident parent. This has since changed. The FLA now speaks of where the children 
live, and spending time with the other parent: by virtue of the Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 
(Cth). 
627 Some women had sought previous ADVOs not accompanied by a cross application. These are not included in this 
discussion. Eg Janet had applied for four or five ADVOs, and only one of these was subject to a cross application. 
628 The exception was Megan. 
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did and in these circumstances the women summarised the general contents of 
the applications. It appears that people who are involved in cross applications are 
likely to be involved in multiple litigation (for example criminal, civil, and 
family law actions emerged in the interviews) and this creates a situation where 
women may find it difficult to retain all the paperwork and may be confused 
about what took place when, and in what legal process.
629
 I attempted to assist in 
clarifying this with my knowledge of the ADVO process; however this was not 
always possible.  
In a number of interviews there was a clear difference between the way in which 
the violence experienced was documented in the complaint for the ADVO and 
the way in which the women described their relationship and the violence 
perpetrated against them. I present some of these differences here and do so with 
the purpose of indicating the narrow picture provided by the ADVO complaint 
process. However, I recognise that these additional matters may not have been 
raised by the woman with the police or the chamber magistrate, nor may the 
woman have been asked about acts of violence in addition to the presenting 
incident. The purpose of this section is not simply to highlight features that are 
missing, but rather to demonstrate limitations in the way in which domestic 
violence is captured in the complaint process and to ask questions about possible 
ways that the complaint process might capture the experience of domestic 
violence more adequately.  
None of the complaints for the ten women mentioned control, although „fear‟ and 
concerns about „safety‟ were included in the narratives. 
A. Single incident the main focus of the complaint 
For six women, their ADVO complaint centred on a single incident.
630
 All of 
these were police complaints. While many of these incidents were of sufficient 
seriousness to support the making of an ADVO, and did so in all but one case,
631
 
they failed to capture the full experience of domestic violence. 
                                                          
629 Kaye et al, above n15 at 39. See also Burton, above n241 at 128. 
630 Chloe, Frances, Janet, Kate, Lillian and Louise. 
631 Kate was the exception. Her ADVO, and the cross application, were resolved via mutual withdrawal. 
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For the two women involved in siege-style incidents this incident formed the sole 
subject of their ADVO complaint.
632
 In her interview Lillian detailed extensive 
violence and control throughout her lengthy relationship which included multiple 
physical assaults, attempted strangulation, verbal abuse, isolating tactics, threats 
against her and people close to her, constant telephone calls and messages and 
stalking. Frances also experienced multiple forms of violence: physical abuse, 
property damage, verbal abuse, threats and since separation harassing telephone 
calls, unwanted attendances at her home, and property damage. Like Lillian, her 
police ADVO complaint only mentioned the siege. In Lillian‟s case her former 
husband was also charged as a result of this incident. It is not clear from 
Frances‟s interview if charges were laid in her case. 
These incidents are clearly serious, and it may seem a trifling point to assert that 
no other aspects of their experience of violence were documented in the 
complaint narrative. Nonetheless the fact that the incidents were part of a pattern 
of repeated violence seems a relevant consideration for the court in considering 
the woman‟s safety. My concern rests with the focus on incidents, and the fact 
that many women, unlike Frances and Lillian, do not experience violence on this 
scale. The focus on discrete incidents means that the multiple and repetitive 
environment of violence and abuse is not conveyed in the complaint narrative. 
Such information is important to convey the full experience of violence and 
abuse and to provide a connective framework through which to appreciate acts 
that might otherwise be viewed as „minor‟ or „trivial‟ when viewed in 
isolation.
633
  
The focus on incidents also enables defence or counter stories to be raised that 
suggest that the behaviour was taken out of context. This may be a particular 
problem if the incident took place at, or concerned, separation. For example, 
there are well-worn stories about the devastation experienced on the failure of the 
relationship, or the pain of still being in love with the woman, which are often 
deployed to conceal stories of control.
634
 The documentation of multiple 
incidents prevents such stories of thwarted romance from taking a dominant role 
                                                          
632 Frances and Lillian. 
633 See Stark, above n84 at 14-5. 
634 See Busch, „Don‟t Throw Bouquets at me…‟, above n425; and Jenny Morgan, „Provocation Law and Facts: Dead 
Women Tell no Tales, Tales are Told About Them‟ (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 237.  
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in the interpretation of events. This can be critical in other legal proceedings, 
such as subsequent family law proceedings. It is also critical in cases where there 
are competing claims about the perpetration of violence, as indicated by the 
presence of a cross application. Cases of this kind fit within Durfee‟s notion of a 
„border case‟,635 that is those cases that are complex, contested, or the allegations 
present an awkward fit with the legislation or notions of a „real‟ victim. Such 
cases risk being unsuccessful. „Border cases‟ emphasise the critical importance 
of complaint narratives that convey the experience of violence beyond the most 
recent incident, that make connections to the legislation, and provide thematic 
connection to the creation of fear.  
Kate‟s complaint also referred primarily to a single incident in which her former 
husband followed her and her new partner on a weekend away. This culminated 
in her former husband assaulting her new partner. The complaint also referred to 
the numerous messages of „love‟ that he had sent to her and displayed in her 
street. This is a good example of the type of complaint that risks being 
reinterpreted as simply a man finding it „understandably‟ difficult to come to 
terms with the end of his marriage. While Kate said that there were no specific 
acts of violence during her relationship, there was a level of control where she 
had to seek his permission to do things, and she „knew his triggers‟. This police 
complaint and the cross complaint were resolved via mutual withdrawal, thus 
providing Kate with no future protection. 
Louise experienced a single incident of physical violence at the end of her eight 
year marriage and it was this incident that was the sole subject of her ADVO 
complaint. For her it was also „the last straw‟ after repeated verbal abuse, 
emotional abuse and property damage during the relationship which continued 
after separation. Her ADVO was contested, with the main argument presented by 
the defence being that Louise was not „in fear‟ of her former husband. While the 
full subject and range of the hearing is not known in her case, a focus on single 
incidents absent any context provides scope for defence arguments that an 
ADVO is unwarranted.  
                                                          
635 Durfee, above n401 at 135-136. See Chapter 4. 
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B. Beyond a single incident 
For four women their ADVO complaint sought to capture more than a single 
incident.
636
 One was a police complaint and three were private applications. 
While there are problems with the narrative, and brevity, of Rosemary‟s 
complaint, it does attempt to capture multiple dimensions of the experience of 
domestic violence: 
The parties were married for 21 years and separated on [date]. There is an ongoing 
property dispute. On [date] I went up to [location] and took my car, which he had 
previously seized and driven up to [location] unregistered. I had previously paid the 
registration so I could make the return drive. On Sunday night [date] he said to my 
daughter on the phone „Your mother‟s dead either way, and your brother‟s going to 
gaol and your mother‟s going to gaol for breaking and entering‟. Previously he has 
threatened me with a firearm, which I know he still has, unlicenced. Last year he sent 
me a card with the message „RIP‟ and other written abuse in it. When he kicked me out 
last year he threatened to kill me and kicked me and smacked me around the head and 
threw me onto the floor. There has been a pattern of verbal and physical abuse from the 
Defendant since we were married. … 
While it is arguable that the opening sentences regarding an „ongoing property 
dispute‟ are irrelevant and position the complaint as one having a basis for 
conflict, the text that follows assists in placing at the forefront the reasons why 
this creates a situation of ongoing fear for Rosemary. Unlike the text of many 
complaints,
637
 in addition to detailing the most recent incident, this complaint 
referred to specific dates as well as providing a general picture of the violence 
perpetrated throughout the relationship. It is worth noting that Rosemary was 
accompanied on her visit to the chamber magistrate by a worker from a women‟s 
centre and it is possible that this worker assisted her in telling her story to the 
chamber magistrate, prompting her about matters that would be relevant to the 
complaint.
638
 
Similarly Marcella‟s complaint made reference to the fact that she has had 
previous ADVOs against her former husband and multiple incidents that have 
taken place since separation. While not as detailed as Rosemary‟s complaint, it 
did refer to more than one incident of violence/abuse and linked these to her 
assessment of fear and safety. Keira‟s is the only police complaint that went 
                                                          
636 Keira, Marcella, Megan and Rosemary. 
637 See Chapter 4. 
638 Eg WDVCAS2 described how she often performed this role. 
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beyond a single incident. This complaint referred to a sexual assault and a range 
of intimidating behaviours that Keira experienced, including those that she could 
not necessarily confirm were perpetrated by her former partner. 
3. ‘Another way of hurting me’: the cross application as 
violence and abuse 
Generally the women interviewed identified the cross complaint as another form 
of abuse, „harassment‟639, „a breach of his AVO‟,640 „another way of trying to … 
get at me … and upset me‟,641 or „hurt me‟.642 Thus the cross complaint was seen 
as a continuation of the abuse that the woman had already experienced. Kate 
indicated that her former husband „threatened‟ to apply for a cross application 
after he was served with her ADVO if she did not withdraw. As Janet noted there 
was „nothing‟ in her former partner‟s complaint about being „fearful‟ of her.643 
This provides another example of an act that does not fit within conventional 
definitions or lists of „what is an act of violence and abuse?‟ 
While many of the professionals interviewed did not view cross applications 
favourably, few spoke about the cross applications in a manner that linked it to 
the continuation of violence. Exceptions to this included: 
…[it] is generally just another way for him to exert that control or to harass her.644 
[cross applications are a form of] legal harassment.
645
 
I see it [cross applications] as another form of violence.
646
 
The literature on mutual protection orders from the USA does not focus on this 
conception of the cross complaint as abuse. This may be due to the fact that the 
problem of mutual orders in the USA centres on judges initiating orders without 
a formal application. However, Joan Zorza notes the potential use of a resultant 
mutual order as „another tool‟ to further „harass‟ a victim by reporting her to the 
                                                          
639 Louise, Marcella and Rosemary.  
640 Louise. 
641 Louise. See also Keira. 
642 Janet. 
643 See also Frances and Lillian. 
644 DVLO1. 
645 WDVCAS4. See also WDVCAS1. 
646 WDVCAS2. See also SOL1. 
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police.
647
 The use of the legal system as a means to continue control has also 
been commented on in the family law arena.
648
 
As a final comment it is worth briefly turning to what the women interviewed 
hoped their ADVO applications would achieve, and how that was countered by 
the cross application. All women in some way mentioned that they hoped that 
their ADVO application would stop or reduce the violence or abuse that they had 
been experiencing. Louise stated that she hoped her ADVO would „just…settle 
things down…keep him under control a little bit‟. A few women spoke about 
how they hoped the ADVO would signal the end of the relationship and that this 
would stop the violence and abuse that they had experienced since separation.
649
 
For example Janet hoped her former husband would accept „that the marriage 
was finished. And I was still hoping that everything would stop, um so the abuse, 
the phone calls, all of that type of thing but it didn‟t ….‟ Olivia similarly stated: 
„…at the time I was just hoping that he would just go away and leave us alone, I 
suppose. [That] it would stop him coming back and doing anything else to us.‟  In 
this vein, Janet notes that the cross application countered these aims: „I was 
trying to do something for myself by getting an AVO and it just seemed like it was 
not going to happen and he was the one that‟s going to win again. And that 
really upset me.‟ 
4. Summary 
This chapter has focused on the broad experience of domestic violence revealed 
through the interview sample. Women in these interviews described these 
experiences in response to general questions: How would you describe your 
relationship? What led you to apply for your ADVO? When did you first 
experience violence in your relationship? What was the most common form of 
violence/abuse? What was the worst act perpetrated against you? I highlight the 
format of the questions to demonstrate that it was the women themselves who 
actively defined their experiences and were not constrained by specific categories 
or acts. While this approach might mean that not all acts of violence/abuse 
experienced by the women were noted (as might be the case if specific questions 
                                                          
647 Zorza, above n13 at 4. 
648 See Kaspiew, above n236 at 128-29, 141. 
649 Frances, Keira, Janet and Lillian. 
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about each type of violence were asked), the format provided space for the 
women to describe their experience in their own words and to include 
acts/behaviours that might otherwise not be mentioned because they do not 
neatly fit notions of what constitutes violence/abuse.  
This chapter has highlighted the multiple, cumulative experience of violence and 
abuse in the lives of the women interviewed. This picture is confirmed in other 
research that notes that the salient features of domestic violence are control, 
repetition, and the use of different forms of violence, abuse and control tactics.
650
 
The dimension of control, so prominent in women‟s discussions of their 
experience of domestic violence, was lost in the production of the ADVO 
complaint which largely provided a „snapshot‟ of single incidents. While many 
of these incidents were of sufficient seriousness to support the making of an 
ADVO, for others the incidents when viewed on their own appear minor and 
trivial. The complaint narratives examined (confirmed in the analysis presented 
in Chapter 6) typically omit factors that have been found to be critical in 
comparing men‟s and women‟s experiences of domestic violence. This can have 
implications for other legal proceedings, and a negative impact when negotiating 
with a cross application. This is particularly the case when we consider that cross 
applications represent an example of a „border case‟ as described by Durfee, and 
hence a more complex case where the quality of the complaint narrative performs 
a more critical function (Chapter 4). The next chapter turns to a detailed 
examination of the contents of the cross applications gathered in the court file 
sample. That chapter highlights the incident dimensions of these complaints and 
the lack of reference to a context of history of violence that is evident in 
women‟s detailed discussions of their experience of domestic violence. Together 
Chapters 5-6 demonstrate the inadequacy of the complaint narratives that form 
cross applications to not only assist in differentiating between the claims made 
by men and women, but also in revealing the experience and function of 
domestic violence beyond incidents alone. 
                                                          
650 See Chapter 2. 
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6. A quantitative examination of 
cross applications 
This chapter presents quantitative data arising from the court file sample. It 
provides a general profile of the court file sample: How many cross applications 
were there as a proportion of intimate ADVO applications? Is the male or female 
applicant more likely to be first in time? Which applications are the police more 
likely to have initiated? This is followed by a detailed analysis of the allegations 
men and women made about violence/abuse in their competing ADVO 
applications: Are there differences between first and second applicants, men and 
women, in terms of the duration of the experience of violence (that is, the history 
of violence), the types of violence alleged to have been perpetrated (physical, 
sexual, threats and other forms of abuse), and the presence of fear?  
The key contribution of this chapter is the use of official data (that is, court files 
generated for ADVO cross complaints) as one method to explore the debates 
about the gendered perpetration of domestic violence (see Chapter 2). As noted 
in Chapter 1, official data has been „neglected‟ in the debate regarding the 
symmetry of the perpetration of domestic violence.
651
 This chapter uses official 
data to explore these debates and also illustrates the limitations of one of the 
methods grounding one side of this debate; that is, simply counting discrete acts 
of violence/abuse as an indicator of domestic violence.  
1. Introduction to cross applications in the court file sample 
A. How many cross applications? 
No official data exists on the incidence of cross applications in NSW.
652
 
However, there has been a perception by workers in the sector that cross 
applications were increasing and that they represented a significant minority of 
matters coming before the Local Court.
653
 
                                                          
651 Melton & Belknap, above n36 at 337. 
652 This lack of data is not restricted to NSW: Victorian Community Council Against Violence, above n25 at 14. 
653 See above n11. In Victoria see Walker, above n12 at 123. Similar anecdotal concern was raised in Queensland, 
however Douglas and Godden found it to be unsupported: above n63 at 28-29. 
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The data collected from the court files at the three court sites indicates that the 
number of cross applications as a proportion of intimate ADVOs is small, 
ranging from five to 11 per cent.
654
 This finding is supported by the view 
expressed by key professionals in their interviews. However, many professionals 
also noted that while the incidence was small, cases involving cross applications 
tended to be more complicated and time consuming than single applications.
655
 
In order to examine cross applications before the NSW Local Court, court files 
were sampled over a 12 month period.
656
 Seventy-eight (78) „complete‟ cross 
applications
657
 were identified at the three courts over March 2002 - February 
2003. This represents a total of 156 individual applications. Some cross 
applications were accompanied by applications made against other people (for 
example, a person‟s new partner, children or other family members).658 Most 
cross applications were initiated on different dates (68/78), however a small 
number (10) were made on exactly the same date (these are referred to as „dual 
applications‟ and are discussed in Chapter 8). In addition to the 78 complete 
cross applications, a further seven (7) „incomplete‟ cross applications659 were 
identified. Given the comparative focus of this thesis, being concerned with 
differences between the complaints lodged by men and women, the material 
presented in this thesis concentrates on complete (including dual applications) 
cross applications, rather than incomplete ones.  
i. As a proportion of intimate ADVO applications  
Court recording practices make it necessary to compare the number of 
appearances of cross applications to the number of appearances of intimate 
ADVO applications, rather than the number of actual cases. While some cases 
may be resolved at the first mention date, an ADVO may involve numerous court 
appearances before being finalised.  
                                                          
654 See Table 6.1. 
655 DVLO1, DVLO4, PP1, PP2, PP3, PP5, SOL3 and WDVCAS3. 
656 See Chapter 3.  
657 See definition above n348. The limitations of the court file recording process created a bias towards complete cross 
applications in the court file sample: Chapter 3. 
658 These additional applications are not discussed in this thesis. Additional applications were made in eight cases in the 
court file sample. Six were private applications overwhelmingly made by men who were second in time (CourtA-4, 
CourtA-5, CourtB-13, CourtB-22, CourtC-4 and CourtC-28). These were all resolved via withdrawal or dismissal. The 
remaining two cases were different: in one (CourtA-1B) the police made the additional applications, and in the other both 
parties (CourtB-35), as well as other relatives, made multiple applications. Two cases in the interview sample involved 
additional applications: Kate‟s former husband applied for an ADVO against her sister; and in Janet‟s case the police 
applied for an ADVO to protect her mother. 
659 See definition above n349 and infra text 
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To estimate the proportion of intimate ADVO applications involving cross 
applications in an average month, I sampled one list day per month over the year 
at the three court sites; that is 12 list days at each court over the 12 months, and 
recorded the number of ADVO applications and the relationship between the 
parties involved in the applications. The results for the three courts are largely 
similar (Table 6.1) with the number of intimate cross applications as a proportion 
of intimate ADVOs being small at all three courts. The result for CourtC was, 
however, slightly higher than for the other two courts: 
 CourtA: 24 cross applications (complete, partial or incomplete) were 
identified, involving 71 appearances of one or both cases over the year. Thus 
for a given month there were approximately 6 court appearances of cross 
applications involving current/former intimate partners. It is estimated that 
7.7 per cent of intimate ADVO applications per month involved a cross 
application.
660
 
 CourtB: 38 cross applications were identified, involving 134 appearances of 
one or both cases over the year. Thus for a given month there were 
approximately 12 court appearances of cross applications involving 
current/former intimate partners. It is estimated that 6.7 per cent of intimate 
ADVO applications per month involved a cross application.
661
 
 CourtC: 32 cross applications were identified,662 involving 107 appearances 
of one or both cases over the year. Thus for a given month there were 
approximately 9 court appearances of cross applications involving 
current/former intimate partners. It is estimated that 11.1 per cent of intimate 
ADVO applications per month involved a cross application.
663
 
                                                          
660 This would decrease to 7% if all the cases where the relationship was unknown involved intimate relationships. 
661 This would decrease to 5% if all the cases where the relationship was unknown involved intimate relationships. 
662 One cross application at CourtC involved a homosexual couple and was excluded from the sample. See rationale for 
the focus on heterosexual relationships in Chapter 1.  
663 This would decrease to 7% (and more comparable to the other courts examined) if all the cases where the relationship 
was unknown involved intimate relationships. 
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Table 6.1: Incidence of cross applications per month at the three court sites 
 
 CourtA CourtB CourtC 
Number of ADVO 
appearances each 
month 
112 285 145 
Type of 
relationship for all 
ADVOs 
 78 
former/current 
intimate 
partners* 
 26 relatives 
 1 ‘other’ 
relationship** 
 8 unable to be 
determined 
 179 former/ 
current intimate 
partners* 
 57 relatives 
 3 ‘other’ 
relationship** 
 38 unable to be 
determined 
 81 
former/current 
intimate 
partners 
 26 relatives 
 3 ‘other’ 
relationship** 
 44 unable to be 
determined 
Number of cross 
application 
appearances 
involving 
current/former 
intimate partners 
(where the 
relationship is 
known) 
6 (7.7%)  12 (6.7%)  9 (11.1%)  
* Intimate partner includes spouses, de facto partners, boy/girlfriend including same-sex partners (not necessary to 
have cohabitated).  
** ‘other’ relationship includes people who lived in the same household and those in carer relationships. 
B. Who was the first in time? 
In both the interview sample and the court file sample, men were much more 
likely to lodge their ADVO application second in time. In the interview sample 
all but one
664
 of the women was first in time (the originating complainant) and 
the man was second (the cross complainant). Similarly, in the court file sample, 
in those cases where there was some time gap between the originating complaint 
and the cross complaint (n=68), a majority of originating applicants were women 
(76.5%). See Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Gender first and second applicants 
 
1
st
 applicant (n=68) 2
nd
 applicant (n=68) 
Female 52 (76.5%) Male 52 (76.5%) 
Male 16 (23.5%) Female 16 (23.5%) 
 
While who was the first to apply might be a useful indicator of who requires 
protection, this is not always the case. Simply because someone applies first does 
not necessarily mean that they are more likely to be the victim than the person 
                                                          
664 Megan. 
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who is second in time.
665
 When discussing recommendations for addressing cross 
applications, professionals cautioned against a „first in‟ approach.666  
C. Police involvement  
As was explained in Chapter 4, ADVO applications may be initiated in two 
ways, via the police or via a private complaint.  
Eight of the women interviewed had the police initiate an ADVO on their behalf, 
while the remaining two sought private applications.
667
 All of the cross 
applications lodged against these women were private applications. 
The court sample reflects a similar pattern, with police more likely to have made 
applications on behalf of women, whether they were the originating or cross 
applicant. As demonstrated by Table 6.3, a majority of first applications were 
made by the police (70.6%, n=48) and almost half (43.8%, 21/48) of these were 
TIOs. This is comparable to the number of ADVOs sought by the police 
generally: in 2002 (the year the court file work was undertaken) the police 
applied for 77 per cent of all ADVOs.
668
 
Table 6.3: Types of applications 
 
 1
st
 applicant (n=68) 2
nd
 applicant (n=68) 
 Female 
(52) 
Male 
(16) 
TOTAL Female 
(16) 
Male 
(52) 
TOTAL 
Total police 
applications 
38 
(73.1% of 
F 1
st
) 
10 
(62.5% of 
M 1
st
) 
48 3 
(18.8% of 
F 2
nd
) 
5 
(9.6% of 
M 2
nd
) 
8 
Police application 
(not TIO) 
20 7  2 3  
Police application 
TIO 
18 3  1 2  
Private 
application 
14 
(26.9% of 
F 1
st
) 
6 
(37.5% of 
M 1
st
) 
20 13 
(81.3% of 
F 2
nd
) 
47 
(90.4% of 
M 2
nd
) 
60 
 
By contrast, most second applications were private applications (88.2%, n=60); 
only eight were police initiated (11.8%), three of which were TIOs.
669
 This much 
                                                          
665 See Dick, above n94 at 12; NSWLRC, „AVOs‟, above n11 at [11.11]. Research in the USA has also found that some 
men contact the police first because they have greater knowledge of the criminal justice system: Susan Miller, „The 
Paradox of Women Arrested for Domestic Violence‟ (2001) 7 Violence Against Women 1339 at 1354-55.  
666 MAG2, MAG3, MAG5, SOL2, SOL3, SOL5, SOL6 and WDVCAS3.  
667 Megan and Rosemary. 
668 Local Courts of NSW, „2002‟, above n65, Table 2.3. 
669 Because the division between first and second applicants is a paired observation it is not possible to test whether there 
was any statistical significance between these groups, or between women first applicants and male second applicants (and 
vice versa). It is however possible to conduct chi-square analysis in terms of gender within these two groups (men and 
women first applicants; and men and women second applicants). These results are noted in the text.  
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lower level of police participation in second ADVO applications may suggest 
that a cross complaint is more likely to be retaliatory or, at the very least, less 
likely to have involved an incident that attracted police attention. 
When we look at gender differences, we find that the female first applicants are 
slightly more likely to be police applications than the male first applicants (73% 
compared to 63%), but this does not reach statistical significance (
2
 = 0.67, 
p>0.05). Similarly in terms of second applicants, female applicants were more 
likely to be police applications (19% compared to 10%) but again this does not 
reach statistical significance (
2
 = 0.96, p>0.05). 
The greater involvement of the police in ADVO applications made by first 
applicants, and for women who are both first and second applicants, may lend 
support to the contention that the type of violence experienced by women is more 
serious and that their need for a protection order is greater.
670
 This perception of 
seriousness is also supported by the number of applications made by police that 
warranted the urgent protection of a TIO. However, a more adequate test of any 
apparent gender relationship requires a larger sample size than was possible in 
the present study. 
2. Comparison of the content of allegations made in cross 
applications 
A. History of domestic violence 
In the court file sample references to past experiences of violence (reported and 
unreported) were commonly noted in complaint narratives by the phrase „there 
has been a history of domestic violence‟ without any further information.671 
Often this „history‟ was articulated in such a way that it implicated both parties, 
or at the very least, failed to specify who the perpetrator was. For example: 
Their (sic) is a long history of domestics between both parties and orders have been in 
place in the past.
672
  
                                                          
670 There is a perception that police initiated ADVOs involve more serious matters: NSWLRC, „AVOs‟, above n11 at 
[3.8]. 
671 Eg see CourtA-19 (Police M 2nd), CourtC-15 (Police W 1st), CourtC-19 (Police M 2nd), CourtC-24 (Police W 1st) and 
CourtC-29 (Police W 1st). 
672 CourtB-34 (Police M 2nd). 
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There has been animosity between the parties for 15 months. There has been a history of 
violence between the parties during the relationship.
673
 
Some complaint narratives did not use explicit terms such as „violence‟, but 
rather used „code‟ terms for violence such as „disputes‟, „problems‟, „animosity‟ 
or „volatility‟, despite the fact that this legal arena is specifically concerned with 
violence in relationships. The use of such terms is problematic given that such 
„code‟ terms are vague and cast the occurrence of violence within a framework 
of conflict or relationship difficulties.
674
 This is illustrated by the following 
examples: 
The PINOP and the [defendant] have been in a domestic relationship for the past 4 
months. During this time both have been involved in numerous domestic disputes.
675
 
In the recent past there have been ongoing problems with the marriage.
676
 
Ruth Busch and colleagues in their study on police responses to breaches of 
protection orders in New Zealand
677
 noted that the police reduce and filter the 
stories of women when writing statements. They quoted a police statement 
produced for Esther which, like the complaint narratives quoted above, referred 
to a history of violence in a way that implicated both parties even where the 
evidence and events suggested otherwise:  
The day before she finally left him Fred assaulted her on and off for hours. She called 
the police and told them, according to her statement, that she had been pushed against 
walls, knocked around the head repeatedly with his open hands and fists, her arms had 
been twisted up behind her back, and that he had threatened her with a butcher‟s knife 
…. Police comments on the file about the incident read: „There has been a long standing 
feud between these two…‟.678 
The court file sample also included two curiously worded references to a history 
of violence which pose a number of questions about the way in which victims 
and defendants are viewed. These complaints appeared to suggest that the 
                                                          
673 CourtC-17 (Private W 2nd). See also CourtB-24 (Police W 1st), CourtC-15 (Police W 1st), CourtC-24 (Police W 1st), and 
CourtC-29 (Police W 1st).  
674 This is reinforced when complaint narratives situate the presenting incident within a „conflict setting‟ (eg regarding 
children or property). Eg see Rosemary‟s ADVO complaint quoted in Chapter 5.  
675 CourtC-5 (Police M 1st). 
676 CourtC-11 (Private M 1st). 
677 Busch et al, „The Gap‟, above n281. 
678 Ibid at 195. 
148 
designation of victim or defendant is changeable and rests on the perpetration of 
incidents alone:
679
 
There is a history of domestic violence between the victim and the defendant and as a 
result there is an enforceable AVO in place taken out by the defendant as the PINOP 
and the victim as the defendant.
680
  
The parties have a history of domestic violence with the protected person being the 
subject of a current order for the protection of the defendant.
681
  
Not all complaints were so vague. The following complaint, for example, 
indicated the direction and experience of the violence, but still lacked detail 
about what that past entailed: 
[the PINOP] has claimed that there is a history of domestic violence between the parties. 
There have been previous AVO‟s (sic) taken out for the protection of the protected 
person.
682
 
Two cases made more detailed references to a history of violence: 
The PINOP reports a history of the defendant making threats that he was going to have 
acid thrown in her face and have her killed.
683
  
The defendant has a history of intimidating the applicant… This history involves: 
…refusing [to let] the applicant … leave his home. The defendant has hidden keys and 
threatened the applicant to make her stay.
684
  
The court file sample was investigated to see whether there were any differences 
in documentation of a history of violence between first and second applicants, 
and between men and women. Studies comparing men and women arrested for 
domestic violence in the USA under mandatory or pro arrest policies have found 
a difference in this regard; with it being far more likely that this was the 
woman‟s first arrest for domestic violence.685  
Cases were coded as having raised a „history‟ if there was simply a statement to 
this effect, if prior incidents were mentioned, if a previous ADVO was 
                                                          
679 This shifting status between victim and perpetrator also emerged in discussions about dual applications, see Chapter 8.  
680 CourtC-19 (Private M 2nd). 
681 CourtA-19 (Police M 2nd).  
682 CourtA-1B (Police W). See also CourtA-14 (Police W), CourtB-26 (Police W), and CourtC-12 (Private W 1st). 
683 CourtB-22 (Police W 1st). 
684 CourtB-7 (Private W 1st). Marcella and Rosemary‟s complaint narratives made similar contextual connections.  
685 See Amy Busch & Mindy Rosenberg, „Comparing Women and Men Arrested for Domestic Violence: A Preliminary 
Report‟ (2004) 19 Journal of Family Violence 49 at 53; Margaret Martin, „Double Your Trouble: Dual Arrest in Family 
Violence‟ (1997) 12 Journal of Family Violence 139 at 150; Henning & Feder, „Who Presents the Greater Threat?‟, above 
n264 at 78; Lynette Feder & Kris Henning, „A Comparison of Male and Female Dually Arrested Domestic Violence 
Offenders‟ (2005) 20 Violence and Victims 153, at 166. 
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mentioned (whether or not it was a cross application), or where „code‟ terms for 
violence (mentioned above) were used in the complaint narrative. 
In the court file sample, complaints made by first applicants were more likely to 
make some reference to a history of domestic violence (61.8%), compared to the 
second applicants (32.4%) (see Table 6.4).  
Table 6.4: History of violence mentioned in complaint narrative 
1
st
 applicant (68) 2nd applicant (68) 
Female 32/52 
(61.5% of F 1
st
) 
Male 14/52 
(26.9% of M 2
nd
) 
Male 10/16 
(62.5% of M 1
st
) 
Female 8/16 
(50% of F 2
nd
) 
Total  42/68 
(61.8% of all 1
st
) 
Total  22/68 
(32.4% of all 2
nd
) 
 
In terms of gender, the percentage of male and female first applicants who 
mentioned a history of violence was almost the same (and the small difference 
did not reach statistical significance, 
2 
= 0.0003, p>0.05). Women as second 
applicants were more likely than male second applicants to mention a history of 
violence. Fifty per cent of female second applicants mentioned a history of 
violence, compared to 26.9 per cent of male second applicants (this did not reach 
statistical significance, 
2 
= 2.93, p>0.05). 
B. Types of violence alleged 
Each complaint narrative was analysed for the types of violence and abuse 
alleged therein.
686
 This was conducted in two stages: the first was a „broad brush‟ 
approach which noted whether the complaints alleged any of the four main types 
of violence and abuse: physical, sexual, threats, and other forms of abuse (verbal, 
emotional or psychological, financial, damage to property, stalking and 
harassment). The second stage attempted to investigate these broad categories 
further by noting the different types of acts alleged within each of the categories. 
This was not always possible given the poor quality of many complaint 
narratives (see Chapter 4).  
                                                          
686 Only acts alleged to have been perpetrated by one partner against the other have been recorded. Acts allegedly 
perpetrated by third parties or towards third parties have been excluded. 
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In addition, because complaints form part of a legal process, it may be that 
„other‟ forms of abuse (that is, those not defined as criminal offences) are less 
likely to be noted or emphasised given that, on their own, they may not be 
sufficient to ground an ADVO.
687
  
It must be remembered that the tables and discussion presented in this chapter 
record only those acts mentioned in the complaint narrative. As has been noted in 
the context of in-depth interviews in Chapter 5, a complaint may only document 
a limited number of acts and thus does not necessarily document all forms of 
violence experienced. Like the complaints for the women interviewed, many of 
the complaints in the court file sample, particularly those initiated by the police, 
focused on a single incident. Of the 68 applications made on different dates, 20 
complaints (18 of which were police initiated) for first applicants were confined 
to a single incident, and six second applicants (all privately initiated) were 
similarly limited. For the ten dual applications, eight (all police initiated) referred 
to a single incident. This means that 43.6 per cent of cases in the court file 
sample described a single incident. This limited focus prevents any exploration 
of gender differences in frequency, repetition and duration of domestic violence 
in this sample. It also draws attention to the way in which the ADVO system 
continues to replicate the criminal law‟s focus on discrete incidents, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
It is important to note that the tables and discussion in this chapter simply 
indicate whether a person has experienced a certain form of violence, not how 
many times a person experienced that form of violence. That is to say, if a person 
provided three examples of physical assaults, this was recorded as physical 
assault „yes‟.688 Thus what is recorded presents a „very conservative‟ estimate of 
the types of violence experienced,
689
 as there is no attempt to record the actual 
occurrence of separate acts of violence nor its outcome or severity. The data 
contained in the court files did not lend itself to this type of analysis – which 
would be highly flawed if it was attempted due to the limited nature of the 
complaint narrative. 
                                                          
687 Hunter & Stubbs, above n16 at 13.  
688 However, if the complaint provided details about what types of acts formed the three instances of physical violence (eg 
hit, punch, push) these have been analysed in Table 6.6. 
689 A similar approach was adopted in Dobash & Dobash, „The Nature and Antecedents‟, above n356 at 275. 
151 
By counting types of violence used, my approach is open to similar criticisms as 
those directed at CTS-style research explored in Chapter 2 (namely, counting 
acts without context). However, unlike the CTS research, I do not rely on this 
tabulation alone to reach conclusions, but rather use it as one method of 
gathering data about cross applications and the competing stories about domestic 
violence contained therein. 
In conducting this broadbrush count of types of violence I have taken the 
allegations and self-interpretations of the acts at face value (that is to say, if a 
person nominated an act as an assault or a threat they have been coded as such). 
This approach has been adopted because it is simply not possible to assess the 
veracity of the allegations contained in a complaint without further information. 
In this way, I am not presenting the allegations of acts of violence as true or 
objective. Rather I recognise that any account is a partial representation of events 
as certain acts may be included and others excluded.
690
 The role of the police 
officer or chamber magistrate in „translating‟ the events into a complaint, 
discussed in Chapter 4, must also be noted as integral to the way in which some 
events are detailed and others are not. 
This approach of simply coding acts as described and asserted by applicants 
creates a number of difficulties. In particular, in a small number of cases some 
applicants sought to characterise acts or behaviours as harassing, threatening or 
verbally abusive, in a questionable manner. These cases are explored in Chapter 
7. These questionable cases raise queries about the appropriateness of labelling 
hurtful or unfortunate acts as domestic violence (as discussed in Chapter 2). In 
the context of cross applications they also raise questions about the way in which 
the legal process may be harnessed to complain about hurtful acts that are not the 
intended purview of the legislation, and instead allow the legislation to be 
manipulated for adverse purposes.  
i. The allegations of violence and abuse revealed in the court files 
First applicants were more likely than second applicants to allege each form of 
violence (except sexual violence where only one first applicant and two second 
                                                          
690 See discussion of realist versus narrative approaches to analysing interviews and text: David Silverman, „Analyzing 
Talk and Text‟ in Denzin & Lincoln (eds), „Collecting and Interpreting‟ above n297 at 343, 348-349; see also discussion 
of needing to take account of the production and purposes of documents: Ian Hodder „The Interpretation of Documents 
and Material Culture‟ in Denzin & Lincoln (eds), „Collecting and Interpreting‟ above n297 at 156-157. 
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applicants alleged this form of violence) (see Table 6.5). Almost 68 per cent of 
first applicants alleged that they had suffered an act of physical violence, 
compared to 50 per cent of second applicants. Just over 55 per cent of first 
applicants alleged that they were threatened in some way, compared to 44 per 
cent of second applicants. In terms of „other‟ forms of violence, almost 68 per 
cent of first applicants made an allegation of this kind, compared to just over 38 
per cent of second applicants.  
Male first applicants raised more allegations about physical violence and other 
forms of abuse than women, however this difference did not reach statistical 
significance (physical violence 
2
 = 1.81, p>0.05, other forms of abuse 
2 
= 0.54, 
p>0.05). This needs to be considered with caution due to the small size of the 
male first applicant group, and the fact that the table simply records the form of 
violence alleged, not its repetition or frequency of usage. 
Women second applicants were more likely to raise all types of allegations 
compared to male second applicants, and there was greater disparity between 
men and women in this group than for first applicants. Importantly it was here 
that some differences between men and women reached statistical significance; 
more women second applicants than men raised allegations about physical 
violence and other forms of abuse (physical violence: 
2 
= 5.24, df = 1, p<0.05; 
other forms of abuse: 
2
 = 16.47, df = 1, p<0.05). Differences in allegations 
about threats did not reach statistical significance (
2
 = 0.27, df = 1, p>0.05). 
These findings begin to suggest that the complaints made by male second 
applicants were of a different nature. This will be built upon as the quantitative 
analysis continues and through the qualitative analysis presented in Chapter 7. 
As noted above, very few complaints alleged sexual violence.
691
 Only two 
women
692
 and one man
693
 made this type of allegation. The absence of sexual 
violence from these court records is worthy of some comment (and further 
                                                          
691 In the interview sample Keira, Janet, Megan and Marcella reported that they had been sexually assaulted, two of whom 
(Keira and Megan) mentioned this assault in their ADVO complaint.  
692 CourtA-1B (Police W 1st), and CourtB-13 (Private W 2nd). In another case sexual assault was not alleged in the ADVO 
application but was mentioned in a letter appended to the court file: CourtA-16 (Police W 1st).  
693 CourtC-7 (Private M 2nd). 
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investigation).
694
 At first glance it may seem surprising given research on 
women‟s experiences of domestic violence that documents the coexistence of 
sexual and physical forms of violence (or indeed other forms of violence/abuse 
and control).
695
 At the same time its absence is unsurprising as it depends on 
whether the person has recognised an event as a sexually coercive or violent 
one.
696
 There are also questions related to raising such an allegation in the 
protection order arena: will the making of such a serious allegation create a more 
adversarial process? Will it anger the defendant? Can such a serious allegation be 
supported in any way?  
Table 6.5: Types of violence alleged in complaint narratives  
 1
st
 applicant (68) 2
nd
 applicant (68) 
 Female 
 (52) 
Male 
(16) 
TOTAL Female 
(16) 
Male 
(52) 
TOTAL 
Physical 
violence 
33 
(63.5% F 1
st
) 
13 
(81.3% M 1
st
) 
46 
(67.7%) 
12 
(75% F 2
nd
) 
22 
(42.3% M 2
nd
) 
34 
(50%) 
Sexual 
violence 
1 -- 1 1 1 2 
Threats 31 
(59.6% F 1
st
) 
7 
(43.8% M 1
st
) 
38 
(55.9%) 
8 
(50% F 2
nd
) 
22 
(42.3% M 2
nd
) 
30 
(44.1%) 
Other 
(verbal, 
harassment, 
stalking, 
damage to 
property, 
emotional/ 
psychological, 
financial, 
social) 
34 
(65.4% F 1
st
) 
12 
(75% M 1
st
) 
46 
(67.7%) 
13* 
(81.3% F 
2
nd) 
13* 
(25% M 2
nd
) 
26* 
(38.2%) 
* Twelve cases were removed from the ‘other’ category for 2nd applicants (one female and 11 male) as there are 
questions about the characterisation of the acts as ‘abuse’ and this was the only ‘other’ form of abuse alleged. See 
discussion in Chapter 7. 
 
In the end however, it must be noted that this table tells us little about the 
experience of violence. Like the various criticisms levelled at CTS-based 
research outlined in Chapter 2, Table 6.5 is unable to tell us anything other than 
that men and women both alleged that they had been subjected to a variety of 
acts of violence/abuse from their current/former intimate partners. 
However, the data documented in this table adds to the picture that is starting to 
emerge about the way in which first applicants are distinguished from second 
applicants, particularly male second applicants. For example, first applicants 
                                                          
694 A similar (and similarly troubling) absence was found in family court files: Moloney et al, above n37 Table 5.2 at 68. 
See also Alesha Durfee, „The Gendered Paradox of Victimization and Agency in Protection Order Filings‟ in Venessa 
Garcia & Janice Clifford (eds), Female Victims of Crime: Reality Reconsidered (forthcoming, 2010). 
695 See García-Moreno et al, above n88 at 32; Kelly, „Surviving Sexual Violence‟, above n165 at 53, 127-32. 
696 See Kelly, „Surviving Sexual Violence‟, above n165 at 84-85, 112 and ch6.  
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were more likely than second applicants to complain about a history of violence, 
and to allege all forms of violence; in turn women second applicants were more 
likely than male second applicants to allege physical forms of violence and other 
forms of abuse (these two differences between second applicants reached 
statistical significance). Other differences between male and female second 
applicants were revealed that did not reach statistical significance, for example in 
terms of the extent to which they referred to past experiences of domestic 
violence. This is suggestive of another area of difference between men and 
women as second applicants that requires further investigation with a larger 
sample. This is explored below and in the qualitative analysis in Chapter 7. 
ii. Forms of physical violence alleged 
The broad categories of allegations documented in Table 6.5, were investigated 
further to see whether they were any differences between first and second 
applicants, and between men and women, about the specific types of acts or 
behaviours perpetrated.  
Of the 68 cross applications made on different dates (136 individual 
applications), 81 people (46 first and 35 second applicants) alleged that they had 
experienced at least one form of physical violence from the alleged perpetrator.  
In four cases the complainant, all women, did not identify what form the physical 
violence took.
697
 In the remaining 77 cases the person nominated a form(s) of 
physical violence. These were coded, with some amendments, using the CDC 
definition of the types of acts that constitute physical violence.
698
 The categories 
used were: scratching, pushing, shoving, throwing, grabbing, biting, choking, 
shaking, poking, hair pulling, slapping, punching, hitting, burning, use of 
weapon, use of restraints or own body against the other person. I have combined 
the categories „hit‟ and „slap‟, as it is not clear why these are classified as 
different forms of physical violence, and it would appear that the term „slap‟ 
tends to used to describe a woman‟s, and not a man‟s, act of hitting.699 During 
the coding process I removed those CDC items that were not alleged in the 
                                                          
697 CourtA-11 (Private W 1st), CourtB-35 (Police W 1st), CourtC-2 (Private W 2nd), and CourtC-17 (Private W 2nd). 
698 Saltzman et al, above n79 at 11-12. 
699 The National Violence Against Women Survey using a modified version of the CTS also combined „hit or slapped‟: 
Tjaden & Thoennes, above n119 at 148. 
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ADVO complaints studied.
700
 Some additional items, absent from the CDC list 
but which emerged with some regularity in the court file sample, were also added 
(spitting, throwing an object at the person, dragging or pulling a person along the 
ground, twisting arms,
701
 pinning a person against the wall, and kneeing a person 
in the groin). An „other‟ category was also included for those physical acts that 
were more unusual and hence tended to be mentioned in a single complaint.  
If a complaint alleged the threatened use of a weapon/object and that 
weapon/object was present this was coded as „use of weapon/object‟, whereas if 
the weapon/object was not present this was coded as a „threat‟. I also recorded 
separately the actual use of a weapon/object and the threatened use of a 
weapon/object, despite some instances of the later being considered an „assault‟ 
under the Crimes Act.
702
 
Table 6.6: Forms of physical violence  
 1
st
 applicant (46/68) 2
nd
 applicant (34/68) 
 Female 
(33/52 alleged 
physical 
violence)* 
Male  
(13/16) 
Female 
(12/16)* 
Male  
(22/52) 
Pushing 16 4 2 5 
Punching 9 3 2 5 
Grabbing 8 2 3 3 
Hitting or slapping 6 2 5 6 
Choking 4 -- 1 1 
Pulling hair 3 -- 1 -- 
Throw object 3 2 1 3 
Kicking -- 2 1 3 
Spitting 1 -- 1 -- 
Scratching -- 2 1 4 
Biting -- 2 1 1 
Burning -- -- 1 -- 
Use of weapon/object -- 2 -- 3 
Use of weapon/object to 
threaten when present 
-- 1 
 
1 4 
 
Use of restraints/ own body 
against another 
-- -- -- 1 
Knee groin -- 1 -- 3 
Dragging or pulling body along 3 -- 1 -- 
Twisting arms 2 -- -- -- 
Pinning against wall 1 -- 1 -- 
Other 7 
 
1 
 
1 
 
4 
 
*Three women first applicants and one woman second applicant did not specify the form of the alleged 
physical violence. 
                                                          
700 Shoving, throwing, shaking and poking were removed. 
701 This was also added to the CTS2: Straus et al, „CTS2‟, above n34 at 308. 
702 See Judicial Commission of NSW, Criminal Trials Court Bench Book, at [5-010]. Available at 
<http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/benchbks/criminal/internet_main.html> (3 February 2009). 
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As was the case in Table 6.5, Table 6.6 does not tell us a great deal other than 
that men and women both alleged that a wide range of physical acts were used 
against them by their current/former intimate partner. Some gender differences, 
however, appeared to emerge when looking at the types of physical acts used by 
men and women. 
Both men and women made allegations that they had been pushed, punched, 
grabbed, hit or slapped, or had an object thrown at them.  
Men were more likely than women to allege that they had been kicked, bitten, 
and threatened with a weapon/object. Only men alleged that a weapon/object had 
actually been used against them. This included knives,
703
 a tomato stake,
704
 a 
shoe,
705
 and a stapler and a piece of wood.
706
 Thus two allegations involved the 
use of a conventional weapon, and the remaining three involved objects that 
appeared to be „on hand‟ at the time. Men also predominated in alleging that 
women had threatened to use a weapon/object against them when that object was 
present.
707
 This allegation was primarily concerned with being threatened with a 
knife.
708
 The only woman who made this type of allegation alleged that her 
former husband had attached a piece of wood to a rope and swung it around in a 
threatening manner.
709
 Only men alleged that they had been kneed in the groin 
and scratched. It is suggested that these acts are more likely to be defensive, 
rather than offensive, in nature.
710
  
In turn only women alleged that they had been spat at, had their hair pulled, were 
burnt, dragged or pulled along the ground, had their arms twisted and had been 
pinned against a wall or door. In addition women were more likely than men to 
allege being choked or strangled. 
                                                          
703 CourtA-19 (Police M 2nd), and CourtB-22 (Private M 2nd). 
704 CourtC-17 (Police M 1st). This is the only case where the court file indicated that the person had been charged in 
connection to the use of a weapon (AOABH, to which the woman pled guilty). This case is discussed in Chapter 7. 
705 CourtB-12 (Private M 1st). 
706 CourtB-26 (Private M 2nd). 
707 Five men and one woman made this allegation. 
708 CourtB-25 (Private M 1st), CourtA-14 (Police M 2nd), CourtA-15B (Private M 2nd), CourtB-3 (Private M 2nd), and 
CourtB-9 (Private M 2nd). 
709 CourtB-20 (Private W 2nd). 
710 See Mary Finn, Brenda Blackwell, Loretta Stalans, Sheila Studdard & Laura Dugan, „Dual Arrest Decisions in 
Domestic Violence Cases: The Influence of Departmental Policies ‟ (2004) 5 Crime & Delinquency 565 at 571. 
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While the data in this area is limited and must be approached with caution, it is 
interesting to note that these gender differences bear similarities to the 
differences found by Heather Melton and Joanne Belknap in their research on 
men and women charged with misdemeanour domestic violence offences.
711
 
Melton and Belknap found that female defendants: 
were significantly more likely than male defendants to be reported as hitting the victim 
with an object…throwing an object at the victim…striking the victim with a vehicle and 
biting the victim… [and that] male defendants were significantly more likely to be 
reported as shoving or pushing the victim…grabbing or dragging the victim…pulling 
the victim‟s hair…physically restraining the victim…strangling the victim… and 
preventing the victim from calling 911.
712
  
Melton and Belknap also found that while it was more likely that women were 
alleged to have used weapons, there was no gender difference in terms of the use 
of conventional weapons, but there was a difference in the use of „available 
household items‟.713 This led Melton and Belknap to suggest that rather than 
women‟s use of weapons suggesting a greater seriousness in their behaviour, 
instead it may be „a means of “levelling the playing field” once abuse has been 
perpetrated against them‟.714 
Allegations concerning „other‟ forms of physical violence also highlighted areas 
of potential gender difference. Melton and Belknap noted in their study that male 
defendants were more likely to perpetrate acts that were „more unusual (using 
unusual weapons or involving an unusual situation) than their female 
counterparts‟.715 It is important to look at these forms of physical violence as 
they indicate the variety of acts that are perpetrated beyond the more typical 
forms of physical violence. In so doing they assist in conveying a more complete 
picture of the way in which some people use acts to demean and control their 
victims. 
                                                          
711 Melton & Belknap, above n36. 
712 Ibid at 339.  
713 Ibid at 344. See also Henning & Feder, „Who Presents the Greater Threat?‟, above n264 at 75; Feder & Henning, „A 
Comparison‟, above n685 at 163; Miller, „Paradox of Women Arrested‟, above n665 at 1365; Busch & Rosenberg, above 
n685 at 53; and Debra Houry, Sudha Reddy & Constance Parramore, „Characteristics of Victims Coarrested for Intimate 
Partner Violence‟ (2006) 21 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1483, at 1486, 1489. 
714 Ibid at 344. See also Dasgupta, „Just Like Men?‟, above n43 at 204-05; Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟, above n21 at 
74; and Busch & Rosenberg, above n685 at 53. That men tend to use their own bodies and women use weapons is also 
reflected in homicide data: 80% of women used a knife or similar instrument to kill their partner, in 22% of cases men 
used their own hands to beat their (former) partner to death, no women killed in the same way: Megan Davies & Jenny 
Mouzos, Homicide in Australia: 2005-06 National Homicide Monitoring Program Annual Report (2007) at 25. 
715 Melton & Belknap, above n36 at 342. 
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Eight first applicants (seven women and one man) alleged other forms of 
behaviour that do not neatly fit within traditional conceptions of physical 
violence. Their allegations included: being physically nudged;
716
 having a bread 
and butter knife waved under her throat and the butter spread across her 
cheeks;
717
 having her head forced onto a stove top;
718
 wrestling;
719
 bashing the 
woman‟s head against a vehicle;720 lifting the woman off the ground causing 
bruises to her arms;
721
 kneeling on the woman‟s stomach when she was seven 
months pregnant;
722
 and forcing his fingers into her eyes.
723
 The only male in this 
group alleged that his former partner had elbowed and kicked him in his sleep.
724
  
Five second applicants (four men and one woman) made allegations about other 
forms of physical behaviour. The allegations made by the men included: being 
sprayed with „insecticide and stain remover in an attempt to poison him‟;725 
barged past the man knocking him „off balance‟;726 stepped on his foot with the 
heel of her shoe;
727
 and „lash[ed] out‟ at the man while holding keys in her hand 
causing a laceration.
728
 The woman alleged that her former partner had yelled in 
her ear and pinched her.
729
  
C. Threats 
Threats were coded in terms of whether they were specified (threats to kill or 
harm the victim, to kill or harm others, to harm property including pets, and 
threats to commit suicide or to self-harm) or unspecified. As explained above, I 
have coded all acts that were described as „threats‟ in the complaint narratives. 
There are, however, a small number of complaints in which I suggest that this 
characterisation is questionable. That is to say that it is open to question whether 
                                                          
716 CourtC-8 (Police W 1st). 
717 CourtC-8 (Police W 1st). 
718 CourtC-13 (Police W 1st). 
719 CourtC-22 (Police W 1st). 
720 CourtC-24 (Police W 1st). 
721 CourtC-29 (Police W 1st). 
722 CourtB-9 (Police W 1st). 
723 CourtB-15 (Private W 1st). 
724 CourtB-25 (Private M 1st). While these actions have been coded in Table 6.6, the characterisation of these acts as 
„violence‟ or as acts that might ground an ADVO is questionable. See Chapter 7. 
725 CourtA-16 (Private M 2nd). 
726 CourtC-8 (Private M 2nd). 
727 CourtB-7 (Private M 2nd). 
728 CourtB-32B (Private M 2nd). 
729 CourtB-25 (Private W 2nd). 
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they are simply unfortunate comments said in anger, such as „you‟re dead you 
bastard‟.730 Only men alleged threats that were questionable, and while they 
have been coded in this chapter as threats, they are the subject of further 
discussion in Chapter 7. 
As is indicated in Table 6.7, 38 first applicants alleged that they had been 
threatened in some way (31 women and seven men). In six cases the threat was 
unspecified. Most of the threats alleged related to the defendant threatening to 
kill or harm the victim. Both men and women first applicants experienced similar 
rates of these kinds of threats. A small number of women first applicants also 
experienced threats to harm their pets or their property. Women first applicants 
also alleged a small number of threats to kill people close to them as well as 
threats by the perpetrator to commit suicide. No male first applicant made similar 
allegations. For all types of threats the numbers were small and must be 
considered with caution. 
Table 6.7: Types of threats  
 1
st
 applicant [38/68 made 
allegation of threat(s)] 
2
nd
 applicant [30/68 made 
allegations of threat(s)] 
 Female 
(31/52) 
Male 
(7/16) 
Female 
(8/16) 
Male 
(22/52) 
Threat not specified 3  
(10%) 
3  
(42.9%) 
1  
(12.5%) 
1  
(4.6%) 
THREAT SPECIFIED (% indicate of the number who specified the type of threat): 
Threats concerning the victim  
To kill victim 15 
(53.6% F 1
st
 who 
specified)  
2 
(50% M 1
st
 who 
specified) 
1  
(14.3% F 2
nd
 who 
specified) 
7 
(33.3% M 2
nd
who 
specified) 
To harm victim 15 
(53.6%) 
2 
(50%) 
6 
(85.7%) 
13 
(61.9% 
To harm property of 
victim 
2 
(7.1%  
0 1 
(14.3%) 
2 
(9.5%) 
To harm pet of 
victim 
1 
(3.6%) 
0 0 0 
Threats concerning others related to the victim 
To kill others 3 
(10.7%) 
0 0 1 
(4.8%) 
To harm others 0 0 2 
(28.6%) 
0 
Threats to engage in self-harm 
Suicide 2 
(7.1%) 
0 0 1 
(4.8%) 
Other self-harm 0 0 0 1 
(4.8%) 
 
                                                          
730 CourtC-12 (Private M 2nd). 
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Heather Melton and Joanne Belknap in their study of domestic violence charge 
cases found a gender difference in the issuance of threats, with men being 
„significantly more likely than female defendants to be reported as making 
threats to the victim‟.731 In the current study both men and women received a 
wide range of threats. There is a tentative suggestion in the data presented in 
Table 6.7 that more women alleged that they were subject to different types of 
threats (including threats to kill), with men appearing to be more likely to allege 
one type of threat. However, this suggestion requires further investigation, as the 
sample relied on in this thesis that not only alleged that a threat had been made 
but also specified its type was very small. This is an important area for further 
investigation as the issuance of threats may be indicative of the presence of a 
coercive environment. 
Significantly Melton and Belknap also found a gender difference in the context 
in which threats were issued. In that study, when men issued threats against their 
female partners it was often about „what would happen‟ if she called the police or 
told anyone about the violence/abuse. None of the threats issued by women 
against their current/former intimate partners revealed this type of coercive 
context.
732
 This resonates with James Ptacek‟s work on the strategies of batterers 
as revealed in women‟s affidavits for protection orders in Massachusetts. Ptacek 
documented multiple strategies deployed by men to prevent the woman reporting 
the violence, proceeding with legal action, or to prevent her from effecting 
separation.
733
 
The complaints involving cross applications were investigated to see whether 
there was any indication of the context in which threats were issued and whether 
this reveals any gender difference. Given the brevity and lack of detail contained 
in many complaint narratives, it is not surprising that frequently no context was 
provided. Table 6.8 details the context and timing (pre or post separation) of the 
threats alleged in the cross applications. While the numbers are very small, it is 
worth noting that only women first applicants mentioned that they received 
                                                          
731 Melton & Belknap, above n36 at 339. 
732 Ibid at 341. 
733 Ptacek, above n13 at 84-85 (retaliation and coercion concerning court and police actions) and 79-82 (separation 
assault). 
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threats during their relationship about reporting violence to the police or telling 
others about it.
734
 The following complaint illustrates this type of threat: 
… The defendant threatened the PINOP that, „I‟ll bash you again if you say anything to 
anyone. I‟ll take the kids away. I‟ll kill you‟.735 
Four women first applicants alleged they were threatened at the time of 
separation, when discussing separation, or to return to the relationship. For all of 
these women the threat was issued as a means of preventing separation and was 
either a threat to kill or harm the woman:
736
  
…Prior to the separation the defendant threatened: „I (sic) you ever leave me I‟ll kill 
you‟ and the defendant has threatened the children of the parties.737 
By contrast the single male complaint, which could potentially fall into this 
category, was of an entirely different nature; he alleged that his former spouse 
threatened to „ruin‟ him at the time of separation by seeking an ADVO against 
him and taking his property.
738
 This threat was not aimed at preventing the 
separation, rather it was the consequence of separation; the woman is alleged to 
have stated to the man „that‟s it. It‟s over. I am going to ruin you‟. 
Only men alleged that women threatened to use the legal system against them, 
particularly by obtaining an ADVO.
739
 This bears similarities to the way that 
some men characterised women obtaining an ADVO and/or reporting breaches 
as forms of harassment or intimidation. These types of characterisations are 
explored in Chapter 7. 
                                                          
734 CourtB-35 (Police W 1st), CourtC-23 (Police W 1st), and CourtC-25 (Police W 1st). See also CourtB-7 (Private W 1st) 
where the woman alleged that the man „boasted [to her that]…he always has revenge on people who have taken AVOs out 
[against him]‟. 
735 CourtB-35 (Police W 1st). See also CourtC-23 (Police W 1st), and CourtC-25 (Police W 1st). 
736 See CourtA-16 (Police W 1st) threat to kill when she broached the subject of getting a divorce; CourtB-7 (Private W 
1st) threat to harm when she requested that he leave her alone; CourtB-21 (Private W 1st) threat to kill if she ever left him; 
and CourtC-3 (Police W 1st) threat to „bash‟ her if she didn‟t return to the relationship. 
737 CourtB-21 (Private W 1st). 
738 CourtC-26 (Private M 2nd). 
739 CourtC-26 (Private M 2nd) defendant alleged to have threatened „…just wait and see! I am going to take out an AVO‟; 
CourtA-16 (Private M 2nd) „The defendant has also threatened to have the complainant arrested by the police, by making 
false statements‟; and CourtB-25 (Private M 1st) alleged the woman sent a SMS message: „Time for another AVO and to 
call the Department of Immigration‟. 
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The focus on post separation events is unsurprising in the context of protection 
order litigation,
740
 however it is notable that only first applicants reported a 
number of threats pre and post separation.  
Table 6.8: Context of threats 
 1
st
 applicant [39/68 made 
allegation of threat(s)] 
2
nd
 applicant [30/68 made 
allegations of threat(s)] 
 Female   
(31/52)* 
 
Male  
(7/16) 
Female 
(8/16) 
 
Male  
(22/52)*** 
No context provided 
or context unclear  
17 6 5 14 
Context of the issuance of threat 
To prevent reporting 
to police/others 
3 -- -- -- 
Trying to separate/ 
during separation 
3 -- -- 1**** 
Trying to get to 
return to relationship 
1 -- -- -- 
Family law – 
children** 
3 -- -- 4 
Family law – 
property 
-- 1 -- -- 
Jealousy about a 
new partner/affair 
-- -- -- 2 
Other 5 -- 3 2 
Time when threat issued 
Pre Separation 6 2 1 1 
Trying to separate/ 
during separation 
1 1 -- 1 
Post Separation 22 4 7 17 
Unclear 3 -- -- 4 
* One woman first applicant provided specific details about two threats, pre and post separation. As a 
result this column totals 32 rather than 31. 
** Threats made when determining parenting arrangements for children post separation, as well as 
threats at the time of changeover, are included here. 
***One male second applicant provided specific details about two threats issued post separation. As a 
result this column totals 23 rather than 22. 
****While this threat is coded here see discussion in text about the different nature of this man’s 
allegation. 
 
One area in which there appeared to be some congruence was for threats made in 
relation to arrangements regarding children after separation. Three female first 
applicants and four male second applicants nominated or implied that this was 
the context or motivation for the threat made against them. While the numbers 
here are very small and the information provided scant, there appears to be a 
slightly different nature in the types of threats issued by men and women in this 
context. The threats alleged to have been issued by women included: a threat to 
                                                          
740 All of the cross applications gathered in this study (court file and interview samples) involved parties who had 
separated (some under the one roof). A preponderance of separated relationships was also found in Ptacek‟s study in 
Massachusetts where only 35% of women were still in a relationship with the defendant: above n13 at 72. 
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„come and burn you in the home‟ if the man went to the Family Court asking for 
a property settlement;
741
 a threat to prevent any contact with the child(ren);
 742
 a 
threat to „Quick kids here‟s our chance, let‟s run did (sic) over‟ when the mother 
collected the children following the father‟s contact time.743 In contrast the 
threats alleged to have been issued by men were all threats to kill the woman to 
gain custody of the children.
744
 In CourtB-17 the woman, who has custody of the 
two children and contact changeover takes place at her home, included the 
following allegation in her complaint: 
… the offender approached the [woman] in the foyer area [of the Family Court 
following a counselling session] and stated „If I can‟t have the fuck‟n kids, you won‟t be 
having them, I‟ll shoot ya first‟. The [woman] did not reply, collected her children and 
returned home. 
Since that date, on each access visit, the offender has made similar threats … On [date] 
he called out „you‟re dead‟. He later returned and said „You won‟t have the boys, 
because I‟ll shoot ya, I‟m getting the shits with the court‟. As a result of these comments, 
the [woman] fears for her safety and requires an apprehended violence order.
745
 
This is an area that requires further research and examination.  
D. Other forms of abuse 
When looking at other forms of abuse more distinct differences emerge. The 
complaints made by women, as first and second applicants, included allegations 
across the broad spectrum of acts/behaviours described here as „other‟ forms of 
abuse. This is consistent with research that details the „constellation of abuse‟ 
experienced by women victims of domestic violence;
746
 that women rarely 
experience only one form of violence,
747
 and that „other‟ forms of abuse play a 
role in the function of domestic violence as a means of control (see Chapter 2).  
                                                          
741 CourtA–9 (Private M 2nd) this is the only allegation in the complaint. 
742 CourtC-14 (Private M 2nd) this is the only allegation in the complaint; and CourtB-19 (Police M 2nd).  
743 CourtB-11 (Private M 2nd). The man also alleged that the woman had: punched him in the chest when they were 
arguing, made „false comments‟ about him, and harassed him (unspecified). 
744 CourtB–6 (Police W 1st), CourtB-17 (Police W 1st), and CourtB-35 (Police W 1st). 
745 CourtB-17 (Police W 1st). 
746 See Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 343 where the authors note that men did not allege the 
same acts of intimidation or coercion „associated with the “constellation of abuse”‟ that were integral to women‟s 
experiences of male violence and abuse. See Chapter 2. 
747 See Rebecca Dobash & Russell Dobash, „Violent Men and Violent Contexts‟ in Rebecca Dobash & Russell Dobash 
(eds), Rethinking Violence Against Women (1998) at 155-156 commenting on the range of behaviours used by violent 
men against their female partners. See also Kelly‟s discussion of sexual violence and its coexistence with other forms of 
domestic violence: „Surviving Sexual Violence‟, above n165 at 127-31. In Melton and Belknap‟s study of men and 
women arrested for domestic violence they also found that men were more likely to use multiple acts in an incident, 
whereas women rarely used more than one or two actions: above n36 at 342. See also Busch & Rosenberg, above n685 at 
55. 
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Forty-six first applicants (34 women and 12 men) and 26 second applicants (13 
women and 13 men) alleged that they had been subject to other forms of abuse 
(verbal abuse, harassment, stalking, property damage, emotional/psychological 
abuse, financial abuse, and social abuse/isolation) (see Table 6.9). As noted 
above, complaints were coded in a generous fashion; however in a number of 
cases, all second applicants, the characterisation of certain actions as abusive 
(particularly those sought to be described as harassment) was highly 
questionable.
748
 These cases are discussed in Chapter 7.  
While the numbers are very small, it is notable that only women alleged 
behaviour that can be characterised as tactics of isolation. 
Table 6.9: Other forms of abuse  
 1
st
 applicants (68) 2
nd
 applicants (68) 
 Female 
(34/ 52) 
Male 
(12/16) 
TOTAL Female 
(13*/16) 
Male 
(13*/ 52) 
TOTAL 
Verbal abuse 23 
(67.7% of 
female 1
st
 
applicants who 
alleged ‘other’ 
abuse) 
5 
(41.7% of male 
1
st
 applicants 
who alleged 
‘other’ abuse) 
28 8 
(61.5% of 
female 2
nd
 
applicants who 
alleged ‘other’ 
abuse) 
5 
(38.5% of male 
2
nd
 applicants 
who alleged 
‘other’ abuse) 
13 
Harassment 18 
(52.9%) 
5 
(41.7%) 
23 9 
(69.2%) 
11 
(84.6%) 
20 
Stalking 6 
(17.7%) 
1 
(8.3%) 
7 2 
(15.4%) 
1 
(7.7%) 
3 
Damage to 
property 
10 
(29.4%) 
4 
(33.3%) 
14 1 
(7.7%) 
4 
(30.8%) 
5 
Emotional or 
psychological 
8 
(23.5%) 
0 8 4 
(30.8%) 
2 
(15.4%) 
6 
Financial 1 
(2.9%) 
0 1 2 
(15.4%) 
1 
(7.7%) 
3 
Social 3 
(8.8%) 
0 3 3 
(24.0%) 
0 3 
Other* 0 0 0 2 
(15.4%) 
0 2 
* Twelve cases (one woman second applicant and 11 male second applicants) have been excluded from the ‘other’ 
category as there are questions about their characterisation of the act/behaviour as ‘abuse’, and this was the only 
allegation of other forms of abuse made in the complaint. 
 
It is interesting to note the extent to which some complainants, particularly 
women, nominated other forms of abuse in a legal arena where, with the 
exception of property damage and stalking, these acts are not crimes and it is 
unlikely that such forms of abuse would, on their own, ground an ADVO. 
„Other‟ forms of abuse did not figure prominently for male second applicants. 
                                                          
748 Twelve cases (all made by second applicants) fit this profile and are discussed in Chapter 7. 
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The only areas in which male second applicants appeared to make greater 
allegations concerned harassment and property damage. 
E. Fear 
Finally, the complaint narratives were investigated for reference to „fears‟ or 
„apprehensions‟ held by each complainant regarding the behaviour of the person 
they were seeking an ADVO against. To obtain an ADVO the legislation 
requires that the person seeking the ADVO „has reasonable grounds to fear and 
in fact fears‟ the commission of certain acts and behaviours.749 That is to say that 
the making of an ADVO is not simply reliant on the presence of certain 
acts/behaviours, but that there must be this additional component of fear. In 
many complaint narratives fear or apprehension was not specifically mentioned, 
and in those where it was it was often included as a routine way of concluding 
the complaint.
750
 In conducting this analysis I recognise that many applicants 
may well still be fearful even when the complaint did not specifically refer to 
fear, and in some cases this might be assumed from the contents of the 
complaint. However, in this analysis if there was no specific mention of fear in 
the complaint this has been coded as „no fear‟ regardless of the contents of the 
complaint. This analysis thus represents a conservative indication of the presence 
of fear. Table 6.10 indicates that women, as first and second applicants were 
more likely than male applicants to make specific reference to fear than male 
applicants. In relation to first applicants this apparent gender difference did not 
reach statistical significance (
2
 = 1.58, df = 1, p>0.05); however the difference 
between male and female second applicants was statistically significant (
2
 = 
5.89, df = 1, p<0.05). This is consistent with the growing picture of male second 
applicants‟ complaints being of a different nature and quality than those made by 
male and female first applicants, and female second applicants. 
                                                          
749 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562AE, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s16. 
750 A similar routine approach was documented in relation to references to ‟a history of violence‟.  
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Table 6.10: Fear 
 1
st
 applicants 2
nd
 applicants 
 Female (52) Male (16) Female (16) Male (52)** 
Fear mentioned 
in the complaint 
29*  
(55.8% W 1
st
) 
6 
(37.5% M 1
st
) 
11 
(68.8% F 2
nd
) 
18** 
(34.6% M 2
nd
) 
Fear not 
mentioned in 
the complaint 
23 
(44.2%) 
10 
(62.5%) 
5 
(31.3%) 
34** 
(61.5%) 
* In 9 of these cases fear was articulated as the fears held by the police for the victim. 
** Two other men mentioned ‘fears’ however these were fears that the woman would cause him to breach his ADVO or 
provoke him in some way. These have been excluded and instead coded as ‘fear not mentioned’. 
This finding replicates other studies where women were more likely than men to 
state that they feared their current/former intimate partner.
751
 This should be 
investigated further through interviews with people seeking ADVOs, as it is 
troubling that more complaint narratives did not make reference to this attribute 
given that it is a legislative requirement for granting an ADVO, and the fact that 
the generation of fear is one area where consistent, and statistically significant 
differences in the experience of domestic violence is found between men and 
women. Like the presence and function of control, to which the generation of 
fear is linked, fear may be an important criterion in different types of domestic 
violence. 
3. Summary 
This chapter has provided quantitative information about the profile and nature 
of cross applications gathered in the court file sample.  
It is estimated that the number of cross applications, as a proportion of intimate 
partner ADVOs, is small. The professionals interviewed agreed with this 
estimation but noted that these cases tended to be more complex and time 
consuming. The court file sample indicated that the majority of first applicants 
were women and that first applications were more likely to have been initiated by 
the police (implying a greater level of seriousness); in contrast second applicants 
were more likely to be men lodging private applications.  
                                                          
751 Kevin Hamberger & Clare Guse, „Men‟s and Women‟s Use of Intimate Partner Violence in Clinical Samples‟ (2002) 8 
Violence Against Women 1301 at 1316; Bagshaw & Chung, above n137 at 11; Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟, above n21 
at 20; Melton & Belknap, above n36 at 342-43; Feder & Henning, „A Comparison‟, above n685 at 163, 166; Jennifer 
Lanhinrichsen-Rohling, Peter Neidig & George Thorn, „Violent Marriages: Gender Differences in Levels of Current 
Violence and Past Abuse‟ (1995) 10 Journal of Family Violence 159 at 171; Barbara Morse, „Beyond the Conflict Tactics 
Scale: Assessing Gender Differences in Partner Violence‟ (1995) 10 Violence and Victims 251 at 268. 
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The remainder of the chapter explored whether there were quantitative 
differences between the types of allegations made by first and second applicants, 
and between men and women. The brevity of complaint narratives, and the 
resultant lack of detail, meant that frequently it was not possible to say anything 
beyond that both men and women alleged that their current/former partner had 
perpetrated a wide range of different forms of acts/behaviour against them.  
Thus this chapter demonstrated not only the limitations of methods that simply 
count acts of violence, but also the limitations of approaches that focus on 
incidents rather than context, and that focus on violence to the exclusion of other 
acts of coercive control. The chapter then reflects the theoretical and 
methodological discussion in Chapter 2 which outlined the debates, within the 
largely sociological literature, on conceptions of domestic violence. Like Melton 
and Belknap, the findings detailed in this chapter indicate that the: 
…differences revealed in quantitative data were not that drastic – both men and women 
used some serious actions, displaying no significant differences with most of the actions 
– examining the qualitative data showed a different picture.752 
Thus taking a quantitative approach provides a „bare bones‟ measure of domestic 
violence.
753
 
That said, some areas of the data presented in this chapter do appear to build a 
picture of some gender difference; this is particularly in relation to male second 
applicants. These applicants appear to make allegations of a different nature to 
men and women first applicants, and to women second applicants. In general first 
applicants, men and women raised allegations across the broad spectrum of 
categories of violence. While some small differences were found between men 
and women first applicants, none of these reached statistical significance. 
However, areas of statistical significance were found between men and women 
second applicants: more women second applicants than men alleged physical 
violence, other forms of abuse and fear. Other areas examined such as a history 
of domestic violence and the use of threats did not reach statistical significance; 
however they were in the same direction as those differences that were found, 
thus suggesting further areas of gender difference between men and women 
                                                          
752 Melton & Belknap, above n36 at 343. 
753 Ibid at 346. 
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second applicants. A larger sample is required to test this proposition. The 
different nature of the complaints made by male second applicants is explored in 
the next chapter, which undertakes a qualitative examination of the complaint 
narratives. That chapter further emphasises the critical importance of context in 
assessing the meaning of violence by exploring in-depth the narrative content of 
the originating complaint and the cross complaint (as a pair). 
169 
7. A qualitative examination of 
cross applications 
[Q]uantitative research that asks … Who did what to whom how many times? These 
studies consistently show few, if any, gender differences in intimate violence…What 
these studies miss, indeed what they cannot measure given the nature of the 
methodology – is the context, motive, and meaning underlying each violent event…754 
In this chapter I build on the picture commenced in Chapter 6 by exploring in 
detail qualitative differences evident in the cross applications gathered in the 
court file sample and the interviews with women. Few of the differences between 
men and women that emerged in Chapter 6 were statistically significant, leading 
to the conclusion that an approach centred on counting, devoid of context, was 
unable to reveal much about gender differences in the use of violence beyond 
simply „who did what to whom‟. The purpose of this chapter is to look beyond 
incidents, to examine other factors that can assist in differentiating the nature and 
occurrence of violence/abuse between intimate partners. I do this by looking 
more closely at the „paired‟ narratives – that is, examining together the woman‟s 
and the man‟s complaints.755 Given the limitations of the complaint process756 
this in-depth exploration was not always possible. Where it was possible, key 
differences emerged in three areas, where it was, by and large, men who: 
 were subject to associated criminal charges at the time the cross application 
was lodged; 
 made complaints that sought to characterise acts/behaviour as violence in a 
questionable manner, or made complaints that did not appear to contain 
allegations that could ground an ADVO; or 
 sought to position themselves within a „wounded‟ narrative. 
                                                          
754 Claire Renzetti, „Editor‟s Introduction‟ (1997) 3 Violence Against Women 459, at 459. 
755 See the emphasis Dobash & Dobash place on examining shared narratives and the reason why this was not undertaken 
for the interview sample in this thesis, above n318. It was however possible in terms of the court file sample.  
756 See Chapter 4. 
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1. The presence of criminal charges 
In the interview sample and the court file sample men (primarily second 
applicants) were more likely than women to be subject to criminal charges at the 
same time as the cross application. 
In the court file sample, 22 people were subject to criminal charges (involving a 
total of 62 charges). See Table 7.1. Seventeen men
757
 and five women were 
charged
758
 (three women were subject to charges at the same time as their former 
partner). Most people were charged with one offence; however seven men (two 
of whom were charged with 11 offences) and four women were charged with 
multiple offences. While most charges related to acts perpetrated against an 
intimate partner, a person known to the intimate partner, or to property, not all 
did.
759
 The number of charges that involved contravening an ADVO is notable; 
eight men, all second applicants, were charged with this offence with three being 
subject to multiple breach charges.
760
 No women were charged with 
contravening an ADVO. This suggests a different quality to the behaviour of 
male second applicants; that these men were engaged in a repetitive pattern of 
behaviour. USA research exploring the difference between men and women 
arrested for domestic violence offences also found that men were more likely to 
have been arrested previously for domestic violence,
761
 including breaching a 
protection order.
762
 
                                                          
757 CourtA-1A, CourtA-1B, CourtA-3, CourtA-4, CourtA-6 (dual arrest), CourtA-19, CourtB-7, CourtB-9, CourtB-10, 
CourtB-11, CourtB-20 (both charged), CourtB-22, CourtB-26, CourtB-34 (both charged), CourtC-2, CourtC-13, and 
CourtC-28. „Dual arrest‟ indicates that both parties were arrested in the same incident; „both charged‟ indicates that it is 
unclear whether the charges arose out of the same incident or separate incidents.  
758 CourtA-6 (dual arrest), CourtB-20 (both charged), CourtB-34 (both charged), CourtB-35, and CourtC-17. In another 
case a man, charged by the police, laid a private information for common assault against his former partner and her father: 
CourtC-28. 
759 Eg the woman in CourtB-34 was charged with resisting an officer in the execution of his/her duty [Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW) s59] and using offensive language in a public place [Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s4A]; all acts she 
allegedly performed to prevent, or protest about, the arrest of her former partner. 
760 CourtA-1B, CourtA-4, CourtA-6, CourtB-7 (three charges), CourtB-10 (three charges), CourtB-26, CourtB-34, and 
CourtC-2 (three charges). 
761 Martin, above n685 at 150; Busch & Rosenberg, above n685 at 53, 54. 
762 See Henning & Feder, „Who Presents the Greater Threat?‟, above n264 at 75. 
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Table 7.1: Presence of criminal charges 
 1st applicant 
(68) 
2nd applicant (68) Dual application 
(10) 
 Female 
(1/52) 
Male 
(3/16) 
Female 
(3/16) 
Male 
(11/52) 
Female 
(1/10) 
Male 
(3/10) 
1 charge -- 2 1 6 -- 2 
2-3 charges 1 -- 2 3 1 -- 
4-5 -- -- -- -- -- 1 
6-7 -- 1 -- -- -- -- 
8-9 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
10-11 -- -- -- 2 -- -- 
 
In many cases the results of these charges are unknown; they were either 
transferred to another court or determined after the finalisation of the 
fieldwork.
763
 Eight charges did not proceed and were withdrawn at court. The 
result is known for 20 charges (half were dismissed and half resulted in a finding 
of guilt). Three men and one woman were found guilty of various offences.
764
 
Little is known about the nature and context of the events that led to these 
charges from the data examined for this thesis; in only two cases was the charge 
fact sheet appended to the ADVO court file. One is the case of Olivia and John, 
quoted at length in Chapter 1 and explored further in Chapter 8. The other is 
CourtC-17. In this case the woman was charged with malicious damage
765
 and 
malicious wounding
766
 to which she pled guilty at the first opportunity. At the 
same time the police sought a TIO to protect her de facto partner. This TIO reads 
in full: 
The parties have been in a relationship for about four years. Today the parties have 
become involved in an argument relating to the wish of the defendant to move out. The 
victim has taken some personal belongings of the defendant and would not return them. 
The defendant has chased he (sic) around parts of the property, as well as assaulting 
him with a tomato stake by hitting him over the head. On return inside the laptop 
computer of the victim has been trashed by the defendant and consequent to a physical 
altercation between the parties the victim has been stabbed in the arm with the jagged 
stake. The victim then fled the premises and defendant contacted the Police. Defendant 
shall be charged with matters arising. 
                                                          
763 The result for 34 charges (involving eight people) is not known. 
764 In CourtA-6 the man was found guilty of maliciously destroying or damaging property, AOABH, two counts of 
common assault, and contravene ADVO; in CourtC-17 the woman plead guilty to malicious damage and malicious 
wounding; in both CourtB-7 and CourtB-10 the men were charged with three contravene ADVO offences and were both 
found guilty of one offence each (the remaining charges were withdrawn). 
765 Malicious damage causing less than $2000 damage: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s195A. 
766 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s35A. 
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Even this complaint makes some reference to the woman perpetrating violence in 
the context of her attempts to separate. The charge fact sheet provides additional 
detail about this context: 
… Over the past couple of years, the defendant [the woman] and victim [the man] have 
been having a number of domestic problems, with the defendant accusing the victim of 
stalking her and not letting her leave him. 
…[after locating a suitable property the defendant took the victim to inspect the 
property] 
When the defendant and the victim returned home, the victim told the defendant she 
wasn‟t to move out of the home. The defendant (sic) went to the victim‟s (sic) bag and 
took out her mobile phone and bankcards so she wouldn‟t have any money to move out 
of home. As a consequence, the defendant grabbed the victim‟s mobile telephone and 
threw it onto the pavement at the front of the house. When this happened, the victim 
grabbed a cordless telephone in the house and hit the defendant with the telephone on 
her arm and hands. 
The victim then held the defendant up against a wall. 
The defendant moved away from the victim and went into the laundry where she picked 
up a mop. The victim followed her and took the mop off [her]. The victim went into the 
kitchen and picked up a kitchen knife. 
When the defendant saw this, she ran into the backyard and held the family dog in front 
of her. The defendant then picked up a tomato stake which the dog had been chewing on. 
The defendant hit the victim [on] the head with the tomato stake causing the stake to 
split in half. 
The defendant ran into the garage. The victim followed her, however, the defendant 
stated that the victim wasn‟t holding the knife at that time. The defendant dropped the 
half of the tomato stake she was holding. In the garage, the defendant picked up the 
victim‟s work laptop and threatened to throw it on the ground if the victim did not return 
her bankcards. The defendant then threw this computer onto the ground. 
Both the victim and the defendant began hitting each other around their faces with their 
open hands. While this was happening, the defendant has picked up the broken tomato 
stake and stabbed the victim in his left forearm area with the stake. As a consequence 
part of the stake has pierced the victim‟s lower forearm and protruded from the other 
side. …. 
The defendant was arrested and cautioned at the scene where she made admissions to 
the assault and damage to the computer. ..In the [recorded police] interview, the 
defendant made admissions to stabbing the victim stating she just wanted him to leave 
her alone. 
The woman lodged a cross application 17 days later. This cross application did 
not address the above detailed incident, instead it alleged that there was „a 
history of violence between the parties‟, including physical assault (two assaults 
were reported to the police), verbal abuse, derogatory comments, and the 
removal of her belongings.  
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This case is particularly interesting because while the woman most certainly used 
violence against her partner, we need to ask whether her acts should be defined 
as „domestic violence‟. In this I want to draw a distinction between civil and 
criminal proceedings (where the civil proceeding is concerned with „who needs 
protection‟ or „who is in fear‟, and the criminal proceeding is concerned with 
whether an offence took place). The police fact sheet reveals that the man used 
violence and threatening behaviour towards the woman and was actively 
preventing her from leaving the relationship, and in response she damaged his 
property and assaulted him with the tomato stake.
767
 There are two separate legal 
questions here. The first concerns who requires protection from domestic 
violence in the form of an ADVO. Here I would suggest that the woman‟s acts 
do not warrant the making of an ADVO against her (as a legal action designed to 
address domestic violence), and indeed both ADVO applications were resolved 
via mutual withdrawal. The second concerns whether the acts perpetrated by the 
woman should result in a criminal charge. Here I agree that given the nature of 
the woman‟s act and the injury sustained, the police were not best placed to 
exercise discretion regarding whether to charge her with malicious wounding 
(however there are pertinent questions about why her legal representative did not 
raise self-defence).
768
 Thus I seek to highlight that while an act might not require 
a domestic violence response, this does not mean that it might not attract another 
legal response. This returns to the questions raised in Chapter 1 about whether it 
is possible for a person to perpetrate an act of violence against a person with 
whom they have a domestic relationship and not label it domestic violence. This 
case provides a useful example of a woman‟s use of violence that might sit 
within notions of self-defence (as I suggest should have been argued), or 
retaliation or anger in the context of her own victimisation, rather than domestic 
violence since she did not appear to be using coercive control, but rather used 
violence to escape the relationship. 
The interviews with women provided further context to understanding the 
presence of charges against male second applicants. First there was a difference 
in the timing of the cross application. The nature of the court file sample created 
                                                          
767 The photographs appended to the court file indicated that the injury sustained was quite severe. 
768 There is some suggestion in the research that women are more likely to admit to their actions and to „plead guilty 
rather than go to trial‟: McMahon & Pence, above n21 at 52. 
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a bias towards cross applications initiated at the same time as the originating 
complaint;
769
 the interview sample was not biased in this way and three of the ten 
women interviewed had been subject to a cross application lodged a considerable 
period of time after their own ADVO had been granted.
770
 In all three cases the 
cross complaint was made after the man had been charged with contravening the 
woman‟s ADVO,771 and the presence of the charge appeared to be a motivating 
factor behind the decision to make the cross application. Both Frances and 
Louise identified the cross application as a way of „blaming‟ them for the 
violence, or justifying the use of violence against them. The narrative of the cross 
applications lodged against these women all centred on their alleged (mis)use of 
their ADVO. These complaints are discussed in the following section. 
2. A questionable characterisation 
In the interview sample and the court file sample there was a small category of 
complaints that raise concerns about whether the behaviour alleged therein 
should be described as domestic violence and hence warrant the making of an 
ADVO. In the interview sample these complaints were made by male second 
applicants, and one male first applicant. In the court file sample, 18 of these 
cases were made by male second applicants,
772
 and one was made by a female 
second applicant.
773
 In categorising complaints as questionable, I have adopted a 
conservative approach. I have not included those complaints that are simply 
vague, brief and without detail, rather I have defined as questionable those 
complaints that do not appear to address the legislative requirements.
774
  
Questions about the characterisation of certain acts as violence or abuse arise 
mainly with respect to behaviours sought to be described as „harassment‟, „verbal 
abuse‟ or „threats‟. For example, the ADVO complaint lodged against Megan 
                                                          
769 See Chapter 3. 
770 Louise (the cross complaint was lodged 6-8 weeks after her ADVO was finalised); Lillian (the cross complaint was 
lodged when she sought to extend her ADVO); and Frances (two cross complaints were lodged after her first ADVO was 
finalised, it is unclear how much later the first cross complaint was made, the second cross complaint was made almost 
two years later). 
771 Lillian and Frances. In Hayley Katzen‟s study of ADVO breaches, one of the three women who were subject to a cross 
application, had this lodged at the same time the man was charged with a breach: above n15 at 42.  
772 CourtA-10, CourtB-5, CourtB-6, CourtB-10, CourtB-11, CourtB-17, CourtB-21, CourtB-29, CourtB-33, CourtC-3, 
CourtC-4, CourtC-12, CourtC-13, CourtC-14, CourtC-15, CourtC-24, CourtC-28, and CourtC-29. Note that some of these 
questionable acts/behaviours were accompanied by allegations of other acts/behaviour that may ground an ADVO, see 
discussion below.  
773 CourtC-20. 
774 See Chapter 6. 
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sought to describe a letter she had written to her former partner‟s parents as 
„harassment‟. Megan explained that she wrote this letter to inform his parents 
about their son‟s treatment of women, and concluded, „I just don‟t think writing 
to his parents was…automatically harassment‟. These complaints question 
whether some acts that might be hurtful or unfortunate constitute domestic 
violence. In Chapter 2 I drew attention to some of the risks of a broad definition 
of domestic violence, most clearly demonstrated in the work of Linda Mills who 
adopts such a wide-ranging definition that she concludes that „we have all 
experienced intimate violence‟.775 As argued in Chapter 2 this type of conclusion 
is a result of the failure to ask whether the different acts (whether physical 
violence, or verbal abuse and so on) are used to exert control over the other 
person. The risk of this failure is perhaps most clear when we discuss other forms 
of violence, that is violence and abuse that is not physical, where physical 
violence starts from an almost assumed position of domestic violence. That is to 
say, when we examine other forms of abuse that can so closely resemble hurtful 
or unfortunate acts, the importance of examining the function of the act (is it for 
controlling purposes or not?) comes to the fore. 
Three types of questionable complaints were identified in this study, those:  
 that appeared to raise no allegations that could ground an ADVO; 
 that mixed questionable acts with acts that could ground an ADVO; and  
 that centre on women‟s „misuse‟ of their ADVOs. 
A. Complaints that contain no allegations to ground an ADVO 
Ten cases (two from the interview sample
776
 and eight from the court file 
sample
777
) reveal cross applications lodged by men that appeared to contain no 
grounds to support the making of an ADVO. One of the key professionals 
interviewed, WDVCAS3, provided an example of this type of complaint where 
the second applicant failed to establish fear, notwithstanding that this was a 
requirement of the legislation: 
                                                          
775 Mills, above n19 at 23. 
776 Rosemary and Marcella. 
777 See CourtA-10, CourtB-5, CourtB-10, CourtC-3, CourtC-4, Court C-10, CourtC-24 and CourtC-29. 
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We had [a case] a couple of weeks ago where he talked about…it was over contact [with 
the children]. The police were called, there was an argument about contact and …he 
tried to slam the door I think while she was driving off, or something around that. His 
complaint was „she yelled at me and told me I couldn‟t see the children and she drove 
off‟. …It was as vague as that. There was no element of fear in it, but [when you read 
her complaint by the police]…not only was that incident scary for her, it would have 
been scary for the children as well. 
Both Rosemary and Marcella were subject to cross applications of this nature.
778
 
The cross application lodged against Marcella contained two allegations: an 
abusive gesture, and a „threat‟. However when the text of the complaint is read in 
full, questions might be raised about the appropriate way to view the allegations 
and whether they should be interpreted as „abusive‟. They appear more likely to 
be „hurtful‟ acts rather than acts of domestic violence, and certainly don‟t appear 
to have any connection to fear: 
The complainant has received a complaint and summons issued against him involving 
the present defendant, and refutes the matters complained of. In addition, he complains 
of the following matters since cross-orders between the parties expired… The situation 
has been reasonable until recently. On … [date], at the commencement of a contact 
period, the defendant said „you‟re dead you bastard‟. On [date], at start of another 
contact period, the defendant made rude gestures at the complainant. 
The fact that there was a previous ADVO (also a cross application) made to 
protect this man, suggests that there were previous acts/behaviour that could 
provide a foundation for an ADVO (and provide some context to the matters 
outlined in the current complaint). This is a generous reading, as on the whole 
this must be viewed as a weak complaint, since the threat appears more akin to a 
„throw away‟ phrase, particularly given that the only other specific allegation 
was „rude gestures‟. Certainly fear is absent from this complaint. According to 
Marcella one of the magistrates that dealt with the application raised similar 
questions:  
The Magistrate …was sort of – he was talking in my favour, trying to um he was trying to 
question the validity or the substance of the claims [made by my former husband] like ah he 
„would have not shook his bat‟ or something [like that] because of that remark [„you‟re 
dead you bastard‟]. … [the magistrate] was sort of saying that …  assuming that it was said, 
it was just not really something that was putting him in danger at all. 
Marcella‟s complaint alleged stalking, a history of violence, and intimidating acts 
that she says could only have been performed by her former husband.
779
 The two 
                                                          
778 The cross complaint lodged against Rosemary is discussed in Chapter 9. 
779 See discussion of „anonymous acts‟ in Chapter 5. 
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complaints were adjourned for hearing. On the day of the hearing these 
complaints were settled via the making of mutual orders.
780
 
Eight complaints made by male second applicants in the court file sample 
complained about behaviour that was described as „harassment‟. One of these 
complaint narratives read: 
There has been an ongoing dispute between the … (PINOP) and the defendant in 
relation to the access arrangements … to the children …. On [date] the PINOP attended 
the defendant‟s residence for the purpose of collecting the children for access. The 
PINOP had put both children in his car and had secured their seat belts and had locked 
the car doors. Just as the PINOP was driving away, the defendant has reached through 
the passenger … window of the PINOP‟s vehicle, unlocked the door and tried to jump 
into the car. Both the PINOP and the defendant have reported this incident to the police. 
On [date] the defendant has contacted the PINOP by phone, the defendant has said to 
the PINOP words to the effect of „Stop your bitterness‟. The PINOP has hung up the 
phone. The defendant has then proceeded to phone the PINOP several more times. The 
PINOP fears further harassment and interference by the defendant.
781
 
This complaint was lodged at the same time that the woman sought a variation to 
her existing ADVO to place an exclusion zone around her new residence as a 
result of alleged stalking by her former husband. The woman‟s original 
complaint alleged a history of violence including physical violence, harassment, 
verbal and emotional abuse, as well as stating that „her husband attempts to 
control her and since separating he is becoming more and more angry towards 
her.‟ Thus there are differences revealed in the duration and nature of the 
violence/abuse alleged by the man and the woman in these two cases; the 
woman‟s complaint evidences a sustained pattern of behaviour that has been 
intensified with separation. In the end the man withdrew his cross application 
while, at the same time, consenting to the variation sought by his former spouse.  
The man‟s cross complaint in CourtC-3 provides another example: 
The complainant and his family a daughter and son are very fearful of the defendant, it 
is alleged that she is harassing family members including the boyfriend of the daughter. 
The son has been harassed at school and is finding same very disturbing. The defendant 
has been making telephone calls to ascertain the telephone number of the boyfriend of 
the complainant‟s daughter. The family only wishes to live in a peaceful environment. 
This private complaint was made approximately two weeks after the police 
applied for a TIO on behalf of the woman. In contrast, the woman‟s complaint 
                                                          
780 See discussion of this case and its resolution in Chapter 9. 
781 Court C-29. The chamber magistrate noted on this complaint that it was a „***CROSS APPLICATION***‟. 
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details coercive threats („If you don‟t come back to me I will bash you‟), 
attending her new residence (this was particularly threatening as she had sought 
to keep her address unknown), and specific fears for her ongoing safety. Both of 
these applications were eventually withdrawn. Thus despite substantive 
differences in the experience of violence/abuse alleged in the two complaints, the 
cross application proved an effective tool to generate the mutual outcome of 
withdrawal. The use of a cross application as a bargaining or negotiation tool is 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
In some cases the complaint text is used as an opportunity to refute the 
allegations contained in the woman‟s originating complaint. For example 
CourtA-10 reads: 
Since accident in 2000 the complainant has had a number of operations which prevent 
him from working. Defendant began to constantly demand money from the complainant 
which he no longer had … Defendant does not have parenting skills and complainant 
has had to take responsibility for the child despite his injuries. Defendant has left the 
marital home twice leaving the baby in the complainant‟s care. The parties had daily 
arguments about her treatment of the child, particularly food abuse and hygiene abuse 
such as when she feeds the child food she has been told not to give him. 
On [date] the parties argued about issues including the feeding of the child. The 
complainant threw a stool at the table and it bounced and hit the defendant. 
Complainant denies intending to assault the defendant. Complainant finds the behaviour 
of the defendant to be harassing. Defendant left the premises on [date] and has not 
returned except to visit the child. The complainant is not aware of the whereabouts of 
the defendant other than when she visits the complainant and their son. The complainant 
seeks orders restricting defendant‟s behaviour towards himself and son. 
This private complaint was made a week after the man was served with a police 
ADVO to protect his wife. In contrast the woman‟s complaint alleged that she 
had previously separated from her husband, that he had assaulted her in the past,, 
verbally abused her, struck her with a stool, punched her, held her head against a 
glass window, and pushed her to the floor. The woman did not attend court for 
her ADVO, and was not served with the cross complaint; in the end the man 
withdrew his complaint (resulting in mutual withdrawal/dismissal). 
In a similar vein the male second applicant in CourtC-25 alleged: 
On [date] the …PINOP informed the defendant that he had cancelled her mobile phone 
account. The defendant has then tipped a glass of juice over the PINOP‟s head and back 
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and said words to the effect of „Fuck you, as if it‟s going to worry me‟. The PINOP fears 
further violence and harassment.
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These allegations appear to centre on actions initiated in direct response to the 
man‟s statement and seem more like angry/retaliatory actions than actions 
intended to control or instil fear. In contrast, the woman‟s complaint alleged a 
history of violence (the police had attended the residence in the past), verbal 
abuse, a threat to kill her made via their teenage daughter, threats to harm her and 
a coercive threat because she had called the police: „this is the second time you 
have called the cops on me you‟ll pay this time you wont get away with it, I‟ll get 
you…‟. 
Both complainants were granted IOs for the periods of adjournment and the 
applications ultimately resulted in mutual orders made by consent without 
admissions. Thus suggesting equivalence in the use of violence/abuse not 
supported by a close examination of the complaint narratives. 
B. Complaints that mix questionable acts with acts that could 
ground an ADVO 
A small number of complaints alleged questionable acts, as well as 
acts/behaviour that could ground the making of an ADVO. However, the tone 
and context of the complaints raise questions about the acts of violence 
themselves and whether they should be seen through the lens of „domestic 
violence‟ rather than as an act of violence, an unfortunate act or even a „mere‟ 
hurtful act. 
One example is provided by the male second applicant in Court B-11:  
…During September 2002 the defendant attended to collect the children after a contact 
visit by the complainant. The defendant said while at the property „Quick kids here‟s our 
chance, let‟s run did [sic] over‟. This was clearly heard by the children, my partner and 
some nearby neighbours. The behaviour of the defendant creating a fear in the 
complainant. 
Further, the defendant is continually making false comment about the complainant and 
the complainant is harassed by the behaviour of the defendant. During the parties (sic) 
relationship the defendant punched the complainant to his chest and the parties at the 
time were arguing. 
                                                          
782 The chamber magistrate noted on this complaint that it was a „***CROSS APPLICATION***‟. 
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While the complaint alleges a threat and an act of physical violence, questions 
are raised concerning the suggestion of „false comment‟. In contrast the woman‟s 
originating complaint made by the police stated: 
The defendant assaulted the complainant on [date] by pushing her against a wall, 
pinned her arms to the wall, then punched her to the right bicep, twisted her right arm, 
raised his fist as if to hit her again. Threats of police complaint caused the defendant to 
stop any further assault. 
After four appearances at court these cases were resolved via mutual withdrawal 
with undertakings. Thus despite differences in the experience of violence/abuse 
neither party has the protection of an ADVO. 
In another case, a man made a private complaint alleging stalking behaviour, but 
the additional matters alleged in the complaint raise questions about whether this 
complaint could ground an ADVO: 
The complainant is subjected to a restraining order at the inst (sic) of the defendant … 
Both the parties have previously frequented the …Club at [suburb]. Saturday night [date 
and time] the complainant was in the company of persons other than the defendant then 
at the front of the club. 
The defendant uninvited approached the complainant‟s group and the defendant 
immediately sat at the table with the group of persons then including the complainant. 
The defendant was in close proximity to the complainant and the defendant was telling 
persons at the table incidents that occurred between herself and the complainant. 
The complainant finished his drink. 
The complainant then immediately left the club in fear of the action/s by the defendant. 
The action/s of the defendant were contrary to those of the PINOP who have obtained 
restraining orders. 
The complainant returning home phoned for the assistance of the police in this matter 
and the police indicated to approach the court. 
Since the separation: The defendant has been sighted driving slowly past the home of 
the complainant. The defendant has been stalking the complainant.
783
 
The woman‟s complaint alleged that the man had attempted to break into her 
house and in so doing had damaged her door and smashed the front window. The 
woman‟s ADVO was finalised by consent 20 days prior to the man‟s cross 
application. The man withdrew his cross application on the first day at court on 
the basis of the woman making an undertaking. 
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The two female second complainants in this category stand in contrast to the 
male complainants outlined above. For example the complaint for the woman in 
CourtB-14 reads: 
Prior ADVO proceedings against the defendant at [Local Court] and order made on 
[date]. Further: Family Law proceedings at [Local Court, file number]. The complainant 
has been seeking to live separate and apart from the defendant. The defendant contrary 
to the wishes of the complainant remains in the Family home. The defendant is a 
continual (sic) obstructionist towards the complainant. The defendant is continually 
arguing with the complainant. Most of the time the defendant is hitting the complainant. 
The complainant is harassed by the talk, talk, talk, of the defendant husband. 
This private complaint was lodged by the woman four days after being served 
with the application made by the police on behalf of her former husband. The 
way in which the chamber magistrate drafted this complaint appears trivialising 
(this is particularly evidenced in the reference to „talk, talk, talk‟). I would 
suggest that more might have been evident from this woman‟s experience if the 
chamber magistrate asked the woman what she meant by „most of the 
time…hitting‟ her, and what she meant by „obstructionist‟. As I have discussed in 
terms of the poor quality of the drafting of complaints, this complaint appears to 
evidence an almost verbatim rendering of the woman‟s words in the final 
sentence.
784
 The man‟s originating complaint contains reference to having a 
previous ADVO against him, and alleged that his former wife had pushed and 
punched him. The parties in this cross application were separated under the one 
roof. These cases resulted in mutual orders on the first appearance at court. 
In the second case, the woman had lodged a cross application approximately two 
weeks after the police had applied for an ADVO on behalf of her former 
spouse.
785
 In this case the man (20 years her senior) had sponsored her 
immigration to Australia as his spouse. The man‟s complaint alleged events 
linked to a property dispute. He stated that when the parties were discussing the 
property division the woman became angry and threw a glass of water at him 
which „narrowly missed [his] head‟ and that she then „had her fists clenched and 
was saying “I want to kill him”‟. In contrast the woman‟s private complaint 
alleged very little that could be characterised as abuse or violence, although there 
is a suggestion of financial abuse (failure to pay child support and the 
                                                          
784 See Chapter 4. 
785 CourtC-20. 
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termination of the lease where she currently resides with the child of the 
relationship, in this way she alleged that her former spouse was „wilfully 
orchestrating the finances so that the victim will be forced to live below the 
poverty [line]‟). These cases were contested and after the hearing the magistrate 
dismissed both applications. The transcript of this hearing
786
 revealed that there 
may have been more substance to the woman‟s complaint (although these were 
not drawn out by her solicitor), as the woman had been granted permanent 
residency on the basis of the domestic violence
787
 before the ADVO proceedings. 
While the magistrate refused to grant either ADVO he noted that the man has 
„some sort of dominance over‟ the woman. 
C. Complaints centring on the woman’s use of her ADVO 
A common theme in the interview and court file samples was the suggestion by 
some men that their need for „protection‟ arose due to the woman‟s alleged 
misuse of her ADVO. That is, the male second applicants alleged that the woman 
had threatened to report him for a breach of her ADVO or had done so, or that 
she had engaged in behaviour that provoked him to breach the ADVO. This 
misuse of the ADVO was variously characterised as harassing, threatening or 
intimidating. Only male second applicants made allegations of this kind; no 
woman made an allegation of this kind. This category of complaint which centres 
on women‟s use of the law, or the perceived „victimisation‟ of men that might 
result from the exposure of his behaviour, has been documented in other research 
that has sought to compare men‟s and women‟s experience of domestic 
violence,788 and in research on the arguments variously articulated by fathers‟ 
rights groups frequently connected to the spectre of false allegations.
789
 
                                                          
786 Appended to the court file. 
787 Migration Regulation 1994 (Cth), Division 1.5 provides that a person who is a victim of family violence may claim 
exemption from the two-year duration of a sponsored spousal relationship to gain permanent residency. Evidence is 
required, such as a criminal conviction, a judicially determined protection order (there are also provisions were the 
protection order was not so determined, eg resolved via mutual undertakings) and the provision of statutory declarations 
from „competent people‟ (eg a doctor, psychologist, nurse, social worker, or a manager of a women‟s refuge or 
counselling service specialising in family violence).  
788 Bagshaw & Chung, above n137 at 10. 
789 Miranda Kaye & Julia Tolmie, „Fathers‟ Rights Groups in Australia and their Engagement with Issues in Family Law‟ 
(1998) 12 Australian Journal of Family Law 1 at 35-37. 
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Three of the women interviewed were subject to a cross complaint of this 
nature.
790
 In all three cases the cross application was made at the same time that 
the man was charged with contravening the woman‟s ADVO.  
The complaint against Frances read: 
…The Defendant has been conducting herself in a manner that is intimidating and 
harassing towards the complainant. The defendant currently has an ADVO in force 
against the complainant. The defendant is deliberately difficult when dealing with issues 
regarding the children of the marriage. The defendant conducts her activities and 
manner with the sole intention of causing the complainant to feel emotionally and 
mentally abused. The defendant deliberately declines to inform the complainant of 
genuine issues regarding the children which in turn encourages the complainant to 
make contact which is in contravention of the orders. …The defendant continues to 
pursue enforcement of the ADVO with … actions that are either brought on by 
incitement, emotion and provocation as well as vexatious allegations. The complainant 
generally believes that the defendant‟s actions are malicious and the complainant seeks 
an order for release. 
Frances‟s former husband, represented by a barrister, sought to have his cross 
application listed at the same time as the contravene charge (his third contravene 
charge), which concerned the making of harassing phone calls. Frances explained 
that she saw this as trying to „mix up‟ the criminal charge with the cross 
application by suggesting that the charge was only prosecuted because of her 
own malicious and vexatious enforcement of her ADVO.
791
 It‟s purpose then was 
„to put the blame on me for basically anything he was going to do in the future, 
by saying this has provoked me‟.792 
Similarly Louise explained that the purpose of the cross application against her 
was to say that „I was using my AVO as a threat towards him – that‟s what he 
was saying.‟ Louise read the full text of her former spouse‟s complaint in the 
interview, at the same time she provided commentary (reproduced on the right-
hand side of the page in plain text) on his allegations:  
 Yep well – um they‟re all a little bit ridiculous but anyway. 
The [date] um the complainant rang the defendant about the 
children because the defendant was going to Darwin for a holiday. 
During the phone call the defendant‟s mother was in the 
background saying „hang up, call the police, have him charged, 
 
                                                          
790 Frances, Lillian and Louise. 
791 By this time Frances‟s former husband had been charged with four breaches of her ADVO.  
792 Frances‟s former husband was however successful in obtaining an IO ex parte on the basis of this complaint. See 
Chapter 9. 
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he‟s a stalker‟. 
 Um that didn‟t – that didn‟t happen at all um „cause I don‟t – I don‟t ever 
contact him and my mother hasn‟t spoken to him for 18 months. I just 
said „oh yeah‟ to him. 
Um [date] the defendant asked the – the complainant to change 
contact weekends. The complainant said „no‟. The defendant said 
„I will call the police if you don‟t swap weekends with me‟. At 
about that time the defendant contacted the police and alleged that 
the complainant had called her a fucking something. At the time 
the complainant had [a]witness to the alleged event but nothing 
was actually said. 
 
 …He was swearing at me so I rang the police and said I shouldn‟t have to 
put up with his abuse, calling me you know different names and the police 
ended up contacting him and that‟s why – I think that‟s why he applied 
for this AVO because he thought he was going to be in trouble about 
collecting the kids and abusing me so he just went one better. Yeah. … 
[date], the defendant rang the complainant at 5 o‟clock. She asked 
the complainant to bring the girls home immediately or she would 
notify the police and have the complainant charged. … in the same 
conversation the defendant said I have an AVO against you and if 
you don‟t do as I say you will be charged or go to gaol. 
 
 Um he kept the children for an extra day and all I did was ring him and 
say „could you please send the girls home‟. Ah I didn‟t say anything about 
– about the police and that he‟d go to gaol or anything like that. 
Um [date] the parties saw that [name of child] was upset. The 
defendant told the child „your daddy is bad and he‟s going to 
gaol‟. The [date] the defendant has arranged for a third party to 
be personally present at contact handovers and there have been 
fewer incidents since the complaint was taken out. Um the 
complainant has been threatened by the defendant who has on 
many occasions indicated a willingness to make a false allegation 
to the police and have the complainant charged. The police have 
already been contacted by the defendant in relation to an alleged 
breach although the police have apparently been satisfied that the 
allegation was false and no action has been taken … Recently the 
defendant has said to the complainant that the police will believe 
me and not you because I already have an AVO against you. The 
complainant fears further harassment and threats from the 
defendant unless an apprehended violence order is made on 
mutual terms for his protection. 
 
 So everything that I've read there is totally made up from him (laughter) 
basically. Um the part about the police um being satisfied that my 
complaint … wasn‟t a breach and there was no action taken. … he put 
that in there … because the police wanted to interview him and he 
refused … so the police hadn‟t even interviewed him about my 
complaint. 
 
These cross complaints by and large demonstrated no allegations that could 
support the making of an ADVO. As Louise explained „as far as I'm 
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concerned…what I read out to you there‟s nothing in that that would say that he 
was - [scared] of me‟. Similarly Lillian argued: 
It was like petty. There was nothing that I was being violent. He was just worried – he‟s 
more saying that I was provoking him to breach the AVO. In case he did anything wrong 
I was leading him on, I was making him do it and that‟s how it was. Ever anything went 
wrong it was always my fault. …So – that‟s the bottom line, answers it all. Because he 
doesn‟t state that I'm around his place or stalking or anything like that so he just really 
pinpoints things that he didn‟t think I could follow up …and… there was no grounds for 
that AVO. 
Four male second applicants in the court file sample also made complaints that 
alleged that the woman had misused her ADVO.
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CourtC-24, a private complaint lodged by a male second applicant at the same 
time that his former wife sought to extend her existing ADVO, provides an 
excellent illustration of this type of complaint. His complaint reads in full:  
The defendant has an AVO against this complainant, which she has sought to have 
extended for 2 years. 
The Victim states that the defendant has been provoking the victim in breaches of the 
order, and that the provocation is of itself, harassment. 
The victim is involved in coaching junior soccer. The defendant has approached 
members of the soccer committee and made derogatory comments to the committee 
about the victim. She advised them that she has an AVO against him, and that he should 
not be involved in soccer training. 
About 3 weeks ago, the victim was at a soccer game with his son, and the defendant 
attended and took photographs. The victim was embarrassed and intimidated by the 
photo taking. 
The victim also believes that the defendant has been make (sic) extremely derogatory 
comments to other people, such as that the victim is a wife basher. 
The victim fears that if an order is not made, the defendant will continue to provoke him, 
and continue to harass and intimidate him. 
In contrast, while there were no reasons provided for the woman‟s application to 
extend her ADVO, her original complaint detailed a history of domestic 
violence, including physical assaults, verbal abuse and threats to kill. The 
physical violence included reference to a specific incident: „on [date] involved 
the defendant physically assaulting the PINOP by grabbing her around the 
throat and bashing her head against a vehicle‟. There appears then to be a 
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substantive difference in the types of matters that the woman and her former 
husband complained about in their respective applications. The woman‟s 
application clearly detailed a history of domestic violence including a range of 
acts/behaviours perpetrated against her; in contradistinction the man‟s complaint 
centred on her actions informing people that there was an ADVO in force against 
him. On the final day at court both applications were withdrawn. 
CourtB-10 provides another example: 
The defendant currently has an AVO out on the applicant. The defendant is harassing 
the applicant by turning up at his place of work and at his home. The defendant 
continues to call the applicant leaving text messages and making calls to his place of 
work. The defendant harasses the applicant by taking his car and leaving hers in place 
of his and giving keys to work colleagues to give to the applicant. The defendant has 
AVO orders not to contact the applicant (sic) and her continuous calls are intimidating 
the applicant. The applicant does not want the defendant to force him [into] breaching 
an AVO and wants to restrict her from contacting him. 
The man had consented to the woman‟s ADVO without admissions one week 
before he lodged this cross application. The woman‟s complaint detailed threats 
and property damage. By the time the man had lodged his cross application he 
had been charged with three offences of breaching the woman‟s ADVO. For two 
of these offences he was found guilty (the other was deemed a „coincidence‟).794 
On the second appearance the man withdrew his cross application. 
In CourtC-13 the man lodged a cross application three days after the woman‟s 
ADVO first appeared at court. The man‟s cross complaint reads as follows: 
The defendant and the victim are married and the relationship was terminated on [date] 
after an altercation, where the victim was charged with an assault, and a telephone 
interim order obtain (sic)…. 
The victim has left the former matrimonial home. During the course of the relationship 
there was animosity between the parties. The defendant would regularly tell the victim 
to get out of the house, which is now solely the victims [sic] and for which the victim 
made financial contributions. 
At the time the interim order was made the victim sought advice from the police as to 
what happens if the defendant contacts him. He was advised to hang up. Since the 
interim order was made the victim has received five telephone calls, and to avoid the 
possibility of an allegation of breach of the AVO, the [victim] has not spoken to the 
defendant. 
                                                          
794 This man‟s antecedents, appended to the court file, indicated that he had been charged with, but found not guilty of, 
three previous contravene ADVO offences.  
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All five telephone calls were to the victim‟s place of business. He has had to take his 
phone off the hook, which interferes with his business. 
On about [date], the defendant wrote to the victim inviting him to the home to have 
contact with the child. The victim has declined such invitation, even though he wishes to 
see his son. 
The victim fears that the defendant is trying to provoke the victim into breaching the 
order. 
It is worth noting that the woman‟s IO did not prevent the man having contact 
with her. The woman‟s complaint details the „altercation‟ referred to in the man‟s 
complaint, which involved a series of connected acts during which the man threw 
cushions and fruit at the woman, spilt laundry powder over her head, „forced her 
head onto the stove top‟, „pushed her over the sink holding her around the neck 
and preventing her from breathing‟, and punched her in the face. On the first 
occasion when both matters were listed at court together IOs were made in both 
cases, and on the next occasion both were withdrawn. 
What is particularly disturbing about this category is the extent to which a small 
number of the professionals interviewed also considered that women misuse their 
ADVOs and provoke breaches of their order.
795
 Similar views were expressed by 
some police in the study conducted by Susan Miller in the USA, who stated that 
protection orders were used by some women as a mechanism to exact „revenge‟ 
or as a „payback‟.796  
Three of the police interviewed in the current study expressed some displeasure 
that they were unable to charge women with „aiding and abetting‟ a breach of an 
ADVO.
797
 PP3 perhaps conveyed the strongest view in this regard: 
 [W]hen police investigate domestic violence they tend to investigate it with a gender 
bias in my view. Ah domestic violence victims are more often than not female, but um 
females have a particular way to „torment‟ domestic violence perpetrators, I use 
inverted commas, and by that I'm saying they usually establish …[an ADVO] and then 
use the order to control the perpetrator so the perpetrator once the order is made 
against him, he'll sometimes expose himself to … permanent control, if you like, for the 
duration of the order …. Representations are often made by defence solicitors to 
myself, as I'm the person who actually deals with the determination of representations, 
in relation to how many domestic violence victims aid and abet breaches of domestic 
violence orders. 
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797 See DVLO2, DVLO4, and PP3. 
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….But aiding and abetting breaching domestic violence orders is a common event and 
it's on that basis that I say that a perpetrator can also be a victim. I guess the short 
answer, or the short perception to that first answer that I gave would be perhaps 
advocating or justifying domestic violence to people who are tormented. … I'm talking 
about matters where, when an order is in existence, how it's used against the 
perpetrator. 
Do people get charged for aid and abet? 
No…To my disappointment. 
Two DVLOs suggested that perhaps mutual orders could be a way to circumvent 
the prohibition on charging complaints with aiding and abetting a breach; where 
mutual orders bind both parties.
798
  
In a similar way one solicitor mentioned that he had advised a man to make a 
cross application „as the woman was putting him in a position where he was 
continually in breach of the order and … I felt that it was probably the only 
way…to try to control the situation so that he wouldn‟t be in breach of his 
order‟.799 When asked why he didn‟t advise the man to seek a variation or 
revocation of the women‟s ADVO the solicitor responded: 
„Cause I don‟t think … these parties …have the capacity to … even comply with modified 
orders or perhaps it‟s in – as I said before it might be better in some cases if they… just 
have no contact with one another.  
The concern with women reconciling with their former partners, or „inviting 
them back in‟ was a theme in a number of the interviews, and as is demonstrated 
in the quote above, was linked by some professionals with the notion that „they 
are both as bad as each other‟ or that some people need to be „kept away from 
each other‟. This is discussed further in Chapter 9. 
This negative perception of women initiating contact with their former violent 
partners has been reflected in other studies exploring police views of civil 
protection orders.
800
 In a recent Scottish study, Clare Connelly and Kate 
Cavanagh noted that this view attributes responsibility for the act of violence 
(and the breach of the order) to the victim rather than the offender.
801
 The failure 
to identify what is the „breach‟ and instead blaming the victim for initiating 
                                                          
798 DVLO2 and DVLO4. 
799 SOL5. 
800 See Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟, above n21 at 68-69; and Connelly & Cavanagh, above n332 at 280.  
801 Connelly & Cavanagh, above n332 at 280. 
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contact (as if that was the breach) is clear from the following comment made by 
DVLO4: 
I think they should because in, like I said in the very slimmest of slim [cross applications 
should continue to be available], there is a need for it and that we do get some victims 
that will want defendants to contact them and do all these things but as soon as they end 
up in a slight argument or whatever they'll call and report the breach of AVO to police 
and I don't think it's fair that they are able to use that system either, because there are a 
few victims that do do things like that. 
3. The lengthy ‘wounded’ complaint narrative 
There were eight private complaints lodged by men from the court file sample 
that fit a different profile (one first applicant and seven second applicants).
802
 In 
these cases the man‟s complaint consisted of a lengthy, often handwritten, 
complaint appended to the summons notice. I have termed these „wounded‟ 
complaint narratives. No female applicant made a complaint of this kind. These 
lengthy complaints are characterised by a tone that seeks to position the man as 
the victim, either because he was „wounded‟ by the termination of the 
relationship or because he has been pursuing his „rights‟ to contact his children. 
These complaints frequently provided a direct response to the allegations raised 
in the woman‟s complaint. 
CourtC-15 provides an interesting example here, as not only is the man‟s letter 
appended in full, but contrary to usual practice it was handed up in court during 
the first appearance of the woman‟s ADVO application and accepted as a 
complaint. While this complaint raises verbal abuse, it can be distinguished from 
other complaints making the same allegation due to the context and tone of the 
narrative. This complaint bears many similarities to those discussed earlier that 
set out few allegations that could ground and ADVO. It reads in full: 
Your worship, 
In answer to [name of W] allegations of threats and violence as we already heard there 
is no history of physical violence between [name of W] and myself over the past eight 
years. In answer to the allegations of trying to run her down and stalking threats at her 
salon, was over exaggerated. 
I was evicted from her premises after 7 ½ years, at that time I was very confused as to 
why I was not good enough anymore after this short period of 7 ½ months [name of W] 
and I returned to our relationship. In this two weeks [name of W] and I tried to work out 
                                                          
802 CourtB-8, CourtB-21, CourtC-7, CourtC-8, CourtC-15, CourtC-18, CourtC-21 and CourtC-28.  
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what was happening to our love, I felt she no longer wanted, needed or loved me 
anymore which was a very difficult thing for myself to accept or understand. 
In answer to our SMS messages of threats, [name of W] on a number of occasions used 
her mobile phone SMS messages to myself regarding some obscenities, which are the 
following: 
(1) on the 28th of July 2002 at approximately 11.37 am she SMSed me this message 
„You stupid man, another threat on my kids the police will see this SMS 
message you fool‟. All my SMS to this response was how are the kids? 
(2) On the 26th of July 2002 at 11.45am I received „you are nothing but f***ing 
shit. You know that. How am I supposed to love shit like that‟ 
(3) On the 27th of July 2002 at 12.25am I received „to me it was worth everything I 
wouldn‟t have put up with all your problems for so long but that doesn‟t not 
mean you didn‟t love me cause I never doubted that.‟ 
Just three short messages that I do not have dates for your worship that I received: 
(1) „Go and pick up your clothes they are outside in garbage bags, I feel sorry that 
you didn‟t believe in how much I truly loved you, you cannot be trusted 
anymore.‟ 
(2) „I have to force myself to sop loving you it is going to hurt‟ 
(3) „I‟m so sorry I was so desperate to make you understand I didn‟t want to put 
this AVO on you, maybe I was gullible I‟m sorry please apologise to [name] 
and [name]‟ [?children‟s names] 
Now in closing you worship I believe [name of W] is hurting and is angry just as much 
as myself or maybe more, with this anger she has attempted to put an AVO on myself on 
previous occasion due to hearsay threats of a gun and shooting her and her daughter. If 
your worship would be so kind as to ask [W name] does she believe this man „me‟ was 
not in love with her and would do almost anything for her. Now I‟m left standing here 
defending myself due to two people wanting and needing so many different things. 
Yours sincerely… 
In contrast, the police complaint on behalf of the woman alleged numerous 
threats to „get her‟, that he was „definitely not going to go away‟ saying things 
such as „I know where you are. I am watching you‟. She alleged that he had 
attended her workplace, and that there was a history of domestic violence 
evidenced in previous ADVOs to protect her. Both cases were adjourned with 
mutual IOs and in the end the man consented to the woman‟s ADVO being made 
against him for six months and withdrew his application. 
The devices used in this man‟s complaint narrative bear similarities to research 
by Kate Cavanagh and colleagues on the „remedial work‟ undertaken by violent 
men to explain their use of violence.
803
 Cavanagh and colleagues employ the 
                                                          
803 Cavanagh et al, above n39. 
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concept of „remedial work‟ devised by Erving Goffman,804 to explore the 
accounts of violent men. Goffman identified three devices in „remedial work‟ 
that serve to change what would otherwise be an offensive act into one that is 
more socially acceptable: accounts (involving the tactics of denial, blame, 
minimisation and reduced competence), apology and requests (here Cavanagh 
and colleagues extend Goffman‟s work by suggesting that for violent men it is 
not so much requests as demands).
805
 Cavanagh and colleagues argue that violent 
men „use these exculpatory and expiatory discourses… to neutralise and 
eradicate women‟s experiences of abuse‟.806  
In the complaint quoted above we see attempts to minimise („the allegations of 
trying to run her down and stalking threats at her salon, was over exaggerated‟); 
blame (the reference to the woman‟s SMS messages to him involving verbal 
abuse, threats, and the concluding paragraph which implicates both parties in the 
anger and hurt of the end of the relationship); denial („there is no history of 
physical violence between [name of woman] and myself over the past eight 
years‟); and reduced competence (his references to the end of the relationship, „I 
was very confused as to why I was not good enough anymore‟). A strong theme 
in this complaint is „love‟, romance and loss presented as an explanation for the 
man‟s actions as well as his former partner‟s.807 There is nothing about fear 
(other than the loss of the relationship), and thus no apparent legal grounds for an 
ADVO. 
Similarly the complaint narrative for the man in CourtC-8 was devoted to 
detailing his version of events, which like the case described above, involved 
„remedial work‟, such as: 
 denials: „I am not an aggressive person‟, „[I] never intentionally 
nudged…no[r] …tried to trip her [over]‟; 
 blame: „Furthermore, I say that she is an aggressive angry person, 
particularly at the moment. On one occasion, when I was in our rather 
                                                          
804 Erving Goffman, Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order (1971). 
805 Cavanagh et al, above n39 at 699, 710. 
806 Ibid at 712. 
807 See also CourtC-18 (Private M 2nd) which exudes a strong theme of „love‟ and „thwarted‟ attempts to resurrect the 
relationship. 
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narrow kitchen entrance, she did not wait for me to leave but barged past, 
knocking me off balance‟; 
 minimalisation: „The incidents [all of which he denied]…have been very 
isolated‟; and  
 different accounts of events: the woman alleged that her former husband 
waved a bread and butter knife under her throat and then proceeded to spread 
butter on her cheeks, the man counters that the „PINOP walked right up to 
the butter knife in a confrontationalist way and stood glaring at me. I moved 
the butter knife away and in the process the butter accidentally landed on 
PINOP‟s cheek. I certainly and emphatically deny smearing butter on both 
her cheeks‟.  
In this case the parties had been married for 14 years and were now separated 
under the one roof. The woman‟s complaint alleges that he physically nudged 
her, tripped her over, put his fist to her face and said „I would just love to knock 
you out‟, that he would purposefully turn on the hot water when she was in the 
shower, and threatened to throw her things on the balcony. She stated in her 
complaint that she found this behaviour „intimidating and has now become 
frightened‟. In the end both complaints were withdrawn. 
CourtB-21 presents a different example of a „wounded complaint‟, where the 
man attempts to position himself as the victim. In this complaint the man 
presents himself as calm and reasonable in the face of the woman‟s response 
which is depicted as hysterical, irrational and aggressive. This type of 
comparative depiction is also evidenced in three other complaints, and in one of 
the interviews.
808
 This man‟s complaint reads: 
On Sunday [date], at the conclusion of a contact period, I was at home with the children 
awaiting the defendant‟s arrival to pick them up. At 5.56pm I received an abrupt phone 
call in which the defendant stated „where the f… are you‟. I replied „here…at home with 
the kids waiting for you, where‟d you think I‟d be‟. The defendant then stated „you‟d 
better get em here right now‟ [name of park]. I then replied „no way, I told you days ago 
to pick them up here‟. The defendant then stated „you bastard, I‟m coming around now‟. 
At 6.07pm I heard the defendant thump the screen door repeatedly. I opened the door 
and the defendant immediately barged into the house in full view of the children, 
slapped me across the face and shouted, „you f…ing asshole‟. The defendant then 
                                                          
808 CourtC-18, CourtC-21; Court C-28; and Megan. 
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grabbed the bag in which the children‟s clothing etc were kept and stated „I have a list 
of everything I gave you! Is everything here?‟ I hesitated and then replied „I did pay for 
those clothes‟; the defendant then stated to the children „come on let‟s get out of here, 
do you want your bikes‟ implying to me that I should retrieve there (sic) bikes from the 
backyard. The defendant then stormed down the driveway with the children to a white 
Toyota Camry in which the defendant‟s father and brother were waiting. After putting 
the children in the back seat, the defendant then returned again to the front door and 
attempted to take a small potted tree, I struggled with the defendant grabbing the rim of 
the pot with both hands returning it to the ground. The defendant then stated „it‟s not 
your f…ing tree‟. I then replied „get off the property NOW, you‟re trespassing‟, the 
defendant then pushed me back and stated „it‟s my f…ing house‟, the defendant then 
returned to the car swearing and cursing under her breath. The defendant sat in the 
back seat next to the passenger side window beside the children; and as the car drove 
away, stuck her middle finger up and screamed out „you f…ing asshole‟. I yelled in reply 
„stop treating me like shit then‟. 
The defendant‟s brother [name], and father [name] have accompanied her at contact 
changeover in a deliberate attempt to intimidate and cause unease. The changeover 
locations demanded by the defendant have often been parks or reserves which, being 
out-of-the-way and out of public view late in the afternoon, heightens the risk of me 
falling victim to potential harassment and/or assault by them. 
…. 
I fear a repeat of the assault of [outlined above], which, both being stressful and 
intolerable to myself, is also extremely distressing and frightening for the children to 
witness and may effect the children‟s long-term emotional well-being. 
…. 
The defendant has entered the property [M‟s home] on many occasions since the [date 
of separation], and has taken property such as cash, cooking utensils, books and other 
personal effects. I am concerned that on a future occasion, the defendant and other third 
parties may confront me at my place of residence and I fear such a confrontation. 
This complaint clearly alleges verbal abuse and physical violence, however the 
tone of the complaint and the way in which the man seeks to cast supervised 
changeover as an intimidating scenario, combines to raise questions about the 
way in which acts are sought to be ascribed as violent. In particular the picture 
that he paints of supervised changeover stands in marked contrast to the reasons 
why the mother may have sought to have changeover take place in a neutral 
location accompanied by family members (all measures that are ostensibly 
designed to ensure her safety and that of her children). In addition the allegation 
about the woman swearing could in turn be read as a (legitimately) angry 
response at the delayed return of the children. In contrast the woman‟s complaint 
alleges a history of violence, including threats to kill her if she left the marriage, 
multiple phone calls, verbal abuse and threats including: „Fuckin bitch, fuckin 
slut – I am going to fuck with your life for 13 years and you‟ll have 13 years of 
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hell‟. In the end the man consented to the woman‟s ADVO without admissions 
and withdrew his ADVO against her on the basis of undertakings. 
Similarly part of the complaint by CourtC-28, which is two pages in length, reads 
as follows: 
4…[discussion about contact with the children] 
Me: „While I am here, what is happening …for Father‟s Day? I have been trying for two 
weeks to get something organised…. 
[w]: „Yes, I was going to bring them over to your house for a couple of hours on Sunday 
morning‟ 
Me: „That is a lie because the only access you were going to give me was in the park 
from 9am to 1pm. I wish to pick them up Saturday afternoon after work and I will bring 
them back or you can pick them up Sunday afternoon.‟ 
[w]: „No fucking way are you going to have the kids in the house.‟ 
Me: „Why?‟ 
[w]: „Because I don‟t trust you in behaving yourself properly with the children.‟ 
Me: „Excuse me, there is a Family Law Court Order that says I‟m allowed to have the 
children.‟ 
5. [w] appeared angry and started saying 
[W]: „you‟re a fucking asshole. I‟m fucking sick of you. 
She went to slam the screen door. I grabbed the screen door with my right hand. 
Immediately, [w] lunged at my neck with her left hand and then with her right hand 
grabbed my left shoulder and started kicking me in the shins. She also tried to knee me 
in the groin. I tried to back away. 
Most of this complaint is concerned with what followed, including an alleged 
assault by the woman‟s father. The man eventually left the property, returned 
home and contacted the police. While waiting for the police the man consumed a 
considerable amount of alcohol. The police ultimately took action on behalf of 
the woman; they applied for an ADVO to protect her and charged the man with 
common assault. The man cross applied
809
 and, as a private informant, charged 
the woman and her father with common assault. 
In comparison the woman‟s complaint detailed previous contact with the police 
although no action resulted, coercive threats, and ongoing fear: 
The defendant has spat in the face of the complainant on two separate occasions on the 
exchange of children re: contact by the father. 
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The defendant during the relationship was violent towards the complainant – and 
harassment and phone calls from the defendant, since separation. 
The defendant has when returning the children has thrown the children‟s scooters. The 
defendant at the time being verbally abusive, saying: „You‟re sick for leaving me‟. 
The defendant had two weeks contact with the children during the Christmas School 
holidays and when the complainant phoned the defendant re the children the defendant 
was yelling on the phone: „Fuckin bitch, fuckin slut – I am going to fuck with your life 
for 13 years and you‟ll have 13 years of hell‟. 
Prior to the separation the defendant threatened: I (sic) you ever leave me I‟ll kill you 
and the defendant has threatened the children of the parties. 
The complainant has sought refuge at the home of her parents. In fear of the defendant 
the complainant is continually shadowed by another family member when dealing with 
the defendant. The complainant has recently obtained her independent accommodation. 
Matters next at the Family Court on [date]– court orders have required the complainant 
to inform the defendant of her address and her home phone number (to enable him to 
contact the children). 
While these cases were resolved by the man consenting to the woman‟s ADVO 
without admissions, and withdrawing his ADVO application on the basis of 
undertakings, it took six court appearances. Again the contrast between the 
violence/abuse experienced is clear with the man alleged to have engaged in 
behaviours that were long-standing, designed to coerce and control, and the 
woman alleged to have engaged in behaviour that was better described as hurtful, 
unfortunate and simply angry. 
4. Summary 
This chapter has explored the „paired‟ narrative of cross applications. This 
qualitative analysis revealed three areas of difference between the complaints 
lodged by men and women. 
First men, primarily second applicants, were more likely to be charged with 
criminal offences at the same time that the ADVO applications were before the 
court. Notably many of these charges concerned contravene ADVO offences. 
This suggests both a level of seriousness attached to these men‟s behaviour, at 
least to attract the attention of the police, and that these men were engaged in a 
repetitive form of behaviour. 
Second, male second applicants were more likely to make complaints that failed 
to satisfy the legislative requirements for granting an ADVO. In some cases men 
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sought to characterise hurtful or unfortunate acts as violence, in others they 
sought to ascribe the woman‟s enforcement of her ADVO as violence or 
harassment. In all cases the alleged act/behaviour failed to have any connection 
with the legislative requirement of fear. 
Third, only men relied on lengthy complaints that sought to position the man as 
the „wounded‟ applicant. Invariably these complaints had little connection to the 
legislative requirements for granting an ADVO (in terms of the nature of the 
acts/behaviour alleged and the generation of fear). Rather these complaints 
engaged in a range of „remedial‟ measures directed at denying, shifting blame, 
and minimising their own violence. 
Building on the picture that started to emerge from the quantitative data analysed 
in Chapter 6, the qualitative analysis in this chapter reinforces the suggestion that 
the complaints lodged by male second applicants are of a different nature to 
those lodged by women (first or second applicants) and male (first applicants). 
They are different in terms of the nature and quality of the violence/abuse 
alleged, and in terms of its impact (fear) and function (control). Fear and control 
were notably absent from the complaint narratives of male second applicants 
discussed in this section. While in some cases the matters were resolved with the 
woman obtaining an ADVO and the man withdrawing; this was not always the 
case. In other cases the man‟s cross complaint, regardless of its substance, was 
effective in achieving mutual results, frequently mutual withdrawal even when 
the woman‟s complaint contained serious allegations of domestic violence that 
revealed fear, repetition and control.  
While it is not suggested that all the complaints made by male second applicants 
fall within the frameworks discussed in this chapter, it is notable that very few 
women‟s complaints fall within these categories, nor did any complaints made by 
first applicants (men or women). This supports the contention that cross 
applications are commonly lodged for quite different reasons (reasons apart from 
securing protection). Chapter 9 explores the way in which cross applications are 
approached and resolved in the Local Court. As will be seen in that chapter, cross 
applications appear to be deployed primarily as a bargaining tool to secure 
withdrawal.
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8. Dual applications 
This chapter focuses on a special category of cross applications: dual 
applications. These are cross applications that were made on exactly the same 
date. Ten of the 78 cross applications gathered in the court file sample involved 
dual applications (12.8%).
810
 Eight of the dual applications were sought by the 
police
811
 and two were private applications lodged on the same date.
812
 This 
chapter focuses on police dual applications.
813
 
All of the police dual applications contained exactly the same complaint narrative 
for both parties,
814
 and tended to predominate at one court site which suggests a 
police practice in that area, at least by some police officers.
815
 However the fact 
that nearly all the professionals interviewed,
816
 had knowledge of, or experience 
with, police dual applications suggests that it occurs more widely than a single 
locale. At the same time the professionals interviewed, particularly the police, 
were of the view that such applications were uncommon and went against police 
policy which discourages dual applications.
817
 However, WDVCAS4 stated that 
she came across dual applications „quite frequently‟.  
Police dual applications raise many of the concerns evident in research on dual 
arrest under mandatory and pro-arrest policies in the USA,
818
 including the 
suggestion that the police have failed to examine wider contextual issues to 
                                                          
810 None of the women interviewed were involved in dual applications. 
811 CourtA-1A, CourtA-3, CourtA-6, CourtA-8, CourtA-13, CourtA-18, CourtC-16 and CourtC-30. 
812 CourtB-18 and CourtB-32A. 
813 It is unclear how private dual applications are generated; is it coincidence? Or does one party know that the other has 
attended court and does so on the same day? These questions are unable to be answered from the data available in this 
study. 
814 While the complaints for both parties contained the same text, this does not mean that the allegations were identical; 
some complaint narratives, while used for both parties, indicated that the male party and the female party engaged in 
different acts.  
815 Six of the eight police dual applications were identified at CourtA. Martin also noted a tendency for dual arrests to be 
confined to certain areas: above n685 at 153. See also Mary Finn & Pamela Bettis, „Punitive Action or Gentle Persuasion: 
Exploring Police Officers‟ Justifications for Using Dual Arrest in Domestic Violence Cases‟ (2006) 12 Violence Against 
Women 268 at 268. 
816 DVLO1, DVLO3, DVLO4, DVLO5, DVLO6 (5/6); MAG1, MAG2, MAG3, MAG4, MAG5 (5/5); PP1, PP2, PP3, 
PP5 (4/5); SOL1, SOL3, and SOL6 (3/5); and WDVCAS1, WDVCAS2, WDVCAS4, WDVCAS5 (4/5). However, 
WDVCAS3, DVLO2, PP4, SOL2 and SOL5 stated that they did not have any experience or contact with police dual 
applications. 
817 DVLO1, DVLO3, DVLO4, DVLO5, DVLO6, PP1, PP2, PP3. See NSW Police Service, „SOPS‟, above n398 at [4.10]. 
818 See Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48; Martin, above n685; Miller, „Paradox of Women Arrested‟, above n665; Feder & 
Henning, „A Comparison‟, above n685; Finn & Bettis, above n815 .Concern about the arrest of women for domestic 
violence, in dual and single situations, has been raised in NSW: see Redfern Legal Centre WDVCAS, „Submission: 
Domestic Violence Charges – Female Defendants‟, submission to the Ombudsman and NSW Police Service (2006), 
unpublished paper, copy on file with author; and Baker, above n312 at 31. 
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assess whether someone is a domestic violence perpetrator and who might need 
protection. Similarly, Anna Stewart, who identified a large number of police dual 
applications (22% of the cross applications in her study were dual applications) 
in her research on respondents to protection orders in Queensland, concluded that 
these are „presumably taken out when the police cannot, or will not, identify who 
is the victim and who is the perpetrator‟.819 
In this chapter I first detail the characteristics of dual applications gathered in the 
court file sample. This discussion is tentative and exploratory due to the small 
number of dual applications. Second I explore, through the interviews with 
police, the role and decision-making processes of the police when faced with 
both parties alleging that they are the „victim‟. Third I analyse two case studies in 
detail. These case studies were selected because additional material was available 
on the court files that shed a different light on the complaint narrative suggesting 
divergent experiences of domestic violence by the men and women involved. 
Finally I explore „primary‟ or „predominant‟ aggressor policies, implemented in 
many USA jurisdictions, as one method to assist police in cases where both 
parties are making allegations against each other.  
1. The nature of dual applications 
A. Limited narrative in dual applications 
The quality of complaint narratives in police dual applications was even more 
inadequate that those for cross applications generally.
820
 Two dual applications 
simply contained statements suggesting that violence took place; there was no 
information about what that violence was or who was involved.821 The complaint 
narrative for CourtC-16, for example, read: 
The parties have been in an ongoing patchy relationship for about the past two years. 
There are current issues relating to the custody and care of the child of the union which 
has resulted in Family Law enforcement action and urgent applications coming before 
the court in the past few days and the next few days. The parties have allegedly been 
involved in an altercation at the … premises [the woman‟s house] today. Each party is 
alleging adverse conduct by the other and all issues relate to the apparent wish of the 
                                                          
819 Stewart, above n12 at 85. 
820 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
821 CourtC-16 and CourtC-30. Both were TIO applications, which raises questions about how the content of these 
complaint narratives met the threshold for a TIO application (or order). 
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father to take their child to see his father. Police consequent became involved and police 
have fears for both parties. 
In other cases complaint narratives did detail the types of violence alleged to 
have been perpetrated by each party: 
The parties have been in a relationship for the past five years. There is a history of DV. 
Police were called to the residence by a neighbour at approximately 10.30 pm tonight to 
find [the woman] on the front lawn crying. She told the police that [the man] kicked and 
punched her. [The man] was located inside and he was also crying. He also alleged that 
[the woman] kicked and punched him. Both parties have been spoken to and [the man] 
interviewed and they both admit hitting and kicking the other party during the course of 
the evening. Police are unable to determine who is the main aggressor.
822
 
However, even in this complaint, the absence of information beyond the 
presenting incident means that it is difficult to say anything about the context of 
the violence, and who might be in „fear‟ and hence in need of protection.  
i. History of violence 
Dual applications were less likely, compared to cross applications made on 
different dates,
823
 to refer to prior experiences of violence. Yet research on dual 
arrest from the USA indicates that this is an area of gender difference, with 
women more likely to have a recorded history of prior victimisation and men 
more likely to have prior reports of perpetration including prior arrests.
824
 
Only three (3/8) police dual applications referred to a history of violence.
825
 Like 
other cross applications this „history‟ was included in a routine way and 
implicated both parties,
826
 an implication reinforced by the use of the same 
complaint narrative for both parties: 
The Parties have been in a relationship for the past five years. There is a history of DV. 
…. Police are unable to determine who is the main aggressor but are satisfied that a DV 
offence has been committed by each party against the other and have fears for continued 
DV due to the history of violence in the past.
827
 
                                                          
822 CourtA-1A. 
823 See Chapter 6. 
824 Martin, above n685 at 150; Henning & Feder, „Who Presents the Greater Threat?‟, above n264 at 76-77. Another study 
that compared dual arrests in Connecticut found that while there was little difference in the perpetration of prior physical 
abuse, men were more likely than women to have perpetrated sexual abuse and issued threats to kill: Feder & Henning, „A 
Comparison‟, above n685 at 163. Thus the authors concluded that men‟s prior use of violence was more severe with more 
severe consequences: at 166.  
825 CourtA-1A, CourtA-18, and CourtC-16 (referred to as an „ongoing patchy relationship‟). CourtA-18 specifically noted 
that there was no „recorded‟ history of violence. 
826 See Chapter 6.  
827 CourtA-1A. 
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Two police dual applications failed to mention a „history of violence‟ in the 
complaint narrative, yet additional information appended to the court file 
indicated that there had been prior violence. In one case the woman had a current 
ADVO against her partner (information that should have been readily available 
to the police),
828
 and in the other medical evidence was presented at the hearing 
which documented past injuries sustained by the woman.
829
 This raises questions, 
at least in these two cases, about the appropriateness of the police applying for an 
ADVO to protect both parties. It further suggests that dual applications may 
result from poor or „lazy‟ police investigative practices.830 It is particularly 
problematic that the same complaint narrative is used for both parties when there 
are clear differences in the experience of violence. These two cases are explored 
as case studies later in this chapter. 
ii. Types of violence alleged 
The eight police dual applications were overwhelmingly concerned with acts of 
physical violence, with seven alleging physical violence on the part of both 
parties.
831
 Three of these complaints noted visible injuries sustained by one
832
 or 
both
833
 parties. Only one case mentioned another form of abuse (verbal abuse) in 
addition to physical violence.
834
 Four complaints referred to an argument
835
 the 
nature of which was unspecified (that is to say, it was unclear what was meant by 
this term, for example was it meant to imply verbal abuse or intimidation, or 
simply a heated discussion). The use of the term „argument‟ within the context of 
other acts of violence and abuse, and in the context of an ADVO application, 
suggests that the „argument‟ was of a different nature than simply a 
disagreement. As noted above, in one complaint the only reference to an act that 
might ground an ADVO was the use of the term „altercation‟ without any further 
                                                          
828 CourtA-6. 
829 CourtC-30. 
830 See also police view that dual arrests are the result of laziness: Miller, above n21 at 63. 
831 CourtA-1A, CourtA-3, CourtA-6, CourtA-8, CourtA-13, CourtA-18 and CourtC-30. This stands in contrast to the 
private dual applications, and cross applications generally, which document a wide range of act/behaviours: CourtB-18 
the woman alleged a history of violence, physical violence, threats to kill her and other family members, while the man 
alleged physical violence, threats to harm and verbal abuse. CourtB-32A the woman alleged a history of violence, 
physical violence, verbal abuse, threats, telephone harassment, while the man alleged a history of violence, physical 
violence, verbal abuse, stalking and property damage. For cross applications generally see Table 6.5. 
832 CourtA-18: the man sustained scratches to the forearms and the woman had „no visible injuries‟. 
833 CourtA-6, CourtA-13 and CourtC-30. 
834 CourtA-3. 
835 CourtA-3, CourtA-6, CourtA-8, CourtA-13 and CourtA-18. 
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information.
836
 No police dual application contained allegations about threats or 
sexual violence. 
In three dual police applications criminal charges were laid against one or both 
parties. In two of these cases only the man was charged, both with common 
assault.
837
 In the remaining case, both parties were charged with multiple 
offences including assault and property damage. The man was also charged with 
breach ADVO.
838
 
The emphasis on physical violence and injuries is reflected in research on police 
decision-making regarding dual arrest in the USA.
839
 The emphasis on physical 
violence is perhaps not surprising in the studies investigating arrest; however, the 
range of acts that can ground an ADVO are wider and one would expect to see 
greater reference to the full range of potentially violent or abusive acts within 
these complaints. 
Given the limited nature of the complaint narrative and the small number of 
cases involved, very few differences emerged in the type of acts of physical 
violence perpetrated by men and women involved in dual applications. However, 
it is worth noting that only men (2) alleged that they had been scratched,
840
 and 
only men (2) alleged that a weapon/object had been used against them (a kitchen 
knife and a spoon).
841
 Like women‟s use of weapons documented in Chapter 6, 
the items allegedly used by women appear to be what was „on hand‟ rather than a 
traditional weapon.
842
  
iii. Who holds fears? 
As outlined in Chapter 6, in order to grant an ADVO the court needs to be 
satisfied that the person fears the commission of violence in the future and that 
that fear is reasonable. Like cross applications generally, statements regarding 
                                                          
836 CourtC-16. CourtC-30 also used the term „altercation‟ however the complaint also noted that both parties sustained 
injuries and therefore has been coded as physical violence. 
837 CourtA-1A (result of charge unknown), and CourtA-3 (charge withdrawn two days after the dual applications were 
withdrawn). 
838 CourtA-6 (Olivia and John) quoted in Chapter 1 and as a case study later in this chapter. 
839 Martin, above n685 at 148; Finn et al, „Dual Arrest Decisions‟, above n710 at 578. 
840 CourtA-6 and CourtA-18. 
841 CourtA-8 CourtA13. This was also the case in the private dual applications: CourtB-18 and CourtB-32A. 
842 Melton & Belknap, above n36 at 344. Women‟s use of weapons has been noted as a factor in dual arrests in the USA: 
see Henning & Feder, „Who Presents the Greater Threat?‟, above n264 at 74; Feder & Henning, „A Comparison‟, above 
n685 at 163; Miller,  „Victims as Offenders‟, above n21 at 2. 
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fear were included in dual applications in a routine way to conclude the 
complaint narrative.
843
 „Fear‟ was mentioned in four police dual applications and 
in all of these applications „fear‟ was cast as the fears held by police, rather than 
the fears held by the parties, for example: 
The police have fears for the safety of the husband and wife and are seeking an order for 
their protection from each other.
844
 
The court does not need to be satisfied as to the fears held by the police, but 
rather is concerned with the fears held by the alleged victim.  
The absence of reference to fears held by the victim in these complaint narratives 
is of concern for two reasons: (1) it fails to address the requirements of the 
legislation; and (2) the generation of fear is one area where research has 
indicated clear gender differences.
845
 Its absence means that it is not possible to 
ascertain whether there were any gender differences in the experience and 
context of domestic violence in these cases. 
B. The resolution of dual applications 
Dual applications were resolved in a similar way to cross applications generally, 
see Chapter 9.  
Half of the police dual applications were resolved by mutual withdrawal (4/8) at 
either the first or second mention.
846
 Three cases resulted in mutual orders at the 
first mention.
847
 Only one police dual application proceeded to a hearing which 
resulted in the woman‟s complaint being dismissed; after which the man 
withdrew his application.
848
 Thus in five cases (5/8) no person (10 of 16 people) 
obtained the protection of an ADVO. 
The dominance of mutual withdrawal resonates with Margaret Martin‟s findings 
concerning dual arrests in Connecticut where those arrests were more likely to 
result in nolle prosequi (this means that no current court action will be taken but 
                                                          
843 See Chapter 6. 
844 CourtA-8. See also CourtA-1A, CourtC-16 and CourtC-30 (this case referred to the likelihood of repetition). 
845 See references above n264. See also Chapter 6.  
846 CourtA-1A, CourtA-3, CourtA-13 and CourtC-16. CourtC-16 is included here as neither party attended court and thus 
the matter was not determined on its merits, despite it being marked on the file as „mutual dismissal‟. 
847 CourtA-6, CourtA-8 and CourtA-18. CourtA-6 (Olivia and John) is included because ultimately both parties ended up 
with an ADVO against each other; Olivia consented to John‟s ADVO and Olivia withdrew her application as it transpired 
she already had an ADVO against John. 
848 CourtC-30. This is presented as a case study later in this chapter. 
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if another incident takes place within 13 months then the case can be reopened; if 
nothing happens the „record is expunged‟, effectively this means no 
prosecution
849
); 79 per cent of women and 82 per cent of men involved in dual 
arrests were not prosecuted as compared to 69 per cent of single arrests.
850
  
Research has indicated that one of the explanations police proffer for the practice 
of dual arrests is that the court is better placed to assess the competing versions 
of events.
851
 This suggests that police may be abdicating their responsibility to 
the court because they have not conducted an adequate investigation. This view 
is supported by one DVLO in the present study who suggested that some general 
duties officers are simply „lazy‟: 
… they don't want to actually make any investigation into who the offender is. Yeah 
okay both parties might have injuries but domestic violence injuries … follow a pattern, 
and I get cops all the time …[who] can't be bothered finding out who [is] the victim and 
the offender, so all they'll do in the event is put them both on as persons of interest and 
both on as victims …. Maybe they've both got injuries, maybe they've both been fighting, 
you know, it's really difficult. But generally sloppy police work, they can't be stuffed 
doing it because they don't, they don't think they have to - go „Oh crap she won't front 
up to court anyway‟ and … „he'll get off‟ and… „we'll be back here next week‟. So for 
them that's, that's definitely the police mentality.
852
  
Evidence from this study, and from Hunter‟s work, indicates that this notion that 
the „court can work it out‟ is countered by the administrative practices of the 
Local Court dealing with ADVOs, where very little, if anything, of substance is 
heard in any ADVO complaint, let alone cross complaints, which are largely 
resolved via some form of settlement. 
C. Legal representation 
Dual applications create a conflict of interest for police prosecutors in that they 
are unable to represent a person as a victim in one case, and then immediately 
afterwards prosecute that person as a defendant. This was emphasised in the 
interviews with DVLOs and police prosecutors,
853
 as well as by other 
                                                          
849 Martin, above n685 at 149. 
850 Ibid at 151. 
851 Finn et al, „Dual Arrest Decisions‟, above n710 at 567-568. The other key justification identified in the USA research 
is that the arrest process can put victims in contact with services that can assist them (thus the arrest process has benefits): 
Finn & Bettis, above n815 at 275 and 282-83. This was not raised in the interviews conducted in this study and hence is 
not explored, however, the contradiction evident in this justification is noted. 
852 DVLO1. 
853 See DVLO1, DVLO3, PP1 and PP2. 
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professionals.
854
 Generally, when asked about the impact of dual applications, 
the police confined their discussion to this problem, and rarely mentioned the 
impact of dual applications on victims.
855
  
To address this conflict of interest, the police prosecutor either withdraws the 
appearance of the police in one or both cases at the first court appearance,
856
 or 
separates the complaints.
857
 Withdrawing the appearance of the police does not 
withdraw the complaint in its entirety, simply the police appearance for that 
complainant. The complaint would then be treated as a private complaint and the 
complainant would have to represent themselves or instruct a legal 
representative. The decision about which case to withdraw from is determined by 
the prosecutor in consultation with the investigating officer and/or the DVLO. 
PP3 suggested that this is done by examining the merits of the complaint 
(however this seems of little assistance where complaints are identical, short and 
of poor quality) and whether one party has been charged.  
With one exception,
858
 there was no notation on the court files that the police had 
withdrawn their appearance from one or both cases, or any notation regarding 
private representation. The status of police representation in these dual 
applications is therefore unclear. If representation by the police prosecutor did 
continue, this is troubling given the rate of settlement of dual applications at first 
mention (either by withdrawal or mutual orders), as it suggests a lack of 
independent advice in resolving the cases. 
D. Impact of dual actions 
It is beyond the scope of this study to document the negative impact of dual 
applications on victims of domestic violence. This information is not revealed in 
the court files, and no women interviewed were involved in dual applications. 
However, it is important to note that dual applications are likely to have a 
potentially profound impact; they are „an action of consequence‟.859 Research on 
dual arrest documents multiple consequences, some of which directly relate to 
                                                          
854 See MAG3, MAG4, MAG5, SOL2, SOL3 and WDVCAS1. 
855 The exception was DVLO1. 
856 MAG2, MAG5, PP3 and WDVCAS1, WDVCAS4 and WDVCAS5.  
857 PP1, PP2 and PP5. See also SOL3. 
858 CourtC-30. The only case that proceeded to a hearing. 
859 Martin, above n685 at 154. See also Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1458. 
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the criminal nature of that action (for example conviction, criminal record and 
resultant impact on employment). Dual arrest may also restrict a person‟s ability 
to access services (that is to say, victims of domestic violence who have used 
violence may be excluded from support services because they are also viewed as 
„perpetrators‟),860 it may negatively impact parenting orders,861 and most 
significantly it may make a victim „reluctant to call the police to report 
subsequent abuse‟.862 These potentially negative impacts arising from dual arrest 
may also arise following dual applications, mutual orders and cross applications 
more generally. This is explored further in Chapter 9.  
2. The role of the police when both parties make allegations 
of violence 
A. The dominance of incidents and physical violence 
What emerges from the complaint narratives for dual applications is a sense that 
an alleged incident of physical violence by both parties was sufficient to generate 
police action. This was confirmed in the interviews with police where the 
primacy of incidents came to the fore in their discussions of the practice of dual 
applications.
863
  
The police interviewed were generally of the view that police should not apply 
for an ADVO to protect both parties arising from the same incident, but were 
unclear how to determine which party they should seek an order for. While the 
police were not directly asked about decision-making processes in the context of 
dual applications, it is notable that there was virtually no reference to the types of 
legal or extra-legal factors raised in research on decision-making regarding arrest 
for domestic violence.
864
 Certainly there was no reference to any extra-legal 
                                                          
860 Osthoff, above n38 at 1527. 
861 Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1459.  
862 Ibid. See also Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟ above n21 at 130; Martin, above n685 at 155.  
863 The police interviewed in this study do not generally attend incidents (although some DVLOs do, particularly if they 
also have a general duties role). The DVLO‟s role includes verifying the actions taken by the attending or investigating 
officer. This involves examining the COPS entry and action taken. The prosecutors‟ role is to prosecute cases initiated by 
the police, whether ADVOs or criminal charges. They will often advise police about their actions, the nature of the 
evidence provided, and specifically the conflict of interest generated by police dual applications. 
864 Factors such as the behaviour/culpability of the victim, the presence of the perpetrator at the scene, the use of drugs 
and/or alcohol by one or both parties, who contacted the police, presence of children, relationship between the parties, 
whether still cohabitating, number of previous contacts with the police: see Dana Jones & Joanne Belknap, „Police 
Responses to Battering in a Pro-Arrest Jurisdiction‟ (1999) 16 Justice Quarterly 249 at 254-56; Lynette Feder, „Police 
Handling of Domestic Violence Calls: The Importance of the Offender‟s Presence in the Arrest Decision‟ (1996) 24 
Journal of Criminal Justice 481; Buzawa & Buzawa, above n244, ch9. See also Jones & Belknap, above n864, at 271 
who noted that pro-arrest policies that are embedded within a progressive integrated response to domestic violence for a 
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factors concerning whether the woman satisfied idealised notions of a „genuine‟ 
victim, whether she was affected by alcohol or other drugs, whether she was 
„mouthy‟, „hysterical‟ or aggressive towards the police – factors which have been 
suggested in other research as a determinant of police decision-making in the 
context of dual arrest.
865
 Indeed there is a substantial amount of literature that 
indicates that the general police response to alleged offences (not just domestic 
violence cases) is influenced by extra-legal factors such as the demeanour of the 
parties.
866
 
Instead the main factor that emerged in these interviews was the reliance on an 
incident framework. While some police spoke about applying for an ADVO for 
the „victim‟, the majority spoke in terms of incidents. Importantly, even when 
identifying incidents, the police suggested approaches that divided events into 
discrete parts where the position of victim and defendant might shift (that is to 
say, that a person might be a victim in the first part of the action, but a defendant 
in the second part). PP1 captured these multiple dimensions in his interview:  
…we have to look at the brief and we have to basically either, …[ask ourselves] „why 
have we done this?‟, look at the evidence, is it a case where there‟s one incident 
followed quickly after by another incident? If that‟s the case we split the proceedings. If 
it happens out of one incident well, generally speaking, part of the investigating officer‟s 
role is to find out where the truth lies, …like who do we believe? Who is the victim? Who 
is the defendant? You know, it gets very, very messy. We‟ll generally have to, I believe 
just say „well … on our investigation we believe this is the true victim‟ and that‟s who 
we‟re bound to have responsibility to represent and you may even need to…flick the 
other one, so to speak….it‟s very murky. 
Even though this prosecutor talks about identifying „who the victim is‟ it is 
linked to an incident framework. This prosecutor notes that in most cases it is 
possible to identify separate incidents, and that in only a small number of cases 
would the prosecution decide to withdraw from one case and proceed with the 
other. This notion of being able to identify, and separate, discrete incidents was 
raised in a number of interviews:
867
  
                                                                                                                                                             
long period of time „decrease the likelihood‟ that extra-legal factors „influence the police response‟. See also Carolyn 
Hoyle, Negotiating Domestic Violence: Police, Criminal Justice and Victims (2000), ch 5. 
865 See Miller & Meloy, above n43 at 95; Feder & Henning, „A Comparison‟, above n685, at 155; Osthoff, above n38 at 
1533. 
866 Eg see Richard Ericson, „The Police as Reproducers of Order‟ in Tim Newburn (ed), Policing: Key Readings (2005) at 
215-246. 
867 DVLO3, DVLO4, DVLO5, DVLO6 (4/6); PP1, PP2 (2/5). 
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…sometimes they‟re taken out when there‟s two separate incidents. You can take them 
out for both parties and that‟s fine. But they‟re usually heard separately, they‟re not 
heard on the same day…they‟re probably not cross applications, they‟re individual 
applications because they‟re relating to two different matters.868 
The emphasis on incidents is connected to the way in which the work of the 
police is defined by the parameters of the law – where the law, particularly the 
criminal law is all about whether a particular incident is a crime, who was the 
victim and who was the perpetrator. This focus then, appears to be translated to 
the ADVO environment where even though multiple acts might form the basis of 
an application, it is inextricably connected to incidents, who did what to whom, 
rather than the context of those acts (which could arguably find a basis for an 
assessment of what amounts to a „good reason‟ for not applying for an ADVO). 
Hirschel and Buzawa have noted the tension between how researchers 
increasingly view domestic violence as a „process‟ but the police and legal 
system continue to focus on a „single incident or a series of discrete independent 
incidents‟.869 This vision of discrete incidents is clearly illustrated in the 
comments from police explaining when dual applications would be appropriate; 
the first quote is from a police prosecutor: 
they're really hard [police dual applications] because we don't know who, who the real 
victim of the matter is … they're mainly the cases where victims have been a victim for a 
long time and then all of a sudden she‟s had enough and she just, you know, either stabs 
the bloke, you know she really just ups the ante like um yeah just like just goes crazy 
…and starts beating him but because the police have got, the police know this lady, she's 
been a victim for so long they've sort of got, they know about her situation, they would, 
or when they get there she might say, „Well he was standing over me, threatening me so 
I did this‟. The police just to cover their own backsides would apply for both. The police 
couldn't determine so the police will take the view, … we need to put some protection in 
place to stop these two from killing each other um but I can't decide who is right, who's 
wrong so let's just take it to the court. 
… how do the prosecutors deal with that? 
Normally, normally we would ask that the different matters go to another court. 
Oh okay so separate them. 
Just separate them so a prosecutor here might deal with Victim A … and the other one 
can go to another court. We would never do that as a cross-AVO…in the same court 
with the same prosecutor, wouldn't make sense. It'd be terrible because I would be 
saying my victim's a victim but then I'd also be cross-examining her as a defendant. 
Wouldn't work.
 870
 
                                                          
868 DVLO3. 
869 Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1456. 
870 PP2. 
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And the second from a DVLO: 
we had a situation um where a DV incident took place over a fairly short period of time, 
over a couple of hours, where the victim in one assault went inside and the incident 
moved inside and then the victim became the offender … by assaulting the previous 
defendant. So the victim outside had moved inside and became the defendant. 
Do you remember what happened? 
… the defendant went inside, the victim was outside, um and the defendant claimed that 
the victim was hurting their dog in the yard by hitting it with a broom and so they've 
come outside and they've hit them, got the broom out of their hand and started hitting 
the other party. That was the first assault. And then the victim in that matter moved 
inside, went into the bedroom, started crying. Some time passed, went back outside and 
to retaliate for being assaulted previously went out and punched the other party in the 
face. You've got two assaults in that time frame, we got telephone interim orders for 
both parties and we ended up charging both … for the two separate assaults.871 
Police officers in Susan Miller‟s study of women arrested for domestic violence 
also spoke about separate incidents based on the elapse of time.
872
 Miller noted 
that the police were concerned with „whether a crime occurred‟ and did not make 
any reference to „context, motivation, or history of abuse [as] important factors to 
use when trying to assess a situation‟.873 Miller argued that this focus on whether 
a crime has occurred illustrates a „simplistic approach‟ to domestic violence that 
is part of the „incident-driven philosophy‟ of the criminal legal system „that is 
devoid of contextual understandings and explanations of violence‟.874 As 
Hirschel and Buzawa argue, the incident focus of the criminal law, and hence the 
actions of the police, adopts a dichotomous view of an incident where there is an 
identifiable victim and perpetrator; this means that the police find it difficult to 
view the „interaction‟ that is part of ongoing domestic violence875 (with the 
exception of cases that fit legal definitions of self-defence). The call for greater 
context may appear difficult in the legal setting where incidents and 
„dichotomous thinking‟ are predominant, however as Miller argues: 
[P]olice exercise discretion at every citizen-police encounter and use selective 
enforcement strategies to decide whom to arrest. Surely it is not too much to desire a 
more considered and informed approach to making arrest decisions in domestic violence 
situations.
876
 
                                                          
871 DVLO5. 
872 Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟, above n21 at 62-63. 
873 Ibid at 63. 
874 Ibid at 75. 
875 Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1458. 
876 Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟, above n21 at 131. See also McMahon & Pence, above n21 at 52. 
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Unlike the question, „has a crime has occurred?‟ (the focus of a decision to 
charge), the decision to apply for an ADVO is not only concerned with whether 
certain acts have taken place, but with „who requires protection‟. In this way civil 
protection orders ask about future protection from the outset – that is their 
function and purpose – this is a key difference to the criminal law. These 
questions are not necessarily premised on a single incident which is the focus of 
the decision to charge. 
The NSW legislation requires a police officer to apply for an ADVO where that 
officer believes or suspects that certain offences have taken place, or are likely to 
take place „against the person for whose protection an order would be made‟.877 
The focus on the need for protection could be stronger if the legislation made a 
specific link to the protective nature of an ADVO in the same way it does when 
specifying when a court can make an order. The legislation provides that the 
court needs to be satisfied that the person fears, and that that fear is reasonable, 
that certain acts may be perpetrated against them in the future by the 
defendant.
878
 The police obligation to apply for an ADVO does not make the 
same connection to „fear‟ or even „future protection‟. By leaving these factors 
absent from the legislation, the obligation to apply for an ADVO retains many of 
the incident defining features that animates the criminal law and the traditional 
police response to domestic violence. 
Given the poor quality of the documentation of complaints in dual police 
applications in the present study, there appears to have been little consideration 
as to whether one or both parties required protection. Rather it seems that the 
police involved were unwilling to conduct a thorough investigation, and in turn 
minimised and trivialised the events by failing to do so. This interpretation of 
police practice is supported by the DVLOs interviewed who said that lack of 
investigation was the main reason for dual applications.
879
 
                                                          
877 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562C(3), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s49. 
878 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562AE, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s16.  
879 DVLO1, DVLO5 and DVLO6. 
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B. Apply for the ‘victim’ 
Three DVLOs spoke about applying for the „victim‟ or whoever is „most 
needy‟.880 Only DVLO1 explained what this might involve, making it clear that 
the identification of the victim was not negated by the victim‟s own use of 
violence. DVLO1 took the view that a woman should not be penalised for 
fighting back in the context of her own victimisation. This view was clearly in 
the minority (where most police interviewed were more focused on whether an 
offence had taken place, whether there were separate incidents, rather than the 
context for the act in question): 
[T]here's only one perpetrator and there's only one victim, every now and again she 
might fight back and good on her and the cops aren't going to penalise her for that. Um 
none of the cops I know anyway. Certainly they're not going to be taking out an AVO 
against her because she managed to hit him with the frying pan one time like you know. 
She might have old bruises and old broken bones and everything like that. We're not 
going to punish her for that.
881
 
DVLO1 was the only police officer who mentioned „fighting back‟ or self-
defence as a factor in women‟s use of violence. Similarly in a study of police 
decision-making regarding dual arrest in Georgia, Mary Finn and Pamela Bettis 
remarked „to our surprise, that either party might have been acting in self-defense 
was not mentioned by any of the officers‟.882 
The other two DVLOs who referred to the need to identify the victim failed to 
articulate how this might be done; one simply referred to the person who is „most 
needy‟883 and the other said „we usually have to pick a party‟ to represent.884 
Neither clarified how a police officer might determine „need‟ or make such a 
choice – there was no articulated connection to victimisation. Both of these 
DVLOs stated that they would refer the other person to the chamber magistrate 
to pursue a private application.
885
 This complies with NSW Police policy which 
states that a police officer is to apply for an ADVO for the PINOP and if the 
„defendant seeks an order [the police officer is to] direct this person to see the 
                                                          
880 DVLO1, DVLO3 and DVLO4. 
881 DVLO1. 
882 Finn & Bettis, above n815 at 282. 
883 DVLO3. 
884 DVLO4. 
885 See also PP2. 
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chamber magistrate‟.886 Whether such a referral is appropriate requires greater 
investigation. Attending police might find referring the other person to the 
chamber magistrate a useful deflection tactic (that is to say, by providing this 
person with an alternative legal avenue they may not be angry with the police 
applying on behalf of the other person). However, this approach is problematic 
because it suggests that both parties have grounds to seek an ADVO and that the 
prime motivation for the police making a decision to apply for one person is the 
conflict of interest generated by making a dual application, rather than any 
assessment of who is the victim and who requires protection. As one DVLO 
explained: 
…I think by…referring the other party on to the chamber magistrate is good because it 
makes us, um, it takes that onus off us and just that conflict, like how do you prosecute 
[both] you know.
887
 
While the concern in this chapter has centred on the making of dual applications, 
the other risk of both parties alleging that they are the victim is the very real 
possibility that the police will take no action.
888
 Hirschel and Buzawa caution 
researchers to examine all possible police responses to a domestic violence 
incident, since researchers who focus on dual arrest risk seeing police that 
practice dual arrest as problematic but fail to identify those that „do nothing‟ as 
being of equal concern.
889
 DVLO6 raises this possibility: 
If they really can‟t find a victim or a …defendant, they‟ll take conflicting…versions and 
not make any application…so if there‟s a verbal argument and they‟re both saying 
they‟ve got fears, or he‟s making one allegation and she‟s making another allegation 
and they [the police] can‟t decide who is right or wrong, they‟ll be no application. 
3. Case studies: The light additional material provides 
In this section I present two case studies. In these cases additional material was 
available on the court file which highlights the limited and distorted picture 
portrayed in the complaint narrative. These case studies present a number of 
interesting contrasts to the position articulated by the police in their interviews. 
                                                          
886 NSW Police Service, „SOPS‟, above n398 at [4.10]. 
887 DVLO6 
888 Finn et al „Dual Arrest Decisions‟, above n710 at 578. Using hypothetical scenarios to assess police decision-making 
regarding dual arrest in Georgia (which has a primary aggressor policy) this study found that if both parties sustained 
injuries, 45.8% of the police surveyed would arrest both parties, 36.5% would take an informal option, and 17.7% would 
only arrest the man. The decision to pursue an informal option when both parties were injured was higher than when only 
one person was injured (when only the wife was injured 20.7% of police said they would pursue an informal option).  
889 Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1450, 1461-1462.  
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Far from appearing „murky‟, or „messy‟,890 this additional information instead 
confirms an inadequate police investigation. This in turn suggests that it is not 
merely the presentation of incidents and injuries that leads to dual applications, 
but rather problems with the police assessment of competing versions of events 
and how they apply their understanding of domestic violence to the case at hand. 
A. Olivia and John 
The most glaring case involves Olivia and John,
891
 quoted at length in Chapter 1. 
The sheer inadequacy of the narrative contained in that police dual application, 
given the events documented in the charge fact sheet, is quite simply astounding. 
As described earlier, Olivia certainly perpetrated acts against John such as 
kicking him, damaging his stereo, and scratching his back.
892
 However, these 
were performed in direct response to his vicious and sustained attack on her, 
which included head-butting her until she was bruised and bleeding. On the first 
date that the dual applications appeared at court, Olivia consented to John‟s 
ADVO against her, and her application was withdrawn because it transpired that 
she already had an ADVO against John.
893
 This prior ADVO should have 
indicated to the police Olivia‟s history of victimisation and provided important 
context to her actions. In fact the charge fact sheet provides quite a clear 
contextual discussion of Olivia‟s acts within the presenting incident. One can 
only surmise that there was some level of frustration experienced by the police, 
perhaps they had attended on multiple occasions, perhaps they felt that Olivia 
should have separated from John.
894
  
At the very least this case supports the contention that if there were incidents of 
physical violence perpetrated by both parties resulting in injuries, then this alone 
was sufficient to generate a dual application. This strict legal (or formal) 
approach also emerges in the dual arrest research where some police have 
complained that it is not their role to investigate „background‟ to the incident, but 
rather „my job is to decide whether or not a criminal act occurred and if so, what 
                                                          
890 PP1. 
891 CourtA-6. 
892 Finn et al, „Dual Arrest Decisions‟, above n710 at 571. 
893 It is worth noting that Olivia‟s existing ADVO was strengthened at this time by adding an exclusion order.  
894 See discussion of police frustration: Ombudsman, above n11 at [3.1]. See also Katzen, above n15 at 229. 
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criminal act and who committed it‟.895 In turn this approach raises questions 
about what the police are meant to do when faced with evidence that both parties 
have used physical violence against each other (and these acts cannot be easily 
defined as self-defence). Approaches to assessing who is the perpetrator of 
domestic violence, such as predominant and primary aggressor policies, attempt 
to navigate this territory. These approaches are discussed at the end of this 
chapter.  
How these dual applications were approached once they appeared in court is less 
clear. On the first mention day when the ADVOs were resolved it is unlikely that 
the charge fact sheet was also before the court. In any event once Olivia 
consented to John‟s ADVO, and withdrew her own it is unlikely that there would 
have been any further inquiry into the nature of the applications. Questions 
should be raised about whether, given Olivia had a pre-existing ADVO, further 
investigation should have been conducted by the magistrate about whether 
mutual orders were warranted in this situation. It was only in relation to the 
charges against Olivia, which took over a year to be finalised, that more in-depth 
questions were raised about the nature of her behaviour by her legal 
representative. In the end the charges against Olivia were withdrawn. 
At this stage, it is important to reiterate that protection orders pose a different 
question than that posed in the decision to arrest and charge; it implicitly asks 
„who requires protection?‟ This question does not appear to have been asked in 
the case of Olivia and John. 
B. Brenda and Joel 
The case of Brenda and Joel involved an urgent dual TIO application, in which 
the complaint narrative provided virtually no information about the incident that 
gave rise to the application: 
The parties have been married for about four years. Police were called to the premises 
today by a third party. Police have attended and found there has clearly been an 
altercation between the parties, however it is unclear who may have been the aggressor 
and who may have been the victim. Both parties have suffered injury consistent with 
some parts of their story and Police are satisfied that unless an order is made against 
                                                          
895 Police officer quoted in Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟, above n21 at 63. 
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each party there is the likelihood or probability of further violence between the parties. 
The matter still remains subject to further investigation.
896
 
The dual applications were mentioned at court on four occasions before being 
listed for hearing, some seven months later. During this time the parties were 
protected by mutual IOs granted by consent. On all occasions Brenda and Joel 
were legally represented (although it is unclear when, or if, the police withdrew 
their appearance for either or both parties). On the day of the hearing Brenda‟s 
case was heard first. As part of her evidence Brenda provided a letter from her 
doctor that detailed two visits to the surgery to have injuries examined and that 
she had informed the doctor were sustained as a result of her husband‟s actions. 
The injuries reported included bruises to her hands, wrist and foot; bruises to two 
fingers and minor skin abrasions on the back of her hands.
897
 At the hearing three 
people gave evidence: Brenda, Joel and another person (it is unclear who this 
person was or their relationship to the parties).  
The magistrate declined to grant Brenda‟s ADVO because nothing had taken 
place in the seven months from the date of the TIO application to the date of the 
hearing; with this lapse of time, the magistrate concluded that he could no longer 
consider that any fears held by Brenda were „reasonable‟.898 This is despite the 
fact that the magistrate found that Joel did assault Brenda as documented in her 
medical certificate, that Joel threatened her saying „I‟ll find you wherever you 
are‟, and that the incident that led to the present TIO application concerned 
Brenda trying to leave the residence and Joel preventing her from doing so. In 
this incident Joel took Brenda‟s mobile phone, a struggle ensued where Joel hit 
Brenda and „eventually she bit him, in order to get him off her‟. The magistrate 
appeared to fail to note that Brenda‟s actions were more defensive than offensive 
in nature, or that Brenda‟s actions, in the context of her attempts to leave, is 
suggestive of a pattern of control exercised by Joel rather than by Brenda.
899
 
                                                          
896 CourtC-30. 
897 There was another exhibit: correspondence from the woman‟s former husband to the then Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (now the Department of Immigration and Citizenship) dated three days after the 
incident that gave rise to the police dual application in which her former husband sought to withdraw his immigration 
sponsorship of his wife as a result of her violence against him, he claimed she „…has a third party (lover)‟ and that they 
no longer live together „I don‟t know where she is living‟. See Dasgupta, „Framework for Understanding‟, above n43, at 
1371 for a discussion of measures designed to undermine a woman‟s immigration status as violence that is not captured 
by act-based measures such as the CTS.  
898 Like the magistrate in this case, SOL3 was also of the view that there should be „some time nexus‟ component to the 
fear test. See a similar emphasis in a Northern Territory case in Spowart & Neil, above n16 at 83. 
899 See references on the heightened risk for women at the time of separation: above n602. 
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In reaching this decision, it does not appear that the magistrate canvassed or 
considered that the IO that protected Brenda was proving effective and that was 
why there had been no further incidents. A similar point was made by Miranda 
Kaye and colleagues in their research on domestic violence and parenting 
arrangements post separation, where the absence of further allegations was not 
„interpreted as a case in which the [interim] order had actually worked … but 
was instead construed as a situation where the perpetrator was no longer a 
danger‟.900  
Following the dismissal of the woman‟s application, the man withdrew his 
application. 
This case raises a range of matters about how domestic violence is understood in 
legal practice. This magistrate clearly saw a time lapse between incidents as 
relevant to the continuing existence of fear and in so doing viewed each incident 
in isolation rather than part of a continuum of experience.  
4. How should the police respond to competing allegations 
about violence?  
How the police should respond to an incident where both parties allege that the 
other party has been violent, and/or where both parties have sustained injuries as 
the result of the other‟s actions, raises critical questions. Most importantly it 
presents a number of challenges about how to look beyond the incident to 
consider the context of the acts. Hirschel and Buzawa outline these challenges in 
the context of dual arrest: 
The notion of a dual arrest in an intimate partner violence case challenges the traditional 
legal identification of a victim and offender in cases involving violence. It also 
challenges researchers to promote the use of definitions of domestic violence that 
examine the entire context of the relationship rather than specific acts of violence.
901
 
„Primary‟ or „predominant‟ aggressor policies have been implemented in the 
USA as a method to assist the police to determine who should be arrested when 
both parties have claimed that the other used physical violence against them 
                                                          
900 Kaye et al, above n15 at 50. 
901 Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1450. 
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and/or that they have both sustained injuries.
902
 There has been recent interest in 
these concepts in Australia, in part motivated by concerns about an increase in 
the number of women being arrested for domestic violence offences.
903
 In 
general these policies, and in some jurisdictions legislation, require the police to 
look beyond the presenting incident
904
 to consider: whether there is a history of 
violence perpetrated by one party against the other, the nature of the injuries 
sustained by both parties, the likelihood of violence in the future, and whether 
one person was acting in self-defence.
905
 The intention is to encourage the police 
to investigate competing claims within a wider contextual framework. Evidence 
concerning the impact of primary or predominant aggressor policies varies – in 
some jurisdictions there has been a decrease in the number of women arrested 
following the introduction of such policies, and in other jurisdictions the arrest 
rate of women has continued to rise.
906
 As Trish Erwin, for the Battered 
Women‟s Justice Project (San Francisco, USA), pointed out, if police officers do 
not possess an adequate understanding of domestic violence and the nature and 
context of women‟s use of violence, they will be unable to understand the 
rationale for the imposition of questions and issues to determine who to arrest.
907
 
Erwin explored the problems with the structure and language of 
primary/predominant aggressor policies. This language, at least initially, led 
police to focus on „who hit first‟ rather than wider contextual issues about how 
violence starts, continues and is sustained in the relationship.
908
 Such approaches 
appear more concerned with „participation‟ rates rather than a „proportional 
analysis‟.909 In many ways this approach is almost inevitably driven by the 
criminal justice system‟s concern with the „incident‟. As a result of this initial 
focus on „who started it‟ most states have changed the language to „predominant 
                                                          
902 In 2000, 24 states had adopted „primary aggressor language‟: Ibid at 1460. 
903 Redfern Legal Centre, above n818; Baker, above n312; Rochelle Braaf & Clare Sneddon, Arresting Practices: 
Exploring Issues of Dual Arrest for Domestic Violence (2007).   
904 Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1460. 
905 See summary of USA primary/predominant aggressor policies or legislation: Sandra Murphy & Mary Fenske, Primary 
Aggressor Chart (2008) available at 
<http://data.ipharos.com/bwjp/documents/Primary%20Aggressor%20Chart%20Final.pdf> (13 February 2009). 
906 Finn & Bettis, above n815 at 271; William DeLeon-Granados, William Wells, Ruddyard Binsbacher, „Arresting 
Developments: Trends in Female Arrests for Domestic Violence and Proposed Explanations‟ (2006) 12 Violence Against 
Women 355 at 364-5; Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1460; Miller & Meloy, above n43 at 92; and Finn et al, „Dual 
Arrest Decisions‟, above n710 at 568. 
907 Trish Erwin, When is Arrest Not an Option? The Dilemmas of Predominant Physical Aggressor Language and the 
Regulation of Domestic Violence (no date), at 13-14. 
908 Ibid at 5. 
909 Hamberger, „Towards a Gender-Sensitive Analysis‟, above n43 at 132. 
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physical aggressor‟, „principal physical aggressor‟ or „dominant aggressor‟.910 
These changes in terminology have not necessarily brought about the changes 
sought.
911
  
Whether it is termed „primary‟ or „predominant‟ aggressor there are also 
problems with the emphasis on injury as an indicator of who should be arrested 
in a given situation. Erwin points out that injury, and related notions of visibility 
and severity, are very poor indicators, on their own, of „who is the predominant 
aggressor‟. These highlight the importance of police knowing the difference 
between offensive and defensive actions, and being aware of injuries that are not 
visible at the time the police attend an incident.
912
 
Erwin‟s commentary on this issue raises important concerns about the way in 
which primary/predominant aggressor policies are conceptualised. First, self-
defence is generally presented as the last consideration, rather than the first 
question (was one person‟s use of violence was legal?).913 This type of question 
thus stands outside the determination of who is the predominant aggressor and 
„who poses a threat to the other person‟.914 One of the attractive things about this 
approach is that it immediately focuses attention on the separate acts performed 
by the parties (was one party using self-defence), rather than starting with 
questions that centre on the „mutual‟ conflicting allegations. 
In turn we need to consider whether the law can in fact accommodate the 
nuances sought to be introduced by such aggressor policies: 
Predominant physical aggressor language is, in some ways, trying to make the law do 
what it does not want to do: it is designed to remedy power differentials in the use of 
violence within intimate relationships, but it is at odds with the goal of the law in 
providing a neutral standard upon which to determine a legal action, eg probable cause. 
It is not an end run to „always arrest the guy‟, but asks officers to consider …that 
violence has different meanings in different contexts. Unfortunately, implementing 
[predominant physical aggressor] raises problems for victims, law enforcement and 
prosecutors alike.
915
 
                                                          
910 Erwin, above n907 at 5. 
911 See references above n906. 
912 Eg injuries relating to strangulation or choking: see Department of Justice, Alberta, Domestic Violence Handbook for 
Police and Crown Prosecutors in Alberta (2008) at 91-94.  
913 See also McMahon & Pence, above n21 at 64. 
914 Erwin, above n907 at 21 provides a diagram about how such a process would operate. 
915 Ibid 14-5. 
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This resonates with the cautions raised in other research in this field about the 
disjuncture between seeing domestic violence as a „process‟ or contextual issue, 
and the predominant legal view that has an incident focus.
916
 
5. Summary 
This chapter has explored the special category of cross applications referred to as 
dual applications. The number of dual applications gathered in this study was 
small and the information about them highly limited; this creates difficulties in 
analysis. This information was supplemented by the in-depth interviews with 
police. What emerges is a policing approach that emphasises incidents and 
physical violence, often with accompanying injuries. While this might suggest 
that these cases concern more serious events, this is certainly not the picture that 
emerges from the complaint narratives; rather what emerges from those 
narratives is a lack of police attention, a lazy approach to police investigation, 
and an approach that appears to undermine both parties‟ claims to protection. 
The complaint narratives suggest a level of mutual culpability in the incident. In 
turn all but one of the police dual applications gathered in this study were 
resolved in a mutual way, via withdrawal or mutual orders. However, the 
detailed case studies presented at the end of this chapter suggest that a different 
picture of the cases emerges when further information is available beyond the 
limited complaint narrative. 
The next chapter explores in greater detail the way in which cross applications 
generally are approached by the legal system and personnel – here, many of the 
factors brought into focus concerning dual applications such as incident 
definitions, mutual culpability, „both as bad as each other‟, and a failure to assess 
the claims but rather seek some settlement are also evident. 
                                                          
916 Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1456; Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟, above n21 at 131; and McMahon & Pence, 
above n21 at 52.  
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9. Before the court 
The life of this legislation…is found not in the appellate record of doctrinal 
interpretation, but in the day to day functioning of the … Magistrates Court.917 
This chapter explores how professionals working in the ADVO system respond 
to cross applications and how they attempt to unravel the competing claims made 
by men and women. It explores the underlying conception of domestic violence 
that these professionals bring to their work. It does this by examining three 
interrelated facets of the ADVO legal process: 
1. women‟s encounters with legal representatives and magistrates;918  
2. the making of interim orders and the final disposal of cross applications;919 
and  
3. how professionals understand domestic violence and the competing claims 
raised in cross applications. 
What emerges is a „paired‟ approach to cross applications, where such 
applications tend not to be viewed as individual claims for protection, but rather 
a paired case that gives rise to mutual outcomes. This paired approach is 
contrasted with the experiences of the women interviewed. This demonstrates a 
disjuncture, or a lack of appreciation of the impact of cross applications and the 
mutual resolution of such applications, on victims of domestic violence seeking 
protection from the legal system. 
1. Cross applications before the local court 
A. Engagement with key professionals 
i. Legal representation 
The vast majority of first applicants in the court file sample were legally 
represented (89.7%). This reflects the high rate of police initiated applications 
                                                          
917 Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 69-70.  
918 Some women also commented on the police and the WDVCASs, however, these did not relate to cross applications, 
and therefore are not discussed. 
919 The other key decision concerns the orders included in an ADVO. This is beyond the scope of this study; while I noted 
the orders made in the court file sample and for the women interviewed, it was not possible to make any comments about 
the negotiation or decision-making processes that led to those orders. This involves a complex interplay of what orders 
were sought, the substance of the complaint, and the role and approach of legal representatives and magistrates. 
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(police initiated over 70% of first applications, Table 6.3), which means that the 
police prosecutor acts in these cases. It also reflects the fact that at all three 
courts where the court file sample was gathered, the WDVCAS provided free 
legal representation to women who sought private applications.
920
 The rate of 
representation for second applicants was lower (64.1%); most likely reflecting 
the lower level of police involvement (police initiated only 11.8% of second 
applications, Table 6.3). 
The police prosecutor represented over half of the women interviewed (6/10).
921
 
These women provided varied, and sometimes mixed, assessments of that 
representation. Chloe, for example, appreciated having police representation; it 
made her feel that she „had someone on my side‟ and was believed. Despite this 
general appreciation, Chloe, like most of the women represented by the police, 
lamented that she was unable to speak with the prosecutor prior to court.
922
 The 
NSWLRC and the Ombudsman have both documented this problem.
923
 As one 
police prosecutor admitted „[I spend] next to no time. In fact I can confidently say 
[I have] never [spoken with a victim before a mention]‟, and that before a 
hearing he „rarely‟ did so.924 Police prosecutors operate under considerable 
resource constraints, this means that they are often not allocated cases until the 
day of court, and hence are frequently unfamiliar with the details of cases.
925
 
These are all factors that impede the quality of representation. 
Keira‟s comments reflect on this lack of communication. For Keira‟s first 
ADVO, which was police initiated and not accompanied by a cross application, 
the defendant indicated that he was prepared to consent without admissions to a 
final ADVO if it was made for six months. The police accepted this offer, 
however, Keira countered: 
…you couldn‟t talk to them [the police prosecutors] … they wouldn‟t listen to you. Um when 
you said „no‟ to something; like I disagreed with the six months … they still put that on the 
                                                          
920 A number of WDVCASs have trained solicitors rostered on to provide representation to women who have sought 
private ADVOs. In 1999 the Legal Aid Commission formalised this process establishing a Domestic Violence Solicitor 
Scheme which operates in 12 courts: Legal Aid NSW, Report on Legal Aid NSW Services to People in Domestic Violence 
Situations (2008) at 19. 
921 Chloe, Frances, Janet, Keira, Lillian and Louise. 
922 See also Janet, Keira, Lillian and Louise. 
923 See NSWLRC, „AVOs‟ above n11 at [3.21]; and NSW Ombudsman, above n11 at [6.1]. 
924 PP3. See also PP5, but note that PP5 considered that this work was performed by DVLOs. 
925 NSWLRC, „AVOs‟, above n11 at [3.21]. 
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table and just totally disregarded how I felt. Um they might be professional lawyers but I'd 
been living in the situation and I probably was in a better position to know what was 
necessary to ensure this never happened again … I honestly believe that if the [first] ADVO 
… had been for 12 months that would have been a sufficient gap.926  
Keira‟s former partner abided by this ADVO, but recommenced his harassing 
behaviour once it expired. As a result the police sought another ADVO to protect 
Keira. This time the defendant lodged a private cross application and was 
successful in having the two ADVO applications adjourned to another court. 
Unfortunately it appears that the police at the first court failed to forward Keira‟s 
file to the new police LAC handling the case. Thus on the day of the hearing the 
police prosecutor had no information about Keira‟s case; he was therefore not in 
a position to proceed with the hearing and had to pursue settlement. In contrast 
the defendant was fully prepared with a barrister and a solicitor. Keira felt 
excluded from the negotiations and discussions that took place: 
So I showed up to court, everyone else had a police officer assigned to their case, I'm just 
sitting there going „OK, whatever‟ and then his lawyer approached…the police prosecutor 
and they went around the corner, [and] had a discussion, I'm in tears going „can someone 
talk to me‟ um and then … you have to go straight into court. So his lawyer, he …had 
organised everything and knew exactly what was happening before anyone had even spoken 
to me…  
This case was resolved via mutual withdrawal with undertakings. While many of 
the problems with Keira‟s case were the product of poor communication between 
one LAC and another, her experience led her to conclude that if she sought 
another ADVO she would make a private application at a court where the 
WDVCAS provided legal representation,
927
 so that she would be able to speak to 
the lawyer face-to-face. Keira stated „I'd never go through the police prosecution 
again‟.928 
The advent of a cross application creates a number of difficulties for police 
applicants. This is because the police will not act for that applicant in defence of 
the cross application.
929
 Thus a police applicant will be required to either 
represent themselves, or engage a solicitor, in defence of the cross application. If 
the person engages a solicitor, this creates an awkward situation where the first 
                                                          
926 Keira. 
927 See above n920. 
928 See also Lillian. 
929 A police prosecutor, however, has discretion to represent victims as defendants in cross applications at mentions: NSW 
Police Service, „SOPS‟, above n398 Appendix G at [7]. 
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applicant (generally the woman) will have two legal representatives partially 
briefed on the case, whereas the defendant, (generally the male) who is more 
likely to have made a private ADVO application, will retain one private lawyer 
for both applications.
930
 There are obviously advantages with engaging a single 
representative to conduct both cases.
931
 
While Legal Aid is ostensibly available to people who are defendants in ADVO 
cross applications, this does not always take place.
932
 Rosemary, for example, 
was initially successful in instructing a private solicitor with a grant of Legal Aid 
to represent her in her private ADVO application and in defence of the cross 
application. The complaint for the cross application was weak appearing to have 
no grounds for an ADVO. It alleged that Rosemary had removed personal and 
joint property from her former husband‟s residence, „much more than … her 
entitled share of the matrimonial property‟ and that Rosemary had „scratched‟ 
his car when she was removing these items and „turned off [a freezer] spoiling all 
the items‟.933 These initial cases were resolved with Rosemary obtaining an 
ADVO ex parte while the cross application was dismissed because her former 
husband failed to attend court. However, three months later Rosemary‟s former 
husband sought another ADVO, based on exactly the same complaint, at a Local 
Court a considerable distance from where she resided.
934
 Rosemary‟s solicitor 
was unable to obtain Legal Aid to defend this new application as there was now 
no accompanying complaint from Rosemary. She could not afford to travel to the 
new court or engage a private solicitor to appear for her. Her solicitor wrote a 
letter to the Local Court with a detailed history of the proceedings requesting that 
Rosemary‟s former husband‟s complaint be struck out. It is not known what 
transpired at the new court, whether the magistrate made reference to this letter, 
or whether Rosemary‟s former husband provided oral evidence to supplement his 
complaint; ultimately Rosemary‟s former husband was granted an ADVO ex 
parte against her. Thus effectively resulting in mutual orders. 
                                                          
930 See Tables 6.2 & 6.3. 
931 This was recognised by PP1. 
932 See above n373. Legal Aid policy changed in March 2008. This may mean that more defendants in cross applications 
obtain aid. 
933 Compare Rosemary‟s complaint quoted in Chapter 5. 
934 WDVCAS4 also mentioned this phenomenon of court shopping and proposed a state-wide database enabling courts to 
check whether there had been previous ADVO applications.  
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ii. Magistrates 
The women interviewed provided mixed impressions of the magistrates who 
determined their cases: some were impressed while others identified deficiencies. 
Women who attended court in metropolitan Sydney on multiple occasions 
generally appeared before different magistrates. In comparison, women who 
resided in smaller communities generally had the same magistrate handle their 
case. The women in this latter group identified advantages with this consistency; 
it meant that the magistrate was familiar with their case, had knowledge about 
what was taking place in their relationship, and about the acts and patterns of 
behaviours that the defendant used. This was seen as being of particular benefit 
when the cross application was lodged. For example, Louise, who lived in a rural 
area, made positive comments about having the same magistrate for her ADVO 
application and the cross application lodged after her ADVO was finalised: 
[The magistrate] he would remember us because we‟d been to court so many times and he 
was the judge that did the day in court … when my ex-husband fought my AVO. …Yeah so 
he had a fair history of the whole thing.
935
 
It is arguable that magistrates located in smaller, rural courts are able to adopt an 
approach that takes account of context when approaching domestic violence 
cases. In these courts many of the key professionals know each other, and are 
likely to know the complainants and defendants that attend court on multiple 
occasions; this provides a contextual picture unable to be constructed in 
metropolitan courts. 
Those women whose ADVO application and cross application were listed in 
metropolitan courts on multiple occasions generally encountered different 
magistrates and thus made comments about variation in judicial approaches. 
Other professionals also commented on this variability.
936
 Marcella‟s case, for 
example, was adjourned „about nine or ten‟ times, always before a different 
magistrate. She was critical of the first magistrate who made „automatic‟ mutual 
IOs without regard to the allegations contained in the two complaints. Marcella, 
however, had positive comments about another magistrate who appeared to 
question the substance of her former husband‟s complaint suggesting that the 
                                                          
935 See also Janet. 
936 DVLO5, DVLO6, PP1, PP5, SOL1, SOL2, SOL5 and WDVCAS4. This variability has been noted in other 
research/reports: see Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 132; NSWLRC, „AVOs‟, above n11 at [3.41]; 
and VLRC, „Consultation Paper, above n377 at [8.56]. 
224 
matters he alleged did not make him fearful. In contrast this magistrate noted that 
Marcella‟s allegations concerned a „history of domestic violence‟. The approach 
of this magistrate made Marcella feel supported and believed. Marcella, 
however, criticised the magistrate listed to hear her ADVO and the cross 
application. This magistrate made it clear that she „was not really interested in 
hearing‟ the matters, and gave the impression that she viewed it as „wasting the 
court‟s time‟ as a result this magistrate „encouraged‟ the parties to negotiate. In 
the end the parties agreed to mutual consent orders. 
Keira‟s case, discussed above, which was transferred from one court to another, 
also commented on variation between magistrates. At the first court she felt that 
the magistrates had a good understanding of domestic violence, however at the 
second court she felt the opposite: 
[At the first court, the magistrates] seem[ed] to have a much better understanding of 
domestic violence um they never ever once asked me to do a mutual undertaking … it was 
kind of like „Okay, this is serious and she‟s making serious allegations [a sexual 
assault]….[At the second court the magistrate] … asked me to go to counselling together, 
rather than sending it to hearing and I [was] just like totally outraged that they would even 
suggest [that] when I'm applying for an [ADVO], „what makes you think that I want to sit 
down with him and discuss our problems‟. Um and you know [my former partner] sat there 
and went „yeah I'm quite happy to go to counselling… and work out our differences.‟ And 
the judge was like looking at me going „well he‟s happy, why aren‟t you?‟ [laughter] 
A critical determinant of women‟s encounters with the legal system rests on the 
demeanour of the judge or magistrate determining the case. James Ptacek 
examined civil protection order proceedings in two Massachusetts courts in 
1992-1993 and identified five types of judicial demeanour: good natured, 
bureaucratic, firm/formal, harsh, and condescending/patronising.
937
 In the present 
study, the brevity of proceedings meant that most women had few comments to 
make about magistrates let alone assessments of demeanour. Court observations 
confirmed this brevity,
938
 and the centrality of procedural issues. This meant that 
overwhelmingly the demeanour of the magistrates observed was 
„bureaucratic‟.939 Ptacek describes the bureaucratic approach as one in which the 
judge is passive, less engaged in the process, displays little empathy for the 
victim, maintains emotional distance from the parties and the nature of their 
                                                          
937 Ptacek, above n13. 
938 A characteristic of the bureaucratic approach: ibid at 102. 
939 Hunter reached a similar assessment in Victoria: „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 107. 
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claims, asks fewer questions, and concentrates on the paper-work rather than the 
people in court.
940
 This approach has consequences for women seeking 
protection: 
Bureaucratic judges were viewed by the women as distant and unconcerned and less 
likely…to spend sufficient time with them. The human connection that women found so 
supportive with good-natured judges was absent from their experience with bureaucratic 
judges. Instead of recognition and compassion, women described feeling like just 
another case.
941
 
Hunter emphasises that institutional environments characterised by high 
workloads reinforce routine or bureaucratic approaches.
942
 These features are 
clearly present in the NSW Local Court.  
Consideration also needs to be given to whether the dominant bureaucratic 
approach in ADVO proceedings might have additional consequences for cross 
applications. As some of the women interviewed commented, the advent of the 
cross claim created a situation where they felt that they had to constantly 
demonstrate that they were the victim, that they were not to blame, and 
frequently meant that they documented their own behaviour in minute detail to 
avoid further accusations about their own behaviour.
943
 Coming before a 
bureaucratic magistrate not only provided no scope for these corrective stories to 
be told, but also meant that these women never received messages that countered 
the effect of the cross claim or that validated their experience of violence. This is 
because a bureaucratic approach governed by procedure and brevity provides 
little, if any scope, for women to be able to put forward their claim for protection 
or to challenge the claim made by the cross applicant. Rather in a bureaucratic 
approach a cross claim simply got dealt with, or processed, often through a 
mutual settlement leaving the woman‟s story untold and unheard. 
B. Key decisions in the court process 
i.  The making of interim orders 
As outlined in Chapter 4, IOs provide urgent protection until an ADVO 
application is finalised. The legislative guidance for granting an IO is minimal; 
                                                          
940 Ptacek, above n13 at 101-02. 
941 Ibid at 153. 
942 See Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟ above n58 at 107. 
943 See Frances and Lillian. 
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the court simply needs to be satisfied that it is „necessary or appropriate to do so 
in the circumstances‟.944 This is often the first key court decision encountered by 
a complainant and hence plays an important role in whether a complainant feels 
that their case has been considered. Thus the making of mutual IOs (or no IOs) in 
cross applications may lead an applicant to feel that their individual case has not 
been assessed, and to question whether the law can assist in unravelling the 
competing claims.
945
 
Most first applicants in the court file sample were granted an IO (78.9% of 
female and 56.3% of male first applicants; this is not statistically significant 
2 
= 
3.4, df = 1, p>0.05). In comparison less than half of second applicants obtained 
an IO (43.8% of female and 44.2% of male second applicants; this is not 
statistically significant 
2 
= 0.002, df = 1, p>0.05). Women first applicants were 
more likely than all other applicants to have an IO, and just under half of these 
were granted to the woman alone (46.3% of women first applicants who were 
granted an IO were the only person to have such protection). In the majority of 
these cases the woman‟s ADVO was listed prior to the cross application. In 
contrast, for all other applicants the IO was likely to be mutual. See Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1: Interim Orders - Court File Sample 
 1
st
 applicant (68) 2
nd
 applicant (68) 
 1
st
 female 
(52) 
1
st
 male 
(16) 
TOTAL 2
nd
 female 
(16) 
2
nd
 male 
(52) 
TOTAL 
Interim 
order 
41  
(78.9% F 1
st
) 
 
9 
(56.3% M 
1
st
) 
50 7 
(43.8% F 2
nd
) 
23 
(44.2% M 
2
nd
) 
30 
Mutual IO 22 
(53.7% of 
those with an 
IO) 
7 
(77.8% of 
those with 
an IO) 
29 7 
(100% of 
those with an 
IO) 
22 
(95.7% of 
those with 
an IO) 
29 
IO for one 
person 
19 
(46.3% of 
those with an 
IO) 
2 
(22.2% of 
those with 
an IO) 
21 0 1 
(4.4% of 
those with 
an IO) 
1 
No 
interim 
order 
11 
(21.2% F 1
st
) 
7 
(43.8% M 
1
st
) 
18 9 
(56.3% F 2
nd
) 
29 
(55.8% M 
2
nd
) 
38 
 
                                                          
944 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562BB(1), now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s22(1). 
945 See Spowart & Neil, above n16 at 84. 
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The interviews with women provided some insight into the process of granting 
IOs.
946
 In cases where the cross applications were listed together, it appeared that 
mutual IOs were granted in a routine or „automatic‟947 fashion as a measure to 
preserve the „status quo‟,948 „keep the peace‟,949 or some gesture towards formal 
equality.
950
  
Keira, who had sought two ADVOs, one when hers was the only application 
before the court, and the second which was accompanied by a cross application, 
was able to contrast the processes. In the first case Keira was required to give 
brief evidence to support her IO. However in the second case, when there was a 
cross application, Keira felt that a different approach was taken; no evidence was 
heard and Keira expressed the view that the legal representatives and magistrate 
started from the presumption that both parties would have an IO, the only 
question was about the terms of those IOs, not the more fundamental question 
whether an IO was „necessary or appropriate‟ for one or both parties.  
Even when a cross application appeared before court on its own, a situation 
where it might be expected to receive greater scrutiny, some women questioned 
the basis on which an IO was granted to the cross applicant. Frances‟s former 
husband, for example, lodged a cross application against her after her own 
ADVO had been finalised. Frances had not been served when this cross 
application was first listed at court and therefore did not appear. On this day at 
court her former husband requested an IO, which was granted ex parte despite his 
written complaint revealing no grounds to support an ADVO (quoted in Chapter 
7). In fact Frances‟s former husband‟s cross application was listed on the same 
day he faced a charge of contravening her ADVO. On the next return date for the 
                                                          
946 Chloe, Janet, Kate, Lillian, Louise and Rosemary (6/10) who had an IO and their former partner did not, could not 
recall whether the man had sought one. 
947 Marcella. See also Keira. 
948 The 1999 survey of NSW magistrates found that just over half (57%, n=39) of magistrates would grant an IO in a cross 
application. Most of these magistrates (over 70%, 28/39) would do so on a mutual basis, and a significant minority (17%, 
5/28) indicated that this was to preserve the status quo: Hickey & Cumines, above n57 at 70. 
949 DVLO3 and SOL5. 
950 Formal equality approaches advocate a gender-neutral approach, treating men and women exactly the same: see 
ALRC, Equality Before the Law: Women‟s Equality (1994) at [3.8]-[3.9]. In contrast the „differences‟ or „special 
measures‟ approach acknowledges that there are differences between men and women that might require additional 
measures in order to achieve equality. Formal equality and differences approaches tend to be the most popular 
conceptions of equality evident in law and legislation. Both have key limitations. In response to the limitations and 
theoretical deficiencies of these approaches Catharine Mackinnon has articulated a „subordination‟ approach which 
theorises equality (and the lack of equality) as a product of power: see „Difference and Dominance‟, in Feminism 
Unmodified (1997); and Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979). For an overview of approaches to equality see 
Graycar & Morgan, above n63 at 28-55. 
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cross application (and charge), Frances was at court and her solicitor successfully 
argued that the IO should not continue.
951
 Frances‟s former husband eventually 
withdrew his ADVO application. In her interview Frances reflected on the 
absurdity of her former husband being granted an IO: 
I think the first time the magistrate saw it and made interim orders it‟s just ridiculous, like 
um you know he sees a complaint‟s been made it‟s got to be looked at, well OK, you look at 
it and you go „yeah all right mate you‟re up here on a breach, you‟re doing this out of spite‟ 
and throw it out. Like it seems so black and white to me that I can‟t understand how they 
can‟t actually see through some of the complaints. 
The magistrates interviewed articulated varied approaches to the making of IOs 
in cross applications.
952
 Two magistrates referred to Smart v Johnson
953
 (which 
requires that when an IO is contested the parties must give evidence and be 
provided with an opportunity to cross examine) and thus described their 
approach in legalistic terms: taking evidence, allowing cross-examination, taking 
submissions, and making a determination.
954
 The remaining magistrates (3/5) 
spoke about determining IOs in a less legalistic manner. MAG1 described his 
approach as follows: 
Well I suppose you look at … who issued the complaint first and … the substance of the 
complaints and form an opinion then as to whether … there should be an interim order for 
one or both… depending on the terms of the interim order too, of course, you know [if] 
she‟s asked for [an exclusion order]…Sometimes …I have declined to make an order or a 
mutual order… [that would] exclude either from the premises …[or] on the basis that they 
can make Family Law applications in respect of the children where the children seem to be 
the sticking point...
955
 
Two magistrates described making IOs in the context of the work environment. 
MAG2 was quite candid about the lack of time available on a list day: 
I mean we‟re guilty of this [making mutual IOs] … than we are in terms of final orders 
because we don‟t have time to take evidence on interim orders and the only way that you 
can mollify everybody on that point is to just make [mutual] interim orders….956 
This discussion has highlighted the variable approach to granting IOs in cross 
applications. It would appear that those cases that are listed on their own, at least 
                                                          
951 It is not known whether this was the same magistrate who granted the IO. 
952 See also DVLO5, PP2, PP5, SOL5 and WDVCAS4. See similar comments in Victoria: Hunter, „Women‟s Experience 
in Court‟, above n58 at 132. 
953 Smart v Johnson (Unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Dunford J, 8 October 1998). See Chapter 4. 
954 MAG3 and MAG5. 
955 MAG1. 
956 See also MAG4 quoted above n458 infra text, and DVLO4. 
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at some stage, are likely to be considered on their own merits, as an individual 
case rather than as part of a cross application. This is seen in both the court file 
and interview samples. At the same time, questionable decisions about the 
granting of some IOs are evidenced in the cross application against Frances, and 
in the perceived automatic granting of mutual IOs in the cases of Keira and 
Marcella. The interviews with magistrates confirm this variable practice and 
emphasise the impact of the work environment in generating mutual outcomes 
which appear aimed at preserving the status quo, „mollifying‟ or „keeping 
everyone happy‟. 
ii.  The resolution of cross applications 
As explained in Chapter 4, ADVOs applications are resolved in three ways: (1) a 
final order may be made by consent, determined ex parte or after a hearing; (2) 
dismissed; or (3) withdrawn. Most are resolved by consent orders, followed 
closely by withdrawal. Reflecting these modes of resolution, cross applications 
may be resolved by: 
 mutual withdrawal (where both parties withdraw their ADVO application, 
usually on the basis of undertakings); 
 mutual orders (where both parties obtain an ADVO generally by consent 
without admissions); 
 only one person obtains an ADVO and the other person‟s application is 
withdrawn or dismissed; 
 mutual dismissal (where both applications are dismissed). 
Mutual withdrawal predominated in the court file sample; 45.5 per cent of cases 
were resolved this way, all at mention. This was followed by mutual orders 
(28.8%). With one exception, mutual orders were made at a mention with both 
parties consenting without admissions. The third way in which cross applications 
were resolved was by one person obtaining an ADVO and the other person‟s 
ADVO being withdrawn or dismissed (18.9%). Notably all the people who were 
successful in obtaining an ADVO were women, most of whom had lodged their 
ADVO application first in time (10/12 excluding the dual applications). More 
hearings were held for this type of resolution than for any other mode of 
resolution (8/14 were determined after a hearing for either the ADVO or a related 
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charge). Mutual dismissal was the least likely way in which cross applications 
were resolved (7.8%). See Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2 Resolution of cross applications – court file sample 
 Cross 
applications made 
on different dates 
(n=67)* 
Dual applications 
(n=10) 
TOTAL (n=77)* 
Mutual withdrawal 30 (44.8%) 5 (50%) 35 (45.5%) 
Mutual orders 20 (29.9%) 2 (20%) 22 (28.6%) 
One person obtains 
an order and the 
other person did not 
12 (17.9%) 2*** (20%) 14 (18.2%) 
Mutual dismissal** 5 (7.5%) 1 (10%) 6 (7.8%) 
*CourtB-8 was excluded, as it was not finalised at the time of the fieldwork. 
** The delineation between mutual withdrawal and mutual dismissal was not always clear. 
Often magistrates mark cases that are withdrawn as ‘withdrawn and dismissed’, others simply 
as ‘withdrawn’. Dismissal following a contested hearing (indicated as dismissal in the table) is 
clearly different to dismissal on the basis of non-attendance (indicated as withdrawal). Given 
the significance of dismissal following a hearing I have included here CourtC-30 where the 
woman’s application was dismissed after a hearing, after which the man withdrew his 
application. 
*** In CourtA-6 the woman consented to the man’s order and withdrew her own, as she already 
had an ADVO against him. So in effect there were mutual orders. 
The data in Table 9.2 aggregates the results from the court file sample (that is, it 
displays the paired results rather than the results for each case). To enable a 
comparison with the resolution of ADVOs generally we need to look at the 
results for individual cases. Looking at individual results (n=154) we find that 
only 58 people involved in cross applications obtained an ADVO (37.7%), while 
96 people did not (62.3%). This does not compare favourably with the making of 
ADVOs generally: in 2002,
957
 50.7 per cent of complainants obtained an ADVO 
and 49.3 per cent did not.
958
  
These results suggest that the lodgement of a cross application is more likely to 
result in a person not obtaining an ADVO than obtaining one. The extent to 
which the results for cross applications represents the way both cases are dealt 
with (that is to say that the results are mutual, rather than individual) also 
emphasises the way that cross applications are approached as one case (a „paired‟ 
approach) rather than two individual cases requiring consideration and 
determination. 
                                                          
957 The year that the court file sample was determined. 
958 Local Courts NSW, „2002‟, above n65 Table 2.4.  
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The resolution of the cross applications in the interview sample was different: 
over half (6/10) of these women obtained an ADVO while the cross applicant did 
not, usually because the cross applicant withdrew his application or failed to 
attend court.
959
 For the remaining women, two agreed to mutual withdrawal,
960
 
one consented to mutual orders without admissions,
961
 and one woman‟s 
application was dismissed while her former partner was successful in obtaining 
an ADVO against her.
962
 
Most of the cases in which the woman was successful and her former partner was 
not (4/6), involved a gap between the finalisation of the woman‟s ADVO and the 
lodgement of the cross application.
963
 Thus in these cases the woman‟s 
application was considered on its own, similarly the cross application was 
considered on its own. This is quite different to the court file sample, where the 
cross applications in that sample were generally those listed together,
964
 and 
hence tended to be treated as a „pair‟ with identical outcomes. This suggests that 
when cross applications are on foot at the same time, negotiation, bargaining, and 
an approach that treats the applications as a „pair‟ comes to the fore. In 
comparison when the originating and cross applications are considered 
separately, due to a gap in time, each complaint appears to be either scrutinised 
on its merits, or the cross is unable to wield its power as a bargaining tool to 
facilitate identical outcomes. The use of cross applications as bargaining tools is 
discussed below. 
Keira and Kate‟s cases were resolved by mutual withdrawal; the most common 
mode of resolution in the court file sample. In Keira‟s case, detailed above, she 
felt she had no option but to accept mutual withdrawal with undertakings because 
of the failure in communication between one police LAC and another, which 
meant that the police were unprepared for the hearing. While Keira was not 
happy with this result, she noted that she obtained „conditions‟ in the undertaking 
                                                          
959 Chloe, Frances Janet, Louise, Lillian and Rosemary.  
960 Kate and Keira. 
961 Marcella. 
962 Megan. 
963 In the remaining cases (Chloe and Rosemary) the man failed to attend court, thus the woman‟s ADVO was granted ex 
parte and the man‟s was dismissed. However, as discussed above, Rosemary‟s former husband lodged another application 
which was successful (thus ultimately resulting in mutual orders). 
964 See discussion of bias in the court file sample in Chapter 3.  
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that she would not have obtained in an ADVO (for example agreement not to 
enter a particular public place).
965
 
Kate‟s ADVO application and the cross application also resulted in mutual 
withdrawal, however, without undertakings. At the time of the interview this had 
proved an effective result for Kate as her former husband ceased his harassment. 
While Kate clearly saw her former husband‟s application as a face-saving, 
retaliatory exercise, she was ultimately happy with the result as she knew that he 
would contest her ADVO application and she „didn‟t want to have to see him 
every fortnight‟ at court.  
One magistrate expressed a preference for resolving ADVO cross applications by 
way of undertakings (rather than orders).
966
 Others recognised that in some cases 
undertakings were the only option available, particularly if the complaint 
narrative for one or both parties was weak.
967
 This again emphasises the 
importance of the quality of the complaint narrative (Chapter 4) when competing 
claims are before the court. A well-drafted complaint can make the difference 
between obtaining an ADVO or settling for an undertaking. These are the cases, 
following Durfee‟s conceptualisation, that have been identified as „border 
cases‟.968 It is worth noting that magistrates, while recognising the legally 
impotent nature of an undertaking, often took steps to imbue it with a level of 
seriousness. For example, MAG2 explained that she accepted undertakings „in 
the most draconian way‟; requiring the defendant to articulate the undertaking in 
court as a method of conveying the court‟s intolerance for domestic violence.969 
C. Settlement: The cross application as a ‘bargaining tool’ 
Settlement, an outcome already emphasised in ADVO proceedings,
970
 assumes a 
greater role in cross applications, where the deployment of a cross application 
operates as a bargaining tool to generate a particular outcome (generally mutual 
withdrawal). Many professionals and the women interviewed made reference to a 
                                                          
965 See above n477 and infra text for an explanation of an undertaking and is non-enforceable nature. 
966 MAG4.  
967 MAG2. See also PP1. 
968 See Durfee, above n401 at 135-36. See discussion in Chapters 4-5. 
969 See also MAG4. 
970 See Chapter 4. 
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cross application within this framework referring to it as a „bargaining tool‟ or a 
mechanism to „level the playing field‟.971  
This „tool‟ analogy was used in two ways: (1) as a tactic used by cross 
applicants; and (2) as leverage able to be harnessed by professionals to facilitate 
settlement. While these two aspects might seem like much the same thing, one is 
perceived as negative, while the other is cast in a positive way (by professionals).  
i. A tool used against the originating complainant 
The predominance of mutual withdrawal as an outcome of cross applications 
(demonstrated in Table 9.2), lends support to the contention that the primary 
motivation for making a cross application is tactical, to achieve withdrawal, 
rather than a measure to obtain protection. This resonates with the argument that 
the claims made by fathers‟ rights groups about domestic violence are more 
about reducing specialist services for women, than about increasing the safety of 
men and women who experience violence. Such stances undermine the claim by 
fathers‟ rights groups for victim status.972 The success of cross applications to 
generate mutual withdrawal supports this contention. Keira, whose case was 
resolved via mutual withdrawal with undertakings, described this tactical 
process: 
„If you‟ll drop yours, we‟ll drop ours‟ … I guess that was the most baffling thing about 
the whole thing was that he had a cross application and then just used it as a bargaining 
chip … even though it‟s not meant to used like that, everybody knows it is …and so you 
just let [him] get away with it.
973
 
Similarly some women described the cross application as a method of „levelling 
the playing field‟,974 „game playing‟ and a „tit-for-tat‟ exercise.975 Other women 
described the making of the cross application as a method of vindicating male 
pride, for example as an exercise in which the man sought to „save face‟976 by 
making the woman „look like the villain‟,977 or that the cross application was an 
                                                          
971 See DVLO1, DVLO4, DVLO5, DVLO6 (4/6); MAG1, MAG2, MAG5 (3/5); PP2 (1/5); SOL1, SOL2, SOL3 (3/5); 
WDVCAS3, WDVCAS4, WDVCAS5 (3/5). See Keira and Kate. 
972 See Kimmel, above n108 at 1333, 1354; and Flood, „The Debate Over‟, above n183. 
973 Keira. See also DVLO1, DVLO5, DVLO6, PP2 and PP3. 
974 Kate. 
975 Chloe. 
976 Marcella. See also Rosemary. 
977 Kate. 
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„ego trip‟.978 The powerful effect of this bargaining chip was summarised by 
Keira when she reflected on what she would do if faced with another cross 
application: „I'd just say „okay, well I‟ve got to drop it and just walk away‟. And 
just live with that fear because it‟s easier than going to court 25 times to have 
exactly the same outcome‟. 
A number of professionals also acknowledged that cross applications function 
this way.
979
 Three professionals specifically drew a connection between the use 
of the cross complaint as an exercise in reasserting power.980 These professionals 
noted that for victims of domestic violence seeking legal protection can be an 
empowering process, where the violence against them is acknowledged and 
validated.
981
 This potential empowerment is undermined by a cross application: 
..when a victim goes to the police and gets an order the power shifts… to the 
victim…and I think when the other party takes out an order they try and gain some 
power back. That‟s what they do, and if you have an order you know then he might have 
a bit of the power back because he then has the ability to say „okay, well you drop your 
order, I‟ll drop mine‟.982 
Similarly MAG5 noted that some male defendants do not like the „fact that 
women are standing up for themselves, supported by the infrastructure of the 
legal system, they don‟t like it. So they‟ve got to get theirs back, you know.‟  
While recognising a cross application as a form of power-play, two DVLOs cast 
cross applications as beneficial because they deflected or diffused the cross 
applicant‟s anger by providing the cross applicant with an avenue to have their 
claims heard, thus „taking the heat off the victim‟. It is important to note that 
these DVLOs were of the view
983
 that cross applications were generally resolved 
following a hearing (a view not supported by Table 9.2). 
I feel that it‟s [a cross application] positive because it‟s an … outlet for [the cross 
applicant‟s] frustrations. It may not be the most optimum way…but if they feel like … 
                                                          
978 Rosemary. 
979 DVLO1, DVLO4, DVLO5, DVLO6 (4/6); MAG1, MAG2 (2/5); PP2 (1/5); SOL1, SOL2, SOL5 (2/5); WDVCAS3, 
WDVCAS4, WDVCAS5 (3/5). 
980 DVLO1, MAG5 and PP2. 
981 See Goldfarb, above n265 at 1514-15; Stubbs & Egger, above n63 at 11; Stubbs & Powell, above n402 at 113; Karla 
Fisher & Mary Rose, „When “Enough is Enough”: Battered Women‟s Decision Making Around Court Orders of 
Protection‟ (1995) 41 Crime & Delinquency 414 at 417. 
982 PP2. See also DVLO1 and WDVCAS4.  
983 A small number of professionals shared this view, that most cross applications were resolved with only one person 
obtaining an order either at hearing or at mention: see DVLO2, DVLO3, DVLO5, DVLO6 (4/6); PP1, PP5 (2/5); SOL1 
(1/5); and WDVCAS1 (1/5). 
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they‟re going to get their day in court and be heard…so at the end of the day [the cross 
application is] really irrelevant because the truth will come out [at the hearing] and the 
right AVO application will be [granted].
984
  
… you know the victim might feel like, „Oh my God I can't believe that he's taken a 
cross-application‟, she might feel violated or betrayed but because we know the system, 
we know the drill, we know it's not gonna reflect on any, it's not gonna reflect on the 
police there being a cross-application. We know that it's actually gonna calm the 
situation.
985
 
… Because he's had his day, he's got his bit of control back for a little while until the 
magistrate makes the decision.
986
 
The dominance of settled outcomes undermines the belief held by these two 
DVLOs that cross applications are beneficial. While these DVLOs acknowledged 
the impact on victims, their belief in the benefits of a cross application and what 
they saw as the ultimate outcome, stands in contradistinction to the profound 
impact that the women interviewed spoke about:  
I was trying to do something to help myself by getting the AVO and it just seemed like it was 
not going to happen and he was the one that‟s going to win again and that really upset 
me.
987
 
CAS2 highlighted the impact that a cross application has on women: 
… It can either … make them withdraw and go home and hide or – or make them angry and 
make them get through it. And it is different because um …– I don‟t know how you put this 
in, but when a woman goes to court and is getting an AVO, that‟s hard enough in itself, and 
often they don‟t feel like victims they feel like they‟ve done something wrong to be in court, 
all that sort of stuff. …[I] spend a lot of time with women who haven‟t done anything wrong 
… then they‟ve got this thing slapped on them and it says that they have and that they‟ve got 
… prove they‟re innocent.988 
In this way, cross applications are not merely a data source to examine men‟s and 
women‟s competing allegations about domestic violence, but are also deployed by 
some men to undermine and counter women‟s claims for protection and their sense 
of empowerment in taking legal action. 
ii. A tool used by professionals 
Professionals interviewed (particularly legal representatives and magistrates) 
often perceived cross applications as a positive, or at least a convenient, tool to 
accelerate settlement, or to calm the situation. For example MAG2 stated that 
                                                          
984 DVLO5. 
985 DVLO5. 
986 DVLO6. 
987 Janet. See also Rosemary. 
988 See also WDVCAS4. 
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when faced with a cross application she takes the view that „we must be able to 
get a settlement out of here somewhere‟ and that it functions as an „open door to 
…settlement‟989 Similarly SOL3 described a cross application as a useful 
„negotiating tool‟. It was not always clear what the desired outcome was; rather it 
appeared that settlement was the goal, regardless of the form that settlement took. 
Like other areas of judicial practice discussed in this thesis, magistrates‟ 
approach to finalising cross applications varied. MAG2 admitted that she 
approaches cross applications in a different way to applications that present on 
their own: 
…to my shame I shouldn‟t treat them differently, but you do….yes, hers is about, you 
know, shocking dreadful, scumbag violence and his is about two phone calls to work or 
something, you know. Like normally you‟d be looking at his going „…I don‟t really think 
there‟s enough here‟…If it was on its own, you‟d hose it out probably.990 
Instead settlement is sought. As MAG2 went on to describe: 
…I use it as a tool, and I think of myself as perhaps one of the more enlightened 
members of the bench, so I can‟t imagine how it‟s used by others to try and clear out the 
list. 
When pursuing settlement MAG2, noting that it was a „compromised world‟, 
focused on whether she felt that the woman had the capacity to continue with her 
application if it were contested: Would she be intimidated or harassed to 
withdraw? Would she be able to sustain cross-examination? Thus MAG2 took 
the view that it was better for the woman to obtain an ADVO in mutual 
circumstances, than for her not to obtain one at all: 
[Mutual] orders are useful sometimes to … get an uncontested order out of somebody 
that you wouldn‟t … without a dreadful hearing and a shocking shouting match and the 
possibility that he would …intimidate her so badly before the hearing date that she 
wouldn‟t come [along]….I guess you sort of make a decision – you get a pretty good 
judge of character as to whether you can look at someone and think, „am I going to see 
you in two months time when this is on for hearing…?‟ You know, the fight‟s almost 
gone … and in two months time [her] resolve, there will be nothing left. 
In this vein PP1 stated „some victims don‟t want to give evidence and they don‟t 
want to get in the witness box, so you try and do the best you can‟. Professionals 
interviewed by Hunter in Victoria also noted that the prospect of a hearing may 
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„frighten‟ some women; it may entail being cross-examined by the defendant, 
and the outcome is unknown.
991
  
MAG4 presented a different approach. As noted in Chapter 4 this magistrate 
adopted a general approach of avoiding hearings, if possible, in ADVO matters. 
MAG4 explained his approach to cross applications: 
I try to ah approach them in a calm, logical manner. I point out the cost factor … I point 
out the fact that I observe A, B and C within their various applications and I point out 
the fact that it appears to me that they‟ll continue to have some form of relationship by 
reason of whatever that I may be able to identify. … I point out orders can be made 
against one, both, none. If they breach an order they could both end up – ah if it‟s 
serious enough, spending time in custody. .… What I do is try and take them through the 
range of matters that can occur and then I encourage them to work with their 
practitioners to come to a resolution and point out that they are the architects that 
brought them before the court. The court doesn‟t have any magic wand. The court could 
get it wrong. …. So what I try and do is make them feel responsible for coming up with 
the resolution to their problem. 
What is interesting about this approach is the way that MAG4 articulates the 
cases as a „pair‟ („they are the architects‟ and „their problem‟) rather than 
identifying and responding to the individual claims for protection. It also ignores 
the fact that these claims arise in the context of domestic violence where 
negotiation and resolution, which assumes some equality between the parties, 
may not be possible. A similar approach was observed at CourtD where a case 
listed for hearing settled on the basis of mutual withdrawal with undertakings. In 
accepting this settlement the magistrate commented, „thank you for being able to 
resolve this amicably and saving the court so much time‟.992 Again the „problem‟ 
of the cross application was cast as one for both parties to resolve together, rather 
than an issue about who might require protection, who might be in fear, and thus 
what the implications of such a settlement might be for the parties. 
So while the approach of the three magistrates outlined above all resulted in 
„dual‟ outcomes, the first maintained a focus on the individual nature of the 
claims, while the other magistrates viewed the claims as a pair. 
Time and resource limitations also play an important role in generating 
settlement. These are not only constraints faced by the court,
993
 but are also faced 
                                                          
991 Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 119. 
992 Observation CourtD (26 November 2006). 
993 See Chapter 4 and the discussion of granting IOs above. 
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by the parties involved. The prospect of multiple court appearances, a lengthy 
wait until the hearing date, combine to make settlement appear attractive as 
complainants and defendants juggle concerns about work, child care and legal 
costs. This was recognised by a number of professionals: 
I think sometimes victims back down and end up agreeing … because they just see the 
whole process being so drawn out and, and some victims you know, they have to go and 
get themselves a legal representative and they might not have the money, they mightn‟t 
have the time, they‟ve taken time off work already just to come to the AVO matter in the 
first place. You know they might have kids and some of them just think, „Oh you know, 
I‟m just gonna agree‟.994 
Some magistrates may highlight these factors as a method of encouraging 
settlement.
995
  
Solicitors expressed mixed views about the way that cross applications were used 
as a „negotiating tool‟.996 SOL5 pointed out that if his client‟s complaint 
contained „serious concerns about violence, I probably wouldn‟t bother 
talking‟.997 Obviously a well-drafted complaint is critical to the ability to be able 
to take such stands in the negotiation process.
998
 SOL1, however, suggested that 
cross applications provide less room for bargaining, as there are only two options 
that negotiation centres on: mutual withdrawal and mutual orders. 
Other professionals‟ criticised lawyers for advising clients to take out cross 
applications simply to obtain a negotiation tool.
999
 The solicitors provided a 
different account of such advice. SOL2 noted that the first person that seeks an 
ADVO may not necessarily be the person that requires protection, and in this 
case he would advise his client to seek a cross application „as a necessary 
response‟. However, SOL3 admitted that he has advised clients to seek a cross 
application in order „to have a negotiating tool‟. For example SOL3 noted that a 
cross application may be a useful tool when the original defendant risks losing 
                                                          
994 PP2. See also MAG2, MAG3, MAG4 and PP1. 
995 See MAG4. 
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997 See also SOL3. 
998 See Chapter 4. 
999 DVLO1, DVLO3, DVLO4, DVLO6, WDVCAS2, and WDVCAS5. 
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his gun licence if an ADVO is made against him,
1000
 or that it might be a useful 
tool in related legal proceedings (for example to generate a property settlement).  
iii. The impact of mutual outcomes 
The perceived impact of mutual outcomes (particularly mutual orders) revealed 
disparity between the views held by professionals and the women interviewed. 
Professionals generally viewed mutual orders as an attractive way to resolve 
cross applications because they avoided a contested hearing yet the woman still 
obtained an order.
1001
 Most professionals did not identify any negative outcomes 
arising from mutual orders.
1002
 DVLO2, for example, stated that mutual orders are 
„easier‟ and the parties „can both go home and everyone is happy‟.1003 In this 
way it appears that „lawyers and judges often think that whether the protection 
order is mutual makes little real difference‟.1004 Marcella and Rosemary counter 
this view of being „happy‟ with mutual orders.  
Marcella‟s case was the only one in the interview sample that resulted in mutual 
orders by consent on the same day at court. Marcella agreed to this settlement to 
avoid the risk of not obtaining an ADVO. Like related debates about „choice‟ and 
tension between victimisation and agency,
1005
 Marcella reflected on this „choice‟ 
within the limited and risky options available to her: 
[I]t could go either way … [if] they don‟t find me to be credible enough ... the risk was too 
much when it comes to this – I couldn‟t take that so I – I took the option of … just agreeing. 
Because otherwise, I know that – I had a feeling that he can … lie so much … he is very 
good with words. … but I think …I did the best choice because I cannot [not have an 
ADVO] … so I [had to] …compromise. 
As Hunter has pointed our there is little, if any, „interrogation of the freedom or 
fairness‟ of a woman‟s consent to mutual orders.1006  
Rosemary ultimately ended up with mutual orders, although as discussed above, 
these were determined on different dates at different courts. In her interview 
                                                          
1000 Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) s11(5)(c). 
1001 Eg see MAG2 quoted above. 
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1005 See Schneider, above n19 at 75-77. 
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Rosemary described how her solicitor attempted to alleviate her concerns about 
being subject to a mutual order, yet Rosemary‟s comments stand in marked contrast 
to how professionals interviewed in this thesis appeared to view mutual orders as 
being of little consequence for victims of domestic violence: 
[My solicitor] …said „look don‟t worry about it‟. He said … „you know you haven‟t done 
nothing wrong, the court [and]… the police know that you haven‟t done nothing wrong‟, he 
said „everyone‟s got a little mark against them somehow‟… So he said „don‟t worry about 
it‟ … But it does worry me, you know, because … having … something on me that I haven‟t 
done. It‟s not right… And that really gets to me … it‟s not fair. 
In a similar way WDVCAS2 noted that some of her clients consented to mutual 
orders to „get it over and done with‟ but that they also struggled with this „because 
they are saying, “I don‟t see why I should because I haven‟t done anything”…‟.1007  
USA research documents a range of potential negative outcomes for women as a 
result of mutual orders, including that they: add fuel to the suggestion that men and 
women are equally violent, fail to place responsibility on the perpetrator, 
negatively impact on the woman‟s credibility, and may create problems for 
subsequent enforcement of orders (police may be confused about who to arrest, if 
anyone, or whether to arrest both parties).
1008
 In this way WDVCAS coordinators 
noted that mutual orders „mark…[a woman] as a perpetrator‟,1009 and place her 
at risk of being alleged to have breached the ADVO.
1010
 WDVCAS4 concluded 
that mutual orders provide women with „less protection‟ because: 
… as soon as anything [be]comes the least bit complicated the police just bow out and 
are likely to say „it‟s a family law issue‟ or something…the woman has said „you know I 
called the police…and um the police have taken notice of him‟ with [him] brandishing 
an AVO, he says…‟she‟s violent to me too‟, so [the police] see that – they use that as 
evidence of her violence and a lack of her credibility….It impacts on her protection in a 
negative way. 
In contrast other professionals were of the view that mutual orders created no 
additional difficulties: 
No, no mutual orders are fine it just means they've both got orders against them. So I 
don't think there is any problem with mutual orders. I mean police independently 
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investigate every incident and if they've got mutual orders and they've both breached 
their orders well then police take action against both of them.
1011
 
However, as demonstrated in the discussion of dual applications in Chapter 8, 
this faith in the thoroughness of a police investigation when both parties make 
allegations is open to question.  
The other reason professionals offered for considering that mutual orders were of 
little consequence was that they had never come across a breach of a mutual 
order. DVLO6, for example, suggested that mutual orders work well and are 
„positive in the sense that very rarely do you ever see a breach‟. SOL1 also 
stated that „we[„ve] never had…any negative feedback about [mutual orders]‟. 
Thus the absence of a breach is viewed positively; with no consideration of the 
possibility that one or both parties did not report the breach due to a loss of faith 
in the police and the legal system. In contrast to this „no problem‟ assumption, 
research from the USA has found that some women involved in dual arrests will 
not contact the police in the future as a result of that arrest.
1012
 This was 
confirmed by WDVCAS3 who noted that women whose cases resulted in mutual 
withdrawal tend „not to call police because … they don‟t want to go through it 
again… they think the system‟s let them down‟.  
Four professionals noted that mutual orders would have a negative impact on a 
woman‟s credibility in ADVO and other legal proceedings.1013 As DVLO1 noted 
mutual orders „blur the line between who‟s the victim and who‟s the offender‟. 
Similarly DVLO5 stated that a cross application „may put a bit of doubt in your 
mind…is my victim really a victim, can she be a defendant‟. WDVCAS4 noted 
that mutual orders would „negate‟ or counter a woman‟s ability to access some of 
the protective measures available for victims of domestic violence in the family 
law system. MAG2, even though she recognised that this was not necessarily the 
case, explained that if she saw that the parties had mutual ADVOs in a family 
law application that would give „a heads up about mutual antagonism between 
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the parties‟,1014 and that „in the back of your mind … they‟re both as bad as each 
other kind of idea comes up, which is totally wrong…‟. 
In this vein Frances noted that in her subsequent dealings with the Family Court, 
her former husband‟s solicitor would raise the cross applications „to make [the 
violence] sound really two-sided. Like … we were both this hysterical violent 
couple that were out to get each other‟. This was even though Frances obtained her 
ADVO after her former husband held her in a siege, and the cross application 
lodged some time later, and subsequently withdraw, coincided with her former 
husband being charged with contravening her ADVO.  
SOL3 presented an entirely different view stating that mutual ADVOs were 
appropriate when there were family law proceedings as this would mean that 
„both parties [would] be treated equally‟. Such an approach, drawing on notions 
of formal equality,
1015
 fails to recognise any differences in the experience of 
violence by one or both parties and how that might be important in the 
determination of any subsequent family law proceedings.  
The dominance of mutual outcomes (withdrawal and consent orders), combined 
with the view of professionals that mutual outcomes were of little consequence, 
stands in marked contrast to the experiences of the women interviewed. These 
women described the cross application has having a great impact on them 
(regardless of the outcome) where it was frequently described in terms of 
undermining their claims and blaming them for the violence. In turn, for those 
cases that resulted in mutual outcomes, the women spoke about the way in which 
such results were „unfair‟ or left them feeling that their legal actions against their 
former partner were without consequence. 
2. Implementation: The professionals who facilitate the 
ADVO system 
Chapter 2 raised concern about the gap between the intention and content of the 
law and its implementation. This was identified as a particular issue for 
developments in the law generated as a result of feminist activism, such as the 
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development of civil protection orders to respond to domestic violence. In this 
part of the chapter I explore whether the practice of the law gives effect to the 
progressive elements of the NSW ADVO system (outlined in Chapter 2); that is 
whether it moves beyond the criminal law‟s focus on discrete incidents of 
violence.  
A. Domestic violence: definitions versus practice 
Most of the professionals interviewed articulated broad, well-developed 
understandings of domestic violence when asked the general question: How do 
you define or understand domestic violence? Only four professionals confined 
their response to the legislative definition.
1016
 For those who articulated broad 
definitions this incorporated reference to:  
 a wide range of acts and behaviours;1017  
 power and/or control;1018  
 women as the predominant victims of domestic violence;1019 and 
 patterns of behaviour, a history of behaviour, or repetition.1020 
These are all features reflective of feminist definitions of domestic violence 
discussed in Chapter 2. MAG5 made specific connections between the 
experience of domestic violence and women‟s unequal position in society: 
[Domestic violence] …is a plethora of acts perpetrated by a man overwhelmingly 
against women involving the use of power to control….I think violence is a political 
issue really. It‟s very hard …for some people to grasp that. They see it on a micro 
[level]…as a dispute, rather than a political issue of the subordination of women and the 
use of violence to control one‟s subordinate and they don‟t understand, they think 
women are stupid for going back…1021 
Other professionals made distinctions between behaviour that is domestic 
violence and that which is not: 
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It‟s not a one-on-one argument, and it‟s not just bad manners, and it‟s not just being 
rude to somebody. It‟s…violence or intimidation or harassment…against somebody 
who…is of unequal power…1022 
However, these broad understandings of domestic violence tended to not be 
reflected in answers to practice-orientated questions. This is seen most clearly in 
the way some professionals: defined cross applications by reference to time and 
incident features (discussed in Chapter 1), approaches to dual applications 
(discussed in Chapter 8), the reliance on popular notions about victims and 
perpetrators, and the struggle some professionals appeared to have with how to 
label and respond to people who use violence in the context of their own 
victimisation. 
The police, in particular, presented understandings of domestic violence largely 
predicated on incidents. This was particularly evident in their approaches to dual 
applications, where a number of the police interviewed spoke about the 
possibility of separating incidents, even those that appeared to be part of a 
sequence of events.
1023
  
A small number of professionals also made mention of various popular notions 
about domestic violence. While it is not possible to ascertain the extent to which 
such comments pervaded the individual‟s own work, nor that of the profession as 
a group, it is worth noting the resiliency of these popular notions within the 
context of cross applications. This raises concern not only about what 
understanding of domestic violence these professionals apply to their work, but 
also the way in which for more complex cases, like cross applications, such 
notions may have greater traction.  
i. ‘Both as bad as each other’ 
Professionals were asked in their interview whether they thought a person could 
be a victim and a perpetrator, and whether they thought there were cases where 
the making of mutual orders would be appropriate. For many these questions led 
to responses premised on ideas that some parties are „as bad as each other‟,1024 
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„as crazy as each other‟1025, involved in „toxic‟ relationships,1026 „playing each 
other‟,1027 and that some people „need to be kept away from each other‟1028 via 
the „boundaries‟ that an ADVO can provide.1029 In summary, three WDVCAS 
coordinators (3/5), two DVLOs (2/6), three police prosecutors (3/5), two 
solicitors (2/5) and three magistrates (3/5) made some comment to this effect 
(total 12/26). As PP3 stated: 
There are some people who need an order and in the same breath should have an order 
against them. There are just some people in this world that should never come into 
contact with each other. 
When asked whether a person can be a victim and a perpetrator, PP5 responded: 
I think it is possible, I‟m not saying this is the case all the time, but a lot of the 
relationships they‟re not one-off instances. They‟re very toxic um inappropriate, often 
immature relationships … and the abuse or the violence within it is ongoing, it is 
habitualised often and it seems as though … it is a normal way of conducting themselves 
and it can go both ways. … [O]ccasionally [the victim will] end up withdrawing a 
matter saying, „I gave as good as I got‟. So it seems to go both ways on occasions. 
One magistrate even drew on commonly myths about female behaviours: 
I think I can accept that there are some cross parties who can be just as violent and 
commit domestic violence offences as the other. And I don‟t doubt, and it‟s raised from 
time to time, quite often actually, that one party, for example, nags the other and 
eventually he or she loses control and commits a domestic violence offence. That‟s quite 
… a common allegation.
1030
 
In a less pejorative way, DVLO4 stated that „there have been a number of 
incidents and both parties on separate occasions have been at fault and that‟s 
very rare‟. 
It is possible that the cases these professionals are referring to involve 
„situational couple violence‟, and hence are evidence of Johnson‟s model of low-
level, non-escalating mutual violence.
1031
 However, further research needs to be 
conducted on two fronts before such a conclusion can be reached: (1) precisely 
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what types of cases and relationships these professionals are describing; and (2) 
an examination of the cases themselves to ascertain the context of the use of 
violence and abuse by both parties. The first area is important as it focuses on the 
conception professionals apply to their work, and has resonance with the work of 
Erez and King where they found that lawyers tended to view domestic violence 
through the spectrum of „situational couple violence‟ whether this was the case 
or not.
1032
 The second area is important because it emphasises the importance of 
context, rather than simply incidents, in determining the nature of the violence 
and abuse used by one or both parties when determining who is experiencing 
domestic violence and who requires legal protection. 
ii. Associated factors 
Closely connected to this notion that both parties are „as bad as each other‟ and 
need to be „kept away from each other‟ was the suggestion by a small number of 
professionals that mutual orders were appropriate where one or both parties used 
alcohol and/or other drugs,
1033
 or suffered from a mental illness.
1034
 DVLO5, for 
example, described a case where: 
[B]oth parties had mental health issues…. Um there was a long history of them trying to 
separate... She would always invite him back into the house …and there‟d be constant 
confrontations and …it was either her or him … in the end I think we had two separate 
incidents … police represented her where he had badly assaulted her and she had an AVO 
and then vice versa, she badly assaulted him and [we] ended up getting an AVO for him. In 
the end it was the right thing to do, just to keep them apart. 
DVLO6, in the same interview, continued: 
AVOs need to be put in place to keep those parties [who use drugs and alcohol] away [from 
each other], like especially when … she‟s inviting him [back], and of course, he comes back, 
and we all know that. 
This type of rationalisation is particularly problematic in cases where one or both 
parties have a mental illness, which gives rise to questions about the capacity of 
that person(s) to understand the terms of an ADVO and the consequences of 
breaching it. Such attitudes imply a „we know best‟ approach to cases that have 
additional layers of complexity. At a fundamental level the views expressed by 
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professionals in this regard focused on factors other than the perpetration and 
experience of violence in determining who requires protection. 
iii. Misuse of ADVOs.  
The views held by a small number of professionals that women misuse their 
ADVOs either by initiating contact with the defendant or provoking a breach of 
the order was canvassed in Chapter 7.
1035
 In addition to that area of perceived 
misuse, some professionals also raised the ever-popular contention that people 
seek ADVOs to gain advantage in family law matters.
1036
 This was raised in two 
ways: the first was within that notion of tactical advantage,
1037
 the second was 
the use of the cross applications as a way to counter allegations of violence in the 
family law setting.
1038
 These are quite different arguments, one draws on 
common assumptions about why people, particularly women, apply for an 
ADVO at the time of separation, and the other recognises the way that a cross 
application may be a tactic to counter the other person‟s claims about violence in 
family law proceedings. There was a general view that cross applications were 
more likely to take place when there were also family law disputes.
1039
 
Other professionals drew attention to the way that ongoing family law disputes 
provide a setting, or context, for violence and abuse in some cases.
1040
 Johnson 
and Janet Johnston have both suggested that separation may give rise to a 
situation-specific form of violence (that is to say that the violence is defined by 
the situation, and not by control which would evidence a more sustained and 
control-instigated form of domestic violence, what Johnson refers to as „intimate 
terrorism‟).1041 This stands in marked contrast to Martha Mahoney‟s call for 
separation assault to be named as a specific harm experienced by women,
1042
 and 
fails to take account of the extent to which separation has been identified as one 
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of the most dangerous times for women attempting to leave a violent partner.
1043
 
It also minimises the extent to which the experience of violence and control 
might motivate women to initiate separation. This area requires further 
investigation as the heightened risk of violence at the time of separation for 
women, means that it is not surprising that women seek an ADVO at the same 
time as they initiate family law proceedings in relation to children and/or 
property.
1044
  
A small number of professionals also spoke about cross applications that have no 
foundation as a misuse of the ADVO system.
1045
 Thus unlike the common refrain 
that women misuse ADVOs to gain advantage in family law matters or to have 
an order by which to „control‟ the behaviour of their former partner (see Chapter 
8), these professionals asserted that cross applications that had no foundation, 
like many of the cases analysed in Chapter 7, were initiated not to seek 
protection but rather to counter and undermine the woman‟s claim for protection, 
and hence represented a misuse of this legal process. 
The incident-focused approach, the reliance on popular notions about domestic 
violence and the reference to associated factors (such as alcohol, drugs and 
mental health issues) suggest that professionals have failed to translate broad 
understandings of domestic violence into practice. In this regard it is revealing 
the way that some magistrates noted the difficulty of putting their 
training/education into practice in an overloaded work environment. MAG2 
explains this „tension between how ideally you would run an AVO list‟ and the 
reality of having to deal with „160 matters‟ on a single day. Thus she concluded 
that magistrates needed „more ideas about how to cope – how to deal with matters 
expeditiously and in the spirit of the legislation‟.1046 
Research needs to be conducted about the way in which education about 
domestic violence can have a better fit with the demands of the institutional 
setting. This is an area beyond this thesis, however the contrast between the 
definitions proffered for „domestic violence‟ and then the application of this 
                                                          
1043 See references above n602. 
1044 Criminal Law Review Division, Apprehended Violence Orders: A Review of the Law (1999) at 9.  
1045 DVLO3 and DVLO4. See Sarah Todd, „Fears about Abuse of Legislation are Unjustified: The Other Half of the AVO 
Story‟ (1994) 32(11) Law Society Journal (NSW) 38.  
1046 See also MAG3 above n439 and infra text. 
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knowledge, or more accurately its lack of application, emphasises the importance 
of this area in the continuing „gap‟ in implementation particularly for magistrates 
and police officers. 
B. The struggle to describe violence between intimate 
partners that is not ‘domestic violence’ 
A number of the professionals interviewed appeared to struggle with how to 
describe, or label, a person‟s actions/behaviour against an intimate partner, if it 
was not domestic violence.
1047
 And hence how to respond to acts of intimate 
partner violence, if not as domestic violence. The professionals appeared to find 
it difficult to step outside the familiar dichotomies of victim and perpetrator to 
enable a more complex position for some people who experience and perpetrate 
violence. Two WDVCAS coordinators, for example, described cases in which 
the women had admitted to using violence against their partner. When discussing 
these cases the coordinators found it difficult to both condemn the violence and 
explain the woman‟s behaviour. WDVCAS1, for example, described a case 
where the man obtained an ADVO against his wife
1048
 because she had „yelled 
and screamed‟ and thrown objects at him after she discovered that he had sex 
with a 15 year old: …you know she admitted it, she was throwing things at him 
and you know pummelling him and basically just so angry with him, which is not 
excusable‟. WDVCAS1 was of the view that this ADVO: 
… made it very clear to her that her behaviour wasn‟t okay as well. I mean…I believe 
that she was really the one that was abused…but her behaviour was violent and abusive 
and I think that the cross application…helped them both realise that… 
Similarly DVLO3 stated that a cross application might be appropriate as it would 
provide a victim with „something to think about before she retaliates after she's 
been continually baited‟. In this way MAG2 agreed that „technically‟ a person 
could be a perpetrator and a victim in that both can perpetrate violence. MAG2‟s 
more detailed response to this question, however illustrates the struggle with 
language, incidents and appropriate legal responses: 
I …keep thinking of particular [cases] over the last few weeks where um you know she‟s 
been the subject of terrible abuse and um intimidation and but you know she got the knife 
                                                          
1047 See DVLO4. 
1048 The woman was also charged with common assault to which she pled guilty and was placed on a good behaviour 
bond. 
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out and stabbed him the other day and um so yeah, both sides can certainly perpetrate 
violence. [pause] Okay, yeah I'm uneasy about that but yeah. 
A cross application complicates or blurs the process of identifying „the victim‟. 
This is well described by DVLO1: 
[When there is only one ADVO application] you know exactly who the enemies are, you 
know who the defendant is, you know who the victim is and you deal with it that way. 
…With cross-applications …everyone's sort of you know confused about it, no one's 
really knowing who did what to who … you know it's not really a cut and dried situation 
of „oh we can hate him because he hit her‟.1049 
However rather than this confusion generating the need for a more forensic 
process, DVLO1 suggests that the police become „blasé‟ about the case and the 
manner in which they deal with it: the prosecutors „don‟t pump up very much 
with cross applications because they‟re thinking “she‟s gonna get up in five 
minutes as the defendant”…the magistrate…can see that she‟s listed as a 
defendant as well.‟ Keira also commented on this blasé approach stating that 
once her ADVO was accompanied by a cross application „the police lost 
interest‟. 
As noted in Chapter 2 the legal system appears to be particularly reliant on the 
dichotomies of victim and perpetrator. The need to identify „a victim‟ and „a 
perpetrator‟ is evidenced in the incident-driven approach1050 that was described 
in Chapter 8 regarding dual applications. In that chapter a number of police 
reverted to identifying separate and discrete incidents in order to deploy the 
labels of victim and perpetrator, rather than considering broader contextual 
questions beyond the mere perpetration of an act of violence. The following case 
example and DVLO5‟s description of the police approach illuminates this 
emphasis on incidents: 
I had one where this woman suffered years of domestic violence and verbal abuse from 
[her partner]… and subsequently she had her children taken off her [as a result of his 
violence] … and he went to gaol for a while. He came out, he started harassing her 
again. He came to the door screaming at her, she just opened the door up and hit him 
across the head with a golf stick. She ended up being charged and she said to me, „But it 
was just years of domestic violence. I just snapped.‟ Ended up charging her [and sought 
an ADVO to protect him. Both of which were eventually withdrawn as it was deemed] 
….not in the public's best interest … to continue with the process. 
                                                          
1049 DVLO1. 
1050 See Miller & Meloy, above n43 at 92. See also Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1458. 
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So the fact that she retaliated, would that make her a perpetrator or a defendant? Are 
they different things? 
Well in our eyes there's no difference, they're just a defendant, the perpetrator is the 
defendant. 
So if there's an incident of violence between people that are in a domestic relationship 
that's sufficient? 
That's, they're just known as yeah the defendant…..To me a perpetrator is like the verb 
of defendant, like that's what he does. 
Two professionals, both legal representatives (one a police prosecutor and the 
other a solicitor) actively resisted the use of the terms „victim‟ and „perpetrator‟ 
drawing on their role in the legal system, and the role of the court in making 
determinations. SOL3 explained that solicitors would not be „receptive‟ to this 
language, and in accordance with their role would refer to a „complainant‟ and 
„defendant‟, or an „alleged victim‟ and „alleged perpetrator‟. In a similar way 
PP3 stated that „victim‟ and „perpetrator‟ were „layman‟s term[s]‟ and not „legal 
concept[s]‟.1051 PP3 goes on to note that being a defendant in an ADVO does not 
necessarily make one a perpetrator.
1052
 While these two legal representatives 
eschewed this language for reasons connected with their role in the legal system, 
their view provides some resonance with the need to be precise about the 
language that we use and that involvement with the legal system does not, of 
itself, indicate the presence of domestic violence or the role and position of the 
people using that system. This is particularly the case in cross applications.  
3. Summary 
This chapter examined the how cross applications are approached and responded 
to when they appear in court. The chapter has examined two areas: (1) how cross 
applications are handled and resolved, and (2) the understanding of domestic 
violence held by professionals through the lens of cross applications.  
The first part of the chapter revealed that cross applications tend to be treated as 
a pair generating identical outcomes. This appears to be a consequence of the 
way a cross application operates as a bargaining tool and the intersection with the 
overloaded work environment. Approximately 75% of the cross applications in 
the court file sample resulted in mutual outcomes (mutual withdrawal or mutual 
                                                          
1051 Follow-up email communication with PP3 (17 November 2006). 
1052 Ibid. 
252 
orders). Overwhelmingly these cross applications were resolved at mention; a 
brief and procedural court day. This means that cross applications find no forum 
in which the competing claims are assessed and determined. When compared to 
the resolution of ADVOs generally it was revealed that cross applications were 
more likely to result in a person not obtaining an ADVO. This was confirmed in 
the different results achieved in the sample of women interviewed who were 
more likely to be involved in cross applications that were lodged some time after 
the finalisation of their own ADVO. The time lapse between the woman‟s 
application and the subsequent cross application meant that both applications 
were considered on their own, rather than as a pair. Thus in this sample we saw 
more women obtaining an ADVO as the only successful party. This suggests that 
when ADVOs appear on their own they are more likely to be determined on their 
merits rather than through a settlement process that emphasises paired or mutual 
outcomes. Thus many of the women and professionals interviewed recognised 
that the primary function of the cross application was as a „bargaining tool‟ 
rather than as a measure to ensure protection. 
Most of the professionals interviewed understood domestic violence in terms that 
reflected feminist definitions of domestic violence discussed in Chapter 2. 
However this understanding failed to be translated into practice when faced with 
cross applications and the constraints of the work environment. Invariably the 
professionals interviewed returned to incident-driven definitions of domestic 
violence, and a small number reiterated popular notions about domestic violence. 
This disjuncture supports the suggestion that the training and education of 
professionals has failed to convey the way that knowledge has practical 
application; the critical implementation question. This area requires further 
research.  
The lack of time available to consider competing claims, makes mutual 
resolution of cross applications highly attractive. The way in which time, or lack 
thereof, plays an important role in how ADVOs are dealt was highlighted 
through the contrasting experiences of women whose cases appeared in rural 
courts compared to metropolitan courts. In the rural courts the women spoke 
about how the magistrate possessed greater knowledge about their cases (that is 
contextual knowledge); a situation not possible within the current resource 
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constraints of the metropolitan courts. This has adverse impacts for people 
involved in cross applications (and ADVOs more generally) who find their cases 
dealt with in brief bureaucratic proceedings and in a manner that appears to give 
little attention to concerns about fear, or the need for future protection. 
This chapter highlighted two key dimensions of legal practice in approaching and 
resolving the competing claims presented by men and women in cross 
applications. The first is that there is little attempt to unravel such competing 
claims, rather mutual outcomes tend to be preferred and promoted. In addition 
any claims that are made are viewed through the lens of incidents (which itself 
allows for mutual outcomes to be promoted) rather than the lens of context. 
Thus, what many complainants are left with is a story about mutuality rather than 
a consideration of who experienced domestic violence and who requires 
protection. 
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10. Conclusion 
This thesis examined the use of cross applications in ADVO proceedings in order 
to investigate two interrelated issues: (1) the recurrent debates about whether 
men and women are equally violent in their intimate relationships, and (2) the 
content and nature of cross applications, and the way they are approached by key 
professionals and ultimately resolved before the court. It did this through multi-
method fieldwork: in-depth interviews with women involved in cross 
applications, in-depth interviews with key professionals, documentary analysis of 
court files, and court observations.  
The debate about gender symmetry in the perpetration of domestic violence has 
long animated the sociological literature. Chapter 2 highlighted the key 
differences between the two sides of the debate (simplistically cast as family 
violence versus feminist): the different conceptual frameworks that underpin the 
respective research, the extent to which acts beyond physical violence are taken 
into account, and the identification of discrete acts without reference to the 
context in which they take place. 
While there has been extensive criticism of the criminal law for its incident-
based approach to domestic violence, reflective of the approach of family 
violence research (Chapter 2), little attention has been paid to the conception that 
underlies legal practice concerning civil protection order systems (a form of legal 
protection specifically designed to more appropriately respond to domestic 
violence). The analysis of cross applications in this thesis, involving men‟s and 
women‟s competing claims about violence, provides for such an examination. 
The contributions of this thesis to the debate about gender and domestic violence 
are threefold: 
1. It investigated official data (a data source neglected in this debate1053) in 
conjunction with other data (in-depth interviews and court observations) to 
explore claims about gender equivalency in the perpetration of domestic 
violence. 
                                                          
1053 Melton & Belknap, above n36 at 337. 
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2. Through the use of multiple methods and different data sources in a single 
study, it illustrated the way that different research methods highlight different 
aspects of the allegations made by men and women about domestic violence.  
3. It extended this debate into the legal arena by exploring what theoretical 
understanding of domestic violence underpins the civil protection order 
system, a system ostensibly designed to better address domestic violence. 
The extent to which this thesis addressed these areas was limited by the quality 
of ADVO complaint narratives. The complaint narratives gathered in the court 
file sample were frequently inadequate; many provided insufficient detail about 
events, referred to a history of violence and fear in a routine manner, included 
irrelevant information, and frequently concentrated on a single, discrete incident 
(Chapter 4). This was evident through the court file analysis (Chapter 6), and 
was the subject of scathing comments from the magistrates and police 
prosecutors interviewed (Chapter 4). The poor quality of the ADVO complaint 
narratives not only placed constraints on the research exercise (Chapters 6-8), 
but it is also a key finding of this thesis that raises critical questions for the legal 
process: how is the legal system able to make determinations, and effective and 
appropriate protection orders, in the context of such paucity of information?
1054
 
While the study focused on cross applications, its findings revealed a number of 
issues of concern for the ADVO system more broadly: namely, the continuing 
practice focus on incidents, the limited and narrow picture of domestic violence 
that is presented to the court and relied on by key professionals working in the 
ADVO system, and the overriding emphasis on settlement.  
In this concluding chapter I draw together the key findings and theoretical 
questions that guided and challenged this study, and highlight areas that require 
further research and investigation. 
                                                          
1054 See similar conclusion regarding allegations of family violence in the family law arena: Moloney et al, above n37 at 
119. 
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1. Men’s and women’s allegations about domestic violence 
A. Are cross applications evidence of gender symmetry in the 
use of domestic violence? A methodological illustration 
i. The quantitative picture 
The quantitative data presented in Chapter 6 compared the allegations men and 
women made in the court file sample. This revealed few differences. 
Both men and women, whether as first or second applicants, made a wide range 
of allegations across the spectrum of violence and abuse. At least half of 
complainants made allegations about physical violence (58.8%), other forms of 
abuse (52.9%), and threats (50.0%). Sexual violence was, however, notably 
absent from the complaint narratives (Table 6.5). While this absence might be 
explicable for a range of reasons,
1055
 it is troubling in this, the main legal forum 
to address domestic violence in NSW, and requires further research given what is 
known about the coexistence of different forms of violence and abuse in 
domestic violence.
1056
 
Furthermore, both men and women alleged that a wide range of different 
physical acts were used against them (Table 6.6). These acts ranged from what 
might be perceived as „minor‟ acts (such as pushing) to more „serious‟ acts (such 
as choking or using a weapon). However, some acts appeared to be more likely 
to be used by men, and other acts were more likely to be used by women. While 
the numbers were small, they are consistent with other research showing gender 
differences in the type of physical act used, particularly the greater use of 
weapons/objects by women.
1057
 Frequently these weapons/objects were items 
that were „on hand‟ rather than items traditionally viewed as weapons.1058  
Allegations about threats and the context in which they are issued appeared more 
fruitful with some indication that women experience more threats pre and post 
separation than men, and more threats that can be described as coercive. The 
number of complaints that made reference to threats and provided details about 
                                                          
1055 See Chapter 6. 
1056 See references above n695 & n747. See also research that has noted a similar absence in family law and civil 
protection order proceedings, above n694.  
1057 See Melton & Belknap, above n36, and references at above n713. 
1058 Ibid at 344. 
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the nature and context of those threats was however very small and the 
discussion in Chapter 6 is, as a result, tentative. However it resonates with 
research by Melton and Belknap who found that men were more likely than 
women to issue coercive threats.
1059
 In contrast only men in the present study 
made complaints that alleged that women threatened to use their legal rights 
against them (for example, by obtaining an ADVO, or reporting them for a 
breach of that ADVO), and only men nominated that they were in „fear‟ that the 
woman would „provoke‟ them to breach her ADVO.1060 These tentative 
differences are consistent with an understanding of domestic violence as an 
exercise of coercive control, and warrant further research with a larger sample. 
The comparison of men‟s and women‟s claims in the second applicant category 
were more revealing with a number of gender differences reaching statistical 
significance: women second applicants were more likely than male second 
applicants to make allegations about physical violence, other forms of abuse, and 
to state that they were in fear of their current/former partner. The finding 
regarding the presence of fear is particularly important as it implies an 
experience of domestic violence that is characterised by control. It is also 
consistent with other research that has found gender differences in the extent to 
which acts of violence generate fear, with women being the more fearful.
1061
  
There were a number of other differences that did not reach statistical 
significance that were consistently in the direction of indicating that the 
complaints made by male second applicants were of a different nature: men were 
more likely than women to lodge their complaints second in time (75% of men 
were second applicants); these applications were more likely to be private 
applications and hence did not attract police attention, and male second 
applicants were less likely than male and female first applicants and female 
second applicants to have alleged a history of domestic violence in their 
complaints. This apparent trend requires further investigation with a larger 
sample to ascertain whether these are gender differences in the nature and type of 
allegations that form ADVO cross applications. 
                                                          
1059 Melton & Belknap, above n36 at 341. 
1060 See men excluded from Table 6.10. 
1061 See references above n264.  
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This quantitative analysis, then, reveals little more than that men and women are 
alleged to use a wide range of different forms of violence/abuse against their 
current/former intimate partner; it does not tell us whether there were any 
differences in the nature and context of the acts perpetrated, how each act or 
behaviour did or did not relate to previous events, or the way the act functioned 
in the relationship. In this way it is consistent with the limited picture afforded 
about the perpetration of domestic violence presented in other quantitative 
studies. Rather than accepting this quantitative data as evidence of „symmetry‟ or 
„mutuality‟ in the use of violence, this thesis investigated these allegations 
further through qualitative analysis. This qualitative investigation, while limited 
by the inadequacy of many complaint narratives, builds on the picture, already 
suggested by the quantitative data, that the ADVO complaints made by male 
second applicants were of a different nature to those of other complainants 
involved in cross applications (that is, different to male and female first 
applicants, and female second applicants). 
ii. The qualitative picture 
Qualitative data was analysed in Chapters 5-8. This analysis shed a different 
light on, and posed additional questions about, the quantitative data analysed in 
Chapter 6.  
Chapter 5 described the broad and extensive violence/abuse experienced by the 
women interviewed pre and post separation from the perpetrator. A key finding 
in this chapter was that the women interviewed actively described their 
experience of domestic violence in terms of control; in contrast the complaint 
narratives prepared on their behalf invariably focused on a single incident and 
thus failed to adequately reflect their experience or the context of control. In 
addition they described a broad spectrum of acts of violence and abuse in a 
manner that is not captured by approaches that focus on a designated list of acts; 
a number of the women interviewed mentioned acts/behaviours that would not 
easily fit within traditional categories of, or questions about, domestic violence, 
for example, perpetrators reporting women to different agencies, forcing the 
woman to read or listen to news stories involving domestic violence, and 
continuing unwelcome messages of „love‟. 
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Chapter 7 revealed that there were distinct differences between women‟s 
allegations and some men‟s allegations. Three key areas of difference emerged: 
 The presence of criminal charges. Men (77.3% of people charged), 
particularly male second applicants, were more likely than women to be 
charged with a criminal offence at the same time that the ADVO applications 
were before the court (Table 7.1). This suggested a level of seriousness 
attached to some men‟s behaviour, or, at the very least, that these men 
engaged in behaviour that attracted the attention of the police. Even more 
significant was the fact that only male second applicants were charged with 
contravening an ADVO. This suggests that these men were engaged in a 
repetitive, patterned use of violence that accords with feminist 
understandings of domestic violence (Chapter 2).  
 A questionable characterisation of acts as violence or abuse. A small group 
of complaints, primarily lodged by male second applicants, sought to 
characterise acts/behaviour as violence or abuse in a questionable manner. 
Many of these complaints centred on acts that were described as 
„harassment‟. In all the cases examined, rather than the acts/behaviours being 
violent or abusive, they were better characterised as hurtful or unfortunate; 
they certainly appeared to have no connection to „fear‟ (the ADVO 
legislative requirement), or to control. The function of the alleged 
act/behaviour was critical to the analysis of these cases, drawing on the 
feminist work discussed in Chapter 2 which emphasised the importance of 
examining context when ascribing meaning to acts or behaviours (whether 
those acts involve physical violence or other forms of abuse). 
It is in this area of „other‟ forms of abuse, rather than acts of physical 
violence, that the importance of context may be underscored in progressing 
understandings of domestic violence based on control. Unlike acts of 
physical violence, other acts of abuse do not start from an assumed position 
of „violence‟. What I mean by this is that perhaps it is when we look at 
„other‟ forms of abuse that questions about the function of that act/behaviour 
(is it for controlling purposes and hence domestic violence, or not) can gain 
greater traction in debates about gender equivalency in the perpetration of 
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domestic violence. As has been noted, Stark advocates this different focus by 
arguing that work on domestic violence needs to be redirected from 
„violence‟ towards „coercive control‟. Stark presents many case studies that 
highlight the extensive and varied acts of abuse and control experienced by 
women separate from or in addition to acts of physical or sexual violence. 
Importantly he emphasises the many minor forms of violence and abuse 
experienced by women that, when viewed on their own, appear minor and 
trivial, but when viewed together comprise a picture of coercive control.  
The different nature of cross applications as a data source in the debate on 
gender perpetration of domestic violence is highlighted in the cases where 
men alleged that women were misusing their ADVOs. Cross applications are 
not only a mechanism through which a person may raise counter allegations 
about violence (and hence a data source to compare men‟s and women‟s 
allegations), they are also a legal mechanism that appears to be initiated 
tactically, as a „bargaining tool‟, to bring about a particular resolution 
(mutual withdrawal) (Chapter 9). Thus a cross application may simply be a 
legal claim designed to counter or undermine the first person‟s allegations. 
Cross applications therefore cannot simply be investigated as potential 
examples of gender equivalency, or cases of mutual violence, but must also 
be seen as a possible extension of the violence and abuse itself. Many of the 
women interviewed saw the cross application lodged by their former partner 
as harassment, a breach of their ADVO, or another way to hurt them 
(Chapter 5). This was also recognised by some of the professionals 
interviewed. This dimension poses further questions about how to define and 
understand domestic violence; the use of a legal mechanism, a cross 
application, to generate withdrawal is certainly not an act/behaviour asked 
about in standardised research instruments measuring the prevalence of 
domestic violence. Indeed the use of the law against victims of domestic 
violence is rarely depicted as part of their continuing experience of violence, 
yet it is seen that way by victims and clearly evidences a type of act that is 
directed at exerting control (or reasserting control). In this way some research 
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in the family law arena has characterised multiple vexatious applications as a 
„weapon against women and their children‟.1062 
 Lengthy „wounded‟ complaint narratives. In eight cases men (one first 
applicant and seven second applicants in the court file sample) lodged 
complaints that were of a distinctly different kind; these were lengthy 
complaint narratives appended to the ADVO application, in which the man 
sought to characterise himself as „wounded‟ or the „true‟ victim. The content 
and nature of these complaint narratives, as argued in Chapter 7, engaged in 
what Cavanagh and colleagues, drawing on the work of Goffman, have 
characterised as „remedial work‟.1063 Invariably these complaints 
incorporated denials, shifted blame (particularly onto the woman), 
downgraded the seriousness of the acts that the man was prepared to admit to, 
and/or provided a different account of the events alleged in the woman‟s 
complaint. In some of these complaints the man also sought to characterise 
himself as the (calm) victim and the wronged person, in contrast to his former 
partner who was depicted as hysterical, irrational and in some cases 
aggressive. 
The qualitative analysis presented in this thesis, then, revealed gender differences 
in men‟s and women‟s accounts of, or allegations about, domestic violence in 
terms of who engages in repeated behaviour, who seeks to identify acts that 
perhaps were never intended to come under the purview of the term „domestic 
violence‟, and who engaged in remedial work to recast the violence perpetrated 
in the relationship. Invariably these were features of the complaint narratives 
lodged by male second applicants. 
Case examples, which juxtaposed men‟s and women‟s complaints, were 
presented to illustrate these qualitative differences (Chapter 7). This method 
highlighted the importance of reading and comparing paired narratives in cases 
where violence is suggested to have been mutual. Dobash and Dobash 
emphasised in their work on differences in men‟s and women‟s use of violence 
                                                          
1062 ALRC, For the Sake of the Kids: Complex Contact Cases and the Family Court, (1995) at [2.30]. See also Belinda 
Paxton, „Domestic Violence and Abuse of Process‟ (2004) 17 Australian Family Lawyer 7, at 7, 11-12. 
1063 Cavanagh et al, above n39. 
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the necessity of comparing men‟s and women‟s accounts of „shared‟ events.1064 
While I did not interview men and women involved in the same cross application 
for safety reasons,
1065
 it was possible to compare the shared narratives through 
the paired comparison of ADVO complaint narratives. Such an approach, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 7, is vital to comparing men‟s and women‟s allegations 
about the use of violence within a contextual framework.  
iii. Summary 
Like other research, this thesis found that quantitative data provided a limited 
understanding of domestic violence.
1066
 However, even this limited data 
suggested that the claims lodged by male second applicants (over 75% of men in 
this study were second applicants) were of a different nature. This suggestion 
was reinforced by the examination of qualitative data. The qualitative data 
confirmed the importance of looking beyond discrete acts as the sole indicator of 
the presence of domestic violence. While control is not a feature that emerges 
within ADVO complaint narratives for a variety of reasons (see discussion 
below), other contextual elements which point to this feature were evident such 
as: the experience of violence pre and post separation, repetition, the use of 
multiple acts, the presence of coercive threats, the generation of fear, and the 
attempts to undermine women‟s claims for protection. In addition the qualitative 
analysis revealed that cross applications are not only a data source to explore 
debates about gender equivalency in the perpetration of domestic violence, but 
also reveal that some men‟s allegations fall within a totally different category; a 
category that seeks to utilise a legal mechanism as a way to challenge women‟s 
claims for safety. That is to say, some men‟s claims were not concerned with 
women‟s use of violence, but rather were concerned with women simply doing 
things men did not like, such as pursuing their legal rights, telling others about 
the man‟s behaviour, calling the men names, swearing at them and so on. 
                                                          
1064 Dobash & Dobash, „Working on a Puzzle‟, above n19 at 332. 
1065 See above n318 for differences between the sample used by Dobash and Dobash and the sample in the present study. 
1066 See Melton & Belknap, above n36 at 343. 
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2. The NSW civil protection order system and cross 
applications 
This thesis asked whether the much criticised narrow focus of the criminal law 
on discrete incidents of violence (a criticism that resonates with feminist 
criticism of family violence research) is replicated in the civil protection order 
system, a system specifically designed to address the key limitations of the 
criminal law. 
Chapter 2 outlined a number of progressive features of civil protection order 
systems, and the NSW ADVO scheme in particular. It was argued that these 
progressive measures provide scope for legal practice under the ADVO scheme 
to move beyond incidents and respond to the broad experience of domestic 
violence, and in so doing provide for orders tailored to the requirements of a 
specific case. The study of cross applications has revealed that for a range of 
reasons, both practical (in terms of institutional constraints such as workload and 
lack of resources) and conceptual (the approach professionals bring to their 
work), these progressive elements of the ADVO scheme have failed to be 
translated into practice. Thus despite its legislative promise, practice within the 
ADVO scheme continues to focus on a narrow depiction of violence; one that is 
dominated by incidents of largely physical violence. This reflects the long-
standing problem of implementation noted in much work on the outcomes and 
barriers faced by feminist law reform efforts (Chapter 2). The implementation 
problem or gap has two key dimensions. The first is the way in which law reform 
fits, or does not fit, with the prevailing legal culture. As Hunter notes, many law 
reformers assume a top-down approach to bringing about change, thus ignoring 
the autonomy of decision- makers in interpreting and putting reforms into 
practice. The second dimension is a more fundamental feminist critique which 
asks whether the law (and the emphasis placed on the law as the site for 
intervention) can actually bring about the desired change in women‟s lives.1067 
Does the translation of gendered harms into existing legal categories and rules 
mean that the intended outcome is lost, diminished, or bears little relationship to 
the harm it was intended to address? Should the law be the only site for 
intervention? 
                                                          
1067 Smart, „Feminism and the Power of Law‟, above n283 at ch4 and discussion of „de-centering law‟ at 163-65. 
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This study of cross applications has revealed that practice under the ADVO 
legislation continues to convey a narrow understanding of domestic violence. 
This is evidenced in the poor quality of complaint narratives, the continuing 
dominance of an incident focus rather than a more contextualised approach, and 
the lack of space for stories about domestic violence to be told and heard as a 
result of constraints inherent in the court setting. 
A. A narrow depiction of the experience of domestic violence 
i. ADVO complaint narratives 
This thesis found that most complaint narratives for ADVO cross applications 
were of poor quality. Many of the narratives examined were brief, focused on a 
single incident (generally the most recent), included irrelevant information, and 
when references to fear and past experiences were included this was done so in a 
routine fashion. This narrative analysis drew primarily on the work of Durfee 
(Chapter 4).
1068
  
The absence of detailed information about current and past experiences of 
domestic violence, and the impact that violence has had on the complainant 
means that the court has inadequate information when making determinations 
about many ADVO matters. While this may not present a problem in „serious‟ 
incidents (or those that are easily „visible‟ and corroborated), such as the siege 
incidents experienced by Lillian and Frances, it does create problems in cases 
that are more complex; that is, those cases Durfee described as „border cases‟.1069 
Border cases are those that are not clear-cut because little evidence is available, 
the allegations are contested, the parties do not conform to traditional notions of 
victim and perpetrator (or complainant and defendant), or the complaint centres 
on incidents that do not neatly fit the legislative requirements. Thus if the 
complaint narrative is poor in a border case this may influence the approach 
taken by professionals: Is this case worth pursuing, or is settlement the only 
option? How much effort should I allocate to it? As argued in Chapter 4, cross 
applications represent just such border cases in that, by their very nature, they 
disrupt the legal system‟s inclination to dichotomise cases of domestic violence 
into victim and perpetrator roles. Thus settlement may be emphasised to a greater 
                                                          
1068 See also Trinch & Berk-Seligson, above n400; and Ptacek, above n13. 
1069 Durfee, above n401 at 135-36. 
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extent in cross applications than for ADVOs generally. Significantly, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 9, the pursuit of settlement in cross applications is more 
likely to result in neither party obtaining protection (mutual withdrawal). In 
contrast a well-drafted complaint may mean that legal practitioners are less likely 
to accept mutual withdrawal or consent orders and instead elect to proceed to a 
hearing.
1070
  
The poor quality of many complaint narratives raises questions about the 
understanding of domestic violence that underpins legal practice in the ADVO 
system. The absence of in-depth, detailed accounts of domestic violence that 
portray the context of domestic violence means that key professionals have 
insufficient information when making decisions about claims for protection. This 
has implications not only for the administration of the ADVO system but also for 
related legal proceedings. For example, the presence of an ADVO is often relied 
on in subsequent or concurrent family law proceedings; if the detail and quality 
of the ADVO complaint narrative is lacking, then this obviously has implications 
for the extent to which domestic violence is taken into account in the family law 
proceedings.
1071
 
The limited information about domestic violence conveyed in the complaint 
narratives is compounded by the constraints of the institutional environment in 
which ADVOs are determined. The excessive workload in many Local Courts, 
the extreme brevity of proceedings, and the connected emphasis on settled 
outcomes means that little, if anything, is evident in the court proceedings about 
domestic violence, or other forms of violence between current/former intimate 
partners. This institutional environment is discussed below. 
ii. The continuing dominance of incidents  
Not only did incidents dominate the complaint narratives examined in this thesis, 
but incidents appeared to continue to dominate the practice of key professionals. 
This is despite the progressive legislative framework (Chapters 2 and 4), and 
despite the generally well-developed understanding of domestic violence that key 
professionals brought to their work in implementing the legislation (Chapter 9). 
                                                          
1070 A comment to this effect was made by SOL5. 
1071 See Moloney et al, above n37 at 119. 
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As discussed in Chapter 9, many of the key professionals interviewed defined 
domestic violence by reference to power and control, repetition, patterns of 
behaviour and a broad range of different types of acts of violence and abuse. This 
reflects feminist conceptions of domestic violence discussed in Chapter 2. 
However, this understanding appeared not to be translated into practice; instead 
incident-based definitions came to the fore. This was most clearly seen in two 
areas: how professionals defined a cross application, and police approaches to 
dual applications. 
While definitions of cross applications varied across, and within, the professional 
groups interviewed, a majority articulated a definition dependant on incidents 
and without reference to the history of the relationship. For these professionals a 
cross application either concerned with the same incident or was lodged within 
close time proximity; if an application did not fit these criteria then it simply 
concerned a fresh, or separate, incident. Thus a subsequent ADVO application by 
a defendant would not be viewed within the context of the earlier ADVO let 
alone the broader relationship. This may lead to inappropriate or unsafe 
outcomes when courts do not take the contextual elements of fear, history and 
repetition into account. 
When discussing dual applications, the police interviewed (DVLOs and 
prosecutors) tended to adopt an approach in which „incidents‟ could be identified 
(and hence separated) as discrete events in which a person was a perpetrator in 
one incident, and a victim in the next (Chapter 9). This took place even in those 
cases where the „incidents‟ were closely linked in time; in fact they appeared 
more as a sequence of events. Police responses not only highlighted the 
dominance of incidents, but the dominance of physical violence as determinants 
of police practice concerning ADVOs; all the complaint narratives for dual 
applications concerned physical violence and did not refer to any other form of 
violence/abuse.  
The complaint narratives that formed the police dual applications were of 
extremely poor quality; they were very brief, focused on a single incident, used 
identical complaints for both parties, and referred to a history of domestic 
violence in a way that implicated both parties (despite in at least two cases 
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evidence being available that the woman had been the victim of previous acts of 
violence). This fails to accord with NSW Police procedures which specify that a 
complaint should include: a short history of the relationship; detail the most 
recent incident as well as any past history of violence including harassment, 
threats and stalking; and information about the victim‟s fears regarding this 
behaviour.
1072
 While the police interviewed suggested that dual applications 
arose out of complicated cases where it was difficult to assess who was the main 
aggressor, and who might require the protection of an ADVO, the poor quality of 
the complaint narratives suggested a different reason. Rather than the cases being 
difficult or „messy‟, the quality of the complaint narratives suggested that there 
had been little, if any, investigation of the different actions each party was 
alleged to have engaged in or the consequences of those acts.
1073
 Thus it is 
difficult to know how the introduction of „primary‟ or „predominant‟ aggressor 
policies might assist police when competing claims are made, as the issue, in at 
least the cases analysed in this thesis, appeared to be less a problem in 
identifying who might be the victim than an unwillingness to investigate 
sufficiently. 
Considerable attention has focused on questioning the adequacy of the police 
response in relation to criminal offences in the USA and Canada following the 
rise in dual arrests and single arrests of women after the introduction of 
mandatory or pro-arrest policies.
1074
 Dual ADVO applications raise similar 
concerns about some police practices and understandings of domestic violence. 
In Chapter 8 I argued that this concern was heightened in dual applications 
because of the way in which civil protection orders start from a different premise 
than the police response to a possible criminal offence. That is to say, civil 
protection orders are not simply concerned with whether an offence has taken 
place, but rather „who needs protection?‟ and „who is fearful?‟ These questions 
necessitate more than simply that an incident has taken place; these questions, 
which should be at the forefront of the ADVO system, arguably give emphasis to 
contextual issues in the implementation of the legislation. The continuing 
                                                          
1072 NSW Police Service, „SOPS‟, above n398 at [4.1]. 
1073 Also suggested by DVLO1. 
1074 See references above n48. 
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emphasis on incidents means that recognition of the importance of these 
questions has not been translated into practice.  
iii. The constraints of the institutional setting 
The Local Court setting is burdened with high workloads. This is particularly so 
in the context of ADVO matters where the workload has increased exponentially 
since ADVOs were first introduced, without additional resources.
1075
 The 
magistrates interviewed complained about this and noted the constraints it placed 
on the way they conducted their work.  
One of the most striking features about the conduct of the ADVO list day was the 
extreme brevity of proceedings (Chapter 4).
1076
 This meant that on most 
occasions there was no public comment made about the allegations contained in 
the complaint, instead the time was spent determining procedural matters. Thus 
there were few opportunities in which to observe judicial comments about 
domestic violence, let alone to assess judicial demeanour.
1077
 Given the speed of 
proceedings and their procedural focus, the only conclusion that could be reached 
regarding judicial demeanour was one of a bureaucratic approach. It was not only 
judicial demeanour that must be characterised as bureaucratic but also the 
general practice of the ADVO list day. As argued by other authors who have 
studied magistrates‟ courts,1078 and Hunter specifically within the protection 
order jurisdiction,
1079
 this means that cases tend to be dealt with in a routine way 
with similar results that do not reflect the individual circumstances of each case. 
The workload of the Local Court means that magistrates do not have sufficient 
time to devote to each case; this may mean that evidence is not taken, or not 
taken at length, and settlement is emphasised over other modes of resolution. 
This was reflected in the court file sample where very few cases proceeded to a 
hearing (a process that was more likely to result in only one party, in this study 
all women, obtaining an ADVO). Only 11 (n=77)
1080
 cases in the court file 
sample were determined via a hearing. Only one cross application was heard in 
                                                          
1075 Hunter made similar comments regarding Victoria: „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 60. 
1076 See similar findings in Victoria: Ibid at 100-127. 
1077 Emphasised in the work of Ptacek, above n13. 
1078 Carlen, above n445; McBarnet, above n445; and Baldwin, above n140. 
1079 Hunter, „Women‟s Experience in Court‟, above n58 at 60. 
1080 One case was excluded as it was not finalised at the time of the fieldwork, see Table 9.2. 
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the interview sample.
1081
 The absence of hearings, particularly for cross 
applications, means that the competing allegations were never conveyed in full, 
tested or determined. 
iv. Emphasis on settlement 
Emphasis on settlement is both a consequence of the nature of civil proceedings 
where „parties…will be actively encouraged by legal institutions to settle their 
differences between themselves‟,1082 and, as Galanter pointed out, a product of a 
legal arena with limited resources and a high workload.
1083
 The emphasis on 
settlement was discussed generally in Chapter 4, and specifically in relation to 
cross applications in Chapter 9. Settlement can mean one of two outcomes: 
obtaining an order (by consent) or not obtaining an order (by withdrawal). Most 
cross applications are resolved via mutual withdrawal with or without 
undertakings (Chapter 9). This means that a cross application most commonly 
results in neither party obtaining an ADVO (62.3% of people in the court file 
sample did not obtain an ADVO); this stands in contrast to the general outcome 
for ADVOs where only 49.3% did not obtain an ADVO.
1084
  
Complainants and defendants are faced with considerable „encouragement‟ to 
settle their ADVO cases; for example, consent is promoted as a method of saving 
time (particularly that of the court), avoiding having to return to court on 
multiple occasions (and hence having to take time off work and make child care 
arrangements), limiting legal costs, and avoiding the trauma that a hearing can 
entail (Chapter 9). A cross application combines with these factors to generate 
even greater pressure to settle. 
Some cross applications are initiated to undermine, or counter, the first person‟s 
claim for protection (usually the woman‟s claim). In this respect cross 
applications were invariably described by the women interviewed, and by a 
number of professionals, as a „bargaining tool‟ (Chapter 9). Hence, even in an 
environment in which settled outcomes are emphasised, „settlement‟ took on a 
                                                          
1081 Megan. Keira, Lillian and Rosemary‟s ADVO application and cross application were all listed for hearing but settled 
on the day at court. 
1082 Hunter, „Having her Day in Court‟, above n449 at 61. 
1083 Galanter, above n442 at 95 and 121. 
1084 This is still a high rate of withdrawal in ADVOs generally. 
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heightened role in cross applications, and played a powerful role in generating 
mutual withdrawal and to a lesser extent mutual orders.  
While both women and professionals recognised the role of a cross application as 
a bargaining tool, they tended to do so in different ways: women invariably 
viewed cross applications as negative (even where the woman was successful 
and the man was not), while professionals tended to view cross applications as a 
useful, almost positive, tool to generate settlement and hence finalise the case. 
This highlighted a disjuncture in the way in which women and professionals 
viewed and approached cross applications. The women interviewed invariably 
spoke about cross applications as a form of abuse or harassment (Chapter 5), and 
while some professionals also recognised this, many went on to consider mutual 
orders as unproblematic (Chapter 9). That is to say, many viewed the fact that 
the woman (whom they usually identified as the primary victim) obtained an 
order as a good result, and one that was not undermined by a mutual order. 
However this justification offered by many professionals was countered by the 
fact that less than 30 per cent of cross applications were resolved this way (Table 
9.2). It also ignored the profound impact women described in being subject to 
mutual orders (see Rosemary and Marcella in Chapter 9). 
An outcome reached by settlement means that there is no formal determination of 
the competing claims and no consideration of whether there are differences in the 
nature or context of the allegations contained in the separate complaints. Instead 
a „mutual‟ approach is taken. That is to say regardless of the settlement reached it 
will apply to both parties as though the allegations were equally valid and of an 
identical nature with the same impact. This thesis has demonstrated, particularly 
through the qualitative analysis presented in Chapters 7 and 9, that in a number 
of cases the complaints lodged by men and women were of a qualitatively 
different nature. The lack of a court determination means that the bulk of the 
cross application cases examined, while „resolved‟, remained without any 
statements regarding who required the protection of an ADVO and who did not 
(that is to say, who required a domestic violence response, and who did not). 
Thus the limited nature of the complaint narrative, the constraints created by the 
work environment and the overriding emphasis on settlement combine to create 
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an environment in which little is revealed about domestic violence in the main 
legal arena in NSW which addresses domestic violence. Cross applications 
further obscure the limited visibility of domestic violence in ADVO proceedings 
due to the fact that the two complaints tend to be viewed and responded to as a 
pair (with mutual outcomes) rather than as individual cases requiring a 
determination on their own merits. This „paired‟ approach fails to consider the 
contents and allegations made by the two individual complainants thus creating, 
and reinforcing, the picture that both parties are responsible for the violence and 
abuse that occurred, that to some extent both are „as bad as each other‟. The 
qualitative analysis presented in this thesis does not support this assessment of 
the allegations. 
3. What to do about cross applications? Can the NSW ADVO 
system take account of ‘power and control’? 
While most professionals interviewed viewed cross applications as problematic, 
albeit to different degrees and in different ways, they were generally of the view 
that they should continue to be available.
1085
 The reasons for this varied and 
included that:  
 a „first in first served‟ approach is inappropriate as the first person who 
contacts the police or initiates a private ADVO is not necessarily the person 
who requires the protection of an ADVO.
1086
 
 in some cases both parties require protection from each other, either because 
the parties are „as bad as each other‟ (Chapter 9);1087 or the woman 
continually invites the perpetrator to have contact with her despite the 
existence of an ADVO (Chapter 7).
1088
 
 that everybody has a „right to a day in court‟.1089 
                                                          
1085 DVLO3, DVLO4, MAG2, PP1, PP2, PP3, PP5, SOL1, SOL2, SOL3, SOL5, WDVCAS2, WDVCAS3, WDVCAS4 
and WDVCAS5.  
1086 MAG3, SOL3, WDVCAS4 and WDVCAS5.  
1087 See Chapter 2. 
1088 DVLO2 
1089 DVLO5, MAG1, MAG5, WDVCAS1 and WDVCAS3.  
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This final reason is of interest given that many professionals recognised that a 
cross application was often a „tit-for-tat‟ claim, a bargaining tool or a wielding of 
power. There would appear to be a conflict in resorting to notions of rights where 
the deployment of a cross application to generate withdrawal may be less about 
being heard and instead a mechanism to bring about a situation where neither 
claim is heard. In turn it fails to recognise that a cross application effectively 
counters the woman‟s „right‟ to her day in court (given the prominence of mutual 
withdrawal). 
A number of professionals offered suggestions that might deter unwarranted 
cross applications: for example the introduction of a filing fee
1090
 or a fee for 
withdrawing an application,
1091
 and the use of the costs provisions against 
unsuccessful applicants.
1092
 A number of professionals also suggested that the 
chamber magistrate‟s discretion to refuse to issue process for ADVO applications 
could be reinstated.
1093
 In doing so, these professionals invariably spoke with 
caution, noting past problems with chamber magistrates turning away victims of 
domestic violence.
1094
 However MAG2 expressed the view that this no longer 
presents the same risk given improvements in the training of chamber 
magistrates about domestic violence. 
Some jurisdictions have specifically addressed the problem of mutual orders in 
legislation. For example in New Zealand there is a presumption against the 
making of mutual orders; an order must not be made to protect the 
respondent/defendant unless that person has made an application and it has been 
„determined in accordance with [the] Act‟.1095 Some professionals interviewed 
considered that this treated cross applications as a special category of ADVO,
1096
 
and that such provisions would be difficult to draft and perhaps create inflexible 
results.
1097
 Others suggested that perhaps some direction in the legislation about 
addressing such claims „on their own merits…[might] stop our [magistrates‟] 
                                                          
1090 PP3. 
1091 DVLO2. 
1092 MAG3, SOL3, SOL5, and WDVCAS4. 
1093 DVLO3, DVLO4, MAG2, PP3, PP5 and WDVCAS2, WDVCAS3, WDVCAS5.  
1094 MAG2, WDVCAS2, WDVCAS3, and WDVCAS5. 
1095 Domestic Violence Act 1995 (NZ) s18. 
1096 MAG3, PP3, SOL4. 
1097 MAG3 and MAG5, PP1 
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sloppy shorthand in the list [which results in] everybody‟s [obtaining] an order‟; 
however, such a requirement would necessitate additional resources.
1098
 This 
latter suggestion also connects with the view raised by a number of professionals 
that perhaps cross applications should be determined following a hearing; in this 
way the claims can be assessed separately rather than resulting in mutual settled 
outcomes.
1099
 
While there is merit in considering ways in which cross applications might be 
addressed in the legislation and other administrative measures, such processes 
fail to tackle the more fundamental concern raised in this thesis which goes to the 
conception of domestic violence underlying the practice of ADVOs. The 
following discussion addresses questions about whether, and how, the ADVO 
legislative scheme can take account of coercive control in its understanding of 
what is domestic violence and what is not. 
A. The adequacy of ‘fear’ as a legislative measure to 
address domestic violence 
The only legal requirement in NSW that looks explicitly beyond discrete acts of 
violence/abuse is the requirement of (reasonable) fear. This is an important 
criterion, and one that distinguishes the ADVO scheme from schemes operating 
in many other jurisdictions. However, while related to coercive control, fear is 
not the same thing. Given that the presence of fear is a legislative requirement for 
the granting of ADVOs, it is troubling that it was not mentioned in over half of 
the cross applications that comprised the court file sample (Table 6.10). In 
addition, given the rate of settlement of cross applications this means that fear is 
unlikely to have been mentioned at all in the court process given the absence of 
evidence-in-chief or submissions from legal representatives in a settled case.  
In practice, legal actors within the ADVO system appeared to assume that the 
presence of a discrete act, on its own, generates fear; that is „an act equals fear‟ 
approach. Such an approach resonates with the approach of act-based research 
canvassed in Chapter 2 where the presence of a single act of physical violence, 
for example, is considered an indicator of the presence of domestic violence. 
Perhaps if practice in the ADVO system (by police, lawyers and magistrates) 
                                                          
1098 MAG2. 
1099 MAG2, PP2 and WDVCAS5. 
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focused more on how an act/behaviour operates (does it create fear?) and its 
impact and function, it might come closer to considering what domestic violence 
is beyond the individual acts it might comprise. It is worth noting here that there 
is also a mismatch between the legislative requirements placed on the police 
when applying for an ADVO and those placed on the court when determining 
whether to grant an ADVO. As noted in Chapter 8, the legislation mandates 
police to apply for an ADVO when certain acts/behaviours have taken place or 
are likely to take place. There is no specific connection to fear or the requirement 
of future protection. In contrast, a magistrate, when determining an ADVO, is 
required to consider whether such acts/behaviours have caused the 
victim/complainant to fear and that those fears are reasonable. The legislation, 
and police practice in this area, would be strengthened (and move away from 
incidents as determinative features) if the police obligation to apply for ADVOs 
also reflected this protective purpose. 
B. The absence of coercive control 
The function of domestic violence as a mechanism of control is not articulated in 
the NSW legislation, and hence (not surprisingly) was generally absent from the 
complaint narratives examined in this thesis. Control emerged in only a small 
number of complaints in the court file sample through the limited framework of 
isolation tactics, such as restrictions on work, or contact with friends and family 
(Table 6.9). Notably these acts/behaviours were only alleged by women as part 
of their experience. These acts on their own are very unlikely to ground an 
ADVO (not easily fitting within the concepts of a personal violence offence, 
stalking, intimidation, harassment or molestation
1100
). The only place where 
control finds some articulation is through the related, but more limited, notion of 
fear. While fear may be integrally related to the presence of coercive control (and 
illustrative of its power) the presence of fear is not the same as coercive control. 
The lack of articulation of control in the ADVO complaint narratives stood in 
marked contrast to the way in which the women interviewed described their 
relationship, which centred on control and not violence (Chapter 5).  
Chapter 2 highlighted the definition and conception of domestic violence 
afforded by feminist research based on women‟s experiences. Here, the emphasis 
                                                          
1100 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s562AE, now Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s16. 
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is not on discrete acts of violence, but rather the way in which they combine, 
repeat and reflect on each other to create an environment of control. As Evan 
Stark argued, one of the reasons why the promise of feminist work on domestic 
violence has stalled is because it has focused on, and developed responses for, 
violence rather than coercive control. This is seen most clearly in the 
development of legal responses, which despite their promise, have failed to 
address this essential feature of domestic violence. The absence of narratives 
about control (or even the more limited notion of fear) in the ADVO setting 
means that the civil system continues to perpetuate a response that addresses 
discrete incidents of „violence‟ as opposed to „domestic violence‟.  
The recurrent debates about gender equivalency in the use of domestic violence, 
and the increasing interest in women‟s use of violence as a result of the arrest of 
women for domestic violence, reinforce the critical nature of control to 
differentiate between men‟s and women‟s typical use of violence. The 
importance of control as a defining feature of domestic violence has also been 
enhanced by increased research interest in differentiating between different types 
of domestic violence.
1101
 The work of Michael Johnson in this emerging area was 
discussed in Chapter 2. As noted in that chapter it was not possible to test the 
applicability of Johnson‟s typology due to the limitations in the complaint 
narratives. It is however worth noting that Anna Stewart, in her work on 
respondents to civil protection orders in Queensland, applied Johnson‟s typology 
and suggested that cross applications might evidence one type of intimate partner 
violence: situational couple violence.
1102
 The need to differentiate between acts 
that form domestic violence (and hence require responses designed to address 
this form of harm, for example civil protection orders, education programs) and 
those that do not is important, and in this regard Johnson‟s typology is attractive. 
However, I have concerns about the application of this typology, particularly in 
the legal setting (Chapter 2). The application of such typologies in legal practice 
may inadvertently reinforce already long-held notions about domestic violence. 
My concerns in this area are substantiated by the views expressed by a small 
number of the professionals interviewed in this study which suggested that some 
                                                          
1101 See Chapters 1-2. 
1102 Stewart, above n12 at 86. 
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professionals continue to resort to notions of mutuality („both as bad as each 
other‟), think that women misuse ADVOs, and hold a view that the mutual 
resolution of cross applications (where both parties achieve the same outcomes) 
is of little consequence (Chapters 8-9). The presence of these views fuels caution 
about the way in which Johnson‟s typology might continue to reinforce myths 
about domestic violence, rather than being directed at the development of more 
appropriate responses. That is to say that differentiation may be seen as a way for 
the court to manage its excessive workload drawing on already dominant notions 
of mutuality, triviality and provocation, rather than a method to assist the court in 
developing appropriate responses to different forms of violence within intimate 
relationships. As noted by Johnson and others, work on typologies is in its 
infancy, and the need to differentiate and be clear about what is and what is not 
domestic violence (characterised by coercive control) is important. 
There has been considerable discussion in the literature about the capacity of the 
criminal law to move beyond incidents of domestic violence and encompass an 
approach to domestic violence that recognises coercive control.
1103
 A small 
number of researchers have attempted to articulate approaches that could achieve 
this aim. For example Stark,
1104
 Deborah Tuerkheimer
1105
 and Alafair Burke
1106
 
have all, in different ways, proposed a criminal offence that would better capture 
the controlling, repetitive and patterned nature of domestic violence. These 
theoretical developments have focused on the criminal law‟s response to 
domestic violence, and have not posed similar questions of the various civil 
protection systems.  
As noted above, questions about responses to domestic violence within the civil 
protection order system pose different challenges than those that centre on the 
criminal law‟s response. Civil protection order systems were specifically 
introduced to respond in a more appropriate way to the experience of domestic 
violence and thus ask about „who requires protection?‟ rather than simply 
whether an offence has been committed. Thus the failure of the civil protection 
                                                          
1103 See McMahon & Pence, above n21 at 48; Hirschel & Buzawa, above n48 at 1456-58; Miller, „Victims as Offenders‟ 
above n21 at 131. 
1104 Stark, above n84 at 382-84. 
1105 Tuerkheimer, above n21; and Deborah Tuerkheimer, „Renewing the Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An 
Assessment Three Years Later‟ (2007) 75 The George Washington Law Review 613.  
1106 Burke, above n248.  
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order system to acknowledge and respond to dimensions of domestic violence 
beyond discrete acts poses quite fundamental questions for the legal response and 
practice. Like the conclusion reached by McMahon and Pence, I see the failure 
of the ADVO system to move beyond incidents as a failure that not only 
„reflect[s] an inadequate understanding of the gendered nature of domestic 
violence‟, but also a failure that „signals…weakness in institutionalized 
responses to domestic violence‟.1107 These weakness are: the way in which 
traditional criminal legal responses continue to underscore the civil legal 
response, the continuing attraction of dichotomies of victim and offender and 
associated notions about what a „true‟ and „genuine‟ victim is and how they are 
expected to respond to the violence and abuse used against them. 
If control is critical to differentiating domestic violence from other acts of 
violence and abuse that might be perpetrated by intimate partners, how can it find 
some mode of articulation within the ADVO setting? This is important if it is 
agreed that responses within the ADVO system are inadequate because it 
misconceives domestic violence as discrete incidents. New legislation in Victoria 
seeks to take that jurisdiction‟s civil protection order scheme in this direction by 
recognising coercive control as a feature of domestic violence. It does this by 
defining family violence to include physical and sexual violence, emotional and 
psychological abuse, economic abuse, threats, and the exposure of children to 
this form of behaviour through hearing or witnessing such acts, and: 
5(1)(a)…behaviour by a person towards a family member of that person if that 
behaviour- 
…. 
(v) is coercive; or 
(vi) in any other way controls or dominates the family member and causes that 
family member to feel fear for the safety or wellbeing of that family member or 
another person; or…1108 
Unfortunately coercive or controlling behaviour is not defined in the new Act. 
Given this lack of legislative guidance it is unclear what behaviours „control‟ and 
„coercion‟ were intended to address, beyond the types of acts/behaviours already 
                                                          
1107 McMahon & Pence, above n21 at 49. 
1108 Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic), s5(1)(a) 
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recognised as part of family violence.
1109
 In addition control and coercion are 
listed as separate behaviours rather than the context in which other 
acts/behaviours that are part of domestic violence occur. This is not the approach 
recommended by the VLRC in its report on family violence legislation. The 
VLRC specified the types of behaviours that should be encompassed in any new 
legislation (physical and non-physical forms of violence/abuse) and proposed the 
following definition of family violence: 
Family Violence is violent or threatening behaviour or any other form of behaviour 
which coerces, controls, and/or dominates a family member/s and/or causes them to be 
fearful.
1110
 
Thus this recommendation positions coercion, control or domination as the way 
in which types of acts/behaviours function. This is quite different to the approach 
actually adopted in Victoria. It will be of interest to monitor how these provisions 
are used and whether they serve to encourage a broadened understanding of 
domestic violence beyond incidents in that jurisdiction. 
4. Limitations of the study 
This was a small scale study involving small samples from a variety of different 
data sources. Hence the results are tentative and exploratory. 
Specific limitations of the study include the absence of interviews with women 
from different cultural backgrounds, the absence of male voices (Chapters 1 and 
3) and the lack of data available on cross applications. In this concluding chapter 
I expand upon the limitations created by the absence of male voices given the 
findings which suggest that some men (male second applicants) make allegations 
of a different nature, with a different function, when compared to those made by 
men and women first applicants and women second applicants.  
A. The absence of male voices 
As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, this thesis would have benefited from interviews 
with men involved in cross applications; recruitment of men was attempted but 
proved difficult and ultimately unsuccessful. While access to men‟s complaints 
was possible through the court files, and the complaints lodged against the 
                                                          
1109 The second reading speech does not provide any greater insight into what behaviours coercion and control were 
intended to address: see Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 26 June 2008 (Rob Hulls) at 2645. 
1110 VLRC, Review of Family Violence Laws: Report (2006), Rec 14 at 105. 
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women interviewed, a richer understanding of men‟s allegations about domestic 
violence would have been generated through in-depth interviews. This is 
particularly important given that the data presented in Chapters 6 and 7 suggests 
that men who lodged their ADVO application second in time made allegations 
that appeared qualitatively different to the allegations made by men who were 
first applicants. Thus it is important that this research compares men as first and 
second applicants to see whether there are differences in the types of claims these 
groups of men make, and hence their experience of violence and abuse by their 
current/former female partner. Such a comparison may assist in differentiating 
between men as victims, and men who might be using the legal system to 
retaliate against their female partner. Little is known about men as first 
applicants. This group was small in the sample studied (16/68 first applicants 
were men). Questions remain about the nature of their claims: are they concerned 
with domestic violence? Is this violence characterised by control or is it of a 
different nature and consequence? 
5. Concluding remarks  
This thesis has contributed to the literature on men‟s and women‟s use of 
intimate partner violence, through a case study exploration of cross applications. 
This involved the use of official data, a data source little used in this debate, and 
the use of multiple methods within a single study. This study has confirmed, and 
actively demonstrated, the limitations of a purely quantitative approach to 
comparing men‟s and women‟s allegations about domestic violence, and, in turn 
the additional contextual information that is acquired via qualitative analysis. 
Through this analysis it was revealed that men who lodged their application 
second in time made allegations about domestic violence that was of a different 
nature to that alleged by women and men first applicants. This thesis then turned 
to the manner in which the legal system and its key players sought to unravel, if 
at all, the competing claims presented by men and women. The practice of 
professionals was hampered by the poor quality of many complaint narratives, 
and by a number of other factors that impact on the practice of the law in this 
field (for example, the continuing dominance of incidents despite otherwise well-
developed understandings of domestic violence), the constraints of the 
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institutional environment and the emphasis on settlement. Most troubling was the 
failure of the ADVO system to put into effect its legislative promise of 
responding more appropriately to domestic violence by encompassing 
dimensions of fear and control, dimensions otherwise dominant in women‟s own 
accounts of their experiences. This is an issue of concern for the ADVO system 
generally, and is not confined to cross applications, although the case study of 
cross applications has served to highlight this absence. This is important given 
the growing recognition in the research literature of the fundamental nature of 
control to the experience of domestic violence, particularly women‟s experiences 
of domestic violence. 
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